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Abstract

This study analyzed the legal documents of cases involving the denial of a high school
diploma as the result of not passing a high stakes exam in public education. The
qualitative extrapolation of consistent themes in the court documents revealed
information regarding the court’s interpretation of the intersection of state authority to
establish diploma requirements, and the rights of the students who were denied their
diploma. The results of the study were influenced greatly by the case law evolution, and
therefore presented a historical a caption of analysis as well as the intended content
analysis. The independent issues presented to the courts were examined and discussed, as
well as the differences between rulings involving students with disabilities and regular
education students, and differences by judicial regions. The results of the analysis inform
the reader of the history of high stakes testing and the constitutionality of the policy
during different decades and under federal legislation regarding subgroups of students
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High Stakes Testing Policy Issues in Education:
An Analysis of Litigation Involving High Stakes Testing
CHAPTER 1
Statement of Problem
Public education has served society by providing its young citizens with the
knowledge, skills, and dispositions needed to become productive members of democratic
communities. “Schools are to help build the civic capacities and a wider sense of
common good among diverse students and families” (Abowitz, 2008, p. 360). The
judicial ruling in the landmark case Brown v. Board o f Education (1954) indicated the
value of education in our society and the immense responsibility of providing education
for all citizens:
Education is perhaps the most important function of the state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment (p. 692).
Our society has valued education for all citizens to maintain our democracy and to
transmit our society’s ideals and culture to the next generation.
Educational philosophies and practices have promoted the need for quantitative
evidence to determine whether these goals were being achieved. Measuring student
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progress through standardized testing was one method for providing quantitative data.
These data have helped contribute to the understanding of the effectiveness of academic
programs, instruction, and interventions as components of public education. However,
general accountability measures seemed to focus on individual student test scores as a
means of evaluating educational progress. Similar to the No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
Act (2001), which imposed sanctions on states and schools based upon academic
performance, some states imposed sanctions on students. Individual student
accountability meant holding each student accountable for achieving the established
outcomes (Mueller, 2001). These sanctions resulted in denying student promotion to the
next grade or refusing to award a diploma to a pending graduate (Mueller, 2001). In order
to “induce students to assume personal responsibility for their learning...” some state and
local school boards have imposed a requirement of successful completion of exit exams
before issuing a diploma (DeFur, 2002, p. 203). A variety of issues have arisen due to the
implementation of state, school, and student accountability measures, but perhaps the
most disputed was the denial of a diploma to seniors who were unsuccessful on the exit
exams. High stakes testing practices were a controversial method to hold students
accountable for meeting the intended goals of education. As a result, “many high stakes
tests implemented across the nation in recent decades have attracted litigation” (Heise,
2009, p. 146).
High stakes exams were not new features of education. In 1864, the New York
Board of Regents installed requirements for entrance examinations for admittance to high
schools and academies. In 1877, the New York State Legislature passed a state statute
authorizing exit exams for students completing high school (The State Education
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Department of New York, 1987). These exams were implemented to determine whether
students had the necessary knowledge and skills needed in order to contribute to society
as productive and capable citizens. In subsequent years, high stakes testing became part
of a larger reform movement intended to improve public education. The foundational
assumption of the new education reform measures was that all children should receive a
quality education regardless of equitable resources and funding, and that best
instructional practices should inform decision-making (Rhoten, Camoy, Chabran, &
Elmore, 2003).
The results of the National Commission on Excellence in Education’s (NCEE)
report, A Nation at Risk (1983), caused concern for the future progress of our nation. This
report began by stating, “Our nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged preeminence in
commerce, industry, science and technological innovation is being overtaken by
competitors throughout the world” (NCEE, p. 5). In an effort to improve education,
leaders borrowed from economic and business models and proposed the implementation
of accountability measures (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Moran, 2000; Wagner, 1989). In
another effort to improve educational outcomes, President Clinton proposed the
Educational Accountability Act during his 1999 State of the Union Address calling for
the end of social promotion in public schools to reduce the number of high school
graduates who lacked basic reading and math skills (Elul, 1999).
The most recent and powerful legislation, PL 107-110, more commonly known as
the NCLB Act of 2001, required states to develop statewide educational standards in
order to address the crisis in education. This legislation was the first to hold states
accountable for student outcomes and accelerated the standards-based reform movement.
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The assumptions of this legislation supposed that the key to improving education was to
raise expectations. Moreover, NCLB intended to hold the states, which were responsible
for delivering public education, accountable for the educational outcomes. The use of
high stakes assessments was intended to lead to data-based decisions to improve
teaching, enhance educational opportunities, and increase academic success (DeFur,
2002; Rhoten, Camoy, Chabran, & Elmore, 2003).
High stakes tests were a legitimate way to “get tough” on public schools (Moran,
2000, p. 109). Originally intended to provide data to evaluate educational programs,
critics argued that these tests were not valid for the purpose of making high stakes
decisions for individual students since they were not designed for this application
(Mueller, 2001). “High stakes testing is the practice of hinging a significant educational
decision on the results of a single assessment tool” (Mueller, p. 203). Opponents
challenged the use of high stakes decision-making on a single test as it would be difficult
to assess the depth and breadth of student knowledge on the basis of one data point or test
score (sole criteria). Moreover, the scope of the use of high stakes testing decreased the
likelihood that the scores would be used for the intended application of determining the
level of student achievement by identifying individual strengths and deficits (Amrein and
Berliner, 2002; Mueller, 2001). Researchers Amrein and Berliner contended that largescale testing programs rarely resulted in the test scores being used for diagnostic purposes
to improve student success. The broader focus of school and individual accountability
was the direct application of high stakes tests, which translated into increased high stakes
testing policies at the state and local level (Amrein & Berliner).
State legislatures were granted the authority to regulate public education under
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Article X of the United States Constitution. In addition, some states allowed local boards,
and in some cases individual schools, latitude in implementing additional requirements
resulting in a multitude of differing graduation policies and possible additional sanctions
(Laird, Cataldi, KewalRamani, & Chapman, 2008). However, the states needed to
exercise these accountability measures within the constitutional framework, as well as
within subsequent legislation and case law. Traditionally, legislation, such as NCLB, was
not been successful at mandating the actions of individual schools, principals, teachers or
students, reiterating the focus on external control for accountability policies and not in
improving schools (Fernandez, 2001; Lemons, Luschei & Siskin, 2003). An indication of
the estranged alignment was exemplified in the argument that, while NCLB required
testing procedures to ensure accountability, it did not mandate the use of these tests as the
sole criterion for promotion or graduation for students who did not successfully complete
the requirements. However, in 2002,18 states required students to pass an exit exam and
in 2004, 20 states required mandatory exit exams (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Katsiyannis,
Zhang, Ryan, & Jones, 2007). As of 2012, 16 states required exit exams for graduation in
an effort to hold schools and students accountable for meeting minimum expectations
(standards) of learning (State of Alaska, 2011). According to a publication titled State
High School Exit Exams (2011), the following states required an exit exam as criteria for
graduation: Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas
and Washington.
The diverse application of high stakes testing policies had resulted in a plethora of
litigation particularly regarding the denial of diplomas to students. The denial of a high
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school diploma has directly impacted the future income, status, and social mobility of
young citizens (Baker, 2005; Mueller, 2001; Thurlow & Johnson, 2000). Consequences
of high stakes testing policies on students have included retention, denial of diplomas,
and an increased likelihood of dropping out of school resulting in self-esteem issues
(O’Neill, 2003). “Students who leave high school without a diploma begin their adult
lives at an enormous disadvantage in terms of career options, potential for achievement,
and self-esteem” (O’Neill, 2003, p. 623). The court documents in the Debra P. v.
Turlington (1979) case predicted that the denial of a diploma could have had serious
consequences both economically and academically for the student. The court’s expert
witness testified that in the State of Florida, 80% o f the state-level jobs required a high
school diploma. The court also heard testimony that the jobs obtained by persons not
earning a high-school diploma were often low paying and lacked the opportunity for
advancement (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979). The unintended consequences of high
stakes testing practices included future employment promotion options, income disparity
between those who had attained a diploma and those who had not, and admittance into
college or military service (O’Neill, 2003).
High-school dropout rates have been a significant issue for our nation’s schools.
In the year 2005-2006, over 600,000 students dropped out o f high school (Stillwell,
2009). The scope of denial of diplomas added to this dilemma in high school completion
for our students. Florida was a state that required the successful completion of the Florida
Comprehensive Assessment Test state assessment. During the year 2002, over one-half of
the 5,206 students in one county were expected to fail the state assessment test and
receive a certificate o f completion instead of a high school diploma (Borg, Plumlee, &
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Stranahan, 2007). These data represented one policy in a single county in one testing
state. The issue was large and the stakes were high for our students and our country.
The impact of these policies on students with disabilities increased due to their
challenges in learning and difficulty demonstrating their capabilities (O’Neill, 2003).
Students who were more than one year behind in achieving state standards would have
had to demonstrate an academic gain 150% higher than the average student (Allensworth,
2004). “Students who tend[ed] to have the lowest achievement [were] most at risk of
being adversely affected by high stakes testing” (Allensworth, p. 160). Minority students,
students of lower socio-economic status, and students with disabilities may have been
further challenged by high stakes testing practices (Allensworth; DeFur, 2002; Hancock,
2007; Jacob, 2001; Moran, 2000; Mueller, 2001). More specifically, one critic of the tests
contended that low-income children o f color were unlikely to have the “cultural capital”
needed to pass the tests (Moran, 2000, p. 110).
Unfortunately, many of minority and disadvantaged students were identified as ‘at
risk’ meaning they were more likely to drop out of school. Attorney and special
education advocate Peter Wright (2004) predicted special education was the area where
future litigation would occur. As the complaint in the case of Noon et al. v. Alaska State
Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District (2004), indicated, the fa il first
policy embedded in high stakes tests was unfair and unconstitutional for students with
disabilities. The plaintiffs in this case charged that the students must have failed the test
prior to receiving reasonable accommodations to meet their individual needs, resulting in
an increased risk of hardship for these students.
As the litigation of plaintiff complaints were costly, educational policy makers,
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leaders, and practitioners need to be informed as to the implications and ramifications of
broadly implemented policies in order to develop an understanding of the impacts on the
stakeholders within educational organizations. An investigation of the legal history of
cases involving high stakes testing could serve as an important framework for future
policy implementation. Armed with this framework, interpretation of resulting data, and
improvements in decision-making could occur perhaps avoiding the violation of students’
rights and resulting litigation.
Statement of the Problem
Analysis of an implemented policy has been a critical step in evaluating policy
effectiveness. Too often, educational programs and policies were implemented without
subsequent evaluation. The determination of whether a program or policy was meeting its
intended objectives should serve as the basis for continuing, eliminating, or making
modifications to said policy. “Unanticipated consequences invariably flow from court
decisions that venture too deeply into legislative and executive policy terrain” (Heise,
2009, p. 327). Informed educational policy evaluations begin with analyzing the policy’s
objectives and outcomes, formulating a judgment as to whether the policy has been
effective in meeting the intended goals, and determining the impact on the organization’s
stakeholders.
The “stakes” in high stakes testing practices were the consequences of the policy
imposed on students. In order to develop a broad perspective regarding these practices, a
comprehensive examination of the legal and educational literature was needed. This
researcher aspired to inform educational policy makers, leaders, and practitioners as to
the implications of the use of the tests as a requirement for a diploma, as well as the
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courts’ interpretations regarding the constitutionality of high stakes testing policies. In
order to analyze and understand the impacts and implications of high stakes testing
policies and practices, the historical context and the current legal status of the case law
was examined. The historical context illuminated the political, social, economic, and
cultural influences that under-girded the policy. The legal foundation explored the
constitutional framework under which the policy existed. The evolution of the courts’
policy interpretation was extrapolated from the case law established since the inception of
the policy implementation.
The implementation of high stakes testing practices created controversy in the
denial of diplomas to individual students (Laird, Cataldi, KewalRamani & Chapman,
2008; Lay & Stokes-Brown, 2008; Swanson & Chaplin, 2003). The legal issues presented
to the courts helped to determine the constitutionality of high states testing as a
requirement for graduation. The legal interpretation of the courts affected the perceptions
of, and helped define the issues embedded in, the implementation of high stakes testing as
a requirement for graduation. Furthermore, an analysis of individual cases regarding high
stakes testing practices revealed current legal information pertinent to educational leaders
and policy makers regarding the use of this policy.
The legal issues that were inherent in diploma sanctions-based practices were an
important factor in [the courts’ ruling on?] the plaintiff complaints. Numerous substantial
cases, primarily due process and equal protection claims, were presented to the courts for
judicial review. The resulting rulings captured valuable information for educators
(Katsiyannis, Zhang, Ryan & Jones, 2007; Quigley, 2001). An analysis of the most
influential case law was addressed by O’Neill (2001) in which he examined the issues
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presented to the courts regarding the use of high stakes testing for a graduation
requirement; the cases O’Neill reviewed were often well-publicized and did not include
smaller, lesser-known cases. The cases not considered in O’Neill’s prior published
analyses may have contained important information necessary to fully inform decision
makers. Case-law consistencies can inform professionals in the field as to the fair use of
educational practices and could provide caveats for constitutionally sound
implementation (Hancock, 2007; Moran, 2000; Mueller, 2001; Quigley, 2001; Superfine,
2008). Due to the amount of litigation that resulted from the implementation of testing
practices, a current analysis of the embedded issues would be helpful to leaders to avoid
future litigation as well as to refine procedures for future policy implementation.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine relevant federal and state case law
involving the use of high stakes testing policies and practices as a requirement for
graduation. The issues extrapolated from the case law were used to formulate a
framework for educational leaders and policy makers to inform future decision-makers.
Moreover, bringing to light the legal impacts of the implementation of high stakes testing
as a requirement for graduation provided guidance to other policy makers on the best
course of action in order to avoid costly litigation when implementing new educational
reform measures.
This study reviewed the relevant case law regarding the denial of diplomas to
pending graduates. The intent of this study was to reveal the issues presented to the courts
regarding high stakes testing practices, and judicial holdings for the courts’ interpretation
of the relationship of the practices to the law. Each case presented in the state or federal
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courts was coded for emerging themes to illustrate the issues presented in the case law.
These themes were then synthesized and summarized in the findings of this study.
Research Questions
The following research questions were used to guide this study:
1. What issues related to high stakes testing and the denial of diplomas were
revealed in state and federal case law within the 1979-2012 timeframe?
2. Were the issues distinctive based upon regular education or special education
students?
3. What differences were revealed within the case law rulings regarding those in
favor of the students and those in favor of the educational agencies?
4. What differences existed between the case law according the geographical regions
as defined by regions in published court reporters and listed as follows:
Northeastern, Northwestern, Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern, Pacific, and
Atlantic regions?
Significance of the Study
The goal of educators and policymakers has been to offer the best quality
education to our children. However, when a policy has been implemented based upon
economic and public sector pressures, the policy model recruited to meet the needs o f the
pressure agents may not have been the most suitable model to meet the needs of all
students, particularly students in vulnerable populations. The overlay of the business
accountability model on a public institution involving human subjects could potentially
create a tension between the stakeholders. Unfortunately, this was what occurred in the
implementation of high stakes testing policies. The business model of zero-defect
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collided with the educational concept of zero-reject. As our society tried to come to grips
with the most prevalent issues in educational reform, the analysis of the implementation
of this policy could provide a framework for which to conduct future analyses and
implementations. “Epistemological development within the human sciences, like
education, functions politically and is intimately imbricated in the practical management
of social and political problems” (Ball, 2007, p. 263). Insight into the practical
management of this social and political problem would be critical to the future reform of
educational policies. The overarching goal of this study was to provide a framework for
educational leaders and policy makers regarding the legal issues as a result of high stakes
testing policies and practices for use in future educational decisions.
Definition of Terms
A legal discussion and analysis contains specific language that is not usually
incorporated into educational dialogue. An understanding of these terms was essential to
the understanding of the legal discussion included in this study and may be helpful for
understanding the statutory analysis. These definitions were acquired from Black’s Law
Dictionary (Gamer, 2004):
Appellant: The party who appeals a lower court decision usually seeking reversal of that
decision (p. 107).
Appellate: O f or relating to an appeal or appeals generally (p. 107).
Arbitrary: Depending on individual discretion specifically determined by a judge rather
than by fixed rules, procedures, or law (p. 112).
Capricious: Characterized by or guided by unpredictable or impulsive behavior. Contrary
to established rules of law (p. 224).
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Certiorari: An extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, as it discretion, directing a
lower court to deliver the record in the case for review (p. 241).
Claimant: One who asserts a right or demand, especially formally: especially one who
asserts a property interest in land, chattels, or tangible things (p. 265).
Complainant: The party who brings legal complaint against another: especially the
plaintiff in a court of equity or, more modemly, a civil suit (p. 302).
Defendant: A person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding (p.
450).
Disparate Impact: The adverse effect of a facially neural practice (especially an
employment practice) that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their
race, sex, national origin, age or disability and that is not justified by business necessity
(p. 504).
Due Process Rights: The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and
principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the
right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case (p. 538).
Equal Protection Clause: The 14th Amendment provision requiring the states to give
similarly situated persons or classes similar treatment under the law (p. 577).
First Amendment: The Constitutional amendment ratified with the Bill of Rights in 1791,
guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly and petition (p. 666).
Fourteenth Amendment: The constitutional amendment, ratified in 1868, whose primary
provisions effectively apply the Bill of Rights to the states by prohibiting states form
denying due process and equal protection and from abridging the privileges and
immunities of US citizens (p. 682).
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Motion: A written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or
order (p. 1036).
Nexus: A connection or link, often a causal one (p. 1070).
Plaintiff: The party who brings a civil suit in a court of law (p. 1188).
Prima Facie: At first sight: on first appearance but subject to further evidence or
information (p. 1288).
Procedural Due Process: The minimal requirements of notice and a hearing guaranteed by
the due process Clauses of the 1st and 14th Amendments, especially if the deprivation of a
significant life, liberty or property interest may occur (p. 539).
Rational Basis Test: The criterion of judicial analysis of a statute that does not implicate a
fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the due process or
equal protection Clause, whereby the court will uphold a law if it bears a reasonable
relationship to the attainment of a legitimate governmental objective (p. 1290).
Remand: The act or an instance of sending something (such as a case, claim, or person)
back for further action (p. 1319).
Stare Decisis: The doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation (p. 1443).
Strict Scrutiny Analysis: The standard applied to suspect classification (such as race) in
equal-protection analysis and to fundamental rights (such as voting rights) in due-process
analysis (p. 1462).
Substantive Due Process: The doctrine that the due process Clauses of the 1st and 14th
Amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further the
legitimate governmental objective (p. 539).
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Limitations of the Study
A limitation of this study included the limiting conditions or restrictive weakness
inherent in qualitative and quantitative research (Locke, Spirduso & Silverman, 2007).
The literature revealed other legal issues regarding the use of high stakes tests in public
schools, such as cases involving promotion for students in elementary and middle school.
Although similar in context, these cases did not contribute to the specific use of high
stakes tests for a diploma requirement and were not included in this study. The
examination of cases did not include cases from municipal courts, state administrative
hearings, and court guided mediation since information from these decisions were not
accessible through database searches, court reporters, or state and federal level court
documents. Therefore, the case law analysis consisted only of those cases that were
presented in state and federal courts relative to diploma requirements or the denial of
diplomas to students as the result of a high stakes testing policy. This limitation affected
the study in the respect that the unpublished cases may have contributed to the deeper
understanding of the legal implications of high stakes testing policies.
Delimitations of the Study
Locke, Sprirduso, and Silverman (2007) described delimitations as “defining the
limits inherent in the use of a particular construct or population” (p. 16). Although the
case law reflected other issues regarding high stakes testing practices, only cases with a
direct nexus to high stakes testing and diploma requirements, and the denial of diplomas
were included in this analysis. The cases examined were limited to the cases brought
before the state and federal courts.
Inherent in any implementation of policy was the unique impact on each
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individual student. This analysis of case law did not represent the impact on all students
under an infinite variety of circumstances. Therefore, what was represented in the case
law reflected only those cases that were brought before the courts at the state and federal
level.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of Related Literature
“Be patient, then, and sympathetic with the type o f mind that cuts a poor figure in
examinations. It may, in the long examination which life sets us, come out in the end in
better shape than the glib and ready reproducer, its passions being deeper, its purpose
more worthy, its combining power less commonplace, and its total mental output
consequently more important ”
(James, 1958, p. 142-143)
High stakes testing policies and practices have incited a conflict between current
national and state reform measures, and the protection of students’ rights. The impact of
these policies and practices on student graduation and diploma sanctions fueled the
conflict. This literature review examined the aspects of the conflict presented in the
professional literature, as well as the seminal case law serving as the foundation for
subsequent litigation resulting from high stakes testing practices. Specifically, the review
included the following key areas of study: historical perspective, judicial intervention,
and case law regarding student rights. A cohesive synthesis o f relevant educational and
legal literature was presented in this literature review. Furthermore, the empirical studies
reflecting high stakes testing policies on the awarding of student diplomas were included,
pointing the final discussion to the need for a high stakes testing policy analysis to
provide a framework for future reform practices and policy implementation.
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Historical Perspective
Policy Rationale
The implementation of mass public educational testing arose from the political and
social landscape during the latter 20th century and early 21st century. During the 20th
century, schools were influenced by turbulent and rapid urbanization, industrialization,
and immigration trends (Moran, 2000). Prior to this time of growth, relatively few
children attended school and only a small minority earned a high school diploma (Dorn,
2003); public schools were not designed to educate the masses and provide the nation
with an adequate workforce. However, changes and challenges to our society increased
the need for educated citizens. States enacted compulsory attendance laws to require
students to participate in educational programs to ensure a fundamental set of skills in
order to participate productively in society (Moran, 2000) thus expanding the nation’s
public school systems. The Russian launch of Sputnik in 1957 inspired an explosive and
critical analysis of the American educational system (Amrein & Berliner, 2002). During
the 1960s, a link was revealed between the established beliefs about the value of schools
and increased effort to formulate a new expectation for more students to become high
school graduates (Dorn, 2003). The implementation of exit exams was a means of
measuring whether high school graduates had acquired the skills necessary to enter the
work force and, thus, become productive and contributing members of our society and
economy.
National Concerns and Accountability
The Civil Rights Movement influenced the next decade as the nation’s schools
advanced toward minimum competency standards as a means to measure student
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preparation. These standards were met with public resistance amid concerns about
fairness to students and concerns that the tests would punish students who were victims
of past discrimination (Moran, 2000). As a result o f increased pressure to address the
minimum standards movement, the increased expectation of the public, and the growing
criticism of the public schools, the NCEE released a report investigating the status of
public education. This report, entitled A Nation at Risk (1983), detailed huge deficits in
the adequate preparation of students and advocated an intense scrutiny of the public
education system and student achievement. A massive movement toward school
accountability was brought forth in the use of standardized tests, which served as the
primary and most cost effective mechanism for measuring school effectiveness (Lipman,
2004; Smith & Fey, 2000). As schools struggled to achieve progress toward political and
social expectations, student accountability emerged as a way of measuring individual
student progress and reporting educational program effectiveness. States began to
implement student accountability standards with the assumption that when consequences
were wedded to the implementation of student test performance criteria, the curriculum
content would be reflected in the instruction in the classrooms (Airasian, 1988). In short,
the intended purpose of state accountability systems was to raise student achievement and
improve the quality of schooling (Camoy & Loeb, 2002).
Educational Reform Movement
Although A Nation at Risk (1983) indicated the need for a reexamination of the
nation’s schools, the intention was to present the challenge of reforming public education
through systemic organizational change. However, in the period following the release of
A Nation at Risk, student achievement was lower than when Sputnik was launched,
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indicating that the wave of concern over student achievement had yielded few results.
Educational leaders saw a need for building capacity by empowering teachers and
administrators to deliver a better education (Camoy & Loeb, 2002). The business world
saw the economic aim of education to prepare students for the work force and to compete
in global economies (Siegel, 2004). The political perspective wanted to hold schools
accountable for student achievement. The conflict between these three philosophies
refocused the subject of educational reform from a political stance to a national debate
(Dom, 2003).
A Nation at Risk (1983) fuelled the debate as the report illuminated the need for
stronger and more comprehensive reform measures including the recommendation for
statewide-standardized testing (Amrein & Berliner, 2002). The report stated that tests
should be administered at each major transition point, such as from one level of schooling
to another and particularly from high school to college or entering the workforce (NCEE,
1983). However, the report also stipulated that nationwide tests should be delivered at the
state and local level, and be used in conjunction with other mechanisms for evaluating
student achievement (NCEE, 1983). The purpose of these tests was to certify the
students’ credentials, to identify the need for remedial interventions, and to determine the
opportunity for advanced and accelerated work (NCEE, 1983).
After the publication of A Nation at Risk, a series of Gallup polls documented
public opinion regarding what was happening in schools. Echoing A Nation at Risk, the
1983, 1984, and 1986 Gallup Polls results indicated that the majority of participants were
concerned about public school effectiveness, therefore, establishing a perceived need for
reform to focus on academic excellence in schools (Afrasian, 1988). The American public
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believed that schools should be accountable for outcomes and these outcomes should be
measured by tests and enforced by sanctions (Heubert & Hauser, 1999, as cited by Smith
& Fey, 2000). The public’s concern regarding school accountability legitimized the use
of standardized tests. Afrasian documented that their wide acceptance was due to “the
perceptions that they evoke[d] and the extent to which those perceptions mesh[ed] with
prevalent social norms and values” or how they served as symbols of the broader societal
goals (p. 302). Conversely, the empirical evidence was important to the legitimacy for the
implementation of new programs and initiatives. In the case of standardized testing,
empirical data was not used as the determinant to push forward the use of tests to
measure school effectiveness (Airasian). “The tests appeared virtually out of
nowhere.. .and have enjoyed an acceptance and status that not only was rarely seen in an
educational innovation, but also far outstripped available evidence of their effectiveness”
(Airasian, p. 304).
The public acceptance of these tests was evident through the determination of
public appeal. Airasian also elaborated on three distinct types of symbolic public appeal.
First, the tests conveyed the order and control the public perceived was needed to
improve public schools through external verification with objective fairness. Second, the
tests measured important educational outcomes validating progress in improving the
system. Finally, standardized tests mirrored a distinct and moral outlook that society
desired to be reflected in public institutions (Airasian). Combined, these three types of
symbolic appeal provided the structure and accountability needed to fuel the reform. This
public approval toward student testing translated into public policy with the assumption
that over time “the demands of public policy will be stronger than the existence of local
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(DeBray, Parson, & Avila, 2003,

p. 57). Public policy regarding high stakes testing had evolved to political debates on how
to improve the nation’s educational system.
The Bias of External Control
The implementation of state standardized testing seemed to alleviate the concern
over the lack of external control; however, the process of implementation was not
standardized, and in some cases compromised fairness. States with the lowest performing
populations implemented the strongest accountability systems (Camoy & Loeb, 2002).
Many of the lowest performing schools had high minority and economically
disadvantaged populations. In 1987, William Bennett serving as US Secretary of
Education, publicly condemned Chicago’s inner city schools as the worst schools in the
nation (Lipman, 2004). Minority students and children of poverty dominated the
attendance at these schools. A year later, Chicago implemented its school reform
movement; addressed as the 1988 School Reform Law. In addition, Chicago added high
stakes testing as a means of standards accountability as well as “centralized regulation of
teacher and schools” (Lipman, p. 2). In his 1999, State of the Union Address, President
Clinton urged states to adopt the same type of educational standards implemented in
Chicago (Elul, 1999).
Supporting this trend, Moran (2000) posted, “High stakes testing [was] popular
because it offer[ed] a way to identify and blame individuals without acknowledging a
collective unwillingness to invest in public schools, particularly those low-income, often
minority areas” (p. 26). Even though the states with the strongest accountability systems
had higher increases in student achievement on national tests, the pressure created by the

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

31

enforcement of sanctions led to litigation as parents sought the courts’ assistance to make
the tests fair to all students (Borg, Plumlee, & Stranahan, 2007; Camoy & Loeb, 2002).
National Policy Regarding Accountability and Reform
In 2001, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was reauthorized
as the NCLB Act (Kim & Sunderman, 2003). This new federal legislation mandated
student testing with demonstrated improvement in terms of Adequate Yearly Progress
(AYP) for students, particularly for students in minority populations, economically
disadvantaged students, students with limited English proficiency, and students with
disabilities (Kim & Sunderman). This legislation also mandated the testing of 95% o f all
students and set specific and absolute requirements for proficiency (Kim & Sunderman).
This marked the government’s increasing pressure to address criticism for our nation’s
public school performance. As a result, concerns regarding the achievement gap between
minority students and white students, success of students with disabilities, and limited
English proficiency, as well as socio-economically challenged students increased in
momentum.
The NCLB Legislation (2001) required states to use student achievement as the
“principal indicator of performance” but, states were also required to use high school
graduation rates as another academic indicator of student performance (Swanson, 2003,
p. 1). The graduation indicator was used as a component in the calculation of AYP to
hold schools accountable for student learning. Student achievement on statewide tests and
graduation data were then used to implement sanctions against those schools that did not
meet the requirement under the law (Swanson, 2003). “The original intent of the
legislation was that a district or school’s failure to achieve adequate graduation rates
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would also result in failing to make AYP (Orfield, et al., 2004, p. 11) thus requiring the
installation of sanctions. However, the “lack of proper funding and support encourage[d]
schools to look for any loopholes that they [could] in order to showcase themselves in a
more positive light” (Price &Peterson, 2008, p. 56). The empirical evidence discovered
by research studies regarding high stakes testing and improvement in student outcomes
provided an insight into the effectiveness of establishing this policy.
Empirical Data Regarding High Stakes Testing Outcomes
Jacob (2001) sought to determine the effects of high stakes tests used for the
awarding of a diploma. By analyzing the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS)
data for eighth through 12th grade students across individual schools, school divisions
and states, his findings indicated that students in states that required testing were more
likely to drop out before completing high school. The author noted that states with larger
populations of African Americans, Latino, and disadvantaged students were more likely
to implement a high stakes testing policy. Investigated by region, southern states that
required testing reported higher student achievement scores in math but also reported
higher dropout rates in high school (Jacob).
Researchers Camoy, et al. (2001) focused on the Texas Assessment of Academic
Skills (TAAS) test. This high stakes testing program was initiated by the Perot
Commission and served as the model for the NCLB legislation. Passing the TAAS was
required for diplomas in 1991, this created controversy as the denial of diplomas met
with legal resistance in litigation filed by parents of students who were not permitted to
graduate (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State
Board o f Education, 2000). Although students increased performance on the test in each
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grade beginning in 1994 and those gains correlated to increased scores on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test, controversy still remained as
accusations arose regarding teaching to the test, students retention as a result of predicted
failure of state testing, students disappearing from the rosters, or skipping the
accountability grade and showing up in later grade levels (Camoy et al., 2001). These
researchers studied approximately 1,000 schools in rural, urban and suburban settings.
Analysis of the data revealed that student achievement positively impacted dropout rates:
a ten percent increase in TAAS scores yielded a 0.24% decrease in dropout rates mostly
in these urban schools. However, the analysis also identified a gap between white
students and minority student achievement, with 78% of white students graduating on
time, and 65% of African American and Latino students graduating on time or at all.
Furthermore, the data indicated that there was a rapid increase in retention and escalating
dropout rates for low socio-economic and minority students but causality could not be
determined nor linked directly to the administration of the TAAS test. These researchers
concluded that the TAAS test did not meet the objectives of improving the overall
education in Texas for minority students or for students from low socio-economic
families despite the small reductions in dropout rates as TAAS scores increased (Camoy
et al., 2001).
Researchers Madaus and Clark (2001) utilized national testing data to report on
high stakes testing policies. They analyzed trend data for the NAEP, NELS, and the
Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) for 30 consecutive years. They concluded that
although high standards along with high stakes tests did have “a markedly positive effect
on teaching and learning in the classroom.. .high stakes testing programs [had] shown to
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increase high school dropout rates-particularly among minority students populations”
(Madaus & Clark, p. 2). Although the authors presented evidence indicating that states
requiring high stakes tests had a higher dropout rate than those that did not, they admitted
causation could not be established linking the dropout rate to high stakes testing policies
(Madaus & Clark).
Arizona State University researchers Amrein and Berliner (2002) conducted one
of the most cited and influential studies on high stakes testing policies (2002). Their
research sought to determine whether high stakes testing programs promoted the transfer
of learning on nationally norm-reference tests. In addition, the researchers also sought to
determine any negative effects generated by these high stakes testing policies on minority
and low-income students. The authors of this study examined whether students who
successfully completed the high stakes tests were demonstrating improved performance
on the American College Testing (ACT) program, the SAT, the NAEP, and the Advanced
Placement Exams in Advanced Placement classes. They examined ACT, SAT, NAEP
and Advanced Placement data across 18 states to determine if the high stakes testing
policies affected student learning. The states selected were the states with the most severe
consequences; leading the nation in school closures, interventions, state takeovers, and
teacher and/or administrator dismissals. These states also had very strict promotion and
retention policies. The researchers analyzed data from the ACT, which indicated that
there were short-term gains after implementing high stakes testing requirements.
However, longer-term negative effects were evident twice as often as the positive effects.
O f the states that implemented the high stakes testing policies, 67% showed decreases in
ACT scores over time (Amrein and Berliner, 2002).
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The SAT data reflected similar results. The majority of high stakes testing states
posted losses in SAT scores after implementation while eight posted positive gains. The
NAEP testing data had congruent findings but due to exclusionary practices of Limited
English Proficient and students with disabilities, these test analyses did not represent
generalizable results and were advised to be only used for limited consideration. The
Advanced Placement results were also limited do to fluctuations in participation. In 2002,
Amrein and Berliner concluded that the data indicated an increase in retention and
dropout rates particularly for minority and low SES groups. In addition, the data resulted
in no significant improvement in the correlation between high stakes testing policies and
an increase in participation in higher educational opportunities. Their general conclusion
was that the implementation of the TAAS test had little impact on the educational
outcomes for Texas students. They contended that the increases in student performance
of high stakes tests did not transfer to increased performance on any of the nationally
norm-referenced tests indicated in the study. The authors reported that the data generated
by high stakes tests were invalid due to distortions and corruptions (Amrein & Berliner).
The authors’ final notes indicated that “there [was] no compelling evidence from a set of
states with high stakes testing policies, that those policies resulted] in transfer to the
broader domains of knowledge and skills for which high stakes test scores must be
indicators” (Amrein & Berliner, 2002, Final Thoughts, If 1). This study also concluded
that the adverse effects of the testing policy on minority and economically disadvantaged
students were disproportionate and were a “benign error in political judgment” (Amrein
& Berliner, 2002, Final Thoughts, If 1).
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Another researcher was skeptical of Amrein and Berliner results and in a
contradictory analysis; Rosenshine (2003) published a report in response to their study.
Rosenshine’s basis for the reanalysis of NAEP data was that Amrein and Berliner
analyzed only those states that implemented high stakes testing policies and did not
include a control group or a comparison group of states that did not implement testing. In
his analysis, Rosenshine’s results contradicted Amrein and Berliner’s original
conclusions and indicated that high stakes testing states outperformed the states without
these policies on three of the NAEP tests for a four-year span. However, in a scholarly
rebuttal, Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner (2003) defended their results and re-analyzed
the data resulting in support for their original data results.
Heilig and Darling-Hammond published a study involving high stakes testing
policies in 2008. This study examined the longitudinal data indicating the progress of
elementary, middle, and high school students in a large urban school district in Texas.
These researchers examined seven years of quantitative and qualitative data including test
data and interview data. The testing data were results of the TAAS and Stanford Nine for
270,000 students in the district for seven years. The researchers accounted for 2,500
variables and used student identifiers to track students throughout their school years in
the district. The qualitative measures were gathered from staff focus groups and
interviews in seven of the high schools within the district. The demographics in these
selected schools were predominately minority students living in urban settings. Heilig
and Darling-Hammond reported that over 7,000 student scores were missing on the
TAAS test from mostly Latino students. Students who took that Spanish version of the
test were excluded from the data but these exclusions were not evident in the Stanford
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data. The results indicated that in 1997, 26% percent of ninth grade students were
retained, with an increase to 31% (one in three students) the following year. Furthermore,
in the 1997-1998 test data, 64% of ninth graders never took the reading portion, and of
the 36% of ninth graders that took the test, only 12% passed. The ninth grade pass rate to
the next grade level was less than 50%. This study also concluded that African American
and Latino students suffered the largest number of retentions (Heilig & DarlingHammond, 2008).
The Impact of Testing on Awarding Diplomas
The public perceived that high stakes tests were meant to improve the education
of the student directly while simultaneously improving the value of a diploma. High
school diplomas were meant to certify to the public that the student has gained the
concrete skills or knowledge required by an educational program, and to signify the
general intellectual worth of graduates to society. Diplomas were also meant to improve
the status of schools as well as to improve the exchange value of the diploma for future
students (Dorn, 2003). As the use of high stakes testing increased as a means of holding
students accountable for their learning, the dropout rate began to draw public scrutiny. In
1995, the State of Texas denied diplomas to over 10,862 students for not passing the
math section of the TAAS test (Cantu, 1996). Communities became concerned about the
number of students who were lacking diplomas and were entering the workforce without
these basic credentials. The assumption of the public was that the value of a high school
diploma was equivalent to the value of the knowledge and skills presumed to be learned
in school. The increasing number of students who were denied diplomas began to cause
public tension, as the expectation of a diploma was a perceived part of adolescence
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(Dorn, 2003). The tests were becoming the gatekeepers to the rewarding of diplomas and
many viewed this as an unfair practice (Moran, 2000). In the series of recommendations
included in A Nation at Risk (1983), the first recommendation encouraged the
strengthening of the high school program by increasing specific curricular requirements.
The increases in requirements claimed to raise the productivity of individual students
(Lillard & DeCicca, 2001). The employment market depended on the schools to provide
workers with knowledge and skills to be productive in the labor force. This “labor market
reciprocity” was compromised with higher numbers of students being denied high school
diplomas (Dom, p. 8). The higher dropout rate was inferred to increase the number of
citizens depending on social programs as an unintended consequence. A higher dropout
rate translated into a reduction of the number of productive citizens graduating from
public schools. Diplomas became a form of educational currency, which served as the
gateway to higher educational opportunities and the labor force (Dom). The public’s
emotional perspective tied the denial of diplomas to very real emotional and economic
consequences not just for the students but also for society as a whole. The paradox
between the national interest of increasing the number of students who graduated and the
increase in high stakes standardized testing began to have legal consequences for states
and school districts (Dom).
Bishop, Moriarty, and Mane (2000) examined the New York Board of Regents
initiative to increase standards for awarding a diploma. In May 1994, the State Board of
Education announced that all students would be required to take Regents level courses in
math and science. In addition, the requirement of passing an end-of-course examination
would precede the awarding of a diploma. This study conducted in 1997, examined data
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from SAT-I scores, the eighth grade NAEP math achievement scores, school enrollment
at the age of 17, and the overall high school graduation rate, to determine the effect of
policy implementation on student achievement, and the number of students who
completed school and were awarded a diploma (Bishop, Moriarty, & Mane).
An analysis of the SAT-I results indicated that students from New York out
performed students in other states by approximately 20%. The NAEP scores revealed that
New York’s eighth grade students scored almost one academic year above other students,
or approximately nine points above other student scores. The data also revealed that
“New York’s dropout rate [was] not significantly different than that of other states with
students with similarly disadvantaged backgrounds” (Bishop et al., 2000, p. 339). The
conclusion of this analysis indicated that the New York Regents increase in course and
examination requirements had a positive impact on student achievement but did not have
a significant influence on the number of students who graduated high school (Bishop et
al.).
Lillard and DeCicca (2001) examined the increase in course graduation
requirements (CGR) to determine if raising the standards for earning Carnegie units
would have an effect on dropout rates. In response to A Nation at Risk (1983), Carnegie
unit requirements increased during the years 1983-1997 when data was analyzed for their
study. Although the increase of less than three Carnegie units seemed insignificant, the
researchers predicted that the increased requirements would elevate student attrition rates.
Lillard and DeCicca examined a broad base of data including Census data, NELS data,
High School and Beyond statistics, employment and population reports, and U.S.
Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Labor statistics to compile their
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report. The data from states requiring high school exit exams (HST) were flagged. The
results indicated that an increase of a standard deviation of 2.5 in course graduation
requirements was met with a .8 to 1.6 percent increase in student attrition rate.
Translating to real student numbers, this increase equated to an increase of 104,000 to
208.000 students dropping out of high school. According to the 1990 data, if states were
to increase CGRs by one standard deviation, the drop out numbers would escalate to
67.000 to 117,000 students leaving school. These data also revealed larger impacts on
children from homes with divorced parents, low socio-economic status, minority families
(particularly Hispanic) and homes in which the parents dropped out of school. In
summary, this research supported that increased graduation requirements, whether CGRs
or exit exams, resulted in increased dropout rates (Lillard & DeCicca, 2001). Conversely,
the authors noted some benefits to increasing CGRs for those students who chose to stay
in school. These students realized increased earnings, better job possibilities, and the
likelihood of success in higher education (Lillard & DeCicca).
Bishop and Mane’s (2001) study also investigated the effects of higher course
graduation requirements on dropout rates. These researchers found that increased
graduation requirements significantly raised the probability of dropping out and earning a
GED instead of a diploma. However, the increase in requirements did not significantly
affect earning a delayed diploma. Moreover, the results indicated that higher course
graduation requirements significantly reduced college-attendance rates. An increase in
course requirements by four Carnegie units resulted in a decline in college enrollment by
two percent. Additionally the Bishop and Mane study revealed that the Minimum
Competency Exam (MCE) requirement had a negative effect on high school graduation
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rates for students with lower grade point averages (GPA). Lower GPA students residing
in states requiring successful completion of the MCE demonstrated 30% likelihood of
earning their diploma later than expected or not at all, as compared to 17% o f students in
non-MCE states. In addition, students that lived in MCE states and struggled with lower
GPA scores were more likely to experience delays in college enrollment. Students who
attended high-SES schools, higher teacher salary schools, and smaller or Catholic high
schools were more likely to enroll in college directly after graduation from high school.
Similar to Lillard and DeCicca’s (2001) results, another research study noted the effects
of MCE policies on graduates’ earnings and employment. The results indicated that
students attending school in MCE states earned an increase of five percent in earnings
income after high school than students from non-MCE states (Bishop & Mane).
The implementation of high stakes testing policies has resulted in mixed findings.
However, there were some consistencies in the effects on vulnerable populations such as
socio-economically disadvantaged and minority students. Table 1 represents a summary
of the findings of the empirical research regarding high stakes testing implementation.
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Summary o f Empirical Data Regarding High stakes Testing
Data Source

Author and Date

Findings
1.6% increase in dropout rate
Correlation between implementation of high stakes testing policy and higher
populations of minority and low SES students
Increase scores on TAAS resulted in increases on NAEP
10% increase in test scores resulted in a .24% increase in drop out.
Disparity between Caucasian graduation rate and minority graduation rate.
Increase in student achievement correlated to an increase in dropout rates.

Jacobs(2001)

NELS

Camoy & Loeb
(2001)

TAAS, NAEP

Madaus & Clark
(2001)
Amrein & Berliner
(2002;2003)

NAEP, NELS, SAT

Rosenshine (2003)

NAEP

Improved performance on state mandated tests did not translate to improved
scores on nationally-normed tests.
Minority and low SES students suffered increased drop-out rates.
Student performance increased in states with mandatory testing policies.

Heiling & DarlingHammond (2008)
Bishop, Moriarty, &
Mane (2000)

TAAS, Stanford Nine,
Interviews
SAT, NAEP, School
Enrollment, Graduation rates

High retention rates among minority students: 26-31% retention in ninth
grade and 60% retention in 10th grade.
States with high stakes testing demonstrated an increase in student
performance with no significant impact on the graduation rate

Lillard & DiCicca
(2001)

NELS, Census, High School
and Beyond statistics, US
Department of Labor,
Employment and Population
reports
GPA

An increase of 2.5 Carnegie Units for graduation resulted in 0.8 to 1.6
percent rise in dropout rates.

Bishop & Mane
(2001)

SAT, ACT, NAEP, AP Test

Higher dropout rates in states requiring MCE
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The Use of Fair and Reliable Assessments
The NCLB (2001) legislation contained language imposing harsh sanctions
against states and schools that did not show increased student performance on the
mandated statewide tests and gave credence to the use of high stakes tests for
accountability measures. However, it was important to note that although NCLB
mandated the use of standardized tests to measure student progress, it did not mandate the
use of these tests as a criterion for denial of promotion or diplomas to students.
In contrast to the earlier high stakes tests, the implementation of statewide tests
differed in that they were mandated for all schools and students. Additionally, they
eliminated local school board discretion in test selection, administration, content
coverage, scoring and interpretation. A single statewide test would be administered and
carried specified sanctions for poor performance (Airasian, 1988; Amrein & Berlinger,
2002). The sanctions and rewards embedded in the new mandated tests conveyed the
public’s perceived image of external control (order), unbiased judgment (fairness),
toughness (sanctions for poor performance), and strong educational leadership thought to
be needed in the nation’s public schools (Airasian, 1988; Au, 2007; Smith & Fey, 2000).
Airasian (1988) criticized the high stakes testing movement and called for the use
of more valid ways to measure school and student progress. Moreover, Airasian
contended that a disparity existed between what the tests seemed to measure and what
they actually did measure. He criticized that these types of tests did not reveal any new
information about students that teachers and administrators did not already know. He also
explained that the testing programs relied heavily on rhetorical constructs such as
competence, basic societal and workforce skills, functional and cultural literacy,
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excellence and academic standards, and preparation for life. These constructs were
difficult to measure accurately in every possible context. “The symbolic richness of high
stakes tests creates the danger that such tests can become a convenient, though poor,
substitute for other necessary and meaningful actions to improve schools and learning”
(Airasian p. 311). Siegel (2004) concurred with Airasian in his belief that a disconnection
existed between these testing practices, and the educational aims and ideals desired by
society.
Another testing critic, Siegel (2004), argued that high stakes tests resulted in
decisions that were based upon judgment and therefore were arbitrary. Siegel claimed
that the determination of the criteria for the tests, and the appropriate standards to meet
the criteria, were arbitrary (Siegel, 2004). Another researcher voiced concerns regarding
the fragmented learning process embedded in standardized testing formats. When the
state imposed sanctions for poor performance, the teachers often taught the content in
fragmented segments to meet the objectives or standards for the test. This is referred to as
teaching to the test. The results of teaching to the test indicated a change in the very
structure of knowledge; content was taught in isolated pieces and was learned only within
the context of the test (Au, 2007). While the literature revealed a small body of evidence
of student-centered instruction, content integration, and subject matter expansion, most of
the evidence pointed toward fragmented content instruction based upon anticipated test
content (Au).
Many questions were raised as to the alignment of these tests to the states’ goals
and the curriculum mandated by each state. Both the Debra P. v. Turlington and the GI
Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f
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Education cases set precedent for the curricular validity o f the tests. “Validity is the
quality of an instrument to yield truthful inferences about the trait it measures” (Smith &
Fey, 2000, p. 336). Phillips defined validity as the “weight of accumulated evidence
supporting a particular use of test scores” (2000, p. 348). An instrument’s validity is
dependent upon the context and use, and in the case of human subjects, the inherent
nature of the differences in human characteristics informs the validity of high stakes tests
(Smith & Fey). Wellstone’s legislation mandated that the tests align with state
educational goals to ensure the curricular validity (Moran, 2000). Curricular validity and
test alignment were issues identified in the literature. Camoy and Loeb (2002) stated that
the states’ “need to set clear standards and align the curriculum and accountability
mechanisms with those standards” (p. 306). Furthermore, assessment systems needed to
be aligned with the curriculum while the accountability mechanisms needed to provide
incentives or sanctions with the success or failure of achieving the standard (Camoy &
Loeb). Valid and reliable instruments were critical to accurate evaluation and the
inferences used to make high stakes decisions. The high stakes decisions became one of
the mechanisms used for the demanded educational reform.
Judicial Intervention
Judicial Reluctance and Statutory Authority
The courts did not demonstrate eagerness to become involved in educational
disputes. The courts were “reluctant to.. .scrutinize the validity of state educational
practices instead deferring to educational authorities” (Elul, 1999, p. 501). The major
issue o f high stakes testing was confounded with the dueling elements embedded within
the concept of statutory authority. The first element was the reluctance of the court to
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undermine the states’ authority to regulate its system of public education, while the
second element related to the federal court’s involvement in the determination and
interpretation of statutory authority. The courts often determined the element of statutory
authority was embedded in the legal language of state constitutions and legislative
actions. In some cases, the courts were asked to address the application of state laws in
possible constitutional and statutory rights violations. In other cases, the courts were
asked to rule on the intent of the legislature when they crafted the law. Nonetheless, the
courts were consistent in their reluctance to usurp the authority of the states and
consistently upheld the authority granted to the states to regulate public education.
Equal Protection and Disparate Impact Regarding Vulnerable Populations o f Students
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects vulnerable
populations from discrimination resulting in disparate impact. Disparate impact is
described as practices that “proscribe not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation” (Griggs v. Duke Power Company,
1971). In order to substantiate disparate impact, the courts must apply the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission guidelines of the “four-fifths rule” (McDowell,
2000, p. 46). The application of this guideline indicated that an adverse impact had
occurred when the selection rate for students of a particular subgroup was less than fourfifths of the rate of the highest scoring group (McDowell, 2000). This guideline was
applied in GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State
Board o f Education case as the court recognized disparate impact on minority students
evident in the first administration of the TAAS test but indicated that scores for minority
students increased after the first year and that the remediation programs established by
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the state were working (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and
the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000).
Students with disabilities were another group of students impacted by high stakes
testing policies. Some students identified as having a disability had difficulty
demonstrating their acquired knowledge and skills on standardized testing formats
(O’Neill, 2001). Accommodations were integrated into the educational program to help
students fully participate in the testing procedure. According to the National Research
Council Report on high stakes testing (Huebert & Hauser, 1999), there are four basic
categories of accommodations for students with disabilities: changes in presentation,
changes in response mode, changes in timing, and changes in setting.
These accommodations were meant to support students with disabilities and were
included in the child’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP). The testing accommodation
was meant to provide the most suitable situation for the child to accurately demonstrate
their performance and understanding of the concepts. The integration of accommodations
for students with disabilities helped to support the students’ participation in statewide
testing as mandated by NCLB, but these students still represented a subgroup of children
who are considered vulnerable. However, in the case of high stakes tests, some posed a
concern as to whether the accommodation was appropriate, as providing the
accommodation may intentionally enhance or diminish the student’s performance
( 0 ‘Neill, 2001).
Students with disabilities often needed additional supports to participate in the
testing programs in their schools. NCLB mandates that almost all students participate in
statewide assessments whereas prior to this legislation, students with disabilities often
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were not tested to keep school scores high. Federal legislation protecting the rights of
students with disabilities prohibited the discrimination of these students and entitled them
to participation in testing programs in public schools receiving federal funding. Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and its most recent
reauthorization all include provisions for students with disabilities that in some way
extended to participation in statewide assessments or alternative assessments (O’Neill,
2001 ).

In an analysis of Virginia state Standards of Learning (SOL) scores, Cunningham
and Sanzo (2002) investigated the impact of high stakes testing policies on students with
low socio-economic status (SES). At the time of this study, 17.7% o f the students
attending school in Virginia were from families living in poverty. Using correlation
regression analysis, the researchers’ analyzed data from 245 high schools in Virginia. The
results of the analysis pointed toward SES as a major factor in students’ scores on the
SOL tests. In fact, the results indicated that 41% of the variation in the regression
analysis for science scores could be explained by SES. Cunningham and Sanzo warned
that “the application of high stakes testing further perpetrate [ed] the socioeconomic
inequality in education rather than resolving it” (p. 72). Supporting previous studies, the
use of high stakes tests did not recognize the prevailing barriers individual students face
and generalize the sanctions imposed upon these children (Cunningham & Sanzo).
As the focus of research seemed to reveal the impacts of high stakes testing
policies on minority and economically disadvantaged students, qualitative data was
necessary to determine the experiences of these students as the policies were
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implemented and student consequences were delivered. Researchers Roderick and Engel
(2001) conducted a qualitative study to examine the effects of high stakes testing policies
on student motivation, particularly for lower achieving students predominately of African
American or Latino heritage.
The data were analyzed and the students were into two groups: those that were in
the “high work effort” (Roderick & Engel, 2001, p. 217) category and those in “no
substantial work effort;” “substantial home or skill problems” (p. 218) was analyzed as a
subgroup of group two. The students in this subgroup were facing multiple barriers both
in and out of school that affected their performance and work effort. The test results
indicated an overall pass rate of 80% for the students in the “high work effort” category
and a 36% overall pass rate for students in the second category and its subgroup.
Similarly, authors Madaus and Clark (2001) supported this evidence in their analysis of
data. They concluded “.. .advocates of the motivational potential of examinations have
not paid enough attention to who will be motivated and who will not... [and] that all
students, regardless of grade level, circumstances, context, and individual differences,
were expected to attain” (Madaus & Clark, p. 9).
Although A Nation at Risk (1983) expressed concern regarding the effect o f this
testing practice on vulnerable populations, the press for wide-scale standardized testing
continued and the unintended consequences for certain groups of students began to
impact the entire educational system. The courts had become a means of restoring justice
to an accountability system that was having an adverse effect on particular groups of
students.
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Some students represented in cases may have already been subjected to
segregation practices or inferior educational opportunities. The effects of these issues
created a disadvantage for these students in regard to successful completion of mandatory
testing practices. Many states’ results from state testing programs indicated disparities in
passage rates for particular subgroups o f students (Moran, 2000). The literature reveals
consistent findings in empirical data that suggested that minority and economically
disadvantaged students were less likely to meet graduation requirements than white
students and were more likely to earn alternative credentials (Borg et al., 2007; Camoy &
Loeb, 2002; Dorn, 2003). Borg et al. (2007) contended that strong evidence suggested
accountability systems might have increased the achievement gap between white
students, and black and Hispanic students.
With the courts upholding the liberty and property interest of a diploma in the
Debra P. v. Turlington case, the use of these tests to deny diplomas fell under legal
scrutiny. As more cases were brought to court, the examination of the use of testing to
make high-stakes decisions revealed the basis for other unfair practices. One practice was
the use of the results of standardized testing as the sole criterion to make high stakes
decisions such as denial of promotion or graduation. Critics argued that the tests were not
developed to be used for this purpose and therefore were invalid as a means of denying a
diploma (Moran, 2000). Moreover, the lack of empirical evidence that the tests were
valid instruments to make high stakes decisions resulted in incorrect inferences regarding
student promotion, retention and the awarding of a diploma (Smith & Fey, 2000).
Opponents of the use of high stakes testing argued that a single score was only a
partial perspective of student achievement as a test could only measure “a single aspect of
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a construct” (Moran, 2000, p. 37), and that using one test result to make high stakes
decisions did not take into account the students’ past academic performance prior to the
test (Moran).
High stakes testing policies have created cause for concern, controversy, and
court reactions to litigation as a means of attempting to resolve a political, social and
educational issue. Differing public sentiment regarding the use of tests for certain
subgroups of students continued to feed an undercurrent of tension between those who
supported high stakes testing and those who were in opposition (Lay & Stokes-Brown,
2008). Moreover, threatened state sanctions under NCLB translated into higher
accountability for students with the denial of diploma as a means of motivating students
to leam. The application of educational policies such as high stakes testing has often been
legitimized in the courts. In order to understand the constitutionality of the
implementation of the tests, an analysis of the case law was needed. The results of this
analysis would help create a historical framework to guide future policy implementation
and to clarify the caveats under which testing policies support the objectives of public
education without constitutional violations. The literature has revealed specific issues
relating to high stakes testing policies; a further examination of this issue was warranted
to help clarify some of the legal issues, and consequences of continuing to use this policy
as a sanction against students.
Summary
The studies discussed in this chapter represented the foundation of empirical data
regarding the policy framework established by A Nation at Risk (standards/increasing
graduation requirements) and NCLB (testing and accountability/increasing graduation
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rate). To address the policy mandates mentioned above, a synthesis of the research
findings were presented. First, the policy for increasing graduation requirements in
response to A Nation at Risk was addressed. A synthesis of these studies indicated that an
increase in graduation requirements led to an increase in dropout rates particularly for
minority and low SES students (Lillard & DiCicca, 2001). Furthermore, the results o f the
research suggested that an increase in graduation requirements contributed to an overall
decline in college enrollment (Bishop & Mane, 2001). However, the research also
revealed although some students dropped out, many students earned GEDs, an alternative
to high school credentials.
Some studies reported mixed student outcomes as the result of high stakes testing
practices. Bishop et al. (2000) indicated higher student achievement associated with an
increase in graduation requirements but also found a higher dropout rate. They contended
that the dropout rate was not significantly different from that of other states with similar
demographics. The policy established by the NCLB Act of 2001 required states to
increase their graduation rates in order to satisfy the AYP mandate. The empirical
evidence was consistent regarding dropout rates for minority and low SES students. In
states that require high stakes tests for a diploma, minority and low income students were
more likely to drop out after the implementation of a high stakes testing program (Amrein
& Berliner, 2002; Jacob, 2001; Madaus & Clark, 2001). Students with lower grade point
averages were also more likely to drop out than students with higher GPA’s (Bishop &
Mane, 2001). From a more positive perspective, students from states that required high
stakes testing, an increase in test scores translated to a lower dropout rate, and those
students who persevered and stayed in school earned five percent more income after
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graduation (Camoy et al., 2001). There are no conclusive results indicating that high
stakes testing policies had a negative or positive effect on graduation rates. Neither could
researchers agree on whether high stakes testing policies have had an impact on other
national test scores such as the NAEP, SAT, or ACT tests. Furthermore, researchers did
not determine whether high stakes testing policies increased student motivation. One
certainty was that high stakes testing policies have affected minority and low SES
learners to a larger degree than non-minority learners (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Jacob,
2001; Madaus & Clark, 2001). In addition, these policies also affected the decision
making of educational leaders at the state, district and school level as these mandates
continued to hold educators and students accountable for educational outcomes.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
All 50 states function under a unique governmental framework established by the
United States Constitution, each state’s own constitution, as well as federal and state
statutes (Kunz, Schmedemann, Bateson, Downs, & Erlinder, 1992). As discussed in the
previous chapter, the Constitution gave each state the authority to regulate its own
educational system. Under this framework, the interpretation and application of high
stakes testing policies have been varied, and have resulted in a plethora of unique cases
with informative, but conflicting, rulings. An analysis of these cases and rulings revealed
the specific issues incurred as the result of high stakes testing policy implementation.
Furthermore, the application of the policy under law resided in the context of the
previously mentioned legal framework as well as the current case law. This context forms
the foundation of judicial interpretation and legal understanding as illustrated by Kunz et
al. in the following statement “.. .Without a context, the law is difficult to understand”
(1992, p. 17). This study aspired to inform educational leaders, stakeholders, and the
general public of the historical framework of the law regarding this policy and the
appropriate Constitutional application of the law. The analysis of case law revealed
specific claims of violations and judicial interpretations, as well as the evolution of the
case law through this framework, which contributed to the understanding of the legal
context of the policy.
In addition to the Constitutional and statutory laws of each state, it was important
to understand the guiding principles established in case law or common law. “The
fundamental goal of case law research is to find binding precedent, or to find the most
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persuasive authority available” (Kunz et al., 1992, p. 13). “Because of precedent, judges
and other decision-makers are bound to apply existing well-reasoned principles...” (Kunz
et al., p. 37). The principle of stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent, under which it is
necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when similar arguments arise in
litigation (Gamer, 2004). The principle of stare decisis implied that the interpretation and
application of law is uniform. However, “the law is not a static entity. It is flexible and
adapts to changing conditions, needs, and norms of society” (Kunz et al., 1992, p. 138).
Theoretically, this flexibility in the law lends support to the concept of a legal evolution
of common law regarding issues such as high stakes testing. As the court cases were
presented, the mlings were guided by previous courts’ interpretations and decisions. It
was important to include a descriptive analysis as each case presented a differing set of
variables. In addition, the details of the relevant case law contributed to insight as to the
broader legal application o f high stakes testing policies.
This study intended to construct an understanding of court cases published in
legal compilations, and focused on the issues imbedded in the differentiation of selected
educational practices implementation, which in some instances, violated student rights.
The analysis of each state’s high stakes testing litigation aspired to reveal a historical
caption outlining details relevant to student rights and implementation issues to help
clarify future educational policy ambitions. Specifically, this study addressed the
following research questions.
1. What issues related to high stakes testing and the denial of diplomas were
revealed in state and federal case law within the 1979-2012 timeframe?
2. Were the issues distinctive based upon regular education or special education
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students?

3. What differences were revealed within the case law rulings regarding those in
favor of the students and those in favor of the educational agencies?
4. What differences existed between the case law according the geographical regions
as defined by regions in published court reporters and listed as follows:
Northeastern, Northwestern, Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern, Pacific, and
Atlantic regions?
Data Collection
The data in this study consisted of federal and state case law from the timeframe,
1979-2012, resulting in the denial of diplomas for graduating seniors based upon a high
stakes testing policy. The 1979 date stemmed from the initial case revealed in the
analysis thus constituting the beginning of the case law. This study was limited to cases
tried in the federal district and appellate courts, as well as the state appellate courts. As
the data were accessible through public records, this study was exempt from the Internal
Review Board for research with human subjects. The researcher used electronic databases
such as Lexis-Nexis Academic, Westlaw Pro, Google Scholar, and Findlaw, as well as
court reporters in bound volumes of case law to access the court opinions. The electronic
databases were searched using the following key words established a priori: high stakes
testing, high stakes assessment, minimum competency exams, denial of diploma, high
school exit exams, and graduation requirements. The researcher then accessed the Center
for Educational Statistics database to identify states that required the successful
completion of a state assessment as a criterion for the awarding of a diploma. The states
that required the test were listed as well as the name of the assessment to expand the
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keyword list to increase the breadth of the search. This keyword list was selective, not
inclusive of all states as the keyword list only included those states that required the test
as a criterion for a diploma. The previously mentioned electronic databases were
searched using this expanded key word list specifying the name of each state’s test which
resulted in the identification of more cases. Table 2 presents the expanded key words
based upon each state’s particular assessment that were used to conduct additional
database searches.
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Table 2
High Stakes Assessment by States
Test

State
Alabama
Arizona
California
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Louisiana
Maryland

Alabama High Graduation Exam
Arizona Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS)
California High School Exit Exam
Georgia High School Graduation Tests (GHSGT)
Idaho Standards Achievement Test (ISAT)
Indiana Graduation Qualifying Exam
Graduation Exit Exam
Maryland High School Assessment (HSA)
Graduation Exit Examination (GEE)

Massachusetts
Minnesota

Graduation Qualifying Exam (GQE)
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)
Graduation Required Assessment for Diploma (GRAD)

Mississippi

Mississippi Subject Area Testing Program (SATP)

Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Carolina

Graduation Required Assessments for Diploma(GRAD)
High School Proficiency Exam (HSPE)
New Jersey High School Proficiency Assessment (HSPA)
High School Proficiency Examination (HSPE)
New Mexico High School Competency Examination
New York Regents Examinations
North Carolina Competency Tests
Ohio Graduation Tests (OGT)
Oklahoma End-of-Instruction (EOI)

Tennessee
Texas

South Carolina High School Assessment Program (HASP)
Tennessee Gateway Examinations
Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS)

Virginia
Washington

Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS)
Standards of Learning (SOL)
Washington Assessment of Student Learning (WASL) High
School Proficiency Exam
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Another important source for finding primary case law was a multivolume index
called a digest that arranged the legal topics alphabetically with cases involving the topic
referenced. The researcher searched the Educational Law digest for any pertinent cases;
however, this search resulted in cases already located via the electronic searches.
Additionally, the researcher read each case thoroughly to reveal any additional cases
mentioned in the court documents to determine any releveant cases that did not result
through the database searches.
Data Analysis
The researcher applied content analysis in an investigation of case law, a primary
source of law. Content analysis is a qualitative research method defined as “the study of
particular aspects of the information contained in a document, film, or other forms of
communication” (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2003, p. 621). Krippendorf (2004) defined content
analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from
texts.. .to the contexts of their use” (p. 18). Krippendorf explained that content analysis
“views data as representations not of physical events but as text, images and expressions
that are created to be seen, read, interpreted and acted on for their meanings... ”(p. xiii).
Schwandt stated, “Researchers can regard a text as an object suitable for analysis” (2001,
p. 250). He further described qualitative data analysis as the “activity of making sense of,
interpreting, or theorizing data” (p. 6). Rossman and Rallis (2003) described the process
of content analysis as “the systematic examination of forms o f communication to
objectively document patterns” (p. 198). The content analysis process used in this study
included creating a set of codes, shown in Table 3, systematically applying the codes to
the published case law, checking the codes for accuracy, analyzing the codes for
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emerging themes, and analyzing these themes for similarities and differences (Rossman
& Rallis; Schwandt, 2001).
Table 3
Identification o f Coding as Per Issue
Axial Themes

Issue
Equal Protection

English Language Learners
Minority Students

Due Process

Procedural
Substantive

Fundamentally Fair Test
Alternative Test
Opportunity to Learn:

Remediation
Multiple Opportunities to take test

Special Education IDEA
No Single Criterion for Graduation:
Judicial Reluctance:
State and Local Authority: Nexus to State
Goals
Free Exercise Clause

For this study, case law was qualitatively analyzed for the puipose of interpreting
the state implementation of high stakes testing, and the legal issues presented to the
courts for judicial intervention. For questions one, two, and three, the cases were
qualitatively analyzed though coding case law by assigning codes a priori aligned with
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the research questions. Strauss and Corbin (1998) defined coding for process as
“sequences of evolving action/interaction, changes in which can be traced to changes in
structural conditions” (p. 163). The process of the courts interpreting the law forms the
evolutionary current for the historical analysis of judicial decision-making. Coding for
data analysis provided the process of defining the similarities in the

. .series of evolving

sequences of action/interaction that occur [within the data’...” (p. 165). In order to
conduct coding for process, the strategy of open coding was used. Strauss and Corbin
defined open coding as “the analytic process through which concepts are identified and
their properties and dimensions are discovered in the data” (p. 101). The resulting
concepts and their properties and dimensions were categorized according to the emerging
themes illustrating the similarities and unique aspects presented in each case. These
themes revealed consistencies and inconsistencies in the courts’ interpretation of the
interaction of law with policy. The codes were expanded as new coding segments
emerged and generated new categories of issues presented to the courts. The analysis of
cases intended to provide a detailed history of court interpretation and policy caveats as
guides for future policy implementations. As the case law revealed the need for more
detailed categorization, it was necessary to employ axial codes to produce subcategories.
Axial coding was defined as “the process of relating categories to their
subcategories.. .linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions” (p. 123). In
addition, relative to question four, the cases were categorized as from which geographical
region they stemmed. The geographical regions, displayed in Table 4, were aligned with
the state and federal court system encompassing the Northeastern, Northwestern,
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Table 4
Judicial Regions
Northeastern

Northwestern

Southeastern

Southern

Southwestern

Pacific

Atlantic

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Illinois

Iowa

Georgia

Alabama

Missouri

Alaska

Connecticut

Indiana

Michigan

North Carolina

Florida

Arkansas

Arizona

Delaware

Massachusetts

Minnesota

South Carolina

Louisiana

Tennessee

California

District of Columbia

New York

Nebraska

Virginia

Mississippi

Texas

Colorado

Maine

Ohio

North Dakota

West Virginia

Kentucky

Hawaii

Maryland

South Dakota

Montana

New Hampshire

Wisconsin

Nevada

New Jersey

New Mexico

Pennsylvania

Oklahoma

Rhode Island

Oregon

Vermont

Utah
Washington
Wyoming
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Summary
High stakes testing has affected students, educators, and stakeholders by
enforcing minimum student achievement standards on all students as a one-size-fits-all
model. Although many factors have evolved into issues concerning high stakes testing,
three questions remained in the literature were:
1.

What did an analysis of the state and federal case law reveal about this practice?

2.

How did it affect the larger goals of education as per students or subgroups of
students?

3.

How did this policy evolve as a result of the relative litigation?
This researcher aspired to provide an interpretation o f a framework embedded in

the case law resulting from high stakes litigation. Using qualitative research methods and
content analysis of published cases, the researcher hoped to inform the field as to the
consistencies and inconsistencies in court opinions involving high stakes testing legal
proceedings. The coding process determined the categories and subcategories of cases to
create the framework of case law, and to simplify the plethora of case law data to inform
policy makers as to the impact of high stakes testing policy implementation.
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis of Results
High stakes testing case law has played an important role in the evolution of the
implementation of state assessment and accountability practices. Court rulings in the
earliest cases established caveats as to the constitutionality of the denial of a high school
diploma as the result of a student’s failure to pass an exit exam. As cases filtered through
the courts, specific facets of case law were extracted and established as fundamental to
the application of law. Each new ruling clarified the interpretation as to the
constitutionality and fairness of high stakes testing. These court interpretations,
embedded deliberations, and rulings developed the framework for the case law that will
influence the judicial interpretation of subsequent litigation. In order to facilitate an
understanding of the evolution of the case law, a historical presentation of the
chronological timeline preceded the analysis and results. The analysis of individual court
documents revealed specific issues in each of the cases, the courts’ interpretations of the
law as applied to these issues, similarities and differences among cases involving students
and their unique needs, and distinctions among the rulings in each of the judicial regions.
As cases were brought before the courts, certain recurring issues were contested
by the plaintiffs and the defendants, establishing themes relating to the implementation of
high stakes testing policies. These themes were analyzed with regard to the courts’
application of constitutional and state law as well as the established case law blanketing
the application of the policies.
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Research Questions
In this study, the issues were first extrapolated using content analysis and coding
of the data. Next, the thematic data were combined. The themed issues were then
examined by comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences among the court
rulings as well as pertinent unique data. The research questions guided the analysis to
generate the discussion and the presentation of the themes in the context of the varied yet
similar issues presented to the courts; issues relating specifically to students with special
needs; similarities and differences in the cases categorized by prevailing party; and the
comparing and contrasting of cases in differing judicial regions. The research questions
were as follows:
1. What issues related to high stakes testing and the denial of diplomas were
revealed in state and federal case law within the 1979-2012 timeframe?
2. Were the issues distinctive based upon regular education or special education
students?
3. What differences were revealed within the case law rulings regarding those in
favor of the students and those in favor of the educational agencies?
4. What differences existed between the case law according the geographical regions
as defined by regions in published court reporters and listed as follows:
Northeastern, Northwestern, Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern, Pacific, and
Atlantic regions?
Analysis of Applicable Case Law
As the themes emerged through the analysis, the specifics of each case became
relevant features of the actions and rulings of the court. This researcher found it
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necessary to include many of these details to aid in the understanding of the court rulings
since each case was unique and varied in its circumstance. An explanation o f the issues
without this supporting evidence would not have facilitated the development of a
framework, nor provided a clear understanding of the outcomes of the cases. As the
research questions were discussed, details of the policy implementation history emerged
and interesting points were noted. The intent of this analysis was not only to deepen the
understanding of the evolution of the case law, but also to highlight the significant
aspects of high stakes testing policies in public education.
A comprehensive search of multiple databases, educational literature, legal
literature, and case law resulted in 41 cases involving exit exams at the state and federal
level. The cases were selected based upon their nexus to the issue of the denial of a
diploma due to the failure of a state assessment or exit exam. Although many of the cases
were continuations of previous cases or nested cases, each different level of court
reexamined and reconsidered the issues revealing new interpretations. Once the initial
analysis began, this researcher found it necessary to track cases as they emerged through
the court of origin, the appeal process, and final rulings until the parties no longer
requested judicial intervention, the cases were dismissed, or the cases were settled out of
court. The rational for this approach resided in the case law evolution. The initial filing of
the case may have included multiple complaints by plaintiffs. It was necessary to follow
the cases through the courts until settlement of the issues to investigate the outcomes of
some of these issues as they were challenged at each level o f the courts. The additional
rulings contained significant details of case law, which gave a rich texture to the analysis.
In addition, the case details deepened the discussion of the evolution of the case law and
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the impact of high stakes testing policies on students, parents, schools, and other
stakeholders. In a broader scope, these details were needed to develop the understanding
of subsequent court rulings and the framework resulting from the continuation of the case
law.
Specific issues were brought to different levels of the courts. The protocol for
court intervention revealed in the analysis required initial administrative hearings by the
State Board of Education, which, upon unsatisfactory rulings, were then brought to the
judicial system to request legal intervention. Cases involving claims of constitutional
violations were heard in the Federal District Courts and some were appealed to the
Federal District Appellate Court. Several cases were heard in the State Supreme Courts
and one resulted in a petition to the United States Supreme Court. As of 2012, no case
regarding high stakes testing and the denial of a diploma was reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.
The results of differing levels of judicial rulings were varied and are explained in
this analysis. Many cases were remanded back to the lower courts for further review and
actions. Some lower court rulings were upheld by the appellate court, others were
overturned and other cases were dismissed. Several court rulings were contradictory to
other court rulings. These variances added interest and complexity to the analysis and are
discussed later in each relevant section of this chapter.
Summary of Cases Reviewed
Of the states requiring exit exams as a criterion for receiving a diploma, litigation
has been brought in 14 states. The states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, New York,
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and Texas have had litigation filed in state or federal courts. The cases Noon et al. v.
Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District (2004); Kidd v.
California Department o f Education (2008); Superior Court o f California County o f
Alameda and Valenzuela v. O ’Connell (2007) and Advocates for Special Kids v. Oregon
(2001) were cases settled out-of-court and lacked judicial rulings. However, some
information was extrapolated via the settlement agreements of the parties that were
approved by the courts.
One of the many elements revealed in the case law were the differences in cases
relating to students with disabilities and cases involving regular education students.
Students with disabilities had unique learning needs and were protected by additional
federal legislation. The Rehabilitation Act of 1964, The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) of 1973 as well as
subsequent reauthorizations of IDEA all undergirded the constitutional and state laws
affecting high stakes testing policies. As the cases involving students with special needs
filtered through the courts, the unique needs of students were applied, and court decisions
were made according to the protections encased in these laws. Therefore, these
applications of law differed somewhat from the applications of law concerning regular
education students. In addition, cases involving minority and English Language Learners
also revealed a theme worthy of discussion, based upon Title VI and Equal Education
Opportunities Act legislation, which protected subgroups of students from discriminatory
educational practices.
In most cases, the courts determined a prevailing party as an outcome of the case.
However, the prevailing party was usually specific to the individual issues that were

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

70

embedded in the cases. The rulings on each issue were discussed as per the themes to
illuminate differences and similarities in judicial rulings as per the issue by prevailing
party. Finally, as cases were brought before different courts, judicial differences were
found as the result of historical, political, and regional issues affected the qualitative
details of each case. Therefore, an analysis o f the differences in the rulings at each level
of the courts as well as the different judicial regions served by the courts was conducted
and discussed in the following sections.
Chronological History of Case Law
As the case law evolved through a chronological sequence of cases, this
researcher determined that it was necessary to provide a context for each case. The case
participants, history of testing policies, and individual state legislative educational
provisions, impacted the overall case law. Therefore, a preliminary summary o f each case
was presented in chronological sequence providing a historical context of the cases to
support the overall understanding of the analysis.
Cases from 1970-1979
The first case that documented the controversy regarding state assessments and
perhaps inspired the subsequent landmark case of Debra P. v. Turlington was brought
before the District Court of Appeals of Florida, First District in March 1979. The case of
Florida State Board o f Education and Ralph D. Turlington v. Brady, was brought to the
court by the Florida State Board of Education and the Commissioner of Education, Ralph
Turlington, with a request to review the final order of a Florida Division of
Administrative Hearing Officer regarding the validity of the scoring criteria used for the
state assessment. The original hearing was brought by the father of an eleventh grade
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student who had passed the state mandated functional literacy test but failed two parts of
the basic skills test. The area of deficits were identified and remediated, and the student
had an additional opportunity to pass the test prior to being denied his diploma. The
student’s father, John Brady, filed a request for a state level hearing based upon the claim
that the scoring standard was not set by the state legislators but instead was determined
by the State Education Commissioner. The Hearing Officer ruled in favor of the student
that the scoring standard was invalid due to the fact that the scoring standard was not
promulgated by the state legislature during the contemplation of the Florida State
Statutes, Chapter 120, the Administrative Procedure Act (.Florida State Board o f
Education and Ralph Turlington v. John Brady, 1979).
The State Board of Education therefore brought the case to the Appellate Court.
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals of Florida, First District in July of 1979
{Florida State Board o f Education and Ralph D. Turlington v. Brady). The Appellate
Court ruled that by including language in the state statutes directing the state to
administer a statewide uniform program of assessment, the state was within its authority
to enforce additional requirements for graduation. The language in the statute also
compelled the state to periodically measure the educational status, progress, and the
degree of achievement of the approved state minimum competency standards {Florida
State Board o f Education and Ralph D. Turlington v. Brady).
Subsequently in July of 1979, the parent filed an appeal under the case name John
Brady v. Turlington challenging the District Court of Appeal’s ruling that the scoring
standard was valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the previous ruling establishing the
scoring criteria on the state test as valid and not in violation of due process procedures as
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the determination of the scoring standard was within the state’s authority (Brady v.
Turlington, 1979). These cases cast a legal light on the Florida State Assessment Program
perhaps illuminating the path for the following seminal case that was also brought before
the Florida courts.
An analysis of the legal history of cases involving high stakes testing would not
be complete without a thorough explanation of the seminal case of Debra P. v.
Turlington, (1979). This case resulted in the first major decision of the courts regarding
the denial of a high-school diploma as the result of students failing to pass state mandated
competency testing. This case has influenced all subsequent cases brought before the
courts.
As a component of the Educational Accountability Act of 1976, the Florida
Legislature enacted Florida State Amendment §229.55 (2)(a), (d), and (f), to ensure that a
system of accountability was in place to guarantee that the public school system provided
an instructional program that met minimum standards set forth by the state. The Florida
Functional Literacy Examination, hence mandated in Florida Statute §229.57, was
implemented with the intent of improve the operation and management of the state’s
public education system. Furthermore, Florida State Statute §232.246 called for the
establishment of requirements or standards for the successful completion of public
schools and the awarding of the high school diploma as a symbol of meeting the state
defined standards. Additionally differentiated diplomas were established as a means of
qualifying the level of standards met. The standards established statewide minimum
performance limits in the core subject areas of reading, writing and mathematics for
students in the eleventh grade.
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Furthermore, students were expected to demonstrate the ability to apply basic
skills measured by a functional literacy assessment, and the completion of a minimum of
academic credits. The State Student Assessment Test Part 2 (SSAT II) was first
administered in 1977, and continued in 1978 and 1979. The results of the first
administration resulted in a 36% failure rate (41,724 of the 115,901 students who took the
test). In the disaggregation of the data, 78% of students of color failed the test as
compared to 25% of Caucasian student failures. The subsequent administrations of the
test resulted in similar disparities for students of color with failure rates ten times that of
Caucasian students. Based upon these data, a group of students petitioned the court
requesting an injunction against requiring the exam as a criterion for the issuance of a
diploma. Tthe students petitioned against the use of the exam results to structure
remediation classes, which could have potentially resulted in the re-segregation of public
schools. Ten African-American students brought this case to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division on July 12,1979. Their claim
was that the state requirement of the assessment violated their Constitutional due process
and equal protection rights based upon the fact that they did not receive adequate notice
of the examination as a requirement for graduation, and therefore did not have adequate
time to prepare for the test. In addition, the assessment would perpetuate the
discrimination resulting from the previous practice of segregating schools (Debra P. v.
Turlington, 1979).
The District Court ruled that due to the previous segregation (1967-1971) in
Florida’s schools, the testing policy was a violation of the students’ equal protection
rights. The Court determined the administration of the test and resulting sanctions for
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students would further perpetuate past discrimination. However, the court stated that test
itself served a legitimate state interest in improving education for the public, and only the
intended use to deny diplomas to students who did not pass the tests violated the
students’ due process rights. The court further determined the students had a property
right in the expectation of a diploma, and the amount of time given of diploma sanctions
was inadequate, and therefore unconstitutional. These two factors, the student property
interest in the awarding of a diploma as well as adequate notice of the testing policy,
would set the stage for future litigation regarding the implementation of exit exams
(Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979). As the decade closed and a new one began, additional
litigation was presented to the courts for adjudication. The following table presents the
three cases heard in the courts from 1970-1979.
Table 5
Cases from 1970-1979
Date

Case

1979

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1979

Brady v. Turlington

Cases from 1980-1989
The decade from 1980-1989 witnessed the perpetuation of the Debra P. v.
Turlington case as well as seven other cases. First, the case o f Wells v. Banks, (1980) was
brought against the Georgia State Board of Education as well as the local school board,
challenging the implementation of minimum competency standards of student
achievement as a graduation requirement. The mandated assessments began in the
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students’ ninth grade year as a requirement of successful completion prior to receiving
the diploma. The plaintiffs contested to both the state and local boards, which upheld the
graduation requirement. The plaintiffs then sought the intervention of the Superior Court
of Georgia, which affirmed the state’s right to test and sanction students. The plaintiffs
appealed, which resulted in the court’s continued support for the state and local boards
and affirmed the Superior Courts ruling. The rational for the ruling resided in the court’s
belief that the State Board of Education was within its authority to establish minimum
competency standards for the public schools and to uphold those standards. In addition,
the State Board of Education’s policy specifically indicated the authority of the local
Boards of Education to impose additional or enhanced standards ( Wells v. Banks, 1980).
In 1980, the Love v. Turlington case was brought before the United States District
Court for the plaintiff by Renita Love. The student, on behalf of others similarly situated,
petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Middle District o f Florida to receive class
certification for litigation regarding the state’s high school exit exam. In the case of Love
v. Turlington (1980), the District Court denied awarding the class certification
The case of Debra P. v. Turlington was brought back to the courts in May of 1981
in an appeal by the Commissioner of Education on the contention that the former court
has erred in its ruling. Ralph Turlington claimed that the test did not violate the students’
due process rights and that adequate notice was given to the students. In addition, he
contended that the test was a valid instrument of assessment and that the court erred in
establishing a property right in the expectation of receiving a diploma. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District ruled on the case. Although an increase in pass
rates for minority students was presented in the case, the court held that the state could

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

76

not deny diplomas until it had determined fundamental fairness as to the curricular
validity of the test. The court’s ruling was meant to ensure that the discriminatory impact
was not the result of the educational deprivation of students during the dual system of
education that had previously existed in the state (Debra P. v. Turlington, May 1981). As
the interest in the case continued, a member o f the Court of Appeals requested a poll of
the judges to reconsider the case en banc. The majority of judges voted against the
rehearing en banc with two judges dissenting (Debra P. v. Turlington, September, 1981).
In 1983, the students in Debra P. v. Turlington filed a class action suit against
state level officials and the State School Board of Education. The case was again heard in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division in
order to determine the constitutionality of the literacy test requirement. This case focused
on the curricular validity of the test as the state needed to ensure that the content of the
test was actually taught in the state’s schools. In order to examine this issue the state
commissioned a private consulting firm to design a study to investigate the curriculum
content taught in the schools. The study consisted of four components: a teacher survey, a
school district survey, a series of site visits for verification o f report accuracy, and a
student survey administered during the site visitations in eleventh grade English and
social studies classes. Expert witnesses were called to report on the data and the resulting
court discussions offered many new questions regarding the issues of fairness, adequacy,
and sufficiency as compared to what was considered constitutional. Instructional validity
became a focus of the court’s discussion and was determined to be a component of the
curricular validity.
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The court ruled that the evidence presented indeed satisfied the overall curricular
and content validity requirement. The court noted that it would have been impossible to
determine if each student had a fair opportunity to learn the material on the test, but the
overall instructional program o f the state addressed the content on the test. As the
Constitution has never mandated the singular level of result per student, the court ruled
that the state had met the burden of proof that the skills assessed on the test were included
in the state’s curriculum, and that teachers were indeed teaching the necessary skills as
deemed essential by the state. Therefore, the court ruled that the state had the right to
withhold diplomas for those students who did not pass the exams primarily based upon
the multiple chances and remediation students were given. In addition, the court
considered that the state had allowed students to stay in school for an additional year to
receive remedial instruction to assist them with assessment deficits thereby giving them
subsequent opportunities to learn {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983).
The next year, the Debra P. plaintiffs requested a review by the United States
District Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District to examine the previous judgment as
to the validity of the state mandated assessment. The plaintiffs claimed that the
disportionality of the pass rates for Caucasian and students o f color was unconstitutional.
However, upon reexamination, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling
based on the findings that (a) the students were taught the skills on the test, (b) the use of
the test as a diploma sanction would help to remedy the vestiges of the past segregation
practices, and (c) the past segregation practices were not found to be causal of the
disproportional failures of students of color {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1984). The court
noted “the state need not correct all the problems of education in one fell swoop and it
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has a stronger interest in those for which it pays the cost” (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981,
p. 407). As a result of this landmark case, other plaintiffs sought the judicial intervention
from the court in regard to the Constitutionality of state mandated, high stakes tests. The
sometimes simultaneous and subsequent legal chronology is presented in the following
paragraphs.
The next case to be filed in court was The Board o f Education o f the NorthportEast Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981). In this case, the
Board of Education of the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District award
diplomas to two high school students with disabilities. One student was a 20 year old
female and the other was a 21 year old male, each with a severe learning impairment.
Abby, the 20 year old female student was recommended for graduation in 1978, but her
parents requested that she remain in school to allow her to participate in a vocational
program. Both the state-mandated reading and math tests were administered to her. Abby
successfully passed the reading test but did not pass the math exam. Neither test was
administered to the male student Richard. As the testing requirement was not imposed
until 1979, Abby could have earned her diploma in her initial recommended graduation
year, 1978. Both students were recommended for graduation based upon the completion
of the goals specified by the Individualized Education Plans (IEP), and were approved to
receive their diplomas by the local Board of Education.
The State Board of Education notified the local board that the issuance of the
diplomas was in violation of the new state code, and by order invalidated the students’
diplomas. Further, the state board demanded the names and addresses of any student on
which the local board had conferred diplomas. The local board president refused to
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submit the names of the students who had received the diplomas without meeting the
state requirements. The local board sought to enjoin the State Board of Education
Commissioner from enforcing the state order and requested that the court validate the
diplomas that were issued on the basis of equal protection and the due process clauses of
the United States Constitution. The petitioners claimed that the diplomas were valid, and
that the requirement of the successful completion of state assessments was in violation of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (The Board o f Education o f the NorihportEast Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981).
As established in the Debra P. v. Turlington case, the students in The Board o f
Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach
did have a vested property interest in receiving their diplomas therefore invoking due
process rights. Again, relying heavily on the Debra P. v. Turlington case, the court
referred to the precedence of the adverse effect on the students as a basis for weighing the
importance of the issuance of diplomas. Further, the court questioned the concept of
functional literacy and the lack of a universally accepted definition of such. The court
illustrated that within the context of the evidence presented in this case, there were
multiple and varying definitions of functional literacy. The court found that the IEPs of
both students did not contain goals to specifically pass the state mandated assessments.
As the testing requirement was just implemented three years prior in 1976, the IEP goals
designed for both students did not prepare them adequately to pass the exams. On this
basis, the State Supreme Court ruled on the case that the requirement for the successful
completion of the state assessment was a violation of the students’ due process rights and
therefore enjoined the State Board of Education from revoking the diplomas (The Board
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o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al., v.
Ambach, 1981).
Continuing with the case chronology, a group of minority students filed a suit in
June 1981 against the Tattnall County School District for due process and equal
protection violations regarding the denial of diplomas to the students who did not pass the
local school board exit exam. This case was restyled from the previous Wells v. Banks
case and named Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes. The courts considered the recent
ruling in the Debra P. v. Turlington case regarding the implementation of exit exams and
the prior history of segregation in public schools. This school district already had a
criterion-referenced test (CRT) in place to annually evaluate specific skills. However, the
local school board also wanted to ensure that their graduates were able to compete on a
national level and sought to implement a norm-referenced test. The school district
adopted the policy of implementing a norm-referenced assessment in 1976, with
notification given to parents and students in the same year. The policy also included the
requirement of remedial instruction for those students who were not successful on the
initial assessment. The school district selected the California Achievement Test (CAT) as
the normed test, and established it as a criterion for graduation. The CAT was
implemented during the 1976-1977 school year and continued in the 1977-1978 school
year. Students who did not meet the benchmark of performing on a ninth grade level in
reading and math were given remediation. In 1978, the requirement of achieving a ninth
grade level became a criterion for graduation (Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes,
1981).
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The school district did not conduct a local validation study prior to adopting and
implementing the CAT. The plaintiffs conducted their own local validation study and the
results revealed that the CAT was not free from bias in Tattnall County. Other concerns
of test validity, curricular validity, and reliability troubled the court. In an expert analysis
of the test, many of the items on the test were considered invalid. In addition, the
assessment was questioned by the court as testimony revealed that not all students,
particularly those in the remedial classes, were taught all components of the curriculum.
The reliability of the test was questioned due to the number of errors in the hand scoring
of the tests with results from one school indicating a 58% error rate on math tests and a
20% rate of hand scoring errors on the reading test (.Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes,
1981).
Another fact that concerned the court was the high occurrence of misplacement of
students of color in special classes for students referred to as educable mentally retarded
(EMR). Court evidence indicated that students of color were placed in EMR classes
almost four times as often as Caucasian students, and Caucasian students were five times
more likely to be identified as having a specific learning disability (SLD) as opposed to
being found EMR {Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981).
The court ruled that the diploma sanction itself was not in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the racial impact was “foreseeable, but not actually foreseen:
{Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981, p. 94). However, the policy could not be
considered without the history of the past de jure segregation. Many of the students, who
were required to take the test, attended Tattnall schools under the previously segregated
system. The court ruled that the exam requirement had a disparate impact on minority
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students both for reasons of de jure segregation and the tracking system that violated their
equal protection rights. As for the due process complaints, the courts mled that the
curricular validity of the test had not been established and therefore the exam requirement
was in violation of the due process protections. The courts ruled that the exam
requirement could not be imposed until all students who had experienced past segregation
practices in Tattnall County had graduated, and until the district could demonstrate that
the test was fair and valid (Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981).
A related case was brought before the court in April of 1984 by one of the
plaintiffs in the previous case. This nested case Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes was brought
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District after the U.S. District
Court ruling state above. The plaintiffs petitioned the court to review the District Court’s
ruling regarding the imposition of an exit exam as a requirement for high school
graduation. The plaintiffs claimed that the exam requirement was discriminatory. The
district court ruling indicated that the school district could reinstate the exams when the
students who attended school in previous segregated situations had graduated, and if the
district could demonstrate that the assessment to be used was fair and valid. The plaintiffs
in this case sought the court’s ruling to enjoin the Tattnall County School District from
imposing the sanction on future students similarly situated. However, the students in the
previous case were all awarded diplomas and therefore this appeal would have only
concerned future students if the school district implemented the exam requirement
sometime in later years. As this appeal addressed students who have received no injury,
the case was not ripe for the court to review (Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984).
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As the chronological history of litigation continued for the decade of 1980-1989,
the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education was filed in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in October of 1982. The plaintiffs were fourteen
students with disabilities in elementary and secondary schools. They petitioned the court
to review a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois on a local
Board of Education’s requirement that students pass a Minimum Competency Test
(MCT) prior to being awarded a diploma. The plaintiffs claimed that the requirement was
in violation of their equal protection and due process rights as well as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Illinois
State Statutes. The students also claimed that in order for the MCT to have been used as a
requirement for graduation, it must have been validated as to the appropriateness for
students with disabilities. The plaintiffs claimed that the test lacked construct validity.
The construct validity of an instrument would indicate that it actually measured what it
was intended to measure. Previously, in an administrative hearing, the State School
Board ruled in favor of eleven of the plaintiffs on their claims of due process regarding
adequate notice violations and ordered the local school board to award their diplomas.
For this ruling, the District Court determined that the plaintiffs attending elementary
school did not have a standing due to their not being affected by the test therefore their
complaints were rendered moot. The remaining plaintiffs were notified in their junior
year that they would be required to pass the MCT.
The District Court ruled that the denial of the diplomas was not a denial of a free
and appropriate education as mandated in the EHA, as the students were receiving an
education and services required under the Act but were unable to pass the test. Moreover,
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the court determined an individual’s inability to pass the test was not a violation of the
students’ rights. Therefore, the District Court overturned the order of the State School
Board to award the diplomas on the grounds that no violations of due process protections
had occurred (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1982).
In an appeal, the appellate court, considered the case differently. They ruled that
adequate notice was not given to the students, and that the defendants’ suggestion for
remedy was for the students to take remedial classes and retake the exam. The court
found that these students had already left school and many were employed, therefore
attending remedial classes would present a hardship on them. Instead, the court ruled that
the most appropriate remedy would be to order the local Board of Education to award the
diplomas to the students. The court reversed the District Court’s mling and directed the
Lower Court to order the school district to award the diplomas to students who had met
all other requirements except the successful completion of the MCT (Brookhart v. Illinois
State Board o f Education, 1983).
The Love v. Turlington (1984) case remerged as an appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit requesting class status for students who were required to
take the basic skills assessment in eleventh grade in the State of Florida. The basic skills
exam was implemented to identify students at risk of failing and would potentially be
denied their diploma. The students who did not pass the test were assigned remediation
resulting in a disproportionately large number of students of color in the remedial classes.
The plaintiff’s complained that the use of the test perpetuated prior racial discrimination
in a formerly segregated school system. The plaintiff also contended that inadequate
notice was given prior to the test becoming a requirement for graduation (Love v.
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Turlington, 1984). The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling
denying class certification to the plaintiff on the grounds that each school district was
responsible for the remedial programs it provided and, therefore, a lack of commonality
and typicality existed rendering the case ineligible for class certification (Love v.
Turlington, 1984). The table below outlines the eleven total witnessed cases that were
tried in the courts from 1980-1989.
Table 6
Cases from 1980-1989
Date

Case

1980

Wells v. Banks

1980

Love v. Turlington

May 1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

September 1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al., v. Ambach

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

1984

Love v. Turlington

Cases from 1990-1999
The next case did not appear before the courts until the summer of 1992 when
Grump v. Gilmer Independent School District was filed in the United States District
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Court for the Eastern Division of Texas. The three student plaintiffs in this case
petitioned the court to be able to participate in their graduation ceremony although they
had not successfully completed the testing requirement for graduation and therefore were
denied their diplomas. Two of the students had completed all other requirements for
graduation except for passing the TAAS. The students requested a temporary restraining
order so that they could participate in the graduation ceremony. Although they had not
passed the TAAS for graduation, they signed affidavits that they would retake the exam
on the next administration in July. However, the ceremony was to occur at 8:00 pm the
evening of May 29th. The due process claim contained in the petition was based upon
whether the students received adequate notice. The legal precedent established in prior
cases indicated that adequate notice must have been given in order to constitutionally
deny diplomas to students. In this case, the test was not a requirement until the fall of
1991 and remedial instruction did not begin until the spring o f 1991. Therefore, these
students who missed the cut score by two points did not have an opportunity for long
term remediation. Judge William Wayne Justice conducted an in-chambers hearing of
both sides of the dispute. The request for a temporary restraining order required the court
find that the plaintiffs would have prevailed on the success on the merits. The judge
considered if the plaintiffs would have suffered irreparable harm, if the potential harm to
the plaintiffs outweighed the potential harm to the defendant, and the temporary
restraining order would not disserve the interests of the public. For the two students who
had met all other requirements, Judge Justice continued the hearing. For the student who
had not met all other requirements, the request for the temporary restraining order was
denied (Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District, 1992).
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Applying the ruling in Debra P. v. Turlington case as well as Brookhart v. Illinois
State Board o f Education, Judge Justice calculated the plaintiffs’ likely success on the
merits. Judge Justice considered that if the two plaintiffs were wrongly denied their
diploma, then they would forever lose the opportunity to participate in a ceremony of
celebration with their peers. The judge considered a graduation ceremony to be a
“.. .celebration [of] profound personal achievement and hope for the future” (Crump v.
Gilmer Independent School District, 1992, p. 554). Further, “.. .a student’s high school
graduation [was] the source of fond memories and treasured mementos and photographs
that cannot be replaced” (1992, p. 554). In addition, Judge Justice ruled that the plaintiffs
would have suffered irreparable harm and that it would have been of no harm to the
school district to have allowed the students to participate in the ceremony. He did allow
the school district to announce during the ceremony that the two students had not yet met
the requirements for graduation (Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District, 1992).
Shortly after the ruling in Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District, the case
of Williams v. Austin Independent School District (1992) was brought to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. Similar to the
previously mentioned case, a plaintiff father sought a temporary restraining order for his
son to participate in the graduation ceremony despite being denied his high school
diploma. The plaintiff contended that his son’s due process protections were violated on
the basis that the student was not given adequate notice to pass the test and that the
instructional program did not prepare his son for the test. The judge found in this case,
that the student had knowledge of the test for seven years prior to the requirement for
graduation. The high school principal’s testimony indicated that all students were given a
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high school guide which informed them of the test and that the teachers had frequently
discussed the TAAS requirement with the students. The evidence also revealed that the
school provided courses that adequately prepared the student for the test. The student had
taken the test twice, once in 1991 and again in 1992 and failed the math portion of the
test both times. Judge Sam Sparks denied the preliminary injunction on the grounds that
the student would not succeed on the merits of the case as he had received adequate
notice and was not wrongly denied his diploma ( Williams v. Austin Independent School
District, 1992).
On March 17, 1994, the case of Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary
and Secondary Education was decided by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First
Circuit. The defendant school board requested a review from the Appellate Court of the
ruling of the District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, which granted a
preliminary injunction against the Louisiana State Board of Education. The board had
denied five students their diplomas based on the students failing the Graduation Exit
Examination (GEE). The first case brought by the students complained that the policy
requiring the GEE was invalid and that the administration of the test was a violation of
the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment and was also a violation o f the
State of Louisiana’s Constitution (Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and
Secondary Education, March 1994).
The first case was heard at the trial court level whereas the trial court judge ruled
that the test had been unconstitutionally administered and therefore issued a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the State Board to withhold the students’ diplomas. The plaintiffs’
complaint was that the policy of the GEE was unevenly applied as students in religious,
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private, or home schools were not required to successfully pass the test prior to receiving
their diploma. The plaintiffs also claimed that the state legislature did not mandate, or
impose the GEE as a requirement for graduation, therefore the Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education did not have the authority to impose the test as a graduation
requirement. The Board of Elementary and Secondary Education disagreed and the case
was brought before the appellate court (Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary
and Secondary Education, March, 1994).
The Appellate Court ruled that the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
was indeed within its authority to mandate the GEE as the language of state law grants
them the authority to perform the functions necessary to supervise and control the state’s
educational system. Furthermore, the court did not recognize the equal protection
complaint regarding public and non-public schools. Lastly, the court applied the rational
relationship standard in the Debra P. case and found that the GEE as an exit exam bore a
rational relationship for the purpose of ensuring the literacy of graduating seniors.
Therefore, the State of Louisiana had a vested interest in the minimum competency o f its
students and the awarding of a diploma as an indicator of such. In addition, the state
policy also provided for remediation to those students who had failed as well as
additional opportunities for the students to retest. The Appellate court reversed the
District Court’s ruling that the administration of the GEE violated the plaintiffs’ equal
protection rights and vacated the preliminary injunction from the District Court allowing
the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education to withhold the students’ diplomas.
This case was appealed to the State Supreme Court on April 12, 1994, which denied a
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review of the case (Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education, April 1994).
The case of Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education was brought before
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1997. The plaintiffs’ requested that the appellate court
consider the Livingston Circuit Court’s ruling that the administration of the Kentucky
Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) was constitutional. The plaintiffs
claimed that the KIRIS interfered with their religious beliefs. The parents of two students,
one a senior and one an eighth grader, informed the school that they did not want their
children to take the KIRIS. At the time, the KIRIS was not a requirement for students,
and the parents’ request was granted.
Subsequently, however, the Kentucky Board of Education mandated the test for
all students with successful completion as a requirement prior to promotion or
graduation. The parents requested to review the test and based upon the parental review,
the parents refused their children’s participation in the administration of the exam. As a
result of their not taking the test, neither student was allowed to progress, with the older
student not being allowed to graduate. The parents filed suit in May of 1994 seeking a
permanent injunction on the denial of their child’s diploma and well as the retention of
the other student. The parents also requested the court rule on the infringement of their
parental rights, due process violations, violation of privacy, and the infringement of their
exercise of religion. The school board requested a summary judgment and in 1996, the
court granted the school’s motion. At that time, the court concluded that the KIRIS was
not unconstitutional however also determined that the parents did have a right to review
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the test and that the test should have been made available for public viewing ( Triplett v.
Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997).
The parents appealed the case to reverse the lower court’s ruling regarding the
constitutionality of the KIRIS while the school district appealed to the requirement that
the test being made available for public viewing. The parents’ complaint resided in the
fact that the requirement for the students to pass the KIRIS occurred mid-year and did not
provide adequate notice thereby violated the due process protections. Further, they
contended that the school board had no legal authority to mandate the tests as there was
nothing in the state codes requiring the assessment be given to all students. The parents
also claimed that the requirement violated their constitutional rights of freedom to
exercise their religion and to direct the upbringing of their children. The parents believed
that the questions on the KIRIS, offended their religion as it

. .established a religious or

moral code, invaded the students’ religious and moral beliefs, discriminated one the basis
of religion and compelled the students to speak against their beliefs by selecting morally
objectionable responses” (Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997, p. 30).
The court found that the test did not violate the religious beliefs of the students, nor did it
require them to speak against their beliefs. The court also ruled that due to the fact that
the KIRIS did not need any preparation beyond the normal academic program, fiirther
notice would not have been necessary; therefore, the due process claim was not valid.
Since no injury occurred due to the lack of notice, no violation occurred (Triplett v.
Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997). In addition, the court ruled in favor of the
school district regarding the pre-assessment viewing of the test. Due to the importance of
assessing the students to further the state’s goals of improving education, the court ruled
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that the test should not be open for general public review. In 1999, the Triplett parents
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to grant a writ of certiorari to the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky. The U. S. Supreme Court denied the petition (Triplett v.
Livingston County Board o f Education, 1999/
The case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District was
brought before the court in Waco, Texas in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas in 1998. The plaintiff was an 11th grade student and her
parents. The plaintiffs petitioned the court alleging violations of the Free Exercise clause
and the equal protection violations. The student completed one-half of her junior year at a
non-accredited private school. As per district policy, she was required to take proficiency
exams for all credit courses that she desired to transfer to the public school. She refused
to take the test, and she and her parents filed a motion to challenge the schools testing
policy. The school district cross-petitioned the court requesting a summary judgment to
defend the plaintiff’s allegations. The court granted the summary judgment to the school
district on the grounds that the testing policy was rationally related to the schools goals
and that the school had a legitimate interest in setting advancement and graduation
requirements. In addition, the court ruled that the testing policy was religiously neutral
and did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ right to exercise their religious beliefs {Hubbard by
Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, 1998). Table 7 presents the seven cases
occurring between the years of 1990-1999.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

93

Table 7
Cases from 1990-1999
Date

Case

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

March 1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education

April 1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

1999

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

Cases from 2000-2012
Another important case was heard by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division in the year 2000. The GI Forum, Image
de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education case
petitioned the court to determine whether the TAAS Test, as a high school graduation
requirement unfairly discriminated against Texas minority students, or whether the
administration of the test was a violation of due process rights. Plaintiffs challenged that
the use of this test violated the due process clause and requested an injunction to prevent
the state from using the TAAS test as an exit level test for graduation (The GI Forum,
Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education,
2000). The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio
Division recognized that education was the particular responsibility of the state and the
courts resisted intrusion in curricular decisions. However, the courts had the
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responsibility to ensure that the state did not implement practices that created disparate
impact on minority groups. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited a federally
funded program from implementing policies that had a disparate impact on minorities. As
the public schools received federal funding, students fell under the Title VI protections.
Although the GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the
Texas State Board o f Education case was ultimately regarding fundamentally fair testing
and disparate impact on minorities there were several unique features illuminated in this
litigation. The court considered the following unique characteristics of this case:
1. Whether the standardized test measured knowledge rather than predicted
performance.
2. Whether the guidelines established by the EEOC in the employment context were
adequate for determining whether an adverse effect exists in this context.
3. Determined the deference to be given to a state in deciding how much a student
should be required to learn (cut-score issue).
4. Examined the issue of the significant discrepancy in pass scores for Texas
minority students (The GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency
and the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000).
The judges particularly noted that this court was not asked to evaluate the wisdom
of using standardized tests and the court demonstrated judicial reluctance to do so. In
addition, the judges expressed that the court had no authority to tell the State of Texas
what a well-educated high school graduate should know prior to graduation, nor could the
court decide the merits of teacher evaluation and objective testing. The District Court
found that the state was aware of the disparity prior to implementing the TAAS and that

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

95

the use of the test was to provide uniformity from school to school. Moreover, the TEA’s
experts were qualified to testify on the internal test fairness and soundness. However,
these experts were not able to testify as to the use of standardized tests as they applied to
ethnic minorities in a state where there were challenges providing equal education
opportunities to those minorities. The discovery phase of the litigation resulted in the
findings that the TAAS test was designed to measure mastery of the state-mandated
curriculum as well as higher order thinking and problem solving skills. There was also
evidence that the test was reviewed by test writers, teachers, and content experts for
validity and reliability (The GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency
and the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000).
All tenth grade students had to take the TAAS and pass the reading, writing, and
math sections. If they did not pass, they were given up to seven other opportunities. The
test cut score was set at 70 percent and increased 10 percent after the first year of
administration. The results of the administration in 1991 revealed that 67 percent of
African Americans, 59 percent Hispanic, and 31 percent of Caucasian students did not
pass the test {GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education, 2000).
The District Courts found that students were given equal opportunity to learn state
mandated curriculum, but that the prevailing standards in education at the time
emphasized that high stakes decisions should not be made upon a single test score.
Graduation requirements in Texas depended on three independent and separate criteria,
however failure to successfully complete the TAAS resulted in denial of a diploma. The
court found that there was sufficient evidence that the results of the first time
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administration bore a significant adverse effect according to the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) four-fifths rule. The EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures includes the four-fifth or 80% rule which stipulates, “A
selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded
by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact” (Biddle Consulting
Group, 2012). However, the court also found that the effects of remediation for eventual
success were more profound than the steadily decreasing minority failure rate. The court
held that the cut score bore a manifest relationship to the state’s legitimate goals and was
not arbitrary or unjustified. Moreover, the use of standardized tests to determine mastery
of standards mandated by the state as a basis for awarding a diploma had a manifest
relationship to state educational goals (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education
Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000).
Another of the court’s concerns was the number of students who had dropped out
of high school. The dropout rates for minorities in the ninth grade were higher and
increased just prior to taking the exam. In addition, the retention and overall drop-out
rates for minorities were higher. Although a concern, there was no substantial evidence to
prove that the dropout and retention rates were linked to TAAS, so there was no causal
connection found in evidence presented to the court between the implementation of the
TAAS and the higher dropout rates. The district court found that the plaintiffs did make a
prima facie showing a significant adverse impact. However, the TEA proved the
administration of the TAAS as an educational necessity. Despite the disparate impact on
the students, the court ruled in favor of the educational institution in that the TAAS did
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not have an impermissible adverse impact and that the administration of the test did not
violate the students’ due process rights as it was deemed an educational necessity.
Additionally, the court ruled that the TAAS was within educational norms, did not
perpetuate prior educational discrimination, and that the disparities in test scores were not
the result in flaws in the test or in administration. As the plaintiffs produced no
alternative test that adequately addressed the goal of systemic accountability, the TAAS
would remain the system of measuring student academic success. However, the court did
note that the unequal education was a matter of great concern and needed to be
eradicated. The TAAS test attempted to identify the inequalities and to address them.
Therefore, the court ruled that the TAAS test did not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, nor did it violate the equal protection safeguards {GI Forum, Image de Tejas
v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000).
In 2001, the Rene v. Reed case was brought before the Court of Appeals of
Indiana. This case was a class action suit filed by students with disabilities seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the requirement of passing the Graduation
Qualifying Exam (GQE) for the awarding o f a high school diploma. The court reviewed
the evidence presented at the trial court and only the evidence that the appellate court
considered most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court upheld the
students’ property interest in the expectation of a diploma pending the meeting of all
graduation requirements as established in the Debra P. v. Turlington case. Therefore, the
students did have due process protections in the expectation of a diploma. However, the
court ruled that the requirement of the GQE did not violate their due process rights as the
court deemed that the three years notice was adequate.
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The plaintiffs also claimed that they were not exposed to all the material
presented on the exam; therefore, the exam itself was fundamentally unfair. While the
students complained that they did not receive adequate notice and only had three years to
prepare for the exam, the defendants presented that remediation opportunities were
mandated by the state for students who did not initially pass the GQE. In addition, the
state also mandated that the curriculum be aligned to the requirements of the GQE in
1996, and that the remedial assistance given to the students provided them with adequate
curriculum exposure in order to satisfy the court in the determination that the
administration of the GQE was fair. In summary, the notice to the students was adequate
and they were exposed to the curriculum assessed on the test. In January of 2002, this
case was presented to the Supreme Court of Indiana where the transfer from the appellate
court was dismissed {Rene v. Reed, 2001).
In January of 2001, the class action suit Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon was
filed by the parents of students with disabilities claiming that the requirement that
students achieve a certificate of mastery prior to graduation, via the successful
completion of a series of test, was discriminatory. Plaintiffs claimed that the Oregon State
Board of Education did not consider students with disabilities when formulating the
exams. With the support of the Disability Rights Advocates, this case was settled out of
court with steps to be taken by the state to ensure that students with disabilities could
meaningfully participate in the assessments. These steps included:
1. Broadening the list of accommodations available to students with learning
disabilities
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2. Providing an alternative to the standard assessment for those learning disabled
students who are disadvantaged by the regular assessment
3. Instituting an appeals process
4. Conducting further research to ensure the validity of the tests with respect to
students with disabilities
5. Providing greater training and information about the assessment to students,
teachers, and parents (Disability Rights Advocates, 2002)
The following year, the case o f Nerw York Performance Standards Consortium v.
New York State Education Department was brought to the courts by the consortium o f 28
public schools in the State of New York. The consortium filed suit in May of 2002, to
request the court review the New York State Education Department’s denial of a variance
to allow the schools to substitute their own performance-based assessments for the state
mandated Regents examination. The schools were previously issued a variance to allow
for the use of performance-based assessments.
However, that variance had expired. The performance-based assessments were
permitted beginning with the 1995-1996 school years for a period of five years. At the
end of the variance, the consortium petitioned the state and was declined based upon the
newer, more stringent learning standards and Regents Examinations. The Commissioner
of Education established a State Assessment Panel to review proposed alternatives to the
Regents Examinations. Under the new regulations, only assessments that had been
approved by the State Assessment Panel could be employed as alternatives to the Regents
exams. The consortium petitioned the courts on the grounds that the denial of alternative
assessments violated their due process rights. The consortium requested an extension of
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the variance and was denied by the New York State Department of Education. The state’s
reason for denial was that it had adopted a new set of comprehensive learning standards
and that the request for the variance did not meet the regulatory requirements. The
plaintiff consortium claimed that the Board did not conduct the periodic reviews outlined
in the variance and therefore could not deny them an extension. The Supreme Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment on the grounds that the Commissioner o f Education had
adequately addressed the regulatory criteria of the state and the consortium schools had
ample opportunity to provide the required information to permit the proposed
performance-based assessments. Therefore, the State Supreme Court denied the
petitioners’ due process claims {New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New
York State Education Department, 2002).
Chapman v. California Department o f Education was filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California in September of 2002. This case was
filed by students with disabilities who petitioned the court in a class action suit for a
preliminary injunction in order to stop, or make voluntary, the administration of the
California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE). The CAHSEE was administered on a
voluntary basis in 2001 but became a requirement for graduation for the class of 2004.
The plaintiffs were all students with disabilities and had Individualized Education Plans.
However, the IEP teams had not had time to include specific modifications for
participation in assessments in the students’ IEPs. The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) required that IEPs include a statement of modifications whereas
students with disabilities may participate in the administration of state or district-wide
assessments. If an IEP team determined that a student could not demonstrate learning
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through participation in the state or district assessments, a statement in the IEP must have
identified an alternative assessment. All plaintiff students named in the case used
classroom accommodations in testing. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction
on the grounds that there was no alternative to the CAHSEE and that students were
unable to take the test with the required accommodations. They also claimed that the test
was invalid, violated due process protections as the plaintiffs claimed that the test
covered material that they had not had the opportunity to learn and that the CAHSEE
failed to conform to nationally recognized standards (Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, 2002).
The defendants, the educational agency in this case, claimed that this case was not
ripe as the injury of the students was not imminent or particularized, as none of the
students had taken the CAHSEE as a mandatory requirement. However, in a class action
suit, the court may consider injuries alleged by named plaintiffs in the context of harm
indicated by the class or group of plaintiffs as a whole, to determine whether a threat of
harm exists for the students. Therefore, the plaintiffs had a standing in the request for an
injunction. The defendants claimed that the case was not ripe based on the contention that
the development of the CAHSEE was a dynamic process and several administrations
were needed to refine and finalize the policies. The defendants also brought before the
court, a provision in the law, which allowed the State Board of Education to delay the
requirement of the CAHSEE as a requirement for graduation. The court found that a state
memo that stated an appropriate accommodation for a student was one that allowed the
student to participate in the assessment to the extent that the score represented a
meaningful measure of the student’s academic knowledge. Therefore, the state was
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required to permit the accommodations for testing in order to assess to a meaningful
degree the level of student achievement. However, the court noted that as a matter o f law
currently standing, the CAHSEE was a requirement for graduation and students had to
pass the CAHSEE in order to receive a high school diploma.
Defendants claimed that there was not private right of action to enforce the
provisions in IDEA as regards to alternative assessments, and testing modifications and
accommodations. However the court disagreed and determined that IDEA specifically
provided a right of action after all administrative remedies were exhausted for claims
relating to “the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child” (220 USC. §1415(b)(6)).
The court determined that the case was ripe for adjudication and that as meaningful
participation in assessments was an important aspect o f public education, there existed a
private right of action protection as specified in IDEA. Furthermore, the court determined
that the plaintiff students had a right to meaningfully participate in the administration of
the test regardless of how the results were to be used (Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, 2002).
The court did not find evidence that the test was invalid as the “present state o f
evidence [did] not reveal an asymmetry between what students are taught and the
material tested on the CAHSEE...” (Chapman v. California Department o f Education,
2002, p. 989). Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on two claims. First, the
use of accommodations would be allowed on the state assessment as prescribed in IDEA
and also that the state would be required to provide an alternate assessment for those
students who could not meaningfully participate in the CAHSEE. The court also found
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that irreparable harm would have occurred to the students based upon the denial of the
right of the students to receive a diploma. Therefore, the probable and possible injuries
“implicated a dignity interest in the foil participation of the educational process”
(Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002, p. 989).
The court ordered that the students could take the CAHSEE with appropriate
accommodations and modifications as provided in their individual IEPs or Section 504
plans. If the IEP or 504 Plan did not specifically identify accommodations or
modifications for standardized testing, the students shall be permitted to take the
CAHSEE with any modifications or accommodations provided for during general
classroom testing. The court also directed the state to develop an alternate assessment.
Students with disabilities who were entitled to the alternative assessment were permitted
to take the alternate but were not be required to take it. The state was also directed to
provide notification of this change to all parents of students with IEPs or 504 plans
{Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002).
Later in 2002, the nested case of Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association
o f California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District was filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review. The court reviewed the case and determined
that the students’ rights to modifications and accommodations did not require the
Appellate Court’s review. However, the challenge that the waiver giving students the
option to participate in an alternate assessment if granted was not ripe for appellate
review pertained to the future harms that would have occurred as to the denial of the
waiver. The appellate court determined that the claim of the uncertainty of the waiver
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process “burden[ed] the students’ rights to participate in the examination by forcing them
to choose between forgoing the use of the modifications or risking the denial of a waiver”
(Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v.
California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont
Unified School District, 2002, p. 781). The court reversed sections of the preliminary
injunction regarding the application of the waiver and remanded to the District Court
directions to dissolve those sections of the preliminary injunction {Smiley, Lyons,
Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District,
2002).

Simultaneous to the Chapman case, Student v. Driscoll was filed in the United
States District Court of Massachusetts on September 19, 2002. This class action lawsuit
was brought before the courts by students who contested the use of the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System exam (MCAS) as a requirement for graduation.
These students were 10th grade students who had failed the 2001 administration of the
MCAS. The plaintiffs claimed that the requirement of the MCAS for graduation violated
their constitutional and statutory rights. As a class action suit, this case involved six
subclasses of students: (1) Black/African-American students, (2) Hispanic students, (3)
English Language Learner (ELL) students, (4) students with disabilities, (5) students
attending vocational technical education schools, and (6) students attending schools in
Holyoke School District. The results of the 2001 MCAS administration indicated that
approximately 16,000 students did not pass the exam. Of these students, the majority
were minority students, students from low-income school districts or schools that were
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under-performing schools, vocational technical education students, ELL students, and
students with disabilities. The premise of the lawsuit claimed that the state provided
unequal education to students in Massachusetts in the vast differences in quality between
wealthier school districts and poor school districts. As a result of this inequality, the use
of the MCAS as a graduation requirement was perceived as being discriminative and
punitive for students in lower quality schools {Student v. Driscoll, 2002).
The Massachusetts legislature enacted the Massachusetts Education Reform Act
to address the disparity of schools throughout the state. This act was intended to ensure a
high quality public education for all of the state’s students. The MCAS was a component
of this act with the purpose to hold educators responsible for student progress. Plaintiffs
claimed that the State Board of Education did not develop the required curriculum
frameworks to ensure that the students were taught the material on the test in a timely
manner. Therefore, the students did not have adequate time to prepare for the exam
{Student v. Driscoll, 2002).
Moreover, the students’ complaint also indicated that the state had exceeded its
authority to require the MCAS as a graduation requirement. The Massachusetts
Educational Reform Act did not direct the state board to implement the exam as a
requirement for graduation. The intended use was for school district accountability and
not for individual student accountability. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that the test was
not valid as it did not conform to nationally accepted testing standards. It was upon these
claims that the students petitioned for injunctive relief to prohibit the use of the MCAS as
a requirement for graduation. They also asked the court for injunctive relief to require
professional development for public school teachers to meet the educational needs o f the
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various classes of students listed on the complaint. Students complained that the test
violated that procedural and substantive due process rights. The judge for the U.S.
District Court, Michael Ponsor, declined to hear the case at the District level and
suggested that the students file suit in state court, but to return to the District Court if they
were not awarded relief (Student v. Driscoll, 2002).
In November of 2003, a petition was filed to request a direct review of the appeal
of the above-mentioned case under the name Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.
The plaintiffs requested an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the state regulation requiring them to pass the MCAS test. The judges of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed the district court’s denial of the
preliminary injunction (Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al, 2004).
In March o f 2004, the case of Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and
the Anchorage School District claiming that the High School Graduation Qualifying
Exam (HSGQE) violated federal and state rights of students with disabilities. The group
Disability Rights Advocates (DRA) also supported the plaintiffs claim that the HSGQE
was unfair to students with disabilities as they did not have a fair opportunity to pass the
test. As a result of the DRA support for the case, the state immediately issued a waiver to
every student with an IEP or a 504, releasing them from the requirement of passing the
HSGQE to obtain a high school diploma. The parties reached an out-of-court
comprehensive settlement in August of 2004, which included negotiations for suitable
assessment requirements for students in the class of 2005, and subsequent years
(Disability Rights Advocates, 2005).
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The Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California case was
brought before the Court of Appeals for the State of California in 2005. In this case, the
Coachella Valley Unified School District petitioned the court for declaratory relief from
administering the state assessment to English Language Learners as per state statute that
the test only be administered in English. As the NCLB legislation did not require the tests
to be administered only in English, the school district petitioned the courts claiming that
the State Board of Education violated the assessment requirement under revisions to
NCLB. The court ruled that the State Board of Education did not abuse its discretion in
adopting the California Standards Test (CST) in 1999 as a system o f accountability as
well as requiring the CST for high school graduation. The District Court also ruled that
the State Board of Education did not abuse its authority to implement the new testing
accountability measures and that the court could not award a remedy to the school
districts. Therefore, this ruling would end the course of litigation for the school districts
{Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California, 2005).
An unrelated yet important case in California litigation affected the outcome o f a
significant high stakes testing case. In 2000, plaintiffs Eliezer Williams et al. filed a class
action lawsuit on behalf of the public school students of the State of California. Williams
charge the state with a failure to provide students with equal educational opportunities in
regard to equitable instructional materials, facilities, and qualified teachers ( Williams v.
California, 2004). Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced the settlement of the
case in 2004 with sweeping reform legislative measures following. The Williams case
resulted in the allotment of 183 million dollars to be spent for instructional materials and
implementation, and oversight requirements. Another 800 million was allotted for
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facilities improvements in the state’s schools (California Department of Education,
2010). Although this case was not related to denial of diplomas, its impact was important
to the understanding of the following litigation.
The case of O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County was filed in
August of 2006. This case was brought before the Court of Appeals of California, First
Appellate District, Division Four to appeal the ruling of the Superior Court of Alameda
County California. The Superior Court had issued a preliminary injunction to restrain the
California Board of Education from denying diplomas to seniors of the class of 2006 who
had met all graduation requirements except passing the CAHSEE. The Superintendent of
Public Instruction, Jack O’Connell, petitioned the Appellate Court for a writ of mandate
to vacate the order of the Superior Court. Despite the reform measures implemented as a
result of the Williams case, the Appellate Court doubted the state’s success in eradicating
educational inequities. However, the court also noted that the implementation of the
CAHSEE was the state legislature’s way of addressing the inadequacies of the state’s
educational system. The state was required to provide remedial instruction for students
who did not pass the CAHSEE and therefore was attempting to bridge the gap between
the inequitable resources and student success. The court implored the parties to work
cooperatively with the trial court to find ways to provide equal and adequate access to
remedial assistance to students in order to pass the 2007 administration o f the CAHSEE.
The court ruled that the trial court erred in granting the preliminary injunction as the trial
court relied on the assumption, access to education included access to a diploma. The
Appellate Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate to the Alameda County Superior
Court to vacate its preliminary injunction. The Superior Court determined a distinction
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between an equal protection claim based on the fundamental right to an education, and an
equal protection claim based on the asserted
right to a high school diploma.
“The purpose of an education is not to endow students with diplomas, but to equip
them with the substantive knowledge and skills they need to succeed in life. A
high school diploma is not an education, any more than a birth certificate is a
baby.” (O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County, 2006, p. 1478)
The O’Connell case was ultimately settled out of court under the case The Superior Court
o f California County o f Alameda County and Valenzuela v. O ’Connell. Both parties
agreed to the following terms: a package of legislative proposals was presented for
students who did not pass the CAHSEE by their intended graduation date. These students
were able to continue to study the material tested on the CAHSEE for up to two
additional years without charge. An additional option for these students was to enroll in a
community college or adult schools, to be re-designated as a senior for an additional year
of high school, or pass the GED in order to receive a diploma equivalent (Superior Court
o f California County o f Alameda and Valenzuela v. O ’Connell, 2007).
In September of 2006, the case of Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v.
State Board o f Education was filed in the California Appellate Court to appeal a denial
from the Alameda County Superior Court of a writ of mandate, and motion for a
peremptory writ. The Californians for Justice Education Fund (CJEF) petitioned the
lower court to enforce a state law requiring the state to complete their study of alternative
assessments to the CAHSEE. The study as to be completed in order for the state
legislature to consider the study prior to enforcement of the requirement for successful
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completion of the CAHSEE for the awarding of a high school diploma. In May of 2003, a
consultant for the Board released a report of the results from the mandated study
regarding the validity and appropriateness of the CAHSEE. The report indicated that the
requirement of the CAHSEE for awarding a diploma was fair, as it met the professional
standards for implementation.
However, the report indicated concerns regarding the fairness of imposing the
CAHSEE as a requirement for a diploma on students who could legitimately prove that
the public schools had not prepared them to pass the exam. The report included several
measures recommended to the Board to counter this concern. The mitigating measures
were addressed as lowering the pass rate, reduce the scope of the material presented on
the test, allowing high scores on one section to compensate for lower or non-passing
scores on another section or allowing for the demonstration of student success using
student portfolios. Later, in 2005, the consultant issued another report with the
recommendations to implement the use of portfolios as an alternative means of
assessment, but to proceed with the implementation of the graduation requirement as
scheduled beginning with the class o f 2006. After this report was published the CJEF
presented letters to the respondents indicating that they were in violation of the order to
conduct a study of the alternative assessments.
The Deputy Superintendent of the Department of Education submitted a memo to
the Board explaining that the proposed and studies alternatives did not demonstrate
equivalent rigor to the CAHSEE and that no alternative was available which would
ensure that the students had met the same criteria for graduation as measured by the
CAHSEE. In another letter, in January 2006, the Deputy Superintendent clarified his
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conclusion and indicated that the alternative assessments were costly to develop, and
would require local scoring and predicted a lack of consistency (inter-rater reliability) and
would not be reasonably implemented within the timeframe. In an unpublished opinion,
the court determined that the required study had been executed and that the statute
requiring the study did not set forth a time frame in which it was to be completed. The
writ of mandate and motion for a peremptory writ were denied to the plaintiffs
(Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education, 2006).
The Superior Court of Massachusetts presided over the case Hancock v. Driscoll
in April of 2004. This case was heard by Margot Botsford, Justice of the Superior Court.
Previous to this case, McDuffy v. Secretary o f Executive Office o f Education resulted in
the court remanding the case to a single judge to retain jurisdiction over the case. The
intention of the court was to determine that appropriate legislative action had taken place
within a reasonable time to address the issues of the Commonwealth’s educational
system. Extensive evidence was considered in this case for the court to determine the
extent of the problems, and provide remedial relief if necessary. Justice Botsford
recommended that the Commonwealth develop a plan, and design for equitable funding
implementation to meet these constitutional requirements for educating the
Commonwealth’s students. She also recommended the retention of a link between the
Commonwealth and the court through an appointed judge with jurisdiction over the case
to monitor the progress of the Commonwealth’s implementation plan {Hancock v.
Driscoll, 2004).
Later in 2004, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case of Hancock
v. Driscoll under the case labeled Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.
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This case attempted to revive the McDuffy v. Secretary o f Executive Office o f Education
(1993) case. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts voiced the opinions of
judges Marshall, Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Corwin, Sosman, and Cordy. The prior case
appointed a specially assigned judge of the Superior Court who, in a prior ruling,
recommended further judicial action to amend the states funding issues for less wealthy
districts to increase equitable resources to schools. Students in districts Brockton, Lowell,
Springfield, and Winchendon demonstrated lower success rates on the MCAS test as
required for high school graduation. The plaintiffs claimed that the Commonwealth’s
schools in named districts had not improved significantly since the 1993 passing of
Massachusetts Educational Reform Act. The plaintiffs contended that the inequitable
resources created a disparity for the outcomes of the students, and that this inequitable
distribution of resources violated the students’ rights. Therefore, the plaintiffs claimed
that the state was in violation of its obligation to educate all students, even those from
less wealth districts, and particularly students with special learning needs.
The State Supreme Court denied the further judicial action recommended by the
lower court, with seven judges concurring and two judges dissenting. Further relief
sought by the plaintiffs was denied by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and the single
justice appointed to jurisdiction did not retain jurisdiction over the case. The court
disposed the case in its entirety. In the opinion of Marshall, the judge noted that although
he accepted the findings of the Superior Court judge, the

. .shortcomings, while

significant in the focus districts, do not constitute the egregious, statewide abandonment
of the constitutional duty identified in the case” (Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f
Education et al., 2005, p. 433). Further, concurring judges commented on the Educational
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Reform Act as well as the federal mandate of NCLB in generating state educational
accountability systems that required student achievement in basic skills. The judges
defended the Commonwealth’s efforts to improve the educational system, and through an
evaluation system, investigated underperforming schools in order to provide additional
assistance. The judges noted that although the system was still not perfect, the
Commonwealth had made progress in the improvement of the state’s schools. Dissenting
judges, Greany and Ireland, supported the intervention of the court in the matter; similar
to the McDuffy case, the disparities in funding for these school districts resembled that of
the schools in McDuffy and therefore required relief by the court {Hancock et al. v.
Commissioner o f Education et al., 2005).
The next case in the chronology was filed in 2005 by Miriam Flores against the
State of Arizona. This case was brought before the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona after the initial case of Flores v. State o f Arizona in 2002 resulted in
the trial court’s ruling that the English Language Learners’ program was inadequately
funded, and ordered that the program be funded in a non-arbitrary and capricious manner.
The court ordered the legislature to enact legislation to address the issue o f funding;
however, the governor vetoed it. The legislature ordered a study of the cost to fully and
properly fund the program, however, after three years, the study was not completed and
the legislature had failed to act. The court charged the legislature with contempt of court
and enjoined the state from requiring that students pass the Arizona Instrument to
Measure Standards (AIMS) assessment in order to receive diplomas. The plaintiff,
Miriam Flores, sought sanctions against the state and injunctive relief from the District
Court due to the continued under-funding of the program.
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After six years, the state had not met its obligations to the court. The plaintiff
requested the court claim federal highway funds as a sanction against the state. Ms.
Flores stated that ELL students failed at three times the rate of English proficient
students. She also contended that 82 percent of ELL students continued to fail in reading
while 81 percent failed in writing. The plaintiff asserted that the courts should protect all
future ELL students from permanent and irreparable harm by enjoining the use of the
AIMS test until all ELL programs were fully funded for a sufficient enough time to allow
students to have a meaningful opportunity to achieve the standards measured by the
AIMS assessment (Flores v. Arizona, 2005).
The defendants claimed that the AIMS test was not the only requirement for
graduation and that this requirement was not imposed on all ELL students for the
preceding five years. Defendants also argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet a prima
facie claim, and failed to explain how requiring all ELL students to pass the exam
violated their due process and equal protection rights. Defendants contended that
adequate notice was given to students regarding the testing requirement. The defendants
requested that the money allotted from NCLB be used to cover the cost o f funding the
ELL program {Flores v. State o f Arizona, 2005).
The district court ruled that the state failed to comply with court orders, and
applied sanctions. The court ordered the least possible power be used to end the dispute,
and therefore denied sanctions resulting in seizure of federal highway funds on the basis
that these funds had no relationship to ELL students. The court granted injunctive relief
to ELL students being required to pass the AIMS test. The court also ordered that the
legislature had 15 days to comply with the court’s order. Every day after 15 days and up
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to 30 days, the court would fine the state $500,000 dollars a day. After 30 days, the state
would be fined $1,000,000 dollars a day for a period of 30 days or until the state
complied with the court order. Continuing, the state would be fined $1.5 million dollars a
day until compliance for another 30 days with the final phase of sanctions resulting in a
$2 million dollar a day fine until compliance. Defendants were also ordered to pay
plaintiff attorney’s fees (Flores v. State o f Arizona, 2005).
Once again, in May of 2008, the re-emergence of the Chapman case entered the
judicial arena. After seven years of litigation, a settlement agreement was reached in the
cases of Chapman v. California Department o f Education and Smiley, Lyons, Learning
Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department o f
Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District. The
Superior Court of California County of Alameda announced a settlement agreement
under the case name of Courtney Kidd et.al. v. California Department o f Education
(2008). In this agreement, the parties settled on the following terms:
1. The defendants would commission an independent study on the CAHSEE via an
external consultant.
2. The study would examine students with disabilities who did not pass the
CAHSEE with modifications and accommodations specified in their IEPs or 504
Plans as to why they did not pass the test.
3. The consultant would issue a report as to the results o f the study and any issues
discovered.
4. The report would put forth recommendations as to why the students did not pass
the CAHSEE with the use of accommodations and modifications and/or identify
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alternative means for students to demonstrate mastery of the content. {Kidd v.
California Department o f Education, 2008).
This settlement agreement marked the end of the Chapman case granting the use of
accommodations and modification on the CAHSEE for students with disabilities. It also
forwarded the study agreed to in Smiley and Chapman cases to seek alternatives to the
CAHSEE for students with disabilities.
One of the most recent cases brought before the courts occurred in the State o f
Minnesota regarding the case of Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The
Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School District Number 1. This case was
brought before the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in July of
2008. The students in this case were students at Lincoln High School, an alternative high
school in Minneapolis. Lincoln High School served students who were foreign-born, with
little formal education, and limited English language skills. The plaintiff students were
refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia who had fled their countries after having spent time
in refugee camps in Kenya. Students varied in ages from 14 to 20, and all had few to no
prior schooling experiences and very limited English language skills. The students were
required to pass the state-mandated tests in reading, math, and writing in order to
graduate high school. Two students passed the tests with accommodations similar to
those given to students with disabilities, two students passed the tests without
accommodations, and one other student passed the test but no indication was made as to
whether she received accommodations for testing. Eight other plaintiffs did not graduate;
seven failed all three competency tests. Several of these students were able to remain at
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the school past their 21st birthday despite the lack of additional funding for these
students.
Plaintiffs charged that the school lacked a quality curriculum, highly qualified
teachers, and failed to assess students for disabilities or assess their progress. In addition,
plaintiffs claimed that Lincoln High School did not attempt to provide an education to
overcome language barriers. The plaintiffs claimed that the school intentionally
discriminated against them, and sought injunctive relief to either forbid Lincoln from
engaging in any practice found to be unlawful or shut down the school. As five of the
plaintiffs had already graduated, and the remaining were too old to attend Lincoln or any
other public school, they did not have a standing for injunctive relief. The court found
that the plaintiffs lacked evidence that Lincoln High School intentionally discriminated
against them and served only students of the protected class, therefore, there were no
comparators available to prove discriminatory animus (Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln
High School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School District Number 1,
2008). Table 8 lists the cases adjudicated between the years 2000-2012.
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Table 8
Cases from 2000-2012
Date
2000

Case
G1 Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New York State
Education Department

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2002

Rene v. Reed

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2004

Hancock v. Driscoll

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2005

Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education

2007

Superior Court o f California County o f Alameda and Valenzuela v.
0 ’Connell

2008

Mumid et al, v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education
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Research Questions
Question One: What issues related to high stakes testing and the denial of diplomas
were revealed in state and federal case law within the 1979-2012 timeframe?
The controversy over high stakes testing resulted in unique situations for which
judicial intervention was requested. The courts determined the constitutionality of the
issues embedded in the testing policy while having to consider the overarching benefits
of public education. The following quote from a judicial ruling provided a cogent
rationale for the use of exit exams for determining whether a student had the necessary
knowledge and skills to become a productive member of our society.
A high school diploma stands for something more than testimony to the
fact that a student has attended that school for a given number of years.
In order for those in the academic field to know that a student has
obtained proficiency in any given subject, it would follow as a matter
of logic that there would have to be, and traditionally there always have
been, tests given to the students on the subjects on which they have
received instruction. {Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington
v. Brady, 1979)
Each case presented for judicial review contained valuable insight regarding the
implementation of exit exams as a requirement for earning a high school diploma. In the
content analysis of the case data, numerous themes emerged that illuminated consistent
issues that were presented to the courts. The cases with a direct or indirect nexus to the
issue were presented through a discussion of the uniqueness of each case and its specific
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judicial interaction regarding the issue. A summary of the issue followed the discussion
and included an explanation of each theme.
Due Process
One of the most prevalent concerns addressed in these high stakes testing cases
was the infringement of due process rights protected by the Constitution. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has protected citizens from the deprivation of life,
liberty, or property interests without due process of law (O’Neill, 2001). Twenty-five of
the cases involved due process complaints. Cases in which due process violation claims
were asserted addressed both procedural and substantive due process rights. The cases
which involved due process complaints were: Florida State Board o f Education and
Turlington v. Brady, (1979); Brady v. Turlington, (1979); Debra P. v. Turlington, (1979);
Wells v. Banks, (1980); Debra P v. Turlington, (May 1981); Debra P. v. Turlington,
(September 1981); Anderson v. Banks, Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); The Board o f Education
o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981);
Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, (1982, 1983); Debra P. v. Turlington,
(1983); Love v. Turlington, (1984); Debra P. v. Turlington, (1984); Johnson and Wilcox
v. Sikes, (1984); Williams v. Austin Independent School District, (1992); Crump v.
Gilmer Independent School District, (1992); Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
Education, (1997); Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, (1998);
GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f
Education, (2000); Rene v. Reed, (2001); Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, (2001);
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, (2002); Noon et al. v. Alaska State
Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District, (2004); Flores v. State o f
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Arizona, (2005); and O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006). The
courts ruled consistently on due process issues and relied heavily on the seminal case of
Debra P. v. Turlington.
The courts determined a due process violation, procedural or substantive, if it
found that the plaintiffs had a protected interest in what the defendant (state) sought to
limit or deny. Procedural due process guaranteed that procedures depriving property or
liberty interests were fair, of “how” a policy or law was implemented. In the argument
regarding high stakes testing, procedural due process protection ensured that adequate
notice was given to students regarding testing implementation and sanctions they may
incur based on the outcome of the testing. In addition, procedural due process referred to
the state’s authority to implement the testing policy but ensured that the actions of the
state were not implemented unconstitutionally. Substantive due process protection
guaranteed that the actions of government were not unreasonable, often referred to by the
courts as arbitrary or capricious.
In other words, substantive due process regarded the “why” in policy and law
implementation. In regard to high stake testing, the substantive due process protections
ensured that the test was fundamentally fair by being valid and providing that the students
had the opportunity to learn the material on the test. The case analysis illuminated
specific information regarding the interaction of due process protection and the
implementation of high stakes testing. The following discussion extrapolated the case law
regarding due process as per each case and the judicial interpretation of the law as it
pertained to the series of circumstances surrounding each case.
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State and Local Board Authority
The analysis revealed an issue closely related to that of nexus to state goals, the
state and local school boards’ authority to impose the testing requirements. Challenges to
state and local board authority have been presented in 14 of the cases. The cases
involving the state and local boards’ authority were Florida State Board o f Education
and Turlington v. Brady, (1979); Brady v. Turlington, (1979); Wells v. Banks, (1980);
Debra P. v. Turlington, (May and September 1981); The Board o f Education o f the
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, (1981);
Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, (1982, 1983); Triplett v. Livingston
County Board o f Education, (1994); Williams v. Austin Independent School District,
(1992); Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education,
(1994); Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, (1998); GIForum,
Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education,
(2000); Chapman v. California Department o f Education, (2002); Smiley, Lyons,
Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District
(2002); Student v. Driscoll (2002); Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al., (2004)
and Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California, (2005). The majority
of these cases involved the claim that the Local and State Boards of Education did not
have the authority to impose diploma sanctions on students who did not pass the state
mandated tests.
The first evidence of state authority in the case law appeared in the Florida State
Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady case of 1979. The District Court of Appeals
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rendered, “Implicit in such direction to the Commissioner of Education [was] granting to
him of the authority to determine scoring criteria” (p. 662). As this case was presented
regarding the Commissioner of Education’s determination of the scoring criteria of the
state test, the plaintiffs complained that the Commissioner did not have the authority to
determine the scoring standard. The District Court of Appeals clearly disagreed. In the
Wells v. Banks case of 1980, the appellants claimed that the local board exceeded its
power to require additional criteria for graduation. The Court of Appeals for Georgia
developed its conclusion based upon the statutory language embedded in the Code of
Georgia. The court determined, “Nowhere in that document [Code of Georgia] [was]
there any indication that local boards may not impose additional requirements” (p. 582).
Additionally, this case revealed the state’s support for local boards to establish
additional criteria as well as specific performance objectives and indicators ( Wells v.
Banks, 1980). The analysis revealed the chronology of the courts’ opinions regarding
states’ authority to regulate and determine the components o f their educational systems.
The Board o f Education Northport-East Northport Union Free v. Ambach case of 1981
presented the State of New York’s legitimate interest in, and, therefore the responsibility
of, providing public education to its citizens. “The State had a legitimate interest in
attempting to insure the value of its diplomas and to improve upon the quality of
education provided. The use of complacency testing to effectuate the goals underlying
those interests was within the discretion of the Board of Regents and the Commissioner
[of Education]” (Board o f Education Northport-East Northport Union Free v. Ambach, p.
835). The evidence presented in the Debra P. v. Turlington cases from 1979-1984
revealed that the courts’ disposition to the issue of state authority.
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“The state has determined that minimum standards must be met and that
the quality of education must be improved. We have nothing but praise for
these efforts. The state’s plenary powers over education come from the
powers reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment, and usually
they are defined in the state constitution. As long as it does so in a manner
consistent with the mandates of the United States Constitution, a state may
determine the length, manner, and content of any education it provides”
{Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981, p. 403).
Later, in September of the same year, the United States Court of Appeals added, “By and
large, public education in our nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities” {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981, p. 1084). The Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board o f Education (1982 & 1983) cases also referenced the state and local boards’
authority to enact policy pertaining to increasing graduation requirements. “The State
Board of Education has jurisdiction of this matter, [and the] Peoria Board of Education
has the right to impose reasonable additional standards for graduation with a regular high
school diploma” {Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983).
The Williams v. Austin Independent School District case of 1992 also provided
evidence of the courts’ support of die states’ authority regarding the imposition of an
exam as a diploma requirement. “The right of a free public education in Texas is a Texas
Constitutional right, and the level of education and academic achievement necessary to
obtain a diploma from a Texas high school was appropriately a judgment call for the
persons elected for that state responsibility and those experienced persons responsible for
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educating and preparing students to achieve the established level of competence”
{Williams v. Austin Independent School District, p. 256).
In the Triplett case (1997), the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the local
school board did have the authority to require all students to take the KIRIS test. The
decision was embedded in statutory law, allowing the State Board of Education to
promulgate state regulations in regards to high school graduation requirements.
Moreover, the state statutes mandated that the State Board of Education review the
requirements for high school graduation. Therefore, in this case, the appellate court ruled
in favor of the Livingston County Board of Education regarding its authority to impose
the graduation requirement of successful completion of the KIRIS {Triplett v. Livingston
County Board o f Education, 1997)
In Louisiana, a case was brought to the court from five plaintiff students who
claimed that the state mandated exit exam implemented in 1989 was invalid. The students
contended that the State Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education exceeded its
authority to implement the Graduation Exit Exam as the state legislature did not
specifically authorize an exit exam as a criterion for graduation. The court concluded that
the state board did not exceed its authority as the state constitution provided the board
with the powers of control over the state’s public schools {Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f
Elementary and Secondary Education, 1994).
In the decade beginning with the year 2000, courts provided further justification
for the states to impose exit exams as a criterion for graduation. In the year 2000, the GI
Forum case documents stated “Ultimately, resolution of this case turns not on the relative
validity of the parties’ views on education but on the State’s right to pursue educational
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policies that it legitimately believes are in the best interests of Texas students” (GI
Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f
Education, 2000, p. 672). The cases Chapman v. California Department o f Education
(2002), Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association
o f California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District (2002) acknowledge the state’s
traditional authority to establish diploma requirements. “The Court notes at the onset that
the State of California is afforded broad latitude in crafting public education policy and
setting standards for students and educators” (Chapman v. California Board o f
Education, 2004, p. 984).
In 2004, the Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. case stated that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts educated with state funds and those students were
subject to competency determinations as deemed appropriate by the Commonwealth,
“.. .the board may promulgate regulations as necessary to fulfill said purposes. Said
regulations shall be promulgated so as to encourage innovation, flexibility and
accountability to schools and school district” (p. 758). The court determined that the State
Legislature of Massachusetts approved the board’s use of the state exam (MCAS) as a
means of implementing the state’s Education Reform Act (Student 9 et al. v. Board o f
Education et al., 2004). The subsequent case of Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f
Education et al. (2005) referenced the state’s Education Reform Act as having
“strengthened the board’s authority to establish statewide education policies and
standards, focusing on objective measures of student performance and on school and
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district assessment, evaluation and accountability” {Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f
Education et al., p. 438).
The case of Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California (2005)
referenced the NCLB Act requiring states to assess students,

. .each state is required to

implement a ‘set of high-quality, yearly student academic assessments that will be used
as the primary means of determining the yearly performance’ of schools within the
state...” {Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California, p. 4).
The analysis also revealed that embedded in the states’ authority to implement
educational policy, was their responsibility to fund its public educational system. The
following cases involved issues of state funding as it regarded implementation of the exit
exams: Flores v. State o f Arizona, (2005); Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education
et al., (2005); and O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006). These
cases have been previously discussed, but the close connection of state funding to the
states’ authority to provide their young citizens with a public education was relevant.
Table 9 lists the cases, which included judicial information regarding the state and local
school boards’ authority to implement the testing policy.
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Table 9
State and Local Board Authority Cases
Date

Case

1980

Wells v. Bank.

1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al., v. Ambach

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2005

Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California.

Property Interest
The case law established that the expectation of graduation was a property interest
and therefore, was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Debra P. v.
Turlington (1979) case established the property right in graduation from high school if
students had fulfilled the requirements for graduation excluding the passing of the exit
exam. The United States Court of Appeals agreed in 1981 that students did indeed have a
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property right in the expectation of graduation. “It [was] clear that in establishing a
system of free public education and in making school attendance mandatory, the state
[had] created an expectation in the students...” {Debra P. v. Turlington, May 1981, p.
403). The understanding that if a student attended school for the required number of years
and passed the required courses, then he would receive a diploma to certify that the
requirements were met. “This [was] a property interest as that term [was] used
constitutionally” (1981, p. 404). This understanding between state and student established
an expectation that “supported] claims of entitlement to those benefits” (1981, p. 403) as
“graduation is the logical extension of successful attendance” {Debra P. v. Turlington,
1979, p. 266).
A student’s property interest was presented through judicial intervention in the
subsequent case law of due process claims. The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East
Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981) also supported the
precedent in which the courts proclaimed the property and liberty interest of receiving of
a diploma, and was the secondary source of case law on which the foundation of property
interest in a high school diploma was established.
In the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983), the court
supported due process protection in awarding diplomas. The Appellate Court for the
Seventh Circuit considered the property interests of the students who were required to
take the test and the impact that the denial of a diploma would have on their future. The
court addressed this impact more specifically by considering the effect on the student’s
reputation, the possibility of a stigma attached to the student, and the compounding affect
this stigma may have on future employment or educational opportunities. Furthermore,
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the court ruled that the plaintiffs had sufficient liberty interest in receiving their diplomas
and that due process protection was warranted (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f
Education, 1983). Similarly, the GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education
Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, (2000) case determined that due to
compulsory attendance laws, the State of Texas has created a student interest in the
receipt of a high school diploma. Although the plaintiffs did not prevail in this case, the
standard set by the court added further evidence of student property rights in the
expectation of a high school diploma (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education
Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education). Additionally, the case of Florida State
Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady (1979), the court referred to the student’s
“substantial interest” in passing subjects toward the goal of graduation (Florida State
Board o f Education and Ralph v. Brady, p. 3). The following table presents the cases in
which the court upheld a student’s property interest in receiving a high school diploma.
Table 10
Property Interest Cases
Case

Date
1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady

1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education
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Adequate Notice
As the courts established a property interest in the expectation of a high school
diploma, they determined that public school students had a protected right under the due
process clause. Procedural due process protections ensured that the student must have
received adequate notice prior to being denied a right or liberty. “The law demand[ed]
that a state provide, at minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard before it
deprive[ed] citizens of certain state-created protected interests” (GI Forum, Image de
Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000, p.
682).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established that a state
could not impose an exam as a graduation requirement without giving its students
adequate notice (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979). In Debra P, (1981) the court ruled
eighteen months was not adequate notice of the exam requirement. In the case of Brady v.
Turlington (1979), the plaintiff complained of due process violations on the grounds of
the retroactive application of the testing policy therefore lacking the required adequate
notice. The Court of Appeals held that the “rule exempted] from retaking the test those
who satisfactorily performed before the rule was adopted; and it did not irremediably
disadvantage those who did not so perform, for they [had] now have another opportunity
to do so” (Brady v. Turlington, p. 1165). The case of Wells v. Banks (1980) resulted in
judicial support for the educational agency in an adequate notice claim.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs were given more than adequate notice based
upon the evidence presented in the case, although the court documents did not reflect the
length of time given (Wells v. Banks, 1980). The GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
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Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education ruling indicated that the
students began taking the test in the third grade and were expected to pass the exit exam
beginning in the tenth grade. The period of time before sanctions began was actually
seven years. In addition, the students were given multiple opportunities to pass the test
before being denied a diploma. The court ruled that the Texas Education Agency had
provided adequate notice to the students as to the use and consequences of the test {GI
Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f
Education, 2000). In the case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport
Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, an expert in the area of competency testing
testified that notice to senior students who were to participate in competency testing as a
criteria for graduation should have been informed of the requirement as early as the
fourth or fifth grade {The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981). Further, the court, in this case, determined
that the denial of a high school diploma would have had negative consequences on the
students and their futures.
Therefore, the court held that early notice should have been given in order to
provide ample opportunity to prepare to pass the tests, however the court did not specify
the length of time. In Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981), the court discussion
focused on the plaintiffs’ claim of due process violations as regard to adequate notice.
The District court’s opinion held that two years was adequate notice if provisions existed
that the students had an opportunity to retake the test and receive remediation {Anderson
v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes).
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An indirect nexus to the issue of due process violations via high stakes testing and
the denial of a high school diploma was revealed in two cases regarding students’ right to
participate in graduation ceremonies. The theme of due process regarding adequate notice
was supported by the rulings in Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District (1992) and
Williams v. Austin Independent School District (1992). The analysis of these cases
revealed embedded due process issues as students who did not pass the state mandated
exams were denied the opportunity to participate in the graduation ceremony with their
peers.
In the two cases, close proximity of time and location, the courts ruled differently.
First was the case of Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District in May of 1992. In
this case, the court ruled that the student would not be awarded his diploma but would
suffer irreparable harm if not allowed to participate in the graduation ceremony. Based
upon the fact that the student may have had a legitimate claim regarding the due process
and adequate notice of the test, the court ruled that the student would have likely
succeeded on these merits. Therefore, the student was denied his diploma but was
allowed to participate in the graduation ceremony (Crump v. Gilmer Independent School
District, 1992). However, the next month, a father petitioned the court regarding the same
issue after reading about the proceeding case ( Williams v. Austin Independent School
District, 1992).
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas determined that based
on notification given to the student in a guide provided to all incoming high school
students and that the teachers frequently mentioned the requirement of the exam for
graduation, adequate notice had been given. Although the reference in the guide was to
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an earlier version of the exam, the judge ruled that the student knew that he would need
to pass some form of an exam in order to receive his diploma. A dispute about the
discrepancy in difficulty between the former and current version of the test was deemed
irrelevant, as increased rigor in examinations was not unconstitutional. “Students should
be given a fair opportunity to pass the test, not a guarantee that they will pass the test”
{Williams v. Austin Independent School District, p. 259). In this case, the courts ruled that
the student had adequate notice of the test, and would suffer no irreparable harm, as he
would have further opportunity to take and pass the test. The plaintiff was not awarded a
diploma and was not permitted to participate in the graduation ceremony. The court
determined that the public’s interest was best served by the court’s non-interference in
school matters, which were best addressed by the school district, the Texas legislature,
and the State Board of Education {Williams v. Austin Independent School District).
The due process claims for students with special learning needs were more
complex; the courts indicated that each student’s Individualized Education Plan (DEP)
specify the testing modifications and accommodations required to prepare for the exam.
As a result, students with disabilities claimed due process violations for the
implementation of a high stakes testing policy without adequate notice.
In reviewing the time frame requirement for notice it must be emphasized that
while these students participated in a program of instruction in the same basic subjects
taught to all students the methods and goals utilized were directed to their individual
needs therefore the time frame for notice to them is much more cmcial than that for nonhandicapped students in conventional programs. {The Board o f Education o f the
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981, p. 981)
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In the case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981), the court ruled in favor of the petitioners. In
this case, both students’ IEPs were designed to meet their educational goals, not to pass
the Basic Competency Tests mandated by the state. The court found that the notification
of the testing requirement was not given to the parents in a timely manner, violating an
EHA mandate that parents be notified of matters that affect their child’s education. The
notice of the requirement was given to the parents in April of 1979, prior to the expected
graduation date of June of 1979. As a result of the late notification, the students’ IEPs
would not have been adjusted to provide them the skills necessary to pass the exams.
Therefore, the New York State Supreme Court found the denial of a diploma to these
students would have been a deprivation of liberty, and upheld their due process protection
(The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et
al. v. Ambach).
In the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, (1982) eleven
students were denied diplomas as the result of a new testing policy requiring successful
completion of a standardized minimum competency test. The District Court ruled that the
denial of a diploma was not the denial of a free and appropriate education as mandated in
the EHA and supported the denial of the students’ diplomas. However, when this
graduation requirement policy was implemented, the students’ IEPs did not reflect plans
for preparing for the test and did not list the modifications or accommodations the
students would need in order to prepare for the test. The students appealed in the case o f
Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education in 1983. The appellate court ruled that the
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students had not received adequate notice and that the suggested remedy of remediation
would not be appropriate for the students.
Therefore, the court ruled that the state was in violation of procedural due
process, and ordered that students were exempted from the testing requirement and
ordered the state to award diplomas to these eleven students (Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board o f Education). A similar case, involving due process violations and students with
disabilities, was brought before the Indiana Courts to determine whether the successful
completion of the GQE as a requirement for graduation was constitutional, and whether it
was in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). In the case of Rene v.
Reed (2001), the plaintiffs filed a class action law-suit against the Indiana State
Superintendent claiming that the GQE requirement violated their due process rights to
adequate notice, as well as their rights under IDEA.
The case began in the Indiana trial court where the court mled in favor of the
state. The court ruled that the requirement was not an infringement of their rights, three
years notice was sufficient, the students were exposed to the curriculum, and additional
remediation was offered to prepare the students for the exam. The plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court ruled that three years notice was substantiated, as adequate time in
the prior case law. Further, the court ruled that the students had been exposed
appropriately to the curriculum. The court noted that although students with disabilities
learned at a slower pace than non-disabled students, the state had met the requirements of
notice and exposure along with multiple remedial opportunities. Interestingly, the
appellate court also “noted initially that the IDEA [did] not require specific results, but
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instead it mandate[d] only that disabled students have access to specialized and
individualized educational services” {Rene v. Reed, 2001, p. 745).
Further, the court found that the denial of a high school diploma to students with
disabilities who did not achieve the necessary level of proficiency to pass the GQE, was
not a denial of a free and appropriate education (FAPE). A non-related case provided
clarity in understanding the judicial perspective of high school graduation. A statement
from the courts regarding high school graduation and the relationship to a FAPE, found
in Brett v. Goshen Community School, noted that the “Supreme Court has refused to
equate graduation with a free appropriate public education because it [was] possible for
students to advance from grade to grade and graduate without receiving a free appropriate
public education” {Brett v. Goshen Community School, 2001, p. 943).
Several other cases were brought to court that involved due process claims. The
case of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981) supported the educational agency in
its mission to improve the quality of education through the means of minimum
competency testing. In this case, the plaintiffs complained of lack of adequate notice,
however the court disagreed and ruled that the “notice period of more than two years, the
provisions that the test may be retaken, and the provision of remedial courses considered
together [were] not constitutionally inadequate” {Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, p.
505). In 1980, Renita Love filed a complaint in the United States District Court claiming
that the students in Florida did not receive adequate notice of the denial of diploma for
students who failed the SSAT-II {Love v. Turlington, 1980). Later, the plaintiffs filed an
appeal for class action status partly based upon the due process claim, but were denied as
there was no commonality and typicality that existed {Love v. Turlington, 1984). In
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addition, the cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9, et al., v. Driscoll, et, al.,
(2004) included complaints of adequate notice; however, the cases were dismissed.
The Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education (1997) court case indirectly
indicated a violation of due process rights with the state’s notification of the requirement
during the year of implementation. The Kentucky Instructional Results Information
System (KIRIS) was first used to measure the performance of each district’s educational
program. However, in 1994, the Livingston County School Board adopted a policy
requiring students to pass all sections of the KIRIS in order to receive a diploma. The
Triplett’s claim was that adequate notice was not given to students in order to prepare for
the test. However, the appellate court held that the exam requirement did not serve to
prejudice the Triplett students, and that the test material was covered in the students’
normal academic program (Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997). In
the case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, (1998), due
process violations were brought forth, however during the proceedings the plaintiffs
abandoned their claim admitting that they had in fact received adequate notice of the
testing policy.
The case of Rene v. Reed was heard in the Court of Appeals in Indiana to dispute
the adequate notice of the state’s testing policy. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the
state violated due process adequate notice protections. The court ruled that the parents
and students had at least three years notice, based upon the precedent set in the Northport
case this length of time was determined to be adequate (Rene v. Reed, 2001). The case of
Chapman v. California Department o f Education (2002) also referenced the issue of due
process violations in that the plaintiff students with disabilities were unable to pass the
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CAHSEE test without the appropriate accommodations and modifications to allow them
to meaningfully participate in the testing. The students’ EEPs did not reflect the successful
completion of the CAHSEE; therefore, the students had not had adequate time to
implement their individualized learning goals. Although the adequate notice issue was
not directly addressed by the court, the plaintiffs prevailed and the court awarded them
the use of appropriate accommodations and modifications to retake the test (Chapman v.
California Department o f Education).
The Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. California Department o f
Education case (2006) indirectly contained an issue of adequate notice. The plaintiffs in
the case claimed that they were not given “a real opportunity to appeal in a timely and
meaningful manner” (p. 5). The court ruled that due to the plaintiff students not receiving
their scores on the LEAP test that they bore no injury considered concrete or
particularized. Instead, the likelihood of injury was considered hypothetical or conjecture.
Lastly, the O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County case in 2006 noted the
State of California’s attempt at reforming public schools similar to that of the State of
Massachusetts. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the State of California noted their
awareness that “the record in this case raise[ed] considerable doubt as to whether the
improvements in California schools required by the Williams settlement were sufficient,
at least in the immediate future, to give all students currently enrolled in high school an
adequate opportunity to prepare properly for the CAHSEE” (O ’Connell v. The Superior
Court o f Alameda County, p. 1483).
As the above case details disclosed, the courts have clarified the interaction of
high stakes testing policies and violations of procedural due process protections. For the
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policy to be considered constitutional, the state and local school boards must have given
adequate notice to parents and students. The court supported two to three years as
adequate notice and consistently ruled as to the constitutionality of these terms o f notice.
Cases below involve due process claims based upon alleged adequate notice violations.
Table 11
Adequate Notice Cases
Date

Case

1979

Brady v. Turlington

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Love v. Turlington

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County
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Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process complaints occurred when the state allegedly violated a
student’s rights that were “so profoundly inherent in the American system of justice that
they cannot be limited or deprived arbitrarily” (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, 2000, p. 682). Substantive
due process protections ensured that the high stakes testing policies were not
implemented in an unreasonable or arbitrary way that would compromise student rights.
The analysis of these cases revealed the consistencies in the court rulings as well as some
unique decisions that contrasted with the majority of rulings. The results of the analysis
were presented below, with details of each case specifically relating to substantive due
process claims.
Legitimate Goals of the State
The major component embedded in substantive due process claims was whether
the test was linked to the legitimate goals of the state. A policy that was determined as a
close nexus to the legitimate goals of the state was less likely to be considered arbitrary
and capricious. In all cases where the use of the test was upheld, the courts determined
that the test was either an educational necessity or bore a manifest relationship to the
states’ legitimate educational goals, of providing or improving the states’ educational
systems.
The following case referenced the test’s nexus to the states’ objectives: Debra P.
v. Turlingjon (1979); Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady, (1979);
Wells v. Banks, (1980); Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); Crump v. Gilmer
Independent School District, (1992); Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and
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Secondary Education, (1994); Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, (1997);
New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New York State Education Department,
(2002); GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State
Board o f Education, (2000); Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f
California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District, (2002); Flores v. State o f Arizona,
(2005); Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al., (2005); Coachella Valley
Unified School District v. State o f California, (2005) and O ’Connell v. The Superior
Court o f Alameda County, (2006). As mentioned earlier in this paper, the judicial courts
were reluctant to become involved in the state’s authority to administer the public
education of its students. The courts carefully considered the goals of the state’s
educational program, and in every case, the court upheld the state’s authority to improve
its educational system.
The case analysis revealed that the courts were consistent in upholding the policy
and the state’s authority to implement the test as a requirement for a diploma, if the
testing policy had a clear nexus to the state goals of improving the education of its
students, and the policy did not clearly and distinctly infringe on the rights of the
students. Table 12 depicts the cases involving substantive due process claims with a focus
on the legitimate goals of the state.
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Table 12
Legitimate Goals o f the State Cases
Date

Case

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1979

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas

2002

State Board o f Education
New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New York State

2002

Education Department
Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2005

Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

As the courts upheld states’ authority to implement a testing requirement, the
courts also upheld the nexus to state goals as a factor in determining whether the test was
fundamentally fair rather than arbitrary. The following discussion reflects the insights
from the analysis and the determination of fairness.
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Fundamentally Fair Test
A consistent theme throughout these cases was whether the test in question was a
fundamentally fair test. The courts’ determinations of whether the tests were
fundamentally fair were two pronged distinctions, as part of due process protections and
the equal protection guarantees. If the plaintiffs were not of a protected class of students,
the fundamental fairness issue was determined under the due process rulings. If the
plaintiff students were of a protected class, the rulings were held under the equal
protection ruling. In both instances the courts’ investigations in determining if a
particular test was fair and constitutional revealed two elements in the case law. The
tests’ fairness was determined by its validity, and nexus to the legitimate objectives of the
state. The nexus to the states’ legitimate interest in their individual educational systems
was discussed in an earlier section.
The issue of the validity of the tests was revealed in the analysis and is presented
in the following discussion. As illustrated in several of the cases, the courts went to great
measures to find evidence that the tests were valid, reliable, fair, and unbiased. The courts
also sought to determine whether the use of test results was to better student learning. For
students with disabilities, the complaints were more complex. The analysis revealed
specific information regarding high stakes testing and students with disabilities. The
following caveats emerged from the data regarding students with disabilities. First, the
standardized test must have been valid in measuring what it was intended to measure
without reflecting the students’ impairment. Second, the students must have had
meaningful access to the test (through accommodations) or the results were rendered
invalid as an assessment of student capabilities.
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Thirteen of the 39 cases presented in this analysis specifically addressed the
validity of the test to consider fairness. The courts gave consideration to the following
criteria to determine the fairness of state tests:
1. The development of the test.
2. The reliability of the test.
3. The evidence that material on the test was actually taught in the schools.
4. The test was free from bias.
5. The educational agency could prove that the test did not discriminate.
As discussed in previous sections, the first case involving substantive due process
claim that addressed the fairness of the test was the Debra P. v. Turlington case
beginning in 1979. In this case substantive due process violation claims focused whether
the material covered on the test was actually taught in Florida schools. The court ruled
that the curricular validity of the test had to be established prior to the denial of diplomas
to any students. The results of the case heard before the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida determined that the state met the burden of proof that the
test did indeed cover the material on the test (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983). This ruling
was upheld by The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 1984
(Debra P. Turlington, 1984), granting the state the right to deny diplomas to students
who did not successfully complete the test.
In 1981, the case of Anderson v. Bank; Johnson v. Sikes also brought forth serious
allegations of the state test, CAT, being unfair, racially biased, and the test lacked validity
and reliability. The court documents reflected that there were indeed serious issues with
the scoring of the tests and the tests curricular validity of the test remained in question.
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Therefore, the court ordered diplomas to the students who would have received them
excluding the requirement of the CAT (.Anderson v. Bank; Johnson v. Sikes).
The cases of Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District (1992) and Williams v.
Austin Independent School District (1992) presented contrasting court perspectives of
substantive due process violations. In Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District
(1992), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, ruled that the
denial of students’ diplomas violated due process protections based upon the
“considerable doubt” that the school district could prove that the material on the TAAS
was covered in the schools’ instruction (Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District,
1992, p. 556). The court held that as the school district’s administrators and teachers were
not allowed prior access to the material on the test, there would have been no way for
them to know if the material was actually covered during instruction. “The more vague
and broad the elements [of instruction] are, the less likely it is that the examination
questions would have specifically corresponded to the school curriculum” (Crump v.
Gilmer Independent School District, p. 556). In contrast, the Williams v. Austin
Independent School District case resulted in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas finding that the school district presented “substantial evidence”
that the student took courses which would have adequately prepared him to pass the
TAAS test ( Williams v. Austin Independent School District, 1992, p. 254).
In Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education (1997), the plaintiffs
complaint included allegations that the test used by the State of Kentucky (KIRIS) was
unreliable, subjective, and arbitrary. The court ruled that the purpose of the exam was to

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

147

assure student achievement, and under strict scrutiny, the test fulfilled the state’s interest
in the improvement of the educational system (1997).
In the year 2000, the GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency
and the Texas State Board o f Education case was presented. The plaintiffs in this case
also complained of violations of substantive due process rights on the grounds of
curricular validity. The evidence presented to the court included expert witnesses that
testified as to the soundness and fairness of the test. Other testimony included expert
analysis as to the validity and reliability of the test. The court ruled that the test
effectively measured mastery of learner skills. Furthermore, the Texas Education Agency
proved that the administration of the test was an educational necessity with a manifest
relationship to the legitimate goals of the state. Therefore, the court ruled that the TAAS
did not depart from academic norms for curricular validity with a “sufficient degree of
reliability,” and that the disparities resulting from the administration of the test were not
due to flaws in the test itself (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency
and the Texas State Board o f Education, p. 682). In addition, the court held that the
students in the State of Texas had sufficient opportunity to learn the material on the test
due to the remedial efforts in place and the multiple opportunities to retake the test (GI
Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f
Education).
One year later, the case of Rene v. Reed (2001) was brought to the Court of
Appeals in Indiana with a request for declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Graduation Qualifying Exam. The plaintiffs were students with special needs who
claimed that the state violated their due process rights by requiring them to be tested on
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material that they did not have an opportunity to learn. The plaintiff students with
disabilities argued that the curriculum had not been realigned after the testing
requirement and they, as students with disabilities, needed more time to prepare for the
test as opposed to regular education students. The court found, however, that the students
did not present compelling evidence that the test was not aligned to state standards, and
that, given multiple remedial opportunities, the students were most likely exposed to the
content covered on the test. The court did note however that the students would have
benefited from an earlier adjustment of their curriculum through their IEPs {Rene v. Reed,
2001 ).

The analysis revealed two cases that involved the determination of the
fundamental fairness of tests used to assess students with disabilities. The Brookhart v.
Illinois Board o f Education (1983) and the Chapman v. California Department o f
Education (2002) cases identified three issues pertaining to testing students with special
learning needs. First, the test must have been valid in measuring what it was intended to
measure without reflecting the students’ impairment. Second, the students must have had
the opportunity to meaningfully participate. Lastly, the courts required evidence as to the
curricular validity of the test. The analysis revealed these consistencies when the courts
sought to determine the constitutionality of high stakes testing policies and students with
disabilities.
The case of Flores v. State o f Arizona (2005) provided an interesting example of
limiting students’ rights to educational programs. In this case, the state legislature was
ordered by the court to fully fund the English Language Learners (ELL) program, which,
at the time, was illegally underfunded. The court held the legislature in contempt, and
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ruled that the state had violated students’ substantive due process rights in limiting their
access to an education. In this case, the court found that ELL students had not had a fair
opportunity to learn the material on the Arizona Instrument to Measure Standards
(AIMS) test due to inadequate funding of the state’s ELL program. The penalty ordered
by the court until the state complied with court orders were as follows: $500,000 a day
for each day after fifteen days until compliance (up to thirty days); $1,000,000 a day for
each day thereafter for up to thirty days; $ 1,500,000 a day for each day thereafter up to
another thirty days, and a stunning $2,000,000 a day thereafter until compliance {Flores
v. State o f Arizona, 2005).
The class action case of Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon (2001) also
addressed the curricular validity of the state mandated test for students with special
needs. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the state test was not valid for students with
disabilities in the respect that the State Board of Education did not consider students with
disabilities when formulating the exams {Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001).
Similarly, the case of Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District (2004), addressed the curricular validity of the High School Graduation
Qualifying Exam, and its use for students with disabilities. Both of these cases were
settled out of court with supporting evidence indicated in each settlement agreement
{Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001; Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f
Education and the Anchorage School District, 2004).
The cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education
et al (2004) claimed that the MCAS test was unfair, as it did not measure specifically the
core context classes mandated in the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993. The

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

150

students complained that the test did not cover the subject areas mandated in the Act and
that the competency of a student to be measured by a variety of assessment instruments
as stated in the Act. The court found that the students did not show likelihood of
irreparable harm in the degree needed to obtain a preliminary injunction {Student 9 et al.
v. Board o f Education et al).
In the case of O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda Court (2006), the
plaintiff, Superintendent of Public Instruction O’Connell, filed suit against the Superior
Court of Alameda County to petition the Appellate Court for a writ of mandate to vacate
the court ordered preliminary injunction restraining the California Board of Education
from denying diplomas to students who did not pass the CAHSEE. The court found that
the appropriate remedy for the state requirement of successful exit exam completion to
receive a diploma was to provide both the opportunity to leam a curriculum aligned to the
test requirements, and free remedial support for those who did not pass. The court held
that if the state met these provisions, there would be no due process violations in the
context of state exit exam requirements (O ’Connell v. Superior Court o f Alameda
County, 2006). That same year, 2006, the case of Californians for Justice Education
Fund v. State Board o f Education was settled with court documents reflecting a published
study, which included concerns regarding the fairness of the test for students who had not
been adequately prepared for the test by the public school system. This report also
included recommendations and suggestions for the Board to consider when deciding
whether to defer the implementation of the CAHSEE {Californians fo r Justice Education
Fund v. State Board o f Education).
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The analysis of data revealed the courts strong support for the curricular validity
o f the tests to ensure that the students had adequate opportunity to learn the material
under the states’ individual public education programs. The table below references cases
that contained information regarding the fundamental fairness of the tests.
Table 13
Fundamentally Fair Test Cases
Date

Case

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1997

Triplett v. Livingston Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education.

2001

Rene v. Reed

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education.

2004

Student 9 et al., v. Board o f Education et al.

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. Board o f Education

2006

O ’Connell v. Superior Court o f Alameda County
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Multiple Opportunities to Test
In addition to a fundamentally fair test the analysis revealed specific information
regarding the students’ opportunities to retake the test multiple times in order to
successfully complete the diploma requirement. States often provided multiple
opportunities for students to retake the test in order to pass and receive their diplomas. In
the analysis, the following cases included information regarding multiple opportunities to
take the test: Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board o f Education, (1982); Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, (1984); Crump v. Gilmer
Independent School District, (1992); Williams v. Austin Independent School District,
(1992); Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education,
(1994); GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State
Board o f Education, (2000); Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the
Anchorage School District State Board o f Education (2004), and Student 9 et al. v. Board
o f Education et al., (2004). Each of these cases mentioned that students had multiple
opportunities to demonstrate mastery of the tested material in order to earn their diploma.
Although multiple testing opportunities was not a featured issue presented to the courts,
the case law evidence supported the tests as being fundamentally fair and supportive of
due process protections. Table 14 lists the cases allowing multiple opportunities for
students to retake the tests.
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Table 14
Multiple Opportunities to Test Cases
Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education;

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas

2004

State Board o f Education
Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District State Board o f Education

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

Remediation
Similar to the multiple opportunities to take the tests, the efforts by the state to
provide remediation to students who were not successful on the test also enhanced the
states’ positions on due process safeguards. These cases included remedial efforts by the
state to support the students in their attempts at passing the tests. These efforts provided
further opportunities to learn the material on the tests and exemplified the states’ due
diligence to provide additional support to students before the denial of their diplomas. As
mentioned in the previous section, remediation was not a featured issue presented to the
courts, but was an axial code that emerged during the data analysis. The following cases
offered evidence of remediation to students were: Debra P. v. Turlington (1979);
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981); Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f
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Education (1983); Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, (1984); GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the
Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, (2000); Rene v. Reed,
(2001); Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al., (2004); Hancock et al. v.
Commissioner o f Education et al, (2005); Superior Court o f California County o f
Alameda and Valenzuela v. O ’Connell, (2007) and Mumidet al. v. Abraham Lincoln
High School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School District 1 (2008). The
safeguards of multiple opportunities to test and remedial opportunities, provided students
with the fair opportunity to successfully complete the requirements for earning their
diploma. These two components, along with the tests not being the sole criterion for a
diploma positioned the states for success against due process claims. Table 15 includes
the cases that referenced remediation in the case documents.
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Table 15
Remediation Cases
Case

Date
1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2007

Superior Court o f California County o f Alameda and Valenzuela v.
O ’Connell

2008

Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District 1

Sole Criterion for Denial of Diplomas
The analysis of the case law revealed that the policy was less likely to be found in
violation of due process protections if the test was not the sole criterion required for a
diploma. Other criteria, such as earned credits, attendance, and the successful completion
of projects, created a broader picture of student success or failure, preventing one
criterion as being the basis for denial of diploma. Of the cases analyzed, four specifically
addressed the use of high stakes exams as the sole criterion for denying a diploma. The
use of exit exams as the sole criterion for the awarding or denial of diplomas was not
supported in the analyzed cases. In fact, one case specified that the use of the tests as a
sole determinant was contrary to the current prevailing educational standards (GI Forum,
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Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education,
2000). The first case documenting the courts’ opinion regarding the sole criterion issue
was found in the Debra P v. Turlington case of 1979. In this case, the court documents
reflect that the state enacted a Pupil Progression Plan in which the legislature established
three criteria for graduation. However, two of the three criteria included the successful
completion of a state mandated test. The first criterion was the satisfactory performance
on the functional literacy test, and the second was the mastery of basic skills as measured
by the state test. The cases of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981) and Johnson
and Wilcox v. Sikes (1984) noted the compulsory attendance laws mandated attendance as
a criterion for graduation. In the Flores v. State o f Arizona and GI Forum, Image de Tejas
v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education cases, the
defendants’ posture highlighted that the use of the state test was not used as a sole
criterion for diploma decision-making. The Flores case documents a “number of
graduation requirements.. .a minimum number of credits that students must successfully
complete” (Flores v. State o f Arizona, p. 1116).
Additionally, the Defendant State of Arizona enacted legislation that would
enable students to apply grades earned in some high school classes to “augment their
AIMS test scores” {Flores v. State o f Arizona, p. 1117). The GI Forum, Image de Tejas v.
the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education (2000) case
specifically addressed the educational practice of a single criterion for denial of diplomas,
“Current prevailing standards for the proper use of educational testing recommend[ed]
that high stakes decisions, such as whether or not to promote or graduate a student,
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should not be made on the basis of a single test score” {GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the
Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, p. 674-675).
Further, the case provided the requirements for a diploma in Texas as three
separate and independent criteria: successful completion of the TAAS, attendance, and
course success as demonstrated by a score of 70 percent (2000). Brookhart v. Illinois
State Board o f Education (1983) used the multiple criteria for a diploma as evidence that
the use of a standardized test diploma as criteria did not deny students with special needs
a free and appropriate education. The case of Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary
and Secondary Education (1994) mentioned the supplemental requirement of 23
Carnegie units in addition to the state exam for the receipt of a diploma. Similarly, the
case o f Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New Americans,
and Special School District Number 1 (2008) made clear Minnesota’s diploma criteria of
earned credits in addition to the state mandated tests. In the Crump v. Gilmer Independent
School District (1992) and Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education (1997)
cases, the courts implied other criteria required for a diploma in the statement
“.. .plaintiffs Crump and Jeffrey ha[d] successfully completed all other requirements for a
high school diploma” {Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District, 1992, p. 553), and
that Chad Triplett had fulfilled all requirements for a diploma {Triplett v. Livingston
County Board o f Education 1997).
Lastly, the case of O ’Connell v. the Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006)
indicated that the same state legislation that created the CAHSEE in California also
required the State Board of Education to conduct a study of other “criteria by which high
school pupils who are regarded as highly proficient but unable to pass the CAHSEE may
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demonstrate their competency” (p. 1460). Neither party in this case disputed that the state
did not adopt any other criteria for the receipt of a diploma. Despite the lack o f other
criteria for the awarding of diplomas, the educational agency prevailed in this case. In
summary, the data revealed evidence that overall the tests were not used as the sole
criterion for graduation. Table 16 lists the cases that referenced the test as a sole criterion
for the awarding of a diploma. Table 17 presents a summary of all the cases involving
due process claims.
Table 16
Sole Criterion fo r Denial ofDiplomas Cases
Case

Date
1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

Table 17
Summary Case Law Regarding High Stakes Testing Due Process Claims
Case

Date
1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1979

Florida State Board o f Education v. Brady

1980

Wells v. Banks

1980

Love v. Turlington

1981

Debra P v. Turlington
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Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois Board o f Education

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois Board o f Education

1984

Besterv. Tuscaloosa

1984

Love v. Turlington

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2004

Student 9 et al., v. Board o f Education et al.

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County;

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education

2008

Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District 1

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education
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Equal Protection Clause Violations
The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal protection to all citizens. The equal
protection clause ensured students the opportunity to learn, and non-discriminatory
educational practices. “A large concern of testing’s opponents is that tests may violate
students’ rights to ...Equal Protection” (Heise, 2009, p. 145). Some plaintiffs claimed
that they were subject to prior discriminatory practices such as segregation, or lack o f
preparation due to tracking or ability. The plaintiffs claimed that the effects of these
practices created a disadvantage for these students and that their opportunity to learn was
compromised. The courts examined the cases carefully under strict scrutiny, and in most
cases ordered injunctions granting relief to these students from the application of the
testing policies.
Twenty of the cases included in this analysis incorporated the equal protection
clause in their complaint or arguments: Debra P. v. Turlington, (1979, 1981, 1983, 1984);
Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady, (\ 979); Wells v. Banks,
(1980); Anderson v. Banks', Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); The Board o f Education o f the
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, (1981); Johnson
and Wilcox v. Sikes, (1984); Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and
Secondary Education, (1994); Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, (1983);
Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, (1998); GI Forum, Image
de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, (2000);
Rene v. Reed (2001); Chapman v. California Department o f Education, (2002); Smiley,
Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California
Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School
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District, (2002); Flores v. State o f Arizona, (2005); O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f
Alameda County, (2006); Kidd v. California Department o f Education (2008); and
Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and
Special School District Number 1, (2008).
The seminal case in high stakes testing litigation, Debra P. v. Turlington (1979),
was brought to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa
Division in July of 1979 challenging the state’s Functional Literacy Examination
claiming that the testing policy violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
plaintiffs requested an injunction on the practice of requiring the exam as criteria for
awarding a school diploma as well as on the practice of utilizing the results as a
component in structuring remediation classes, which was interpreted by the plaintiffs as
an attempt to re-segregate public schools (1979).
The plaintiffs’ claims asserted that the state designed and implemented a test that
was racially biased, and violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. In
addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the use of the test for structuring a remediation
program supported the re-segregation of public schools, thus violating the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of future students who may fail the state mandated exam. The court
evidence revealed a disparity between minority student and white student pass rates,
indicating lingering vestiges of the previously segregated schools. This was a significant
factor in the court’s ruling (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979).
On appeal to the district court in May of 1981, the appellants complained that the
court erred in its ruling that the testing policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
those students did not have a property interest in the awarding of a diploma. Although the
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court noted the state’s responsibility for maintaining minimum standards and improving
the quality of education, the court found that the test’s curricular validity could not be
established. Upon this conclusion, the courts considered the test fundamentally unfair to
the students, resulting in violation of their equal protection and due process rights (Debra
P. v. Turlington, 1981).
In 1983, the case came back to the District Court on remand from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The original injunction of 1979 was to
expire and the plaintiffs challenged the state again on the same grounds. The court ruled
that the vestiges of past discrimination were no longer present. Therefore, the state could
begin to deny diplomas to students who did not pass the state mandated test {Debra P. v.
Turlington, 1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld
this decision in 1984 {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1984).
The class action case of Debra P. v. Turlington (1979) was filed partially on
violation of equal protection claims based upon the statistical evidence indicating the
results of the 1977 administration of the state test, SSATII. Seventy-eight percent of
African-American students failed one or both sections of the test compared to 25%
failure of white students. The 1978 administration resulted in similar percentages of
students of color failing. Overall, the failure rate among students of color was ten times
that of Caucasian students. The primary claims in this case were that the requirement of
the SSAT II “perpetuate[ed] and reemphasize[ed] the effects of past purposeful
discrimination” (1979, p. 250), and that the test was racially biased.
In addition, the plaintiff students claimed that the higher percentage of minority
students failing the test was foreseeable and probable, and the Florida State Board of
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Education was aware of the adverse consequences on vulnerable populations. Analysis of
test data revealed that “race more than any other factor, including social-economic status,
[was] a predictor of success on the test” (p. 257). Under these circumstances, the court
ruled that utilization of the test as a requirement for a high school diploma was a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. The claim of racial bias of the test
instrument itself was not proven by the plaintiffs, and therefore was ruled to be of
minimal threat to the test.
In the case of Wells v. Banks (1980), plaintiff students claimed that the local board
of education’s requirement of successful completion of the state test as a criterion for
diploma was a violation of their equal protection rights. The students claimed that the
requirement imposed by the local board resulted in them being treated differently than
other students in the State of Georgia. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs and found
that the local board was acting within its statutory authority to impose additional diploma
requirements; other local boards in the state could choose to employ other requirements
as well (Wells v. Banks).
Similarly, in the class action case stemming from the previously mentioned case,
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981), plaintiff students claimed that the diploma
requirement violated their equal protection rights. Statistical analysis of the testing data
indicated that race was a “potent predictor” of success on the test (p. 488). In addition,
student placement in classes for mentally retarded students exceeded the national average
in Tattnall County, Georgia. The national average of placement in classes for mentally
retarded students was 2.3% while in Tattnall County; the average student placement was
7.7%. The pattern of placing students of color in classes for mentally retarded was
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“grossly disproportionate” (p. 496). The equal protection violation claim presented in this
case was two-pronged. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the diploma policy violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, and second the policy perpetuated prior de jure segregation (p.
498). The court found that the policy itself was implemented without racial animus and
that the higher percentage of black students failing the test was “foreseeable but not
foreseen” (p. 499). However, the court determined that the policy could be considered
independently of previous segregation, and that the grouping of students created a “potent
predictor” of success on the test (p. 500). Furthermore, the court deemed the tracking
system employed by the school district as unconstitutional (Anderson v. Banks; Johnson
v. Sikes).
In another case, The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al. v. Ambach, (1981), the local Board of Education brought the
Commissioner of Education for the State of New York before the Supreme Court of New
York to validate the diplomas of two students with disabilities. The State Board of
Education revoked the students’ diplomas when it was revealed that the students did not
pass the state competency exam. The court ruled that these students were entitled to
protections under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but the requirement that
they pass the test did not violate their equal protection rights. The court determined that
they were guaranteed the right to participate in the test without discrimination, but were
not guaranteed to succeed on the test. However the court enjoined the state from revoking
the diplomas on the basis of a due process violation, that the students would be deprived
of their liberty and property interests should they not receive a diploma and would suffer
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adverse effects on their futures if they did not receive their diploma (The Board o f
Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach).
Once again, the Debra P. v. Turlington case emerged in the courts in 1981. This
time the case was the result of a request for federal judges to reconsider the case in which
the majority voted not to review. In one of the two dissenting opinions, Circuit Judge
Tjoflat, commented on the previous ruling of the case. In his opinion, he commented that
the “federal court has told the State of Florida that it is constitutionally required to award
diplomas to students who are functionally illiterate” (p. 1080). In addition, Judge Tjoflat
wrote that the federal court also found it “constitutionally impermissible for the State of
Florida to presently require the same level of functional literacy from black and white
high school students” (p. 1081). In his dissention, Judge Tjoflat disagreed with the prior
court’s ruling that the “state’s requirement perpetuated past racial discrimination was an
affront to the principles underlying the landmark case of Brown v. Board o f Education ”
(p. 1081). In 1984, Debra P. v. Turlington was appealed before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals review of the case upheld the
district court’s ruling establishing the curricular validity of the test, that there was no
causal link to the disproportional number of failures among black students and the
vestiges of past segregation practices, and that the use of the SSAT II as a diploma
sanction would ultimately remedy the vestiges of past segregation. Therefore, on these
grounds, the Court of Appeals ruled that the State of Florida could begin denying
diplomas to students who did not pass the exam in the year 1983 (Debra P. v. Turlington,
p. 1417).
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In the same year, Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes (1984) was brought before the U.S.
District Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for review. The appellants claimed that
the court misinterpreted prior case law regarding equal protection claims in the earlier
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981) case. The judges denied the request for
review on the grounds that the district court had not yet entered an order or final
judgment permitting the school boards to reinstate the exam requirement. All students
who were formerly denied a diploma were awarded diplomas by the Tattnall County
School District as a result of the Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes ruling. The court
ruled that this case was not ripe for appellate review.
In January of 1983, a case involving students with learning disabilities was
brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The eleven
plaintiff students in Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983) claimed the
application of MCT requirement for students with disabilities violated their equal
protection rights. The Appellate court ruled that the students did not have a standing on
equal protection claims solely on the basis of the test requirement. The court ruled that
the requirement was not a violation on the grounds that students with disabilities who are
“incapable of attaining a level of minimum competency will fail the test” (Brookhart v.
Illinois State Board o f Education, p. 184). Further the court determined that altering the
test to accommodate the inability of students with disabilities to leam the content tested
would be a “substantial modification and a perversion of the diploma requirement” (p.
184).
Further, a “student who [was] unable to leam because of his handicap [was]
surely not an individual who is qualified in spite of his handicap” and the denial of
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diploma as a sanction for not successfully completing the MCT [was] not discriminatory
(p. 184). In the last component of the claim, the plaintiffs contended that the test must
have been validated for students with disabilities to determine that the test was suited to
the purpose for which it was intended as to the particular population of students. The
court decided against issuing an order to the school board to validate the test for the
plaintiffs on the grounds that such an order may have affected the validity of the test
when applied to all handicapped students. The court noted that the school district had
provided free remedial courses to special education students to provide another
opportunity for the plaintiffs to be exposed to the curriculum and leam the material.
Moreover, the court advised future students with disabilities to “bypass the courts and
enroll in those courses when necessary” (p. 188). Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs and ordered the school district to award diplomas to the eleven students
{Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education).
It was over a decade before the next case was brought to the courts. This case was
brought before the Court of Appeals of Louisiana by five public school students who
failed to pass the state Graduation Exit Exam (GEE). The complaint of equal protection
violations was based upon the state’s lack of the same requirement for students in non
public schools, who were homeschooled, or were pursuing a GED. The previous trial
judge ruled that due to the uneven application of the requirement as a criterion for
awarding a diploma it was a violation of the equal protection clause. However, the
appellate court mled that the lower court erred in its judgment and that the State Board of
Education did not have the right to dictate the curriculum requirements in non-public
schools. The appellate court vacated the preliminary injunction against the school district
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from denying diplomas {Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education, 1994).
Four years later, the case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School
District (1998) was filed in United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
The plaintiff in this case was a 16 year old who had previously attended the Buffalo
Independent School District until her seventh grade year. She transferred to an
unaccredited private school during her eighth grade year. She later transferred back to the
school district in the middle of her junior year. The district’s policy on students
transferring from a non-accredited school required students to take an exam to
demonstrate proficiency in each of the subject areas in order to transfer the credits to the
public high school. The court ruled that this policy did not infringe on a fundamental
right nor did it “burden a suspect class” (p. 1016); public education was not a
fundamental right, and parents who chose to educate their children in private schools
were not members of a suspect class. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the school
district to uphold the policy of uniform public school advancement and requirements a
diploma and issuance of a diploma {Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School
District, 1998).
The case o f Rene v. Reed was brought to the courts in 2001 with equal protection
violation claims by Meghan Rene based upon the contention that the state violated her
rights when she was unable to utilize accommodations during the administration of the
state test. In this case, the court determined that “an accommodation for cognitive
disabilities provided for in a students’ IEP must necessarily be observed during the GQE,
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or that the prohibition of such an accommodation during the GQE is necessarily
inconsistent with the EEP” (2001, p. 744).
In the class action case of Chapman v. California Department o f Education
(2002), the District Court for the Northern District of California ruled in favor of the
students after they sought an injunction from the state requiring them to pass the
CAHSEE in order to receive their diploma. The plaintiffs in this case were high school
students identified as students with special needs and were served by accommodations
and modifications in their Individual Education Plans (IEPs). These students were unable
to meaningfully participate in the statewide assessment due to their disabilities. However,
the state had no other means of alternate assessment available for these students to
demonstrate their academic achievement. The students were entitled to accommodations
and modifications under IDEA to participate in statewide assessments. This court relied
on United States Department of Education Memorandum Guidance on Including Students
with Disabilities in Assessment Programs, to guide them in their ruling in favor of the
students on two parts.
First, students with IEPs should be assessed with appropriate accommodations
and modifications necessary to demonstrate their academic success, or in the case of the
accommodations and modifications being inadequate to assess student learning, an
alternate assessment must be given. The second action taken by the court was to address
the timeliness of the assessment and the development of the IEPs, as to whether the
students would have sufficient time or notice to prepare for the CAHSEE. The court ruled
that the students had a “dignity interest” in full participation of the educational process
and therefore would need to participate in assessment {Chapman v. California
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Department o f Education, 2002, p. 10). In addition, the State of California was ordered to
develop an alternate assessment to protect the rights of students with special needs. Until
then, students identified with special learning needs could participate in the assessment if
they so choose. This case was brought back to the courts in 2002 under the case Smiley,
Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California
Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School
District. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard the case as an
appeal of the previously mentioned case, Chapman v. California Department o f
Education. The Appellate Court upheld the ruling granting students with disabilities the
right to take the CAHSEE with the appropriate accommodations and modifications
specified in their IEPs. Challenges to the waiver provisions were deemed unripe for
adjudication as future harm claims, as they may not occur as anticipated.
However, the waiver process and embedded uncertainty of receiving a waiver,
burdened the students’ rights to participate in the exams by “forcing them to choose
between forgoing the use of modifications or risk the denial of a waiver” {Smiley, Lyons,
Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District,
2002, p. 781). Therefore, the appellate court reversed, in part, the sections regarding the
granting of waivers. The court also reversed the section regarding the voluntary
participation in the test until an alternate assessment could be implemented, and
remanded these sections back to the District Court for dissolution {Smiley, Lyons,
Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department
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o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District,
2002).
Other cases have been brought to the courts for judicial support for the equal
protection clause guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment (Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board o f Education, 1983; Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984; Love v. Turlington, 1984;
Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education, 1994). The case of
Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady (1979) mentioned equal
protection although it was not claimed in the plaintiffs complaint. The court ruled that
the scoring standard set by the Commissioner of Education Ralph Turlington was applied
evenly to all students in the state, and therefore was not discriminatory (1979) Although,
equal protection complaints were not a featured issue, the court documents included
specific language claiming that the plaintiffs complaints were not based upon
discrimination. The court noted, “We do not have here a case of discrimination in which
the test required of one student was not required of all others. We do not have a situation
where one’s test papers were graded any differently than all other students in the State of
Florida similarly situated” (p. 663). In Wells v. Banks (1980), the court ruled that the
diploma requirement was uniformly applied to the entire county, and that the plaintiff
students were not treated any differently than other students in the county. Although the
court did note that other students in the state were not subjected to the diploma
requirement, the decision to implement the additional requirement was within the
authority of the local boards of education. While other boards had opted not to implement
the additional requirement, the students were not being subjected to arbitrary or
discriminatory practices ( Wells v. Banks, 1980).
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The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School
District et al. v. Ambach (1981) was the next case to address the issue o f equal protection.
In this case, the two students with disabilities were awarded their diplomas. However, the
state sought to revoke their diplomas as the students had not successfully completed the
state mandated assessment prior to receiving their diplomas. The court considered the
equal protection allegations and determined that the students were not denied their equal
protection rights as the applicability and implementation of the BCT test was rationally
related to the state’s interest in education (The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East
Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981).
The next series of cases included equal protection complaints against the Tattnall
County School District protesting the application of the school district’s testing
requirement (Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981; Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes,
1984). The initial complaint resided in the Wells v. Banks case discussed previously. The
Wells v. Banks case was later “restyled” as Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981, p.
476). The Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes case was brought forth by Kathy Norris Johnson
as a request to consolidate her case with Wells v. Banks. The consolidation of these cases
resulted in a class action complaint brought forth by minority students claiming that the
test violated their equal protection rights. As many schools in the south had been
previously segregated, lingering effects of the dual systems were still apparent. The
plaintiff students claimed that the test had a disproportionate negative impact on black
students in Tattnall County Georgia.
The court considered two aspects in the plaintiffs’ complaint. The first was
whether the diploma policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The second aspect was
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whether the diploma policy perpetuated the prior de jure segregation. The court ruled that
the CAT test was a diploma requirement implemented without racial animus, despite the
disproportionate impact on black students. The racial impact was not intentional
discrimination; however, the diploma policy itself was under scrutiny in the light of the
past discriminatory practices. In the school system, students were placed unfairly into
classes based upon test scores with the lower classes not being exposed to the same
curriculum as the higher classes. On the basis of this system, the CAT perpetuated
discrimination as a result of the tracking system. Therefore, until the school system could
present evidence to the court that the effects of previous segregation were eradicated; the
diploma policy was in violation of the equal protection clause (1981). The case came
under appeal as Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes in 1984. The plaintiffs again challenged the
use of the exit exam to deny diplomas to students who did not pass the CAT test in
Tattnall County Georgia. The United States Court o f Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the case on the grounds that the students, who in the original case had been
denied their diplomas, had received their diplomas and no current injury needed to be
resolved by the court (1984).
The case of O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006) was
filed by plaintiff students claiming that they did not have the educational resources
necessary to pass the CAHSEE. The opportunity to leam aspects of this case resided in
the California Legislature’s appropriation of 20 million dollars in supplemental funding
to be distributed to the school districts with the highest percentage of students who did
not pass the CAHSEE. Schools that received funding had a failure to pass rate of at least
28% and received 600 dollars per student who had not yet passed the test. The plaintiffs
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filed a class action suit in the San Francisco Superior Court requesting a writ of mandate,
and for declaratory and injunctive relief upon the grounds that the supplemental funding
was arbitrary.
The San Francisco Superior Court granted the plaintiffs request enjoining the
state from denying diplomas to students who had otherwise met all requirements for a
diploma except passing the CAHSEE. The court also permitted the students to participate
in graduation ceremonies upon the claim that the state funding violated the students’
equal protection rights. The Appellate Court, however, ruled that the funding was not
arbitrary and in fact commended the legislature for its efforts to “ensure that all available
funds were allocated to those districts most in need...” (O ’Connell v. The Superior Court
o f Alameda County, 2006, p. 1467). Unfortunately, the number of students who did not
pass the test was larger than anticipated and the funding was inadequate to provide the
plaintiff class members from receiving the remedial instruction to pass the test.
The Appellate Court ruled that the issue brought before them was to determine if
the legislatively mandated funding was arbitrary. They found that it was not, and
therefore did not violate any student rights (O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda
County, 2006). As the data analysis revealed, the case law contained, multiple variances
in the interpretation of the interaction of the testing policy for a diploma and students’
equal protection rights. The O ’Connell case, as well as the previous nested cases, was
finally settled under the case name Kidd et al., v. California Department o f Education et
al. (2008). The parties in the cases consented to settle the case under an agreement
specifying requirements for the state to study students in 12th grade who had not
successfully completed the CAHSEE despite the use of accommodations and
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modifications. If the study found that the students were unable to demonstrate their
knowledge through the administration of the CAHSEE, then an alternative means would
be explored (.Kidd et al., v. California Department o f Education et ah). Equal protection
violations claims were substantial in the case law regarding the denial of diplomas to
students who did not successfully complete the state mandated testing. Table 18
references those cases that involved judicial information regarding the equal protection
clause.
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Table 18
Equal Protection Clause Violations Cases
Case

Date
1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1979

Florida State Board o f Education v. Brady

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

Anderson v. Bank; Johnson v. Sikes

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

2008

Kidd et al., v. California Department o f Education et al.
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Curricular Validity
Another aspect of equal protection claims involved the issue for the students’
opportunity to leam the material for the test. As the issue of the fundamental fairness of
the tests was discussed as part of due process, this pertained only to cases involving
students of a protected class regarding the issue of curricular validity. The curricular
validity of the test involved whether the material on the test was actually taught in the
schools and that the students had a fair opportunity to leam the material. The case
analysis revealed the court’s consideration of curricular validity as an equal protection
dominant issue if the students who were denied their diploma were from a protected class
of students.
The first case involving a complaint of equal protection regarding curricular
validity was the Debra P. v. Turlington (1979) case. In this case, equal protection claims
focused on whether the material covered on the test was actually taught in Florida
schools. In the initial case, the court ruled that the state could not prove that the material
on the test was actually taught in the state’s schools. The court ruled that the curricular
validity of the test had to be established prior to the denial of diplomas to any students.
Later the case was heard before the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida to determine whether the state had met the burden o f proof that the test did indeed
cover the material on the test {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981; 1983). The evidence
provided by the state confirmed that the test covered the material taught in the schools.
The next year, this mling was upheld by The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in 1984 {Debra P. Turlington, 1984) granting the state the right to deny
diplomas to students who did not successfully complete the test.
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The case of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981) resulted in the court
finding for the students as the state had not met the burden of proof that the material
covered on the test was part of the adopted curriculum. On these grounds, the court
determined that the requirement of the test for a diploma had violated the substantive due
process clause, and ordered that the students be awarded their diplomas. In addition, the
court ruled that “no exam policy [could] be utilized until it [was] demonstrated that the
test used [was] a fair test of what [was] taught” (Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes,
1981, p. 512). Similar to the Debra P. case, this ruling was later overturned by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1982 finding that the state
had met its burden of proof in an evidentiary hearing that the material tested on the
California Achievement Test adopted by the county, was indeed taught in the classrooms
in the county {Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984).
In 1992, the concurrent cases of Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District and
Williams v. Austin Independent School District offered conflicting rulings regarding the
curricular validity of the TAAS test in the State of Texas. In Crump v. Gilmer, the court
questioned the legality of the TAAS as the “school district must eventually make a
substantial showing to demonstrate the validity of the TAAS examination, and there is
little assurance that the district will be able to make this showing” (p. 556). However, in
the Williams case, the judge in this case, the defendants “presented substantial evidence
that McCallum High School provided, and Williams took, courses which adequately
prepared him to take and pass the TAAS” (p. 254).
Later in the same decade, the case of Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
Education (1997) was filed in Kentucky. The Triplett’s complaints regarding curricular
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validity was based upon claims that the KIRIS exam “[was] subjective and arbitrary,
therefore, lacks reliability in that it does not measure either the child’s or the schools
performance accurately” (p. 33). The court ruled that it was not the role of the court to
“judge the relative flaws or merits of the exam, but to adjudge whether its requirement
rises to the level of a constitutional or statutory violation” (p. 33). The court held that it
did not (Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education).
Another case presented in 2000 was the GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education. The plaintiffs in this case
complained of equal protection rights violations on the grounds of curricular validity.
Therefore, the court ruled that the TAAS did not depart from academic norms for
curricular validity with a “sufficient degree of reliability” and that the disparities resulting
from the administration of the test were not due to flaws in the test itself (GI Forum,
Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education,
2000, p. 682). In addition, the court held that the students in the State of Texas had
sufficient opportunity to leam the material on the test due to the remedial efforts in place
and the multiple opportunities to retake the test (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education).
One year later, the case of Rene v. Reed (2001) was brought to the Court of
Appeals in Indiana with a request for declaratory and injunctive relief from the state’s
Graduation Qualifying Exam. The plaintiff students were students with special needs who
claimed that the state violated their equal protection rights by requiring them to be tested
on material that they did not have an opportunity to leam. The plaintiff students with
disabilities argued that the curriculum had not been realigned after the testing
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requirement and they, as students with disabilities, needed more time to prepare for the
test as opposed to regular education students. The court, however, found that the students
did not present compelling evidence that the test was not aligned to state standards, and
that given multiple remedial opportunities the students were mostly likely exposed to the
content covered on the test {Rene v. Reed, 2001). The court did note however that the
students would have benefited from an earlier adjustment of their curriculum through
their IEPs {Rene v. Reed, 2001).
The case Chapman v. California Department o f Education was filed in 2002 and
revealed plaintiff complaints that the administration of the CAHSEE violated the
students’ rights in that the items on the test covered material they had not yet had the
opportunity to leam. The court found that the state’s evidence did not reveal that the
items on the test were not covered in the state’s curriculum. The court indicated that
“.. .the present state of the evidence does not reveal an asymmetry between what students
are taught and the material tested on the CAHSEE implicating due process concerns”
{Chapman v. California Board o f Education, 2002, p. 543). The case of O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006) included complaints that the “statutory
scheme creating the CAHSEE require [d] that the school curriculum be aligned to the
test” (p. 1476). The court held that the state’s educational reform efforts were designed to
ensure that all students who were enrolled in California’s public schools received an
adequate opportunity to prepare properly for the CAHSEE {O ’Connell v. The Superior
Court o f Alameda County). As the issue of curricular validity of the tests filtered through
the courts, the states’ refined their process of ensuring the material on the tests was
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covered in the educational programs offered to public education students. The cases in
which the curricular validity of the tests was discussed by the courts are listed below.
Table 19
Curricular Validity Cases
Case

Date
1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Chapman v. California Board o f Education

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

English Language Learners
Students who are identified as Limited English Proficiency have been required to
participate in state mandated testing in order to earn their high school diplomas. Due to
language barriers and inadequately funded programs, some o f these students have
struggled to pass the exit exams and have been denied their high school diplomas. In
several cases, the students and parents filed cases to improve the inequity of the programs
and to request court interference in the denial of the students’ high school diplomas. Six
cases were filed regarding English Language Learners (ELL). The first case was brought
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to the United States District Court District of Massachusetts in September of 2002.
Student v. Driscoll was a class action suit filed by plaintiff students challenging the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) test. The class action suit
included subclasses of students who were identified as Black/African American,
Hispanic, Limited English Proficient, students with disabilities, students attending
vocational technical education schools, and students in the Holyoke School District.
The majority of students who had not passed the MCAS test were members o f the
first four classes of minority, Limited English Proficient, students with disabilities, and
students attending vocational technical schools. The plaintiffs contend that the majority
of students who did not pass the test resided in poor school districts and attended lower
performing schools. The students in these schools were subjected to overcrowded
classrooms in districts with inadequate resources and inferior learning environments, as
compared to suburban schools where the students’ demographics were predominately
white. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on the grounds that the students who were
denied their diplomas had met all other diploma criteria and as a result of the MCAS test
would be denied post-secondary opportunities, would suffer stigmatization, and would
have diminished access to employment opportunities {Student v. Driscoll, 2002).
Case documents revealed that the student who represented the Limited English
Proficient students was one of 1,518 students who had yet to pass the MCAS. These
students represented 65% of all ELL students in the class of 2003. The plaintiffs’ claimed
that, according to state regulations, the ELL students had to take the MCAS if they were
recommended for regular education for the following year, or if the student has been
enrolled in school in the United States for more than three years. If the student did not
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meet these criteria and was to read near grade level in Spanish, they then took the
Spanish/English version of test in math and science, but not in English. The ELL students
were required to pass the English test in English prior to being awarded their diploma.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Equal Educational Opportunities Act o f 1974 protected
these students under the state requirement to provide an educational program designed to
overcome language barriers so that these students could meet the expected standards.
Further, they contended that the MCAS had not been validated for ELL students. The
case documents stated that 84% of ELL students had not yet passed the MCAS exam.
The plaintiffs argued that the state did not determine the effectiveness of the ELL
programs, and that limited support was provided to schools and school districts to help
ELL students meet the established goals and standards.
Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the state had knowledge that the use of
the MCAS exam would have an adverse effect on the subclasses. Results of validity
studies revealed that differences in test results by race and ethnicity may have been the
outcome of different learning opportunities, and that course selection patterns were
related to student performance on the 8th and 10th grade tests. Plaintiff students claimed
that the state legislature was in violation of the equal protection clause, the Equal
Education Opportunity Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting the state
from discriminating against students due to their national origin. In paragraph 227, the
court documents read “the state and local defendants failed to take steps necessary to
ensure that the members of the subclass of students with Limited English Proficiency
received an education consistent with the requirements of the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of overcome language barriers so that the plaintiffs could participate
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meaningfully in their respective school’s education program. The students were unable to
leam the content and skills on which they could expect to be assessed on the MCAS thus
violating of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. § (f).
Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that the MCAS was not validated for ELL
students and that it was inappropriate for the Language Arts test to assess ELL students
and lastly, that the state failed to ensure that the ELL students received appropriate and
effective instructional programs. The U.S. District Court denied the requested injunctive
relief to the plaintiffs {Student v. Driscoll, 2002).
Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. was filed after an injunction request
was denied, and the Superior Court of Massachusetts granted an appellate review was in
November 2003. The students claimed that the State Board of Education had exceeded its
powers to mandate that students pass competency tests in order to earn their high school
diplomas. The State of Massachusetts passed the Education Reform Act of 1993 directly
after the release of the McDuffy decision, which amended the state regulations to
implement a system of establishing and achieving specific educational goals for each
student, as well as an effective mechanism for monitoring the progress toward these
goals. The Education Reform Act included such a system, identified as a “competency
determination” {Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al., 2004, p. 757), which was to
be based on academic standards and the curriculum frameworks for tenth graders in eight
subject areas.
The state legislature further stipulated that all students educated with state funds,
were subject to the competency determination. The legislature also amended the law to
define and include students with disabilities and students with limited English
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proficiency. One of the plaintiff students was identified as a student with limited English
proficiency. English was one of the core subjects in which mastery was required.
Students with disabilities were entitled to the use of accommodations, or in the case o f a
student with significant disabilities an alternative assessment was available. Students,
who were not successful in demonstrating mastery, were able to participate in remedial
programs and could retake the exam as many times as they wished. The plaintiff students
had not successfully passed either, or both, the English language arts and mathematics
sections of the test. The plaintiff students contended that the exam was unlawful because
the competency determination only applied to the English language arts and mathematics
subject areas, but not to the areas of science and technology, history and social science,
and foreign languages as stated in the state statute. The court ruled that the state was
within its authority to impose standards and criteria for a diploma, and that the
competency determination was an attempt to improve education to meet the state’s
obligation of providing a public education system of “sufficient quality” (Student 9 et al.
v. Board o f Education et al., 2004, p. 755).
Later, in April of 2004, the Hancock v. Driscoll case was brought to the Superior
Court of Massachusetts. Justice Margot Botsford provided the opinion in this case to
determine if the Massachusetts Constitutional obligations to provide an appropriate
education to its students had been met by the state. Justice Botsford was appointed as the
single justice with jurisdiction to monitor the provisions o f the court resulting from the
McDuffy case. The evidence in this case centered around four focus districts, and the
differences in educational quality between other districts in the state. A particular element
in this case was the programming for ELL students. As the school district required
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additional funding for these students, the court investigated whether the budget needed to
include increased funding for educational programming and support for ELL students. As
ELL students were a subgroup under the NCLB Act, Justice Botsford ruled that the
budget formula should include the additional funds to supplement ELL educational
programming, as these students were required to pass the MCAS test in order to graduate
from high school (Hancock v. Driscoll, 2005).
Flores v. State o f Arizona (2005) was filed in the United States District Court of
the District of Arizona on the claim that the English Language Learners program in the
State of Arizona was inadequately funded. Six years earlier, a trial judge held that the
ELL programs were funded in an arbitrary and capricious manner, which violated the
EEOA. The court ordered the legislature to address the issue, but the governor vetoed the
legislative remedy. The court then held the legislature in contempt of court and granted
injunctive relief to ELL students requiring them to pass the state mandated test Arizona’s
Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS). The court further ordered that until the
legislature complied with the court order, they would be fined 500,000 dollars per day for
30 days, 1 million dollars a day for the subsequent 30 days, and 1.5 million dollars until
the end of the legislative session with a 2 million dollar fine for each day after the end of
the session (Flores v. State o f Arizona, 2005).
Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New Americans,
and Special School District Number 1 (2008) was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota. This case was filed by 13 former students of Lincoln High
School, an alternative high school established to serve students with limited English skills
and limited experience with formal education. The plaintiffs claimed that the high school
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discriminated against them on the basis of national origin in that the school primarily
“warehoused” immigrant students until they aged out of the school, and that the school
failed to provide them with an education designed to overcome the language barriers as
mandated by the Equal Education Opportunities Act. The court held that the
discrimination claim was not valid, as former court precedent required that the
discrimination be intentional. In this case, the evidence did not indicate that Lincoln High
School had intentionally discriminated against the students. The court ruled that the
students’ claims of being poorly educated were primarily due to incompetence and not
animus. “Incompetence that happens to burden only members of a protected class is not,
by itself, evidence of discriminatory animus” (Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High
School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School District Number 1, 2008, p.
6). The court further held that the plaintiffs’ request for monetary compensation and
injunctive relief would not be awarded due to the fact that monetary relief for EEOA
violations was not available. Further, the court held that injunctive relief would not be
appropriate, as none of the students would attend the high school again; four of the
plaintiffs passed the Graduation Required Assessments for Diploma. One student
graduated from Lincoln but it was unclear if she passed the exam, the remaining eight did
not pass the required tests for receiving a diploma although several of the students stayed
enrolled at the school beyond the age of 21. The school did not receive additional monies
for the students after this age. The court ruled in favor of Lincoln High School and
District 1, the co-defendant.
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The analysis of the case law revealed that the issues of ELL were unique and
varied with regard to high stakes testing. The following table references all the cases in
which students who were ELL filed complaints.
Table 20
English Language Learners Cases
Case

Date
2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2008

Mumid et al, v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1

The Establishment Clause
The Establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibited governments from
coercing persons to participate or support the exercise of religion or acted in a way that
establishes a state religious faith. Two cases included complaints of violation of the
Establishment clause (Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997 &
Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, 1998). In the Triplett
(1997) case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that the KIRIS exam was intended to
hold schools accountable for student achievement and that the state had a legitimate
interest in the accurate assessment of educational programs across the state. Further, the
court pointed out that to measure the educational equality and progress of educational
programs in the state, the requirement that all students participate in the administration of
the assessment would be important. The court held that mandating the state’s students to
pass the KIRIS test was not a violation of the Establishment clause as the test did not
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“directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercise or in the favoring of a
religion as to have a meaningful and practical impact.. ( Triplett v. Livingston County
Board o f Education, 1997, p. 32).
Sarah Hubbard and her parents filed suit claiming that the State of Texas denied
them free exercise of their religion based upon the state requirement of successful
completion of an exit exam prior to graduation. The case was based upon the plaintiff's
claim that the school board’s refusal to transfer the student’s private school credits
without testing violated her free exercise rights. The court ruled in favor of the school
district, due to the defendant’s position that the policy was purely non-religious, and that
the student’s study time to prepare for the exam did not evoke constitutional protections.
Moreover, the policy was generally applicable to all students who wished to transfer
credits for the purpose of graduation, and the requested summary judgment was awarded
to the school district {Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District,
1998).
School district policies that are religiously neutral and serve to legitimate interests
of the state were deemed constitutional in that they did not infringe on the student’s free
exercise of religion, nor did they interfere in the parent’s right to parent their children and
to make choices for the advancement of their educational preferences. Table 21 includes
the two cases involving the Establishment Clause cases.
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Table 21
The Establishment Clause Cases
Date

Case

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

Public Viewing of the Tests
Only one case included a complaint regarding the public view of high stakes tests.
In the case of Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, the parents petitioned the
court for the right to view the test under a provision included in the Hatch Amendment
which mandates that all instructional materials or other supplementary material which
will be used as part of any applicable programs shall be available for the inspection by
the parents are guardians of the students. Although the Livingston County Circuit Court
ruled that the exam must be available for public viewing, the Kentucky Appellate Court
held that the interests of the state to maintain the reliability of the exam results
superseded the public’s right to inspect the exam prior to administration. Therefore, the
Kentucky Court ruled that the test should not be open for public viewing without a
special showing of necessity. In addition, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the
KIRIS exam was not a part of a students’ regular curriculum, and indicated that the
KIRIS served no instructional purpose.
Participation in Graduation
Other issues addressed by the courts relating to graduation/promotion were the
participation in graduation ceremonies. Case law that provides guidance on issue of
graduation participation is contained in Williams v. Austin Independent School District
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(1992) and Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District (1992) and O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County (2006). In both of the first cases, parents petitioned
the court to allow their children to participate in graduation ceremonies despite not
fulfilling the requirement of successful completion o f the state mandated test.
In both the Crump and Williams cases, the plaintiffs’ posture argued that student
participation in the graduation ceremony celebrated a profound personal achievement and
instills hope for the future. The plaintiffs claimed that the students would suffer harm in
the loss of these important memories. The defendants’ complaint in these cases
contended that by allowing the students to participate in the ceremony would have
reduced the significance and the tradition of the school as well as compromised the
schools’ interest in instilling pride in the students and motivating students to meet the
academic requirements. The court ruling conflicted somewhat in the interpretation of the
law regarding participation in graduation ceremonies. The judge in Williams v. Austin
Independent School District held that there was not a constitutionally protected property
right to participate in a particular graduation ceremony and that “there [was] no
accompanying constitutional right to receive [a] diploma at a specific graduation
ceremony...” {Williams v. Austin Independent School District, 1992, p. 256). The court
stated that the State of Texas has altered the property right in the expectation of receiving
a diploma from the court ruling in Debra P. The State of Texas specified that the
expectation of receiving a diploma was only apparent when the student completed the
mandatory attendance requirements, successfully completed required courses, and passed
the comprehensive examination at the end of their senior year. The court noted that it
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respected the principal’s decision not to allow students who did not meet the state’s
requirement for graduation to participate in the graduation ceremony.
Further, the court substantiated the states legitimate interest in accounting to the
public that a student who earns a diploma had the necessary skills to enter the workplace
or to seek advanced education. The public’s best interests would be harmed if the state
did not enforce that responsibility. In contrast, the judge in the Crump v. Gilmer
Independent School District case sympathized with the students and demonstrated the
balance of harm to the plaintiffs compared to the harm of the defendants. In this case, the
court determined that the students would receive greater harm than the school, and there
would be no public harm if the students were to participate in the graduation ceremony.
In the O ’Connell case of 2006, the court stood firm on the issue of participation in
graduation ceremonies despite not having passed the CAHSEE. The Court of Appeal of
California concluded that the plaintiff’s claim of irreparable injury caused by not being
able to participate in graduation ceremonies was not given much weight by the trial court
and was reluctant to do so as well. “.. .the emotional harm caused by exclusion from
one’s high school graduation ceremony, while undoubtedly distressing, is not of
sufficient weight to support the relief granted by the trial court” (O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County, 2006, p. 1469). Table 22 includes the two cases
involving the students’ rights to participate in graduation ceremonies.
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Table 22
Participation in Graduation Cases
Date

Case

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

Question Two: Were the legal issues distinctive based upon regular education or
special education students?
The case analysis resulted in the identification of 18 cases involving students with
disabilities. Four of the cases were heard in the early 1980s, with no cases heard in the
courts during the decade of the 1990s. The majority of the litigation was heard in court
during the years of 2000-2010. This researcher speculated that the passing of the NCLB
Act in 2001, which mandated strict accountability measures for the nation’s schools,
ignited the resurgence in litigation. Moreover, the reauthorization of IDEA, with
additional protections for students with disabilities, may have contributed to the increase
in litigation.
The cases heard in the courts involving students with disabilities were: The Board
of Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v.
Ambach, (1981); Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board o f Education (1982); Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, (1983);
Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, (1984); Rene v. Reed (2001); Advocates fo r Special Kids v.
Oregon, (2001); Rene v. Reed, (2002); Student v. Driscoll (2002); Chapman v. California
Department o f Education, (2002); Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f
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California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District, (2002); Student 9 et al. v. Board o f
Education et al., (2004); Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the
Anchorage School District, (2004); Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.,
(2005); Californians fo r Justice v. State Board o f Education, (2006); O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006); Kidd v. California Department o f Education,
(2008); and Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1, (2008). The following table references
the cases in the analysis that included students with disabilities.
Table 23
Cases Involving Students with Special Needs
Date

Case

1981

Anderson v. Banks: Johnson v. Sikes

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach.

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

2001

Rene v. Reed

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Rene v. Reed

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.
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Case
Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education

2006

O 'Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education

2008

Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1

As mentioned before, several of the cases in the analysis were related cases or
nested cases which were heard multiple times in court, often under different case names,
as new plaintiffs joined the lawsuit or several different cases were consolidated under a
single case name. The case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1982) was
appealed to the Federal Appellate Court, and was decided later that year in Brookhart v.
Illinois State Board o f Education (1983). The cases of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v.
Sikes (1981) continued through the courts as Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes (1984).
Moreover, the case of Rene v. Reed, was first heard in 2001, but was later appealed to the
State Supreme Court of Indiana in 2002. This appeal was not used in the analysis as it
provided limited contribution to the data (Rene v. Reed, 2002).
The case of Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District, (2002) was a consolidation case of Chapman v.
California Department o f Education (2002), and was finally settled under the case of
Kidd v. California Department o f Education (2008). The cases of Student v. Driscoll,
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(2002), Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al., (2004) were related cases. The
Hancock v. Driscoll (2004) and Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.
(2005) were also related cases continuing the litigation originally presented to the courts
in McDuffy v. The Secretary o f Education (1993). The individual cases were relevant in
the data as each case presented new information regarding the court’s opinions, and
contributed to the evolution to the case law. Additionally, three cases were settled out of
court resulting in settlement agreements instead of court rulings {Advocates fo r Special
Kids v. Oregon, 2001; Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District, 2004; and Kidd v. California Department o f Education, 2008). One case,
Rene v. Reed, (2002), was a petition to the State Supreme Court that was denied.
Data Analysis
The analysis of the data embedded in the court documents resulted in the
emergence of two major legal themes. Mirroring the themes that emerged from all the
cases, the violation of the due process clause and the equal protection clause were the two
main complaints concerning students with disabilities. However, for students with
disabilities, the courts interpreted the constitutionality of these cases in accordance with
other federal protections such as the Education For All Handicapped Children Act,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Similar to cases involving
regular education students, the issues regarding property interests and state authority
emerged from the case data. However, the courts ruled the same on these issues, for both
regular education students and students with disabilities.
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The data revealed specific issues regarding equal protection and due process
based upon the fundamental fairness for students with special disabilities. Embedded in
the equal protection complaints by students, axial themes of opportunity to leam,
meaningful inclusion, and the rights o f students with disabilities to utilize
accommodations and modifications emerged. Interestingly, in the early cases, the court
determined that the denial of a diploma was not a denial of a free and appropriate
education (FAPE) as required in the EHA. Overall, the courts determined that the denial
of a diploma to a student with disabilities was fair if the student did not pass the test but
was afforded the following provisions: the student was given adequate notice, the use of
the test was within educational norms, the student’s IEP reflected the goals for passing
the state mandated exam, and the exposure to the material on the test was embedded in
the state’s curriculum. It was not until the cases after 2001, that the issue of
accommodations and modifications was included in the court documents.
The caveats of the cases of students with disabilities for the appropriate use for
tests echoed the caveats embedded in cases regarding regular education students.
However, two distinct differences were noted between regular education students and
students with disabilities. These differences were a.) the courts deemed that adequate
notice for some students with disabilities needed to be longer than that of regular
education students, and b.) students with disabilities were entitled to accommodations
and modifications under special protections granted in legislation regarding persons with
disabilities. Mainly, these differences were the result of legislation protecting students
with disabilities that afforded these students Individualized Education Plans that
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specifically addressed the individual needs of the students regarding testing. Further
similarities and differences were summarized in the following sections.
Due Process
Due process protections in the 14th Amendment stated, “nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (US Const.
Amend. 14, § 1). Although not a testing case, the case of Near v. Minnesota (1931)
resulted in the courts interpretation of the due process clause as protecting rights in the
First Amendment from interference by state governments (US Const. Amend. 1). “It
[was] no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech [was] within the
liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment from invasion by
state action" (Near v. Minnesota, 1931, 283 U.S. 697, p. 707). The analysis of the cases
revealed that the applications of the testing policy interacted with the due process
protections, and resulted in the emergence of themes utilized by the courts to validate or
invalidate the Constitutionality of the testing policy under due process scrutiny.
Due process protection themes extrapolated from the high stakes testing case law
involved adequate notice of the denial of a right, the use of the tests within educational
norms, the tests were within the state’s authority, and that the tests had a clear nexus to
the state’s legitimate goals in doing so made certain that the tests were neither arbitrary
nor capricious. In the analysis of the case data, themes that emerged were examined for
similarities and differences between students with disabilities and regular education
students. It was also noted in the analysis that the fundamental fairness of the tests
resided in the requirement of the test and its nexus to the legitimate goals of the state. As
in the cases for students who did not qualify for special education services, the courts
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supported the states’ legitimate interest in improving their educational programs.
However, in the cases that involved special education students, this aspect was of
particular importance as it proved that the state did not intentionally discriminate against
students with disabilities and therefore did not violate the due process safeguards. The
specific similar interaction of due process protections and students with disabilities was
summarized in the following section. Then the differences between cases involving
students with disabilities and regular education students are presented.
State Authority
Similar to the cases involving regular education students, nine of the cases
involving students with disabilities reiterated the state’s authority to establish diploma
criteria and to deny diplomas to students under specific criteria. The cases o f Anderson v.
Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East
Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, (1981); Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board o f Education, (1983); Chapman v. California Department o f Education, (2002);
Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v.
California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont
Unified School District, (2002); Student v. Driscoll, (2002); Student 9 et al. v. Board o f
Education et al., (2004); and Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al., (2005);
and O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006), all contained specific
language in the courts’ rulings addressing the state’s authority to implement additional
graduation requirements. The court rulings consistently held that the states had a
legitimate interest in attempting to ensure the value of its diplomas (The Board o f
Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach,
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1981) and clarifying the judicial position in reluctance to “assuming a role in the
educational debate” (Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al., 2005, p. 469).
The state’s right to impose standards of accountability was not argued in this case law.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed the state’s right to “pragmatic gradualism”
in the implementation of such tests (Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al., 2004, p.
114). Clearly, the courts agreed that even in cases o f students with disabilities, the states
had a right to improve the quality of their educational programs as long as the rights o f
the students were not violated. The table below illustrates the cases that contained
information regarding the states’ authority to implement testing policies.
Table 24
State Authority Cases
Case

Date
1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County
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Adequate Notice
The theme of adequate notice was first evident in the seminal case of Debra P. v.
Turlington, (1979). "Denial of sufficient notice would make denial of a diploma and its
attendant injury to reputation fundamentally unfair” (Debra v. Turlington, p. 404). O f the
16 cases, eight claimed that inadequate notice was given to the students. In two early
cases, the courts ruled in favor of the plaintiff students.
The cases of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al, v. Ambach, (1981) and Brookhart v. Illinois Board o f Education,
(1983) resulted in the courts finding that the state had provided inadequate notice to the
students. In the case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al., v. Ambach, the court ruled in favor of the students and held
that denying the students their diploma would stigmatize the students and “foreclose on
their freedom in pursuing employment opportunities” (The Board o f Education o f the
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al., v. Ambach, p. 572). As in
Debra P., the court validated the students’ property interest in the expectation of
receiving their diploma therefore invoking due process protections. The students were
given less than one and one-half years notification prior to the test being a criterion for a
diploma. Therefore, the educational agency fell short of its constitutional requirement of
procedural safeguard protections as it did not give the students enough time to prepare to
pass the test (The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al., v. Ambach).
The latter case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983) resulted
in the court finding that for students with disabilities, adequate notice of the testing
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criterion was only adequate if the students’ IEPs could be tailored to include enough time
for the student to prepare to leam the material on the test. In this case, the court ruled that
the students’ individualized educational program of instruction were not designed for
them to pass the MCT, and therefore, the students had not been sufficiently exposed to
the material on the test. Further, the evidence presented revealed that the well-reasoned
decision of the IEP team of parents and teachers focused on the student’s needs on other
educational requirements, rather than focusing on passing the MCTs. Therefore, the oneand-one half year notice was not adequate to expect a learner with challenges to meet the
diploma requirement (Brookhart v. Illinois Board o f Education, 1983). However, the case
of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes resulted in the court finding for the educational
agency that the “notice period of more than two years, the provision that the test may be
retaken, and the provision of remedial courses considered together [were] not
constitutionally inadequate” {Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981, p. 505).
The case of Chapman v. The California Department o f Education, (2002) also
included comments by the courts regarding adequate notice. Similar to Brookhart v.
Illinois State Board o f Education, the United States District Courtfo r the Northern
District o f California concluded that the students’ IEP and 504 teams had not had enough
time to specifically address the test as a diploma requirement. “Therefore students and
parents should not be penalized if a plan fails to address the CAHSEE specifically”
{Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002, p. 989). In this case, the
CAHSEE was to be a requirement for graduation in 2004 and was administered in 2001
on a voluntary basis. In 2002, the test was mandatory for all students in the class of 2004
who had not yet passed the test. The court found for the plaintiff students on the grounds
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that two years notice was not adequate time for the IEPs to address the test as a
requirement for a diploma (Chapman v. California Department o f Education). Similarly,
the cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al
(2004) contained complaints of adequate notice.
The last case involving adequate notice resulted in the courts finding for the
educational agency. This case was brought to the courts beginning as O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County, (2006). The Court of Appeals of California ruled that
the school division had notified the students, parents, and guardians for the CAHSEE
diploma requirement for three years prior to the case being filed. The court supported the
educational agency in the duration of three years notice as adequate notice {O’Connell v.
The Superior Court o f Alameda County, 2006).
The early cases in the case law evolution resulted in the courts finding for the
plaintiff students based upon the lack of adequate notice. However, as case law evolved,
the courts found for the educational agency in the duration of notice being at least three
years or more for the students to adequately prepare for the exams. For students with
disabilities, the length of time was based upon the opportunity for the students’ IEP goals
to include the passing of the test and that they were given the opportunity for remediation
before being denied a diploma.
Comparing case law on adequate notice differed for students with disabilities and
regular education students. Beginning with Debra P. v. Turlington (1979), the court ruled
that adequate notice for students was three years. However as the case law evolved, the
courts ruled that adequate notice would have been at least two years. For students with
disabilities, the timeline for implementation of a diploma requirement of passing a state
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mandated test would need to be in excess of two years. In one case, an expert testified “I
would like to have seen the students know about [the tests] in the middle—sometime in
the middle of their elementary school: fourth or fifth grade” (The Board o f Education o f
the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981, p. 844).
The Supreme Court of New York emphasized that educational programs for students with
disabilities should be determined by individual needs, and therefore, the time element of
notice for these students was more specialized. The court ruled that early notice for
students with disabilities would allow for the proper consideration of whether the goals of
the students’ IEPs should include preparation for the exams and would afford the
appropriate time for preparation and instruction (The Board o f Education o f the
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach).
In summary, the case law revealed that courts upheld mandates that both regular
education and students with special needs have appropriate notice to ensure that they had
the opportunity to leam the material on the test. The difference for students with
disabilities pertained not just to the length of adequate notice, but also to the appropriate
goals included in the IEP to ensure FAPE and preparation to pass the state-mandated
tests. The cases involving students with disabilities revealed no specific ruling indicating
an appropriate length, but did include consistencies in the latter cases of at least three
years.
However, the Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983) case
suggested a length of seven years. Overall, the cases indicated that the time of adequate
notice resided in the alignment of the students’ IEP goals to the intent of preparing the
student for passing the test. If the goals were not aligned with the intention of student
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success on the tests, then the students may not have had the opportunity to learn and
therefore were denied FAPE. In addition, the caveats of remediation and multiple
opportunities to pass the tests were included in the court rulings. The following table
reflects the cases in which adequate notice was contested for students with disabilities.
Table 25
Adequate Notice Cases
Date
1981

Case
The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

Remediation
For students who did not successfully complete the tests and were ultimately
denied diplomas, the courts supported the state’s obligation to provide remedial
assistance to the students. In the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education
(1983), the court established that the appropriate remedy for the students who were
denied their diplomas was the opportunity for remediation. For cases that involved
students with disabilities, which specifically addressed remediation, the court mled that
the students must have had access to remedial opportunities.
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The case o f Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981) revealed further insights
into the case law involving remedial programs and students with disabilities. The students
were enrolled in a remedial program with disproportionate numbers of minority students
in the remedial program. The court determined that, “the educational plan which
combine[d] the diploma sanction with a remedial program [was] drastically reducing the
departing seniors who scored at the beginning ninth grade level on the CAT” {Anderson
v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, p. 509). The combination of the CAT requirement and the
remedial program was “enough to sustain the policy against the charge of irrationality”
(p. 509). The closely related case of Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes (1984) was dismissed in
favor of the educational agency partly due to the fact that “as part of the testing
requirement, the District instituted remedial courses for those who failed to achieve the
requisite score...” {Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984, p. 645). The case of Johnson and
Wilcox v. Sikes ended this series of complaints against Tattnall County Schools.
In the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983), remedial
opportunities were made available for all students who did not pass the MCT and data
was provided to the teachers regarding areas of weakness to assist the students in future
attempts to pass the tests. In the subsequent case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f
Education, (1983), the court held that the students were not given a fair opportunity to
leam as much as 90% of the material on the test due to the IEPs not being crafted to
ensure instruction in the material on the test. In the latter Brookhart case, the court the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed, and ruled that the
students’ IEP goals were determined through the well-reasoned and informed decision
making of the IEP team that focused on individual student needs as opposed to passing
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the test. This court ruled that more time was needed for the students to receive
remediation for instruction. However, this remedy would have presented a hardship on
the students who had acquired jobs and would not be able to attend the remediation
sessions. Therefore, the court ordered the students be exempted from the requirement of
passing the state exam and ordered the school district to award the diplomas to the
students (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983).
In 2001, Meghan Rene brought the case of Rene v. Reed on complaints that the
state violated IDEA when implementing the state assessment as a requirement for a
diploma. In the findings of fact, the court determined that a state law required remedial
assistance for all students who did not pass the GQE, and concluded that partly through
the multiple remedial programs, Meghan and other students similarly situated, had been
afforded the opportunity to learn the material on the test {Rene v. Reed, 2001).
In the cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f
Education et al., (2004), the court ruled in favor of the educational agency partly due to
the fact that any student who did not pass the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System was given remediation via an education assistance plan, as evidenced in the line
budget item appropriations as per the state Legislature (Student v. Driscoll, 2002; Student
9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. 2004).
The case of Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al. (2005) presented
further information regarding remedial programs. The court documents in this case
indicated that “Prior to the [Education Reform Act], failing high school students were
permitted either to graduate without basic skills or fade away from the public education
system altogether. Now they are given extensive remedial opportunities” {Hancock et al.
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v. Commissioner o f Education et al., 2005, p. 1143). This case revisited the state of
public education after the McDuffy case illuminating disparities in the educational
opportunities for the students in Massachusetts. Although the case was not specific to
students with disabilities, these students were impacted by the disparity and were
included as a subgroup in the case documents (Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f
Education et al., 2005). Finally, in Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The
Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School District Number 1, the two plaintiffs
who were qualified for special education services prevailed based upon a report
indicating that the school violated state regulations requiring them to develop adequate
remediation plans for the students who failed the Basic Skills Test (Mumid et al., v.
Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School
District Number 1, 2008).
The fundamental fairness of the state exam as a diploma requirement was
influenced by the state’s evidence that remedial programs were in place and were
specifically designed to assist the students to pass the test to receive their diplomas.
Providing structured remedial programs as a means of affording students the opportunity
to learn was evidenced in the court cases and became a caveat under which the testing
requirement was determined to be Constitutional. However, this component was the same
for students with disabilities as for regular education students; therefore, there bore no
distinct differences between the two categories of cases. Remediation was not
independently applicable to students with special needs. Table 26 represents the cases of
students regarding involving remediation for students with disabilities.
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Table 26
Remediation Cases
Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

2008

Mumid et al, v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1

Multiple Opportunities to Take the Tests
Similar to the closely related issues of remedial programs and the subcomponent
of the opportunity to learn, the courts supported that students have multiple opportunities
to take the tests prior to being denied a diploma. In three cases, the court rulings were
influenced by the provision of multiple opportunities to pass the test. The case of
Anderson v. Banks, Johnson v. Sikes, (1981) revealed that the students in Tattnall County
who failed to achieve a score of 9.0 on the CAT were permitted to retake the CAT and to
enroll in additional coursework until they passed the exam. The court upheld the diploma
sanction for students who were properly classified in the remedial programs, and were
given multiple opportunities to take the test {Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981).
In Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983), students identified with
special needs could continue to take the tests until the age o f 21 in order to pass and
receive their high school diplomas. Students were given the opportunity to retake specific
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subject tests they had not passed, and were not required to retake the subjects that they
had previously passed. Despite the provision, though, the courts ruled in favor of the
students based upon the fact that the students had not received adequate notice in order to
prepare to pass the tests. In the cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v.
Board o f Education et al., (2004), the educational agency prevailed partly due to plaintiff
students having been given multiple opportunities to pass the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System. The Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education
and the Anchorage School District (2004) case also included multiple opportunities to
pass the tests. In the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that if a student with
disabilities did not pass the initial administration of the test the IEP/504 team would then
decide whether the students would retake sections o f the test with additional
accommodations, or whether a modified test with accommodations would be more
appropriate for the student (Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the
Anchorage School District). Cases involving multiple opportunities to retake the tests are
included in the following table.
Table 27
Multiple Opportunities to Take the Test Cases
Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.
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Equal Protection
Equal Protection complaints were prominent issues regarding high stakes testing
cases and students with disabilities. Plaintiff students either filed complaints specifically
as a feature of the case or, in some cases the equal protection rulings have been included
in the discussions of the court reported in the case law. Overall, the analysis revealed
evidence o f the equal protection theme in ten cases concerning students with disabilities.
Some of these cases directly related to equal protection complaints, while others were
embedded in the data and emerged in the analysis. As in the cases for regular education
students, the data specific to students with disabilities revealed themes that emerged to
ensure the fairness of the test such as curricular validity, state provided remediation,
multiple opportunities to take the tests, and multiple criteria for graduation. These
subcomponents of the case analysis did not reveal any district differences between cases
involving students with disabilities and regular education students. However, the
analysis of cases specific to students with disabilities, revealed the theme of
accommodations and modifications for students to demonstrate their mastery of learning
objectives and to have access to alternate assessments. These themes emerged as
definitive distinctions as the case law evolution became focused on the states reluctance
to allow the use of accommodations and modification, as well as alternate assessments
for students with disabilities on standardized high stakes tests.
The evidence concerning equal protection claims first emerged in the case of
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981). This case included students with disabilities
who were incorrectly classified as EMR and were denied a diploma based upon this
classification, which was in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
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Section 504 prohibited the discrimination or denial of benefits or participation in
programs if the discrimination was based on the individual’s handicap, but was otherwise
qualified for such benefit or program. The plaintiff students claimed that being placed in
the EMR classes prohibited them from accessing the curriculum needed to successfully
pass the CAT test. The court ruled in this case that students who were correctly placed in
the EMR classes benefited from that program that was specific to their learning needs.
Therefore, the school district did not intentionally discriminate, and was not
required under Section 504 to award diplomas to those students who were unable meet
the academic standard set by the state {Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes). However,
the court ordered that a plan be developed to correctly classify and provide a remedial
program for the students who had been inappropriately classified and placed in EMR
classes without proper procedures. The court held that the diploma sanction did not
violate the students’ rights as the test was not implemented in as intent to discriminate
and the diploma requirements were within the legitimate interests of the state {Anderson
v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes). This case emerged again under the case Johnson and Wilcox
v. Sikes (1984); plaintiff students continued the complaint that the test was discriminatory
based upon the failure rate disparity between students of color and Caucasian students.
The plaintiffs request to deny the school districts option to reinstate the test if it was able
to demonstrate that the benefits of the testing program outweighed the “lingering causal
connection between the diploma sanction and the tracking system” (p. 647). The court
ruled that the plaintiffs’ were based “merely on assumed, potential invasions of their
constitutional rights” (p. 648) and therefore the court ruled in favor of the educational
agency {Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984).
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The case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach was filed claiming discriminatory actions by the school
district based upon Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973, with an additional
claim of violation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) that would
deny the students a free and appropriate education. The court held that the EHA did not
require specific results, and that awarding a diploma was not shown to be a necessary part
of an appropriate education. Therefore, the denial of a diploma, as a result of the student
not passing the BCT, did not amount to a violation of the EHA and did not intentionally
discriminate against the students {The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East
Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981).
In 1983, the case of Brookhart v. Illinois also contained complaints of
discriminatory intent, with alleged violations of EHA and Section 504. Again, the court
determined that the EHA did not require specific results and only mandated the access to
specialized and individualized educational services for students with disabilities. As the
students had received their special education services but were unable to pass the MCT,
the court ruled that the MCT requirement was not a denial of FAPE, and therefore did not
violate the EHA. Additionally, the EHA specified that no single score should be used as
the sole criterion in determining an appropriate educational program. The plaintiff
students contended that the MCT was used as a single score criterion and therefore
violated the EHA. However, the evidence presented to the court provided information
regarding multiple criteria needed to earn a diploma and therefore the MCT did not stand
as the sole criterion. Further allegations of violations of the Rehabilitation Act were based
upon the handicapped students’ inability to attain the level of academic progress needed
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to pass the MCT. The court ruled that, “A student who is unable to learn because of his
handicap is surely not an individual who is qualified in spite of his handicap” (Brookhart
v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983, p. 184). Therefore, the court ruled that the
MCT was not intentionally discriminatory and was not in violation of Rehabilitation Act.
Rene v. Reed (2001) presented complaints of IDEA violations, as students with
disabilities who took the state’s GQE but did not pass were unable to graduate. In this
case, the court determined that although the evidence reflected the students could have
benefited from earlier adjustments to their IEPs to prepare them for passing the GQE, the
students had been exposed to the curriculum covered on the GQE. The court stated
“.. .IDEA does not require specific results, but instead it mandates only that disabled
students have access to specialized and individualized education services” (Rene v. Reed,
2001, p. 1382). Further, the plaintiff students contended that the state violated IDEA by
not allowing certain accommodations and modifications specified in the students’ IEPs
when taking the GQE. The court ruled that the GQE “[was] an assessment of the outcome
of that educational plan” and that the “state need not honor certain accommodations
called for in the students’ IEPs where those accommodations would affect the validity of
the test results” {Rene v. Reed, p. 1382).
In 2002, the case of Chapman v. California Department o f Education was filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. This case
represented plaintiff students with disabilities who were unable to utilize
accommodations on the state mandated test needed to graduate high school and earn their
diploma. The court ruled in this case that the denial of students’ accommodations for
testing, and the lack of an alternative test to the CAHSEE violated Section 504 of the
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Rehabilitation Act (RHA) of 1973. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) supported the rights of students with disabilities to be meaningfully included in
the educational program. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff students, as they were
entitled to accommodations and modifications on the CAHSEE if indicated in their IEPs.
Further, if the IEP or 504 team determined that an alternative assessment was needed, it
would be provided by the state (Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002).
In the same year, the Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f
California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District., was filed with the request to review
the prior case. The United States Court of Appeals noted that the preliminary injunction
to allow the students to take the CAHSEE with the necessary accommodations and
modifications was already in effect but the students’ challenge to forego the use of the
accommodations and modification and risk the denial of the a waiver to the test was
unripe for judicial review (Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California
and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District, 2002).
The O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County (2006) continued the
case as the Court of Appeal for California reviewed the lower court’s ruling. The Court of
Appeal ruled that the statewide injunction on issuing diplomas was overly broad in scope
and that the trial court erred in granting the injunction and reversed the court order o f the
injunction (O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County). This case was again
revisited under the case name Kidd v. California Department o f Education (2008) in
which a settlement agreement was reached between the parties. The parties agreed to a
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study to examine twelfth graders who had taken the CAHSEE with the modifications and
accommodations specified in their IEPs or 504 plans, but who had not passed the
CAHSEE. The study was intended to determine if the students had learned the material
but could not demonstrate their knowledge with acceptable accommodations and
modification indicating the need for an alternative test {Kidd v. California Department o f
Education, 2008). Cases involving complaints of equal protection violations and students
with disabilities are listed in the table below.
Table 28
Equal Protection Cases
Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education
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Fair Test
The use of an assessment to deny a diploma fell under equal protection
complaints if there was a question of the fairness of the test due to its validity. Eight o f
the cases specifically referenced the fairness based upon validity of the tests for use with
students with disabilities. In the case of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981), the
plaintiffs claimed that the test was invalid, as no validation study had been conducted.
The court investigated the claims, and found concerns regarding discrepancies in the use
of the test for students in Tatnall County. However, the CAT was a normed test, and the
court upheld the use of the test in the school division although citing, “It [was] difficult to
explain the disparity of the results obtained in the Tatnall County Public Schools. The
Court [could] not conclude that this well respected test instrument [was] unsuitable for
use in Tattnall County” (p. 509).
The Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education the plaintiffs sought remedy
through the court regarding the validity of the state test, the M.C.T. for evaluating
students with disabilities. The plaintiffs suggested that the RHA and EHA specify that a
test for evaluation and/or placement, be selected and administered to accurately reflect
the student’s knowledge or achievement. The court determined that it “need not interpret
the scope of these regulations to decide this case” (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f
Education, 1983, p. 184). Instead, the court decided that it should refrain from issuing a
broad order to the school district that would potentially affect the validity of the M.C.T.
for all students with disabilities and decided the case on “less intrusive grounds” (p. 184).
The court commented directing the school district to ensure that the students with
disabilities were sufficiently exposed to the material on the M.C.T. or they could produce
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evidence of a reasoned and well-informed decision by the parents and teachers involved
that a particular high school student would be better off concentrating on educational
objectives other than preparation for the M.C.T.” (p. 188).
The Rene v. Reed (2001) case revealed the plaintiff students contended that the
curriculum “for a significant number of disabled students had not been realigned to the
proficiencies tested on the exam” (p. 744). The court agreed that the students would have
benefited from earlier adjustment of the curriculum” (p. 744) but upheld the trial court’s
determination that the students were exposed to the subjects and material during their
high school years (Rene v. Reed). The same year, the Advocates for Special Kids v.
Oregon questioned the validity of the test. The parties in this case reached an out-ofcourt settlement agreement whereas the state agreed to conduct further research to ensure
the validity of the state assessment with regard to students with disabilities.
The Chapman v. California Department o f Education case also included
questions of test validity. The court ruled that for some students, the CAHSEE was not a
valid assessment. The court held that some students with disabilities were not able to
meaningfully access the CAHSEE, therefore making it an invalid instrument to measure
their academic progress. Therefore, as reported earlier, access to an alternative
assessment was a salient and prominent feature in this case (Chapman v. California
Department o f Education, 2002). The cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et
al. v. Board o f Education et al. (2004) argued the test’s validity as a criterion for a
diploma due to the fact that the state reform act required that students would have the
opportunity to demonstrate mastery via a variety of means. However, the courts
concluded that the plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of these
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claims {Student v. Driscoll 2002; Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. 2004).
Lastly, the case of Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education
(2006) included evidence of test validity concerns for students with disabilities. In this
case, the defendant educational agency had the results of a state mandated study that
determined that the CAHSEE satisfied all “professional standards for implementation as
a high school graduation requirement...” {Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v.
State Board o f Education, p. 3).
In summary, the courts upheld the fairness of the test, in regards to the validity of
the testing instrument, as an important component in improving the states’ educational
programs, with the exception of the Chapman case. The Chapman case court ruling
negated that the test was appropriate to all students with disabilities thereby requiring an
alternative assessment for some students {Chapman v. California Department o f
Education, 2002). The following table addresses the issue of test validity.
Table 29
Fair Test Cases
Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education
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Meaningful Inclusion
The theme of meaningful inclusion in assessments was revealed in seven cases
presented to the courts. In this analysis, meaningful inclusion was presented in a broad
theme with subcategories of Accommodations and Modifications and Alternate
Assessments. As these concepts were intertwined, the interaction of all three will be
discussed in the following analysis. These concepts were the main differences between
the cases involving students with special needs, and those involving regular education
students. Students with disabilities were protected under the Constitution and additional
federal legislation, and were therefore assured the opportunity to meaningfully participate
in the assessments. However, there were no such provisions for students in regular
education programs.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act required that a student with
disabilities be afforded a Free and Appropriate Education (FAPE), which included access
to specialized and individualized educational services. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 required agencies that receive federal funding not exclude persons with
handicapping conditions solely on the basis of the handicap. Earlier cases in the analysis
present the courts’ initial perspective on FAPE and Section 504 regarding meaningful
inclusion. As case law evolved, changes in the courts’ interpretation were evident.
Beginning with The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach (1981), the Supreme Court of New York ruled in favor
of the educational agency on the basis that Section 504 required that a handicapped
student be provided with an appropriate education, but did not guarantee that a student
successfully achieve the academic level necessary for receiving a diploma. Moreover, the
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Brookhart (1982) case ruling also indicated the court’s interpretation of the laws
regarding students with disabilities as less pragmatic. The United States District Court
ruled that “pretending that such a standard [diploma] has been achieved by a person
whose handicap clearly makes attainment of that standard impossible or inappropriate in
the overall best interests of that person” (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education,
1982, p. 730).
The right for students to be included in assessment has been clarified through the
case law presented in this analysis. Specifically, the courts ruled on meaningful inclusion
in the Chapman v. California Department o f Education (2002) case and the Smiley,
Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California
Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School
District (2002) cases. These cases specifically addressed the plaintiffs’ likelihood for
success on the premise that the presence of harm was not dependent upon how the tests
were being used, but in the fact that the students had a statutory right to be meaningfully
included in the statewide assessments (Chapman v. California Department o f Education,
2002). This case centered on the accommodations provided to students with disabilities
as the gateway for students to meaningfully participate in the tests.
The case of Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District (2002) examined the issue o f a waiver available to
students with disabilities, and the risk to students should they the opted for the waiver but
were denied. The court ordered that the Department of Education could grant, but not
deny the waiver. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs
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challenged this ruling. The court ruled that the choice between forgoing the use of
modifications, or risk the denial of the waiver, posed a real and immediate injury to
students with disabilities and burdened the students’ right to participate in the
examinations. The court remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California to dissolve that portion of the preliminary injunction {Smiley, Lyons,
Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District).
Under the settlement agreement of Kidd v. California Department o f Education
(2008) the state agreed to conduct a study of students with disabilities who did not pass
the CAHSEE. If the study determined that an alternate assessment was needed to ensure
the meaningful participation of students with disabilities, an alternate assessment would
be evaluated and made available {Kidd v. California Department o f Education).
The Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School
District (2004) case also involved meaningful participation in statewide testing. Although
this case was settled out of court, the settlement agreement documents provided insight
into the case law evolution of the rights of students with disabilities to meaningfully
participate in state assessments. In the out-of-court resolution of this case, the parties
agreed that the Commissioner of Education would recommend regulations to the State
Board of Education to clarify and revise the information regarding the High School
Graduation Qualifying Examination (HSGQE) in The Participation Guidelines fo r
Alaska Students in State Assessments with regard to options for participation by students
with disabilities. The revisions were to include descriptions of options for students with
disabilities to participate, the implications of each option, and the process by which the
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students could appeal {Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District, 2004).
The main access agent for participation in assessments is the use of
accommodations and modifications through a student’s Individualized Education Plan
(IEP). The topic of accommodations for testing has dramatically evolved in the case law
and begins with the initial case concerning students with disabilities, Board o f Education
o f the Northport-East Northport Free Union School District v. Ambach, (1981).
Meaningful inclusion was an important aspect of the cases listed in the below table.
Table 30
Meaningful Inclusion Cases
Date
1981

Case
The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education

Accommodations and Modifications
Eight of the 13 cases analyzed involved the rights of students to have
accommodations and modification for instruction and testing. In 1981, the first case to
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examine the rights of students to have accommodations for testing was brought before the
Supreme Court of New York. This issue was not settled in the courts until the case of
Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon (2001). The clarification of the use of
accommodations to allow students to meaningfully participate in the assessments was a
controversial topic, as revealed in the court documents. The evolution of the case law is
revealed in the next section.
In the case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981) students Abbey and Richard were granted
diplomas by their local school board, and were later informed by the State Department of
Education that they were invalid. The plaintiff students argued that the testing
requirement invalidating their diplomas violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. The Supreme Court of New York ruled that the testing requirement was not in
violation of Section 504. The opinion of the court was that Section 504 required that a
handicapped student be provided with an appropriate education, but did not require
schools to make substantial modifications in their programs to allow disabled persons to
participate. Instead, the court interpreted Section 504 to only require that an otherwise
qualified person not be excluded from participation in a federally funded program solely
on the basis of a handicap or the assumption of inability to function in a particular context
(The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et
al. v. Ambach, 1981).
The Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education cases illuminated the court’s
interpretation of the use of accommodations by students with disabilities. The United
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States District Court would not uphold the rights of students with disabilities to have
accommodations for testing. The court’s opinion resided in the belief:
To discover a blind person’s knowledge, a test must be given orally or in
Braille, if appropriate. This however, certainly does not mean that one can
discover the knowledge or degree of learning of a mentally impaired
student by modifying the test to avoid contact with the mental deficiency.
To do so would simply be to pretend that the deficiency did not exist, and
to fail completely to measure learning. A diploma issued as a result of
passing such a modified test would be a perversion of the program to lend
meaning to the diploma as a record of educational
achievement... .{Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1982, p.
728).
However, during the appeal, the school district conceded that accommodations to the
MCT must, and would be necessary for students with disabilities and offered to readminister the test with certain modifications to minimize the effects of the students’
disabilities (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983).
In the Chapman case, the plaintiffs petitioned the court claiming that the under
IDEA and Section 504, the students were entitled to testing accommodations. Due to the
timing of state mandated test implementation in California, the students’ IEP were not
amended to reflect the available accommodations. The court held that the issue was two
fold, one element related to the specific accommodation or modification to which the
students were entitled. The second element was to whether the federal laws required that
the states treat scores of students with accommodations in the same way that it would
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treat scores of students without accommodations. The court held that IDEA did offer
guidance on DEPs and testing accommodations as per the students’ specific needs. In
addition, the Court examined the Office of Special Education Program’s document,
Guidance on Including Students with Disabilities in Assessment Programs, which awards
the determination of a student’s testing accommodations to the student’s IEP team. The
court ruled that IDEA did not interfere with the states prerogative of implementing
educational standards, but ensured that the state was held accountable for helping all
students meet them.
Therefore, the court granted relief to the plaintiffs that the students be permitted to
take the CAHSEE with any modifications or accommodations written in their IEP or 504
Plan. If the specific language of the IEP did not address the CAHSEE, then the student
could take the test with any accommodations or modifications provided for under any
standardized testing conditions. The court also held that students had the right to forego
any accommodations or modifications to which he or she is entitled. The court reserved
from considering fiiture issues as to whether, and to what extent, the state may treat
students taking the CAHSEE with unapproved modifications, or taking an alternate
assessment when granting a diploma (Chapman v. California Department o f Education,
2002). The continuation of this case was appealed to the United States Court o f Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the students’ rights for testing accommodations and
modifications (Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District, 2002), and settled under Kidd v. California
Department o f Education (2008).
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Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District
(2004) and Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon (2001) also presented issues of
students’ entitlement to the use of accommodations for state mandated testing. Both cases
were settled out of court, with some agreements to this issue being published in the court
settlement documents. Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District resulted in a settlement agreement providing for the clarification of
accommodations for students. This agreement identified the duration for use of the
accommodation in the classroom as three months prior to the accommodations being
allowed on the test. The parties also agreed that Department of Education would provide
a checklist and guidelines to be used when determining whether an accommodation was
appropriate for students with disabilities. Also, the Department of Education would
expand the list of accommodations for students with disabilities, and consider other
proposed accommodations, as they were to arise. The agreement also included the school
district’s right to refuse an accommodation on a case-by-case basis with provided reasons
for the refusal (Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School
District, 2004). Similarly, the parties of the Advocates for Special Kids v. Oregon case
agreed to an expansion of the list of accommodations available to students with
disabilities to minimize the impact of the disability, and to allow the students to
meaningfully participate in the testing {Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001).
Furthermore, the parties in Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the
Anchorage School District agreed that the students’ IEP or 504 team should determine
whether a particular proposed modification would be helpful to the students on a subtest
of the HSGQE, in the event that a student did not pass. The accommodation was to be
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approved by the Department of Education, as the state officials would determine if the
potential benefit to the student would outweigh the adverse effect on the test’s validity. In
addition, if a student did not pass the subtest of the HSGQE, the IEP/504 team would
determine whether the student would retake the subtest with other accommodations, or
take the modified HSGQE or a non-standard alternate assessment (Noon et al. v. Alaska
State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District, 2004). The analysis
revealed interesting and apparent differences in the courts findings regarding the use of
accommodations in testing. The following table lists the nine accommodation cases.
Table 31
Accommodations Cases
Date
1981

Case
The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education
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Alternate Assessments
Alternate Assessment was another axial theme that was revealed in the analysis.
There were six cases in which alternative assessments were brought before the courts and
were included in the rulings (Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001; Chapman v.
California Department o f Education, 2002; Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities
Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education,
California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District', Student 9 et al. v.
Board o f Education et al, 2004; and Kidd v. California Department o f Education, 2008).
The issue of alternate assessments emerged from cases involving meaningful
participation. Chapman v. California Department o f Education revealed that there was no
prior case law regarding alternate assessments in the context of IDEA, but the court noted
that that academic literature gave examples o f alternative assessments for students with
disabilities {Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002). The court ruled that
some students were not able to meaningfully access the CAHSEE, regardless of
accommodations, and therefore the test was not a valid measure of their academic
achievement. The court held that students who were not capable of the high school
curriculum were entitled to a valid assessment of their capabilities. The IEP/504 team
would determine whether the student needed an alternate assessment, as per the student’s
ability to participate in the test. Most importantly, this court ruling mandated that the state
develop an alternate assessment to meet the needs of the students with disabilities. In
August of 2002, the Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District case documented that the state had failed to develop an
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alternate assessment; however, the U.S. Court of Appeals determined that this aspect of
the case was not ripe for adjudication. However, ultimately the plaintiffs in this case
prevailed in the settlement agreement under Kidd v. California Department o f Education
(2008).
The cases of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education
et al. (2004) mentioned that the use of alternative assessments by students with
disabilities was already in place, and therefore the court did not address this issue. The
Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon (2001) case provided a provision for students with
disabilities to utilize an alternative assessment so that students could meaningfully
participate in the state testing program. The six alternate assessment cases are below.
Table 32
Alternate Assessments Cases
Case

Date
2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education

Additional Training
Another axial theme that emerged from the data was that of additional training
for teachers, students, parents, and administrators. This training was to prepare
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professionals in the use of accommodations for students with disabilities, and to inform
parents and students of their rights concerning the use of the accommodations for state
mandated testing. Interestingly, both of the cases in which the additional training was
mentioned were settled out of court, and the additional training requirement was featured
in the settlement agreements (Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the
Anchorage School District, 2004 and Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001). In
both of these cases, the Center for Disability Advocates supported the plaintiff students.
The Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon case resulted in a document, Do No Harm,
which provided a framework for high stakes testing and their use with students with
disabilities. Two additional training cases are listed below.
Table 33
Additional Training Cases
Case

Date
2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

Question Three. What differences are revealed within the case law rulings in favor
of the students and those in favor of the educational agencies?
In the analysis of cases by the prevailing party, several consistent themes emerged
from the data. Mainly, the cases that were brought for judicial intervention were
embedded with multiple issues. Judicial rulings were administered for each specific issue
presented in the cases. Therefore, the prevailing party was decided per each issue. For
example, in a case brought before the court for due process and equal protection violation
claims, the plaintiffs may have prevailed on the due process claim, but may not have on
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the equal protection claim. Therefore, for this analysis, each issue was extrapolated from
the cases, and then the issues were categorized according to the prevailing party on the
specific issue. This organizational strategy illuminated the judgments and judicial
opinions on specific issues as they evolved through the courts.
It was important to note that not all cases were brought to the courts as cases
involving students and educational agencies. For example, one case was brought by an
educational agency to the state government requesting modification of the testing policy
(New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New York Department o f Education,
2002). This case was not considered in this section o f the analysis as only the cases
involving both students and educational agencies were included. The following section
discusses the similarities of the cases that resulted in a decision in favor of the
educational agency, and then a discussion regarding the student as the prevailing party.
Of the 41 cases presented to the courts, seven cases that appealed to higher courts
were considered moot, and denied review or were dismissed (Debra P. v. Turlington,
(1981); Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, (1981); Love v. Turlington, (1984); Rankins
v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education, (1994); Triplett v.
Livingston County Board o f Education, (1999); Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Rene v.
Reed, (2002)). Four other cases, that lacked judicial interpretation, were settled out of
court: Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, (2001); Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f
Education and the Anchorage School District, (2004); Kidd v. California Department o f
Education, (2008); and Superior Court o f California County o f Alameda and Valenzuela
v. O ’Connell, (2007). These cases were not considered in the analysis. Therefore, 29 of

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

233

the cases resulted in judicial rulings with outcomes in favor o f educational agencies or
students.
The analysis of cases in which the educational agency prevailed yielded similar
themes of court opinion. Overall, fifteen of the cases were won by the educational
agencies. Of these fifteen, two cases were continuations of the Debra P. v. Turlington
case; one establishing the curricular validity of the Florida state exams (Debra P. v.
Turlington, 1984) and one ruling supporting that students did not suffer from
discriminatory educational practices under previously segregated schools {Debra P. v.
Turlington, 1983). In the analysis of cases resulting injudicial rulings, the following
themes emerged from the court documents: substantive and procedural due process with
the subcategories of nexus to state goals/legitimate interest, curricular validity,
opportunity to learn, and adequate notice. Some cases revealed the following less
prevalent issues; free exercise clause, claims o f violations o f the Establishment Clause,
and accommodations fo r students with special learning needs. As the cases involving
accommodations were discussed thoroughly as part of the last question, it will not be
discussed here. The similarities of these issues will be discussed to clarify the judgment
of the courts for the educational agency as the prevailing party, and the differences as the
student as the prevailing party.
Procedural Due Process
The due process clause protected citizens from the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property interests without due process of law (O’Neill, 2001). The due process clause
offered procedural and substantive process protections. Procedural due process
guaranteed that procedures depriving property or liberty interests conducted in a fair
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manner. “Due Process standards [are] applicable when an individual suffers academic
consequences form a failure to achieve certain academic standards...” {Anderson v.
Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981, p. 504). Regarding high stakes testing, procedural due
process protection ensured that adequate notice was given to student regarding testing
implementation and the application of sanctions. The courts consistently upheld a
student’s property interest in public education as an entitlement, which has been
protected by the due process clause (O’Neill, 2001).
The initial case of Debra P. v. Turlington (1979) revealed the court’s
interpretation of high stakes testing and due process violation claims. The Fifth Circuit
Court found that students had a protected liberty and property interest in receiving a
diploma. This decision established the basis for future litigation based upon the similar
due process claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established
that a state could not impose an exam as a requirement for a diploma without giving its
students adequate notice as to the use of the test {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981).
Educational practices “must balance the students’ property interest in receiving a diploma
against the eventual purpose of the degree requirement” (Dorn, 2003). “The due process
violation potentially goes deeper than the deprivation of property rights without adequate
notice. When it encroaches upon concepts of justice lying at the basis of our civil and
political institutions, the state is obligated to avoid action which is arbitrary and
capricious, does not achieve or even frustrates a legitimate state interest, or is
fundamentally unfair” {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981, p. 404).
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Adequate Notice
Educational Agency as Prevailing Party. Twelve of the cases brought for due
process violation claims based upon adequate notice were won by the educational
agency. Adequate notice “[became] constitutionally inadequate when it render[ed] the
rule or regulation unreasonable” (Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981, p. 505).
The case law evolution clarified the differing courts’ opinions of reasonable notice for
students. However, the cases analysis revealed that the court did not consider adequate
notice in isolated context. In the majority of the cases won by the educational agencies,
adequate notice rulings were based upon the inclusion of remedial programs and multiple
opportunities to take the test. Moreover, the cases in which the educational agency
prevailed determined adequate notice as two years notice with the inclusion of these
additional caveats.
As discussed in the prior section, the Debra P. case resulted in the suspension of
state testing. The ruling in Debra P. that suspended the state testing and denial of
diploma impacted another case involving due process claims based on inadequate notice.
In the Love v. Turlington case of 1984 plaintiffs opposing the test filed for class action
status for students in Florida. The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida denied the petition. The students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit; this court also denied them class status. The Appellate court
documents noted that the state provided remediation to students and, at that time, the
passing of the SSAT-1 was not a requirement for a diploma due to the suspension of
sanctions in Debra P. v. Turlington. Therefore, on these grounds, the denial of the
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petition to represent a class of students was affirmed, resulting in the educational agency
as the prevailing party {Love v. Turlington, 1984).
In the case of Brady v. Turlington (1979), the court ruled in favor of the
educational agency. The court did not specifically address a time period as adequate
notice, and instead relied on the fact that students would have other opportunities to test
even though the state rule of minimum competency was retroactively applied. As
students who satisfactorily completed the test prior to the rule being enacted did not have
to retake the test, students who did not successfully complete the test had other
opportunities to retake the exam for completion. Similarly, in the case of Wells v. Banks
(1980) the courts did not specifically indicate a time period for reasonable and adequate
notice. In this case, plaintiff students filed a petition in the court to challenge a County
Court order that denied students a diploma without passing the state mandated
achievement test. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision
finding that the local board had not violated the students’ due process rights on the basis
of adequate notice. The court declared that the students had received “more than adequate
notice of the imposition of this additional requirement for graduation...” although the
court documents did not reflect the time period specific to the amount of notice {Wells v.
Banks, 1980, p. 583).
The Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981) cases also addressed due
process/adequate notice complaints. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the state had
not given them adequate notice. The CAT test was implemented in 1976 with sanctions
being enforced in 1978. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia deemed two years notice as adequate. The judges considered “the notice o f two

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

237

years, the provision that the test [could have been] retaken, and the provision of remedial
courses considered together [were] not constitutionally inadequate” (Anderson v. Banks;
Johnson v. Sikes, 1981, p. 505). The appeal of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes was
heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit under the case name
Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, (1984). The Federal Court denied to consider the case, and
dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the District Court had suspended the use of the
test and that until the court ordered a final judgment allowing the court to reinstitute the
test, there would be no future harm to students.
The case of Williams v. Austin Independent School District in 1992 also resulted
in the court finding for the educational agency. The court in this case found that the
plaintiff student had received adequate notice prior to being denied his diploma as a result
of failing the TAAS test. Additionally, the case of Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
Education (1997) included the plaintiff students’ claims that they were not given
adequate notice of the testing policy. However, the court directed that “no advance
preparation [was needed] beyond the students’ normal academic program, hence, further
notice would have served no purpose” (Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education,
p. 29).
In addition, the case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School
District (1998) included a due process violation claim but plaintiffs later abandoned their
claim admitting that they had notice of the testing policy, therefore the court ruled in
favor of the defendant school district. In the case of G1 Forum, Image de Tejas v. the
Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education (2000) the plaintiffs
challenged that the administration of the TAAS test violated student procedural and
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substantive due process. Although this case did not focus on the adequate notice claims,
the court documents reflected that the students were given eight opportunities to pass the
test with remedial opportunities (GI. Forum v. Texas Educational Agency, 2000).
The Rene v. Reed (2001) case resulted in the courts finding for the educational
agency as the prevailing party regarding adequate notice and students with disabilities.
The court found that three years notice was constitutionally sufficient for these students.
In addition, the court found that there had been no due process violation in the
requirement for testing students with disabilities as the state had offered additional
remedial opportunities to learn the required material (Rene v. Reed, 2001). The cases o f
Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. (2004) both
included complaints of adequate notice. Both cases resulted in the education agency
prevailed. The case of O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda (2006) did not result
in a court ruling regarding adequate notice however, the court documents reflected that
statewide notification of the CAHSEE began in 2001 with the CAHSEE as a requirement
for a diploma beginning in 2006. Similarly, the court documents from the case of the
Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education in 2006 implied
adequate notice in that the state test the CAHSEE was implemented and “satisfied all
professional standards for implementation as a high school graduation requirement”
including notification (p. 4). Table 34 lists the cases in which the educational agency was
the prevailing party on due process/adequate notice claims.
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Table 34
Adequate Notice, Educational Agency as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1979

Brady v. Turlington

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1984

Love v. Turlington

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education

Students as Prevailing Party. Students were the prevailing party in seven cases
in the analysis regarding due process violations and adequate notice. Two o f these cases
involved special education students, with particular focus on their IEPs and the intent of
the state having provided adequate notice for these students.
The first case involving high stakes testing and due process claims in which the
student prevailed was the seminal case of Debra P. v. Turlington in 1979. In this case, the
court determined that the thirteen months between notice and sanctions was
fundamentally unfair. Expert testimony was presented that stated that at least four to six
years was required to implement a new testing requirement for a diploma. Due to
multiple concerning circumstances, such as a prior segregated school system, lack of
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established curricular validity, poor quality remedial programs, and sufficiency of
instruction since the sanction announcement, the court found in favor of the plaintiff
students and suspended the state’s use of sanctions against them. However, later the case
was brought to the Court of Appeals for the State of Florida in which the court remanded
the case back to the District Court to investigate the curricular validity of the test. It was
important to note that the Debra P. case did not reach a final ruling until April of 1984.
Two of the cases in which students were the prevailing party involved students
with disabilities; this factor influenced the ruling in favor of the students. In these cases,
the plaintiffs were able to prove due process violations based upon the students’ learning
goals contained in their IEPs. The court in the case of The Board o f Education o f the
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981) ruled that
two years notice was not sufficient for students with disabilities as their learning goals
were directed to meet their individual learning needs. The court decided that the notice
given to students with disabilities was more important than notice for regular education
students. In the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983, the United
States Court of Appeal for the Seventh District determined that the plaintiff students with
special needs were given only one and one half years to prepare for the test. This period
of time was shorter than examples in the case law. This court determined that the time
factor was less relevant; instead, the court focused on the students’ IEP goals being
written to meet the criteria of passing the test. The evidence in this case indicated that the
plaintiff students were not exposed to up to 90% of the material on the test, and did not
have time to adequately prepare for the test as their IEP goals were not amended to give
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adequate time for students with special learning needs to prepare for the test (Brookhart
v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983).
In the Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District (1992) case regarding
adequate notice, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled
that the one-year implementation period was insufficient, and that remedial opportunities
were not available until the spring in which passing the exam became a requirement. The
court found this unconstitutional and therefore sided with the plaintiff students (Crump v.
Gilmer Independent School District). The Chapman v. California Department o f
Education case of 2002 included a court discussion o f adequate notice as per students
with disabilities. The Court determined that the IEP/504 teams of the plaintiff students
did not have adequate time to address the CAHSEE as a requirement for a diploma as the
notification for the testing requirement began in 2001, the year before the case was heard.
Adequate notice was an important feature of the case law in Table 35 depicts the cases in
which the student was the prevailing party regarding due these process/adequate notice
complaints.
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Table 35
Adequate Notice, Students as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

C urricular Validity
Educational Agency as Prevailing Party. The prior section discussed the
seminal case of curricular validity in the Debra P. v. Turlington cases of 1983-1984. The
United States District Court for the Middle District o f Florida found that the test was
determined to have curricular validity thus finding for the educational agency after the
prior litigation {Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983). The plaintiffs then appealed the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, but the Court of Appeals upheld
the curricular validity decision of the District Court and allowed the state to begin to deny
diplomas to students who did not pass the SSAT-II test with the class of 1983 {Debra P.
v. Turlington, 1984). In the cases o f Anderson v. Banks: Johnson v. Sikes (1981) the
plaintiffs alleged that the CAT test, used as an exit exam, lacked curricular validity and
therefore violated their substantive due process rights. The state presented enough
evidence to convince the court that the test did reflect the curriculum taught in the Tatnall
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County School System, and that the due process claims therewith were not substantiated.
The ruling identified the educational agency as the prevailing party based upon this
evidence (Anderson v. Banks: Johnson v. Sikes, 1981).
The Williams v. Austin Independent School District, (1992) also contained
information regarding the theme of curricular validity. The plaintiff student complained
that he had not been taught the material covered on the test and therefore was denied his
due process protections. However, the court concluded that the school division had
provided “substantial evidence” that the student had taken the appropriate courses in
which to prepare for the test (p. 254). Therefore, the court supported the educational
agency and upheld the denial of the student’s diploma ( Williams v. Austin Independent
School District). The court in the case of Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
Education (1997) also found for the educational agency. The judge commented, “While
the KIRIS assessment exam nay not be perfect (doubtless, no testing process is), it is our
responsibility only to adjudge whether its requirement rises to the level of a constitutional
or statutory violation. We hold that it does not” (Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
Education, p. 33).
The court documents of the GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education
Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education (2000) provided evidence of the state’s
process of evaluating test fairness, including the curricular validity. Court documents
indicated that the test was reviewed by: “subject matter experts, review committees of
teachers and educators, test-construction experts and measurement experts” (GI Forum,
Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education,
p. 672). The panel of test evaluators was also asked to “assess whether or not each item
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on the TAAS exam cover[ed] information that was sufficiently taught in the classroom by
the time of the test administration” (p. 672). The Student Assessment and Curriculum
Divisions of the Texas Education Agency conducted a second review of the TAAS, along
with additional evaluations by test developers and scoring specialists. With this evidence,
the court ruled that the state had exercised due diligence in ensuring the test was
fundamentally fair and valid (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency
and the Texas State Board o f Education).
Further evidence was found in the Rene v. Reed case of 2001. Plaintiff students in
this case complained that they were not exposed to the curriculum in order to successfully
pass the test; the court found otherwise. The court asserted that the students “did not
submit evidence the GQE [was] not aligned with the curriculum required by state law to
be offered at their schools and made available to them through state mandate” (Rene v.
Reed, p. 744). The case of Chapman v. California Department o f Education was filed in
2002 in the State of California. The plaintiffs’ claim was grounded in the argument that
the students had not had the opportunity to learn the material on the test. The court ruled
that the plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of the due process
claim. Although the students prevailed in the preliminary injunction, they did not prevail
on the due process claim. The court determined that the state had met its burden o f proof
as to the curricular validity of the test and that there was “not an asymmetry between
what students [were] taught and the material on the CAHSEE implicating due process
concerns” (Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002, p. 989). Student v.
Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. (2004) both contained
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evidence of curricular validity in the court documents. Cases in which the educational
agency was the prevailing party regarding complaints of curricular validity are below.
Table 36
Curricular Validity, Educational Agency as Prevailing Party
Case

Date
1981

Anderson v. Bank and Johnson v. Sikes

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1997

Triplett v. Livingston Board o f Education

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2002

Rene v. Reed

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

Students as Prevailing Party. Eight of the analyzed cases resulted in students
prevailing in claims against the curricular validity of the tests. First and foremost, the
Debra P. v. Turlington cases of 1979 and 1981 questioned the curricular validity of the
test. This case provided the foundation for the fundamental fairness of the administration
of a test on which the students had not had the opportunity to learn the curriculum. O f
course, in subsequent cases under Debra P. the state was able to establish the curricular
validity ensuring that the state’s curriculum did indeed address the content on the test
{Debra P v. Turlington, 1981). The next year, in 1982, the issue of curricular validity was
raised in the case of Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education. In this case, the
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students’ IEPs were not written specifically for the students to pass the state mandated
test. Due to the misalignment of the students’ IEP goals, the students were not exposed to
the curriculum assessed on the test. Although the court determined that the appropriate
remedy would be to have the students attend remediation and additional testing
opportunities, for these students, the remedy would have place an undue burden on them.
Therefore, the students prevailed and were awarded their diplomas. However, the court
did recommend that future students avoid the courts and take the opportunities for
remediation and retesting opportunities (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education,
1983).
The Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District case of 1992 also resulted in
the students prevailing over the educational agency. In this case, the judge noted that
“since the defendant’s [school district] administrators and teacher [were] not allowed to
view the contents of these tests, there is no way of knowing for certain if the TAAS
examination is actually based on [the essential elements]” {Crump v. Gilmer Independent
School District, p. 556). Furthermore, “there [was] no statutory requirements.. .that the
tests be based solely on these elements” (p. 566). Continuing, the judge expressed
concern that “even if the TAAS was based on the essential elements established by the
Board, the effect of this restriction on the TAAS would depend entirely on how specific
those elements [were]” (p. 566).
The cases of Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon (2001) and Noon et al. v.
Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District (2004), included
statements regarding the validity of the tests and the opportunity for students with
disabilities to leam the material on the test. In the Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon
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settlement agreement, the state agreed to conduct further research to ensure the validity of
the test with respect to students with disabilities. The state appointed a neutral panel of
experts to conduct the study (Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon). The Noon case also
indirectly included the curricular validity as to the settlement agreement. The State
School Board agreed to clarifying and modifying the “Participation Guidelines for Alaska
Students in State Assessments” with respect to students with disabilities to ensure that the
test was fairly administered to students with disabilities {Noon et al. v. Alaska State
Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District).
The Flores v. State o f Arizona case of 2005 resulted in the court finding for the
plaintiff students as the result of underfunding the ELL program. As a result of the
underfunding, the state was held responsible for the students not having been exposed to
the appropriate curriculum. The court also indicated that the remediation provided by the
state did not “ remedy the fact that the underfunded ELL programs deprive[d] ELL
students of an equal opportunity to pass the AIMS test...”(.Flores v. State o f Arizona, p.
1120).

In the 2006, the California Department of Education was again in court, this time
requesting the court to vacate a trial court’s preliminary injunction of the denial of
diplomas for the students who did not pass the required sections of the CAHSEE.
O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County contained evidence of the state’s
legislation requiring the state to develop the CAHSEE in accordance with the statewide
content standards adopted by the State Board of Education. The court ruled that there
were some students who were not exposed to all tested curriculum, and that the
appropriate remedy would be remedial assistance and additional opportunities to take and
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successfully complete the test {O’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County,
2006). The court ruled that the state should find a practical solution to provide all
students an adequate opportunity to learn the material on the CAHSEE {O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County, 2006). The table below lists the cases resulting in the
students as the prevailing party regarding curricular validity.
Table 37
Curricular Validity, Students as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Debra P. Turlington

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

Equal Protection
Educational Agency as Prevailing Party. In analyzing equal protection claims,
the courts have established three standards for review “...when legislative enactments
classified persons by race or religious beliefs the strict scrutiny standard was applied. For
classifications based on birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or
affiliations, an intermediate standard of review was appropriate. All other classifications
were analyzed under the rational relationship standard” {Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f
Elementary and Secondary Education, 1994, p. 554)
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Similar to the due process requirement that determines whether a state
governmental action is arbitrary or capricious, evidence that the action had a clear nexus
to the goals of the state was necessary for the educational agency to prevail in claims
involving equal protection violation. The analysis o f cases concerning equal protection
claims, court determinations of nexus to state goals was the hinging factor as to the
constitutionality of a testing policy. The following cases represented the court opinions in
favor of the educational agencies.
In the case of Wells v. Banks (1980), the students contended that they were being
treated differently than other students across the state and therefore were entitled to equal
protection safeguards. The plaintiffs claimed that the testing requirement was
discriminatory as not all counties required students to pass the exit exam. The court ruled
that the local school boards had the authority to implement additional standards for
graduation and that other boards across the state had the same authority to do so.
Moreover, the additional requirements were implemented throughout the county.
Therefore, the students were not being treated any differently than any other students in
the county and were afforded their equal protection rights ( Wells v. Banks).
In the case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al. v. Ambach (1981), the court determined that the plaintiffs’
claim of equal protection violation was not evidenced in the case. The court affirmed that
the implementation of the BCT program and the applicability of the program to plaintiff
students Abby and Richard did not fall short of a rational basis and thus, did not violate
the equal protection clause. Lastly, in the case of Florida State Board o f Education and
Turlington v. Brady (1979) the plaintiffs did not claim equal protection violations, but the
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court proactively determined that the testing policy did not discriminate against students
and therefore no equal protection violations occurred (Florida State Board o f Education
and Turlington v. Brady).
In 1984, the Debra P. v. Turlington case was finally resolved. In both the 1983
and 1984 cases heard by the courts, the rulings indicated that the students no longer
suffered from discriminatory practices of segregated schools and therefore, the testing
requirement did not violate the students’ equal protection rights {Debra P. v. Turlington,
1983, 1984).
In the case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District
(1998), the District Court for the Western District o f Texas ruled in favor of the
educational agency based upon the state’s legitimate interest in setting uniform
advancement and graduation requirements. The plaintiff claimed that the requirement for
students to pass proficiency tests to transfer credits towards graduation from private
schools was denying her due process, equal protection, and free exercise rights (1998).
The court ruled that the plaintiff was not a member of a protected class as a student
coming from private school, and that the plaintiff was informed of the credit transfer
requirement prior to enrolling in public school.
Additionally, the requirement was generally applicable to other students (1998).
The court determined that the policy had a clear nexus to state goals, and that the policy
did not treat the student differently. Therefore, there were no inherent equal protection
violations embedded in the application of the policy {Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo
Independent School District, 1998). Similarly, in Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f
Elementary and Secondary Education (1994) the court reversed the trial court’s ruling of
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equal protection violations. The plaintiff complained that students in private schools were
not required to pass the test to earn their diplomas. The court determined that the
classification of public and non-public school students was not recognized and did not
contain any suspect classes under the equal protection clause. The court applied the
rational relation standard of review and determined that the exam was constitutional
based upon their conclusion that the state “ha[d] a strong interest in the public education
for which it pays the cost. We conclude that the GEE does not violate the equal
protection clause because its administration is rationally related to the state’s legitimate
interests of insuring minimum competency among persons obtaining a state diploma”
(Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education, 1994, p. 555).
The case of Rene v. Reed (2001) also contained complaints of violations of the
equal protection clause. Although the plaintiff students contended that they were not
afforded the opportunity to learn the material on the test due to their disability, the court
held that there was not equal protection violation. The court reasoned that although the
students would have benefited from earlier adjustments to their curriculum, they were
provided multiple opportunities to retake the test as well as remedial instruction (Rene v.
Reed).
In the case of O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County (2006), the
trial court ruled that the CAHSEE requirement violated equal protection laws due to the
lack of adequate resources and preparation that resulted in a disproportionate effect on
English Language Learners. However the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
in its ruling and gave undue weight to the plaintiff’s claim of irreparable harm. The
Appellate Court responded that the trial court did not make the distinction “between an
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equal protection claim based upon the well-established fundamental right to an education
and an equal protection claim based on the asserted fundamental right to be awarded a
high school diploma” (p. 1478). The Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court’s
awarding of diplomas and criticized the trial court’s assumption that “access to education
include[d] access to a diploma” (p. 1478).The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s
order resulting in the educational agency as the prevailing party.
Two cases were brought before the courts claiming violations of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency
and the Texas State Board o f Education (2000) and the Mumid et al, v. Abraham Lincoln
High School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and Special School District Number 1
(2008) cases both resulted in the educational agency as the prevailing party on this claim.
The GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board
o f Education (2000) case presented the argument that the testing policy violated the
students’ civil rights under Title VI.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas determined the state was
not in violation of the Civil Rights Act using the EEOCs four-fifths rule to determine
disparate impact. The four-fifths mle required a statistical significance in disparities
between the pass rates of white students and minority students. The court considered both
single administration results and cumulative administrations of the test and determined
“sobering” (GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education, p. 679) and significant statistical differences under the
standard. Despite the disparate impact of the test, the court held that the TAAS test did
not violate the Title VI regulations, although the test did adversely affect minority

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

253

students in significant numbers. The evidence presented to the court found that the Texas
Education Agency had demonstrated an educational necessity for the test and that the
plaintiffs failed to identify effective alternatives to the TAAS. Therefore, the court ruled
in favor of the educational agency.
In the case of Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r
New Americans, and Special School District Number 1 (2008), the court examined two
methods for proving intentional discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, the direct
method and the indirect method. The direct method of examination required the plaintiffs
to present strong evidence of discriminatory intent. The indirect method would be used
when plaintiffs have weaker evidence of discriminatory intent; the court must then
consider the evidence based upon the three steps McDonnell Douglass framework. Under
this framework, the plaintiff would first need to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The defendant then would need to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory
explanation of the challenged actions. Finally, the plaintiff would put forth sufficient
evidence to the court to determine the discrimination. The United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota considered this framework. The court determined that due to the
fact that there were no comparators, this framework did not apply. The court therefore,
ruled that there was insufficient evidence that the school’s actions were intentionally
discriminatory {Mumid et al, v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 7). The educational agency prevailed in
eleven cases regarding equal protection, which are listed in Table 38.
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Table 38
Equal Protection, Educational Agency as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1979

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1983

Debra P. v. Turlington

1984

Debra P. v. Turlington

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

2008

Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1

Students as Prevailing Party. The initial case of Debra P. v. Turlington (1979)
brought forth the plaintiffs’ claims of equal protection violations on the grounds that the
SSAT-II “perpetuate[d] and reemphasize[d] the effects of past purposeful discrimination”
(p. 251). The plaintiffs argued that the test was racially based and that the enactment of
the test resulted in a disproportionate number of students of color failing the test. Several
key witnesses from the State Department of Education as well as Ralph Turlington
provided testimony that they anticipated a higher number of black students to fail the test.
In addition, they attributed this disparity to be the result of the inferior education that
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these students received under the segregated school system formerly established in
Florida. The court ruled in favor of the students based upon, “When students regardless
of race are permitted to commence and pursue their education in a unitary school system
without the taint of the dual school system, then a diploma requirement based upon a
neutral test will be permitted” (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979, p. 257). The Debra P. case
of 1983 questioned the curricular validity of the test therefore resulting in the court
finding for the students until the curricular validity of the tests could be established
{Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983).
In the cases of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes (1981) the petitioners
requested that the court order the awarding of diplomas to students, and suspend further
diploma sanctions based upon previous segregation in the schools. The court found in
favor of the plaintiffs and ordered that no further diploma sanctions could be enforced
until the first group of students who had been educated after the abolition of the dual
system had graduated. The court held that the testing policy had a significant racial
impact on African-American students in that these students had been misplaced in
remedial classes. The racial make-up of the remedial classes was a strong predictor of
success on the test for black students and the testing policy itself was discriminatory
{Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes).
Similarly, in the case of Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes (1984) the plaintiffs claimed
that the testing requirement discriminated against them because of their race. In an
Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, the District
Court found that the plaintiffs prevailed on equal protection claims due to the lingering
connection between the discriminatory tracking system and the diploma sanction.
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Plaintiff students were awarded their diplomas. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court dismissed the appeal due to ripeness; no
students had been denied their diplomas and no further injury or harm had occurred
(Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes).
The Chapman et al., v. California Department o f Education (2002) and the
Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v.
California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont
Unified School District (2002) both involved equal protection complaints resulting in the
student prevailing. In order to meaningfully participate in the state mandated testing, the
students were awarded the right to use accommodations and modifications to demonstrate
their knowledge on the CAHSEE (Chapman et al, v. California Department o f
Education). The subsequent Smiley case affirmed the students’ rights to utilize the
accommodations and modifications included in their IEPs. However, this case also
clarified the court’s intention to eliminate the burden place upon the students who wish to
forgo their accommodations and apply for a waiver. These students would not have to
risk the denial of the waiver if they were to opt to take this course in lieu of taking the test
with their accommodations (Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f
California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District).
One of the most interesting of these cases was that of Flores v. State o f Arizona
(2005), the United States District Court for the District of Arizona favored the plaintiffs
claims of equal protection violations. Students claimed that the state neglected to fairly
fund the ELL program for the state resulting in unfair treatment of ELL students in the

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

257

State o f Arizona. The court agreed and issued a ruling that resulted in the state legislature
being held in contempt of court with large daily fines for non-compliance of equitable
funding for the state’s English Language Learners. The court ordered that students would
not be required to pass the AIMS test as a result of arbitrary and capricious funding
{Flores v. State o f Arizona). The next table lists cases regarding equal protection
complaints with the student was the prevailing party.
Table 39
Equal Protection, Students as Prevailing Party
Case

Date
1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Debra P. v. Turlington

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona
State and Local Board Authority
Educational Agency as Prevailing Party. In all of the cases brought to the

courts claiming violations of state and local board authoritative powers, the educational
agency prevailed. The courts consistently supported the state and local boards’ authority
to set scoring criteria, establish testing policies and impose additional graduation
requirements including exit exams for students. The following cases represented the
courts’ opinions extrapolated from the case analysis on state and local board authority.
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Again, in this analysis, the case of Florida Board o f Education v. Brady (1979)
initially addressed the issue of state and local board authority. Prior to this case, a state
administrative hearing officer determined that the scoring criteria for the test were invalid
due to the scoring standard not being promulgated in the state legislature. The State
Board of Education appealed the case to the District Court o f Appeals, which vacated and
set aside the hearing officer’s order on the basis that the determination of the scoring
standard was a valid exercise of state authority as defined in the state statutes (1979). The
Debra P. v. Turlington (1979) case also addressed the issue of state and local board
authority. Although the plaintiffs did not bring forth a complaint regarding state
authority, the court commented on the legitimate interest of the state in implementing a
mechanism to evaluate the statewide educational objectives. The court did not question
the legitimate interest of the test for the improvement of the state’s educational system,
but did question the timing of the test as a requirement for graduation (1979). The
Anderson v. Banks', Johnson v. Sikes (1981) cases resulted in similar conclusions of the
court. The state and local board authority was supported by the courts but the timing o f
the test as a requirement for a diploma was under scrutiny in light of past segregation and
the impacts of inferior schools on black students.
In the case of The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al. v. Ambach, (1981), the court ruled, “The state has a legitimate
interest in attempting to insure the value of its diplomas and to improve upon the quality
of education provided. The use of competency testing to effectuate the goals underlying
those interests is within the discretion of the Board of Regents and the Commissioner”
(1981; p. 835). The court upheld the state legislature’s role of the supervision and support
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of a state system of education. Similarly, the Wells v. Banks case of 1980 resulted in the
courts supporting the legitimate interests of the state. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed
that the local school board lacked authority to increase the high diploma requirements.
The plaintiff contended that the state statutory language did not grant the local school
boards the authority to impose the completion of the test as an additional diploma
requirements. The Court of Appeals of Georgia disagreed specifically stating that there
was a document presented in the case granting the State Board of Education the right to
establish diploma requirements with no “indication that local boards may not impose
additional requirements” (1980, p. 271). In addition, the document referenced by the
court, granted the local boards the authority to require additional credit units for
graduation and to establish performance objectives and indicators. Therefore, the court
found that the local board of education had been given the authority to require the testing
as a performance objective thus awarding the case to the educational agency (1980). In
Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education (1994), the court
found that the Louisiana Constitution provided the state’s right to supervise and control
the state schools. Although there was no evidence of legislative intent to require the state
testing as a diploma requirement, the absence of contrary language allowed the State
Board of Education to establish the testing requirement for a high school diploma
(Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education, 1994).
In the case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District
(1998), the plaintiff student claimed that the testing policy to transfer courses from a
private school to a public school was unconstitutional. The court ultimately found that the
plaintiff’s rights were not violated and that the testing policy to transfer credit for

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

260

graduation was rationally related to the state goals. Therefore, the state board had the
authority to require the testing to verify the courses to be used toward graduation. The
court stipulated “A public education is not a fundamental right and every variation in
which education is provided need not be justified by a compelling necessity” {Hubbard
by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, 1998, p. 1017)
In Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education (1997), the court mled in
favor of the educational agency on the grounds that the local school board acted within its
authority to require the exam for a diploma. The court mled that the state and local
boards were granted authority in the state statutes to establish additional diploma
requirements above the minimum set forth by the State Board of Education. As each
school district is responsible for their performance on the test, they have the authority to
set policy as it relates to the assessment process as long as this policy does not infringe on
the state’s authority (1997). Additional support can be found in the case of Smiley, Lyons,
Learning Disabilities Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District
(2002), which also contains court statements regarding state and local board authority. In
this case the court specifically noted that the state’s authority to impose diploma
requirements. The court also indicated the distinction between a student’s right to
meaningfully participate in the state testing and the state’s authority to test and set
diploma requirements. The evidence found in the case law affirms the state’s authority to
impose and assessment as a requirement for a diploma. In the cases of Student 9 v.
Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. (2004), the court also
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noted the state’s authority to impose additional graduation requirements. The following
table lists the cases involving state authority in which the educational agency prevailed.
Table 40
State and Local Board Authority, Educational Agency as Prevailing Party
Case

Date
1979

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady

1979

Brady v. Turlington

1979

Debra P. v. Turlington

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

Anderson v. Bank and; Johnson v. Sikes

1981

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District v. Ambach

1994

Rankins v. Louisiana Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

Special Education Accommodations
Educational Agency as Prevailing Party. The right for students with disabilities
to testing accommodations has resulted in an interesting evolution in court rulings.
Beginning with Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education (1983), the court’s
interpretation on the use o f accommodations on high stakes testing has provided a shift in
perspective regarding the rights of students with disabilities. The following cases were
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influenced by other federal legislation that granted increased rights to students with
disabilities. The additional scope of rights is mandated under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. As the courts considered the following cases, the mlings reflected the
changes in interpretation of students’ rights under these mandates.
The first case to be considered by the courts was Brookhart v. Illinois State Board
o f Education (1982). In this case, students claimed the testing policy violated their rights
under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. The court determined that the
EHA did not require students to attain “specific results” (1983, p. 183). The court stated
that the “Denial of diplomas to handicapped children who have been receiving the special
education and related services required by the Act, but are unable to achieve the
educational level necessary to pass the MCT is not a denial o f a free and appropriate
public education” (1983, p. 183). In addition, the plaintiffs’ claim of an additional
violation of EHA was that the passing of the test was the sole criterion for determining an
appropriate education for a child by the state. However, the evidence presented in the
case reflected that the requirements for graduation also included credits, completion of a
constitution test, and a consumer education course. The plaintiffs claimed that the test
violated their rights under the EHA and the RHA, as some handicapped students would
not be able to successfully complete the test without the use of accommodations and
modifications to the test. The court determined that the test did not discriminate on these
grounds “altering the content of the MCT to accommodate an individual’s inability to
learn the test material because of his handicap would be a substantial modification as well
as a perversion of the diploma requirement” (1982, p. 184). Moreover, “a student who is
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unable to learn because of his handicap is surely not an individual who is qualified in
spite of his handicap” (1983, p. 184). Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the
educational agency that this testing requirement was not in violation of these two federal
acts.
Likewise, in the case of Rene v. Reed (2001), the plaintiff students filed a
complaint that the requirement for students to take the GQE without certain
accommodations stated in their EEPs violated IDEA. The court found that the state did
permit some accommodations typically documented in BEPs. However, the court
supported the state in the refusal of accommodations that would affect the validity of the
test results {Rene v. Reed). The two cases in which accommodations for students with
special needs were an issue and in which the educational agency was the prevailing party
are listed below.
Table 41
Special Education Accommodations, Educational Agency as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

Students as Prevailing Party. Three cases were found involving the use of
accommodations in which the students prevailed. In the first case of Brookhart v. Illinois
State Board o f Education (1983), the defendants (educational agency) in the case
conceded that the “modifications of the [M.C.T.] must be made available to the
handicapped” (p. 184). The school district offered to readminister the assessment to the
students with modifications to accurately assess their knowledge of the material

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

264

{Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education). In the cases of Chapman v. California
Department o f Education (2002) and Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f
California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District (2002), the courts ruled that the students
with disabilities could participate in the California Assessment of High School Exit
Examination utilizing their accommodations and modifications as described as part of
their IEP or 504 plans. The plaintiffs in the first case, Chapman v. California Department
o f Education, prevailed on their claims that the administration of the CAHSEE without
allowing students to meaningfully participate by use of accommodations and
modifications was a violation of their equal protection rights. The students were granted
the right to take the CAHSEE with their accommodations and modifications provided in
their IEP or 504 plans as well as an opportunity to take an alternate assessment if so
stated in their IEP or 504. The court further directed the state to develop an alternate
assessment and until the alternate assessment is implemented, the students may take the
CAHSEE on a voluntary basis. The preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from
administering the test to all students was not granted. Further, the state was also required
to inform parents and students of the allowances granted by the court.
Later in 2002, Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District was brought before Appellate Court for review. The
U.S. Court of Appeals reviewed the case and upheld the students’ rights to use the
accommodations and modifications listed in the IEP or 504 plans in order to participate in
the test. The Appellate Court reversed the waiver stipulation, which would burden
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students with disabilities with the choice of foregoing the use of modifications or
accommodations or risk being denied a waiver of participation. Lastly, the Appellate
Court reversed the stipulation that the students may take the CAHSEE on a voluntary
basis until an alternate assessment could be developed. The Appellate Court remanded
these items back to the district court for dissolution (Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities
Association o f California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education,
California Board o f Education and Freemont Unified School District, 2002) on the
ground that they would affect the validity of the test results. The three cases in which the
student prevailed on the issue of student accommodations are listed below.
Table 42
Special Education Accommodations, Students as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

Free Exercise Clause Educational Agency as Prevailing Party. Two cases were
brought before the court on the grounds that the state’s testing policy violated their Free
Exercise rights guaranteed in the First Amendment {Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo
Independent School District, 2008). The plaintiffs in both cases complained to the courts
that the test inhibited their rights to exercise their religion. Both cases resulted in the
educational agency as the prevailing party.
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In the case of Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, the
plaintiff contended that the state testing policy burdened her right to free exercise of
religion. The plaintiff claimed that the she would need to study and sacrifice to prepare
for the tests and that this would violate her, or her parents, free exercise guarantees. The
court disagreed and found that, by the parents own admission in their depositions, they
did not have objections to the districts testing policy and that their objections with the
school division were not entirely based upon religious grounds. The court also
determined that the general applicability of the testing policy was religiously neutral and
that the extra time to study would not violate the student’s free exercise protections
{Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, 2008). In Triplett v.
Livingston County Board o f Education (1997), the parents o f a senior student filed suit
claiming that the test violated their free exercise clause protections. The parents
contended that the test violated their rights as it established a religious or moral code and
invaded their child’s religious and moral beliefs. They also claimed that the test
compelled the child to speak against their beliefs by having to select objectionable
responses. The court ruled that the evidence presented in the case verified that the test did
not advance nor inhibit religion nor did it encourage governmental entanglement with
religion {Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997). Table 43 identifies the
two cases that the educational agency prevailed.
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Table 43
Free Exercise Clause, Educational Agency as Prevailing Party
Date

Case

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

Question Four. What differences existed between the case law according to the
geographical regions as defined by regions in published court reporters and listed as
follows: Northeastern, Northwestern, Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern,
Pacific, and Atlantic regions?
The analysis of cases concerning high stakes testing and the denial of a high
school diploma included cases only heard in the state courts and the federal courts. The
state courts ruled on violations of state laws, rules, and regulations, and applied and
interpreted the state’s own Constitution. The federal court system ruled on federal laws,
rules, and regulations, and interpreted the laws or policies in accordance with the
Constitution of the United States. The federal court system was comprised of the U.S.
Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the U.S. District Courts. The District
Courts heard trial cases in the 94 districts throughout the United States. Most states were
served by one or two district courts, while larger states were perhaps served by several
district courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals was divided into 12 regional circuits serving
the 94 judicial districts. Each of the 11 circuit courts had an appellate court with the
twelfth circuit hearing cases only from the District of Columbia. The state level courts
were divided into state courts, appellate courts, and State Supreme Courts. All of the
courts were categorized into seven judicial regions: Northeastern, Northwestern,
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Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern, Pacific, and Atlantic. The cases in each court were
reported in the court reporter for that region. This analysis followed the regional template
as outlined in the court reporters and categorized the cases according to the state in which
they were brought to the court. Table 44 illustrates the different states and their regional
assignment.
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Table 44
Judicial Regions
Northeastern

Northwestern

Southeastern

Southern

Southwestern

Pacific

Atlantic

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Illinois (2)

Iowa (0)

Georgia (3)

Alabama (0)

Missouri (0)

Alaska (1)

Connecticut (0)

Indiana (2)

Michigan (0)

North Carolina (0)

Florida (9)

Arkansas(0)

Arizona (1)

Delaware (0)

Massachusetts (4)

Minnesota (1)

South Carolina (0)

Louisiana (2)

Tennessee (0)

California (6)

District of Columbia (0)

New York (2)

Nebraska (0)

Virginia (0)

Mississippi (0)

Texas(4)

Colorado (0)

Maine (0)

Ohio (0)

North Dakota (0)

West Virginia (0)

Kentucky (1)

Hawaii (0)

Maryland (0)

South Dakota (0)

Montana (0)

New Hampshire (0)

Wisconsin (0)

Nevada(0)

New Jersey (0)

New Mexico (0)

Pennsylvania (0)

Oklahoma (0)

Rhode Island (0)

Oregon (1)

Vermont (0)

Utah (0)
Washington (0)
Wyoming (0)
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Northeastern Judicial Region
The Northeastern Judicial Region included the states of Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Ohio, and New York. There were five unique cases with ten total cases
heard in this judicial region in the states of Massachusetts, New York, Indiana, and
Illinois. The two main topics addressed by the courts in this region were cases involving
students with disabilities and equitable funding. The State of Massachusetts saw the cases
of Student v. Driscoll (2002) and Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al. (2004) as
well as Hancock v. Driscoll (2004) and Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et
al., (2005) which were connected to complaints in the McDujfy case. The Student v.
Driscoll was heard at the District Court level while the Student 9 et al. v. Board o f
Education et al. was heard at the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The Hancock
v. Driscoll and Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al. cases were heard at
the Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Two unique cases were heard in the State of New York. The cases of the Board o f
Education o f the Northport East Northport Union Free School District v. Ambach, (1981)
and the case of New York Performance Standards Consortium v. the New York State
Education Department (2002) were brought before the Supreme Court o f New York, one
as a special term in Albany and the other in the Appellate Division, respectively. The
states of Indiana and Illinois heard two cases each with both cases being appeals of an
original case (Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983; 1984; Rene v. Reed,
2001; 2002, respectively). The Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education case
originated in the United States District Court with the court of last jurisdiction being the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Rene v. Reed (2001) case
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originated in the Court of Appeals for Indiana with a request to the Supreme Court of
Indiana to review the case but was denied (2002). O f these cases, the New York
Performance Standards Consortium v. New York State Education Department (2002) was
brought to court from an agency representing 28 of the state’s public schools, not by
students themselves. Otherwise, the remaining five cases involved students with
disabilities. In the cases brought to court by student plaintiffs, the courts ultimately
denied the diploma requirement in all cases except the Rene v. Reed case of 2001.
Two cases were brought to court in the early 1980s; the rest occurred after the
2001 Rene v. Reed ruling in favor of the educational agency. After this 2001 case, all
other cases were settled in favor of the plaintiff students but included the caveats of
remedial assistance, and adequate and fair funding for students. The Hancock v. Driscoll
(2004) and Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al, (2005) cases finally
resolved the McDuffy case of adequate funding for all school districts in the State of
Massachusetts. Table 45 lists the cases in the Northeastern Judicial Region.
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Table 45
Northeastern Judicial Region Cases
Date
1981

Case
The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
School District et al. v. Ambach

1982

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

1983

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education

2001

Rene v. Reed

2002

Rene v. Reed

2002

New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New York State
Education Department

2002

Student v. Driscoll

2004

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al.

2004

Hancock v. Driscoll

2005

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al.

Northwestern Judicial Region
Only one case was heard in the Northwestern Judicial Region. The case of Mumid
et a l, v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New Americans, and Special
School District Number 1 (2008). This case involved immigrant students who complained
that they did not receive and adequate education from the school district but due to the
very unusual circumstances, the plaintiff students were not successful in receiving
monetary damages on their equal protection claims (2008).
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Table 46
Northwestern Judicial Region Case
Date
2008

Case
Mumid et al, v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute fo r New
Americans, and Special School District Number 1

Southeastern Judicial Region
All of the cases that were heard in the Southeastern Judicial Region were nested
cases originating with the Wells v. Banks case of 1980. This case originated in the Court
of Appeals in Georgia and then was transferred to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia in the case of Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes in 1981.
The case evolution continued as the case was again heard in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1982, and was ultimately forwarded to the
federal court level in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit under
Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes (1984), in which the federal court determined the case
unripe for review. The original case resulted in a ruling in favor of the educational agency
with a reversal a year later under Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes. The subsequent
rulings after this case resulted in rulings in favor of the educational agency. All of the
cases heard in this region were nested cases, involving minority students with an
interaction between the testing policy and the vestiges of prior discrimination and
segregation in the public schools.
One of the unique features of the court rulings in this judicial region was the State
of Georgia’s prior history with segregated schools for Caucasian and African-American
students. The racial discrimination once apparent in the state’s school system resulted in
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unequal learning opportunities for students of color. The court’s ruled that the vestiges of
this past discrimination affected the students’ ability to learn. Students educated under the
dual system would not be held accountable for the state testing requirements until all
evidence o f the dual system was eradicated. Southeastern Judicial Region cases are listed
below.
Table 47
Southeastern Judicial Region Cases
Date

Case

1980

Wells v. Banks

1981

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes

1984

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes

Southern Judicial Region
Similar to the Southeastern Judicial Region, past discriminatory practices
influenced the cases brought to court, as well as the discussions and rulings of the courts,
in the Southern Judicial Region. Cases brought before the courts in the Southern Judicial
Region involved only two states: Florida and Louisiana. There were a total of five unique
cases that were presented to the courts in eleven different appearances. The first cases
were brought in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Florida under the cases of Florida State
Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady and Debra P. v. Turlington originating in
1979. The case o f Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady originated
in the First District Court of Appeals of Florida, with resolution being determined by the
same court in an appeal brought by the plaintiff John Brady; the court affirmed the prior
decision (Brady v. Turlington, July 1979). The seminal case of Debra P. v. Turlington
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was brought before the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in
July of 1979. This case evolved through the courts via the United States Court o f Appeals
in May and September of 1981. The case was back in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida in 1983, with the case finally reaching resolution under the
federal court level in an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in 1984. Also the cases of Love v. Turlington (1980, 1984) were brought before
the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit respectively, requesting class certification for students similarly situated, but were
denied by the court.
In the State of Louisiana, one case was brought before the court. The case was
heard in the Court of Appeals of Louisiana First Circuit in the case of Rankins v.
Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education (March 1994). The
prevailing party in this case was the educational agency, resulting in the plaintiff students
requesting a review by the Supreme Court of Louisiana which was denied (Rankins v.
Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education (April 1994). Similar to
the Southeastern judicial region, one o f the distinctions revealed in this region was the
vestige of past racial segregation in public schools. Due to the dual system of education,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Florida upheld the student’s rights to a diploma, although they
had not successfully completed the state’s assessment, due to the prior discrimination and
inequitable educational opportunities. In this judicial region, the history of segregated
schools affected the court’s ruling. Table 48 lists the cases in the Southern Judicial
Region.
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Table 48
Southern Judicial Region Cases
Date

Case

1979

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady

1979-84

Debra P. v. Turlington

1979

Brady v. Turlington

1980

Love v. Turlington

1984

Love v. Turlington

March 1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education

April 1994

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
Education

Southwestern Judicial Region
In the Southwestern Judicial Region, six unique cases were presented, with seven
court appearances. All but one of the cases heard in this judicial region were heard in the
State of Texas. The first two cases brought to the courts in Texas involved contradicting
judicial rulings regarding participation in graduation ceremonies after having been denied
a diploma due to the students failing state exit exams. The cases of Crump v. Gilmer
Independent School District (1992) and Williams v. Austin Independent School District
(1992) were heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
and the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas respectively. The
case of Crump v. Gilmer resulted in a ruling in favor of the plaintiff, while the case of
Williams v. Austin Independent School District resulted in a ruling in favor of the
educational agency.
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The next case was brought to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas in 1998 by Sarah Hubbard seeking a summary judgment challenging the
school district’s testing policy as the student refused to take the test. The court found in
favor of the educational agency on the grounds that the testing policy was a legitimate
interest of the advancement of public schools {Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo
Independent School District, 1998). The next case was the GI Forum, Image de Tejas v.
the Texas Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education, which was brought
again before the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in 2000.
This case was filed with the support of the Image de Tejas advocate for ELL students.
This case protested the use of the test as a criterion for denial of diploma to minority
students, as a disproportionate number of minority students did not pass the test.
However, the court found in favor of the educational agency as the court determined that
the TAAS test did not result in a disparate impact on minority students, did not perpetuate
discrimination, and was an educational necessity (2000). This case continued through the
case of United States o f America and LULAC GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas State Board o f Education in 2007 and 2008 under an
Equal Educational Opportunity Act claim; however, the high stakes testing issue had
already been settled under the previous case.
Only one nested case was brought in the courts in another state in the
Southwestern Judicial Region. This case was brought in the State of Kentucky under the
case name of Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education in 1997. This case
claimed that the KIRIS test inhibited the parents and students’ rights to free exercise of
their religion. The Court of Appeals for Kentucky found in favor of the educational
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agency finding that the test did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The plaintiffs
requested a review by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1999, which was denied.
The table below represents the cases heard in the Southwestern Judicial Region.
Table 49
Southwestern Judicial Region Cases
Case

Date
1992

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District

1992

Williams v. Austin Independent School District

1997

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education

1998

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District

2000

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the Texas
State Board o f Education

Pacific Judicial Region
The Pacific Judicial Region saw eight court cases with two resulting in court
rulings. Four unique cases were heard in the State of California, and one case was heard
in Arizona. Two cases were brought in the states of Alaska and Oregon, Noon et al. v.
Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District and Advocates fo r
Special Kids v. Oregon, but were settled out of court. Both cases involved the Disability
Rights Advocacy Group and resulted in the settlement agreements in favor of the
students.
The case of Flores v. State o f Arizona was brought before the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona in 2005. This case resulted in a ruling in favor of
the students and held the state legislature in contempt of court for the lack of adequate
funding for the ELL students in the State of Arizona.
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The rest of the cases were filed in California, several of the cases were nested,
resulting from the original case of Chapman v. California Department o f Education in
February of 2002 in the court of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California. The case was then brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit under the case name of Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f
California and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District later in August of 2002. The last case
was brought before the Superior Court of Alameda County in 2008, where the final
resolution was determined in a settlement agreement between the parties under the case
name of Kidd v. California Department o f Education.
Two cases were filed in the Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District
(Californians fo r Justice Fund v. State Board o f Education, 2006; O ’Connell v. The
Superior Court o f Alameda County, 2006). The case of Coachella Valley Unified School
District v. State o f California (2005) was brought before the United States District Court
for the Northern District o f California. This case involved the claim o f violation of the
NCLB act regarding students as ELL The case of O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f
Alameda County was filed in 2006 with complaints of violations of the equal protection
and due process clauses. The educational agency prevailed in the case. However, the case
was brought back to the court under the case name The Superior Court o f Alameda
County and Valenzuela v. O ’Connell (2007). The parties reached a settlement agreement
concluding the case in California. A summary of the nine cases heard in the Pacific
Judicial Region is presented in Table 50.
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Table 50
Pacific Judicial Region Cases
Date

Case

2001

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon

2002

Chapman v. California Department o f Education

2002

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California, and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board o f
Education and Freemont Unified School District

2004

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
School District

2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona

2005

Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California

2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f Education

2006

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County

2008

Kidd v. California Department o f Education

Atlantic Judicial Region
There were no cases brought to the courts in the Atlantic Judicial Region.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
The public school system in our country was established to educate all students to
become productive citizens. As the population of the nation increased, the demands on
public education to provide a free education to children increased as well. Public scrutiny
of the quality of education intensified, resulting in pressure for school accountability to
ensure that students were receiving a quality education necessary to maintain our nation’s
status in global competition.
The high stakes testing policies became one o f the methods by which states could
hold local school boards, individual schools, administrators and teachers accountable for
student outcomes. In addition, the high stakes testing policies were implemented to hold
students accountable for their own learning. The denial of high school diplomas based
upon student performance on these tests became a controversial issue in some cases
requiring judicial intervention. Research questions pertaining to the implementation of
this policy and the resulting litigation included:
1. What issues related to high stakes testing and the denial of diplomas were
revealed in state and federal case law within the 1979-2012 timeframe?
2. Were the issues distinctive based upon regular education or special education
students?
3. What differences were revealed within the case law rulings regarding those in
favor of the students and those in favor of the educational agencies?
4. What differences existed between the case law according the geographical regions
as defined by regions in published court reporters and listed as follows:
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Northeastern, Northwestern, Southeastern, Southern, Southwestern, Pacific, and
Atlantic regions?
The courts addressed the issues embedded in the controversy, with outcomes
illustrating the interpretation of the constitutionality of the policy. The interpretations per
issue were extrapolated from the court cases and synthesized to provide a comprehensive
examination of the evolution of the case law, the overall interpretation of the policy as
per the constitutionality of each issue, the similarities and differences in the rulings, and
specific caveats under which the policy could be implemented without violating students’
constitutional rights. Moreover, the analysis revealed rich detail as to the individuals
impacted by the policy, and the conditions under which each student incurred the
demands of the policy and the results therein. The analysis also provided information as
to the prevailing party in each issue and the interaction of the policy with each issue.
Lastly, the analysis revealed the states in which the litigation occurred, and investigated
the similarities and differences as per judicial region.
Data
The cases examined in this study directly involved the denial of a high school
diploma upon the basis of a student’s failure to pass an exit exam required by state or
local school board. The plaintiffs’ claimed the implementation of the test was in violation
of students’ rights. Coding of the cases by similar topics resulted in the emergence of
themes from the data. Often the issues presented in the complaints emerged as the themes
however, additional information found in the court documents emerged as subthemes
deepening the understanding of the contextual analysis of the data.
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The synthesis of the themes in the data created a landscape of the case law
regarding the individual issues considered by the courts. A discussion of the analysis of
the court’s interpretation of each issue clarified the similarities and differences in the
interpretations, as well as to illuminate the unique circumstances that influenced the
judges’ decisions. As a result, a framework was extracted from the case law providing a
structure to understand the Constitutionality of the implementation of high stakes testing
policies as a requirement for the awarding of a diploma. The unique and relevant details
of the cases added depth and condition to the framework, giving it the richness of a study
involving the interaction of a policy on students.
Findings and Interpretations
Issues Presented to the Courts Involving High Stakes Testing
The implementation of high stakes testing policies impacted thousands of students
across the nation. As schools continued to function under increased accountability
measures, high stakes testing became one vehicle for meeting political and societal
expectations. Most of the cases sought judicial intervention to challenge the
implementation of the policy in order to protect student rights. These cases offered a rich
texture to the legal interaction of the policy on the lives of the impacted students. Each
unique case presented in this analysis involving high stakes testing contained an
individual history of the interaction of policy implementation with student rights.
However, despite the diversity of the case histories, many consistent issues emerged
within the data. The prevalent themes revealed in the analysis were: due process, equal
protection, and issues regarding students with disabilities. The themes embedded in the
larger issues were state authority, fundamental fairness of the test, curricular validity,
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adequate notice, remediation, multiple opportunities to take the tests, alternative tests,
public viewing of tests, claims of violations of the Establishment Clause and
accommodations and modifications for students with disabilities. These features of the
case law landscape provided much information as to the effects of implementation as
well as the interpretation of the courts, which would serve as a resource for similar policy
implementation in the future. Additional key concepts and caveats also emerged in the
analysis. As the courts considered the constitutionality of the policy, the case law evolved
creating a framework for proper implementation with regard to student rights.
A dichotomy between the testing policies and the success of students emerged in
the data analysis. The denial of diplomas to students who were unable to pass a state’s
mandatory state assessment may have incurred possible negative consequences later in
life. These consequences would likely affect the future income, job opportunities, and
family security of these students. However, the states had a manifest interest in providing
verification that its educational program was preparing its students for productive
citizenship and basic skills needed for the workforce. High stakes tests became one o f the
ways that states could collect data to measure the effectiveness of its programs as well as
provide information to the states’ taxpaying public to ensure accountability that funding
provided to the schools was indeed the value expected from effective school systems.
The courts determined that students who attended school and participated in the
states’ educational program had a reasonable expectation of receiving a diploma. This
expectation established a property or liberty interest. The protection of this property
interest in the expectation of a diploma fell under the Due Process Clause. Procedural due
process ensured that educational officials could not constitutionally implement a testing
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policy without adequate notice of the possible consequences of the denial of the diploma.
Additionally, the state and local boards must have provided proof that students had
adequate time to prepare for the test.
Conversely, student promotion evoked no due process rights as the case law
established that there was no reasonable expectation of promotion of a student
performing in a substandard manner. A case involving student promotion provided the
distinction between promotion and the expectation of a diploma. “Students have no
legitimate expectation that the meaning of ‘satisfactory work’ done in the classrooms will
remain constantly fixed at a level that in truth is academically unsatisfactory” (Bester v.
Tuscaloosa Board o f Education, 1984, p. 1516).
Another interesting aspect illuminated in the case law was the gradual transition
from the use of Minimum Competency Tests (MCT) in the early case law evolution to
the comprehensive exit exams during the middle evolutionary period. Later in the
evolution of the testing implementation, the end-of-course tests were used to measure
student knowledge so specific course content. Perhaps it was this transition to end-ofcourse tests, which explains the reduction in the number of cases brought in the later
years of the timeframe. As the last case was heard in 2008, this research speculates that
the litigation may have diminished as the end-of-course tests were considered more fair
to students and fewer students were denied diplomas for failing the tests.
Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process violations involving adequate notice was a main theme
revealed in the analysis. The examination of the issues embedded in the case law has
established that in order for the high stakes testing policies to be constitutional, the
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students must have had adequate notice of, at minimum, two years. Additionally, students
must have had the opportunity to learn the material on the test with the burden of proof
residing with the state for guaranteeing the court that the state’s curriculum covered the
material on the test and that curriculum was taught in the classrooms. For students with
disabilities, the Individualized Education Plan had to reflect goals of passing the test, and
that adequate time was given to the students as well as access to accommodations and/or
modifications to demonstrate their knowledge without their disability affecting their test
results. The case law also revealed that the tests were to be reliable and valid assessment
instruments with the courts often considering the development of the test and the
statistical data for outcomes of the test. Moreover, the courts were consistent that students
must have remedial opportunities before withholding a student’s high school diploma for
failure to pass the exam. Additionally, the courts did not support the test as the sole
criterion for graduation.
Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process protections ensure that the actions of a governmental
agency are not arbitrary or capricious. The analysis revealed that the courts supported the
states’ authority to establish criteria for a diploma and gave great deference to the states
in the functioning of their educational systems. The courts demonstrated reluctance to
intervene in state matters and only did so when cases presented allegations of violations
of student rights. Courts upheld the states interest in improving their educational
programs by implementing the tests. States with disparities in funding among school
districts, a history of prior segregation, and seeking to establish a statewide curriculum
and student learning objectives utilized assessments as a means to improve the quality of
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their educational programs. However, holding students accountable for a minimum level
of competency did not align directly with this objective. Student accountability sought to
establish the high school diploma as social and economic currency to ensure against the
deflation of the value of a diploma. Increasing accountability for students aspired to
motivate students toward achieving the minimum standards of the states.
The analysis revealed the students who were denied their diplomas as the result of
testing, may have experienced underfunded and inequities in learning environments,
poorly aligned curriculum, and the vestiges of prior segregated schools. However, the
courts often held that the states employed the tests as a mechanism to eradicate these
educational disparities by holding schools, school districts, administrators and teachers
accountable for the educational progress of their students.
In every case in the analysis, the courts supported the states’ intentions by
affirming the nexus to the legitimate goals of the state. The nexus to the states’ goals of
improving their educational system ensured that the testing policy was not arbitrary and
therefore did not violate substantive due process protections.
Curricular Validity
Another component of due process protections involved the curricular validity of
the tests. Curricular validity ensures that the students were tested on material, which they
had been taught, and that the states’ adopted curriculum was aligned to the material
covered on the test. In cases involving vulnerable populations of students, the analysis
revealed that the curricular validity fell under equal protection if the students had not had
the opportunity to learn the material on the test. In some cases, the lack of the opportunity
to learn rendered the test discriminatory based upon the protected populations and the fair
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access to the curriculum. Cases involving minority students in Florida and Georgia
received much of the focus of the curricular validity being considered discriminatory as
these states had a history of previously segregated schools and the vestiges of the prior
discrimination remained in the school districts.
The court consistently upheld the curricular validity of the tests if the states’
Boards of Education could provide evidence that the schools taught material on the test.
The court did not require that the educational agency prove that the each student was
exposed to the material but that in general the states’ curriculum frameworks documented
the material tested was taught in the schools.
Fundamentally Fair Test
The court consistently ruled in favor of the educational agency if the test in
question was fundamentally fair. The courts considered a test as fair if the state could
provide evidence that the test was a valid instrument that measured what it was intended
to measure. Additionally, the test was to be a reliable instrument of assessment and that
the test questions were not biased. It was also important for the scoring of the tests to be
reliable with respect to errors. Again, the test could only be considered fair if the students
were given the opportunity to leam the material on the test prior to being denied their
diploma.
Remediation and Multiple Opportunities to Test
The courts supported the educational agency’s testing policy if the state could
provide evidence that it offered remediation to students who were unsuccessful on the
tests and that the students had been given additional opportunities to take the tests. The
courts did not intend to undermine the states’ efforts to maximize the value of a diploma
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by awarding diplomas to students in cases resulting in student rights violations. The
courts preferred to remedy the students’ situation by ensuring that the students received
remediation and support to assist them in passing the test. In all the cases presented, the
data revealed that the states had remedial programs in place and that the students were
afforded additional opportunities to pass the tests. Despite the intentions of the courts, not
all cases were remedied by remediation and additional testing opportunities. In some
cases, the remedial efforts and testing opportunities would present a hardship to the
students. In these cases, the court ordered the school district or state to award the
diplomas.
Equal Protection
Complaints of equal protection violations were another major theme emerged
from the data. Students of color complained that the test violated their equal protection
rights due to the disparity in pass rates for these subgroups of students and Caucasian
students. In most cases, unless the state had a history of discrimination via segregated
schools, the court held that the educational agency attempted to rectify the discrimination
by ensuring that all students received a quality education. The tests were a mechanism to
improve the states’ instructional programs. In the cases where prior discrimination was
evident and students had attended school under discriminatory practices, the courts ruled
that the state could not deny diplomas until the vestiges of the prior discrimination were
no longer evident. After the students who had attended the previously segregated schools
had graduated, the court held that the states could then begin to deny diplomas to the
students who were unable to pass the tests. Of course, the consistent caveats of
remediation and multiple opportunities to pass the tests were intact in these cases.
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English Language Learners
English Language Learners complaints were not frequent in the analysis but were
a subtheme that emerged from the data. The cases involving ELL students were the result
of underfunding of the ELL programs in the state or the result of fundamentally fair test
complaints. These cases were unique and the court rulings were specific to the
circumstances of the cases. This researcher found it difficult to determine any
generalizations from this section to inform the framework as to the variations in the cases
and the data.
The case law included issues regarding the impact of the policy on minority
students, students with disabilities, and ELL. The analysis revealed that the testing policy
did not violate equal protection rights if the state had a legitimate interest in improving
education through the use of the tests to illuminate disparities and inequities in
educational programs. Although the analysis indicated that inequitable funding was a
contributor to low performance by some subgroups and that, these students were unfairly
deprived with an opportunity to leam the material on the test.
Graduation Participation
Similar to the ELL theme, the data for the student’s participation in graduation
ceremonies was inconsistent and thus unsuitable for generalizations. The three cases
reflected differing court opinions on the meaningfulness of graduation and the rulings
ultimately resided in the personal position of the judge presiding over the case.
Summary
Educational leaders and policy makers need to be informed as to the implications
and broad scope of the policy to deny a high school diploma. The societal impact over

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

291

time could challenge the economic stability of our country as public schools prepare the
citizens of tomorrow. The diminished employment opportunities, pay disparities, and
self-esteem issues resulting from the lack of a high school diploma are very real and
detrimental, to both students and our nation. Before a policy with such potential impacts
is introduced, leaders and policy makers should be clear as to the constitutional
framework regarding the property rights of students as well as the potential unintended
consequences and outcomes for students and society.
As the discussion of the analysis revealed both in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the
information embedded in the case law was unique and multivariate. However, the
extrapolated and connected consistencies created the overall framework for the
appropriate and constitutional implementation of the high stakes testing policies. Table
51 provides a summary of all cases and the issues revealed in the analysis.
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Table 51
Question One Cases
Property

Adq

Auth

Fair

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Opport

X

X

X

X

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

Crit

Protect

Validity

X

X

ELL

Est

Case

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979

X

Florida State Board o f Education and
X

X

X

X

X

Turlington v. Brady, 1979
Brady v. Turlington, 1979

X

Wells v. Banks, 1980

X

X

Love v. Turlington
Debra P. v. Turlington, May 1981

X

X

Debra P. v. Turlington, Sept 1981

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

The Board o f Education o f the NorthportEast Northport Union Free School
District et al. v.Ambach, 1981

X

X

Clause

Grad
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Property

Adq

Auth

Fair

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Opport

X

X

X

X

X

X

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

Crit

Protect

Validity

X

X

ELL

Est

Grad

Case
Clause

Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes,
X

1981
Brookhart v. Illinois Stale Board o f
X

X

X

Education, 1982
Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983

X

X

X

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Education, 1983
Debra P. v. Turlington, 1984

X

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984
Love v. Turlington, 1984

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Crump v. Gilmer Independent School
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

District, 1992
Williams v. Austin Independent School
X
District, 1992
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Property

Adq

Auth

Fan-

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

ELL

Est

Opport

Crit

Protect

Validity

Clause

X

X

X

X

X

Case

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f
Elementary and Secondary Education,

X

March 1994
Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f
Elementary and Secondary Education,

State Supreme Court request denied.

April 1994
Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
Education, 1997

X

X

X

Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f
United States Supreme Court request denied

Education, 1999

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo
X
Independent School District, 1998

X

X

Grad
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Property

Adq

Auth

Fair

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Opport

X

X

X

X

X

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

Crit

Protect

Validity

X

X

X

X

X

ELL

Est

Case
Clause

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas State

X

Board o f Education, 2000

Rene v. Reed, 2001

X

X

X

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon,
X

2001

Rene v. Reed, 2002

State Supreme Court request denied.

New York Performance Standards
Consortium v. New York State Education

X

Department, 2002

Chapman v. California Department o f
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Education, 2002
Student v. Driscoll, 2002

X

X

Grad
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Property

Adq

Auth

Fair

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Opport

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

Crit

Protect

Validity

ELL

Est

Grad

Case
Clause

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities
Association o f California, and Chapman
v. California Department o f Education,

X

X

California Board o f Education and
Freemont Unified School District„ 2002
Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

al„ 2004
Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004

X

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f
Education and the Anchorage School

X

X

District State Board o f Education, 2004
Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f
Education et al., 2005

X

X
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Property

Adq

Auth

Fair

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Opport

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

Crit

Protect

Validity

ELL

Est

Grad

Case
Clause

Coachella Valley Unified School District
X

v. State o f California, 2005

Flores v. State o f Arizona, 2005

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

0 'Connell v. The Superior Court o f
X
Alameda County, 2006

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund
X
v. State Board o f Ed, 2006

Superior Court o f California County o f
Alameda and Valenzuela v. O ’Connell,
2007

X

X

X
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Property

Adq

Auth

Fair

Mult

Interest

Notice

Goals

Test

Opport

Remed

Sole

Equal

Curr

Crit

Protect

Validity

ELL

Est

Grad

Case
Clause

Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High
School, The Institute for New Americans,
X

X
and Special School District 1, 2008

K idd v. California Department of
X
Education, 2008

X
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Regular Education and Students with Disabilities: Case Law Similarities and
Differences
Students with disabilities were protected by several pieces of federal legislation.
The Education for all Handicapped Children Act, Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act and the Rehabilitation Act contain specific language mandating educational protocols
for students with disabilities. The case law involving high stakes testing and students with
disabilities has evolved dramatically particularly regarding the use of accommodations
during the administration of high stakes tests. In the earliest cases, the courts ruled that
the use of accommodations and modifications for students with disabilities would affect
the validity of the results. However, as the case law evolved, the influence of federal
legislation and prior case law regarding students with disabilities and educational issues,
the courts ruled differently supporting the students’ rights to a Free and Appropriate
Education. The use of high stakes tests with students with disabilities required specific
guidelines of which educational leaders and policy makers must be knowledgeable.
The interaction of high stakes testing policies with students with disabilities was
featured in the analysis. Students’ EEPs must have addressed the assessments through the
goals for the student. Furthermore, the student must have received adequate notice,
particularly so that IEP goals to be developed with the intention of successful completion
of the test. Students with disabilities must have accommodations and modifications in
place to help them access the curriculum and meaningfully participate in the assessments
without the impact of their disability, if possible. If the students were unable to
meaningfully participate, then an alternate test must be available. Moreover, students
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with disabilities must also have access to remedial opportunities to learn the material
covered on the test in the case of demonstrated lack of success on the tests.
The analysis of the case law revealed that the activation of advocacy groups for
students with disabilities resulted out-of-court settlement agreements in several cases.
These cases often involved the Disability Rights Advocate group co petitioning the
courts. This group was instrumental in supporting students with disabilities and in the
cases of Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School
District, Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon and Kidd v. California. The support o f this
advocacy group influenced the rights of students to use accommodations and
modifications on the state tests and to meaningfully participate in the assessments.
Tables 52-54 summarize the cases and issues involving students of disabilities.
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Table 52
Question Two Cases
Auth

Adq

Remed

Mult

Equal

Fair

Mean

Opport

Protect

Test

Inclusn

Alt

Add’l

Assess

Trng

X

X

X

X

X

Accom

Case
Notice
The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981

X

X

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1982
Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984

X

X

Rene v. Reed, 2001

X

X

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001

Student v. Driscoll

X
X

X

Rene v. Reed, 2002
Chapman v. CA Department o f Education, 2002

X

X

X

State Supreme Court request denied.
X

X

X

X

X
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Auth

Adq

Remed

Mult

Equal

Fair

Mean

Opport

Protect

Test

Inclusn

Accom

Alt

Add’l

Assess

Tmg

Case
Notice
Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California,
and Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California

X

X

X

X

X

B oard o f Education and Freemont Unified School District, 2002

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et al., 2004

X

X

X

X

X

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the
X

X

X

X

X

X

Anchorage School District State Board o f Education, 2004
Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al., 2005

X

X

0 ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County,
X

X

X

2006
Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f
X
Education, 2006
Kidd v. California Department o f Education, 2008

X

X
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Distinctions between Prevailing Parties
The analysis of the cases revealed some distinctions between cases won by the
students and the won by the educational agency. It was noted in the data analysis that
some cases were brought to the courts by educational agencies requesting judicial
interference with other educational agencies. For example, in the case o f The Board o f
Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach,
(1981) the school district petitioned the court for an injunction against the State
Education Commissioner to enjoin him and the State Board of Education from revoking
the diplomas of two students with disabilities that had previously been awarded their
diplomas. In the analysis, the cases that were brought to the courts by other agencies or
entities were removed and not considered as part o f the data set for this question. The
results of the study indicated that the courts supported the educational agencies’
implementation of high stakes testing requirements and the withholding of a high school
diploma as long as the court could determine that the policy has a nexus to the state goals
of improving education. In addition, the courts demonstrated judicial reluctance to
become involved in determining the appropriateness of the state mandated testing and
instead respected the public’s interest in elected officials and educational professionals to
determine the policies regarding the states’ public education system.
Plaintiff students prevailed in the court if they could prove that they did not
receive adequate notice, were impacted by the vestiges of prior segregation, or were not
provided or able to access to remediation or were victims of grossly underfunded
instructional programs.
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Due Process
The data revealed that early in the case law evolution, the student prevailed more
often in cases regarding due process/adequate notice. However, in the later cases in the
case law evolution, the educational agency prevailed more frequently. This researcher
speculates that as the court clarified adequate notice, the educational agencies ensured
that the notice given met the requirements of the court in order to avoid litigation.
Curricular Validity
As stated in the discussion previously, the analysis revealed that the curricular
validity of the tests was often upheld by the court as the educational agencies were able to
provide evidence supporting the validity of the test in the curriculum frameworks of each
state. Overall, the analysis yielded more cases won by the educational agency than by
plaintiff students.
Equal Protection
Echoing the conclusions regarding curricular validity, the educational agency
more often prevailed in cases involving equal protection claims. The analysis revealed
that the educational agencies did not intentionally discriminate by implementing the
testing policy. Instead, the court interpreted the states’ efforts to promote student progress
and to improve their instructional programs as attempts to eradicate prior discrimination.
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Table 53
Question Three Cases
Adequate Notice

Curricular Validity

Equal Protection

Special Ed
Accommodations

Case
Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979
Brady v. Turlington, 1979

X

X

X

X

Florida State Board of Education and

X

Turlington v. Brady, 1979
Wells v. Banks, 1980

X

Love v. Turlington, 1980

X

X

The Board of Education of the Northport-East
X

Northport Union Free School District et al. v.

X

Ambach, 1981
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981

X

X

X

306

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

Adequate Notice

Curricular Validity

Equal Protection

Special Ed
Accommodations

Case
Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981

X

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board of

X

X

X

X

Education, 1982
Brookhart v. Illinois State Board of

X

X

Education, 1983
Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983

X

X

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1984

X

X

Lovev. Turlington, 1984

X
X

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984
Williams v. Austin Independent School
District, 1992
Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District,
1992

X

X
X

X
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Adequate Notice

Curricular Validity

Equal Protection

Special Ed
Accommodations

Case
Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Rankins v. Louisiana Board of Elementary

X

and Secondary Education, 1994
Triplett v. Livingston County Board of
Education, 1997
Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent
School District, 1998

X

X

X

X

Gl Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas State Board

X

X

X

of Education, 2000
X

Advocatesfor Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001
Rene v. Reed, 2001

X

Rene v. Reed, 2002
Student v. Driscoll, 2002

X

X

X

X
X

X
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Adequate Notice

Curricular Validity

Equal Protection

Special Ed
Accommodations

Case
Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

Chapman v. California Department of

X

Education, 2002

Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

X

X

X

X

X

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association
of California, and Chapman v. California
Department of Education, California Board of
Education and Freemont UnifiedSchool District,
2002
Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board of
X

Education and the Anchorage School District,
2004
Student 9 et al. v. Board of Education et al,
2004
Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004
Flores v. State of Arizona, 2005

X

X

X

X
X

X
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Adequate Notice

Curricular Validity

Equal Protection

Special Ed
Accommodations

Case

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f
Education et al., 2005

Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

X

O'Connell v. The Superior Court of Alameda

Education

Student

Education

Student

Education

Student

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

Prevail

X

X

X

County, 2006
Californiansfor Justice Education Fund v.
State Board of Education, 2006

X

Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High
School, The Institutefor New Americans, and
Special School District Number 1, 2008

X
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Distinctions by Judicial Regions
The analysis revealed that four judicial regions were the primary litigation regions.
These regions were the Northeastern, the Southern, the Southwestern, and the Pacific. Two
of the cases in the Northeastern region stemmed from the McDuffy case and the attempts of
the state of Massachusetts to reform its educational system. Two other cases were related to
the passage of the Education Reform Act, which fueled the litigation as inequities in
funding prompted plaintiff complaints.
The Southeastern Region also experienced a higher number of cases however these
cases were the nested cases of Wells v. Banks', Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, and
Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes.
The Southern Region had 11 cases brought to the courts with five of these being
litigation as the Debra P. v. Turlington cases from 1979-1984. Four other cases were heard
in the state of Florida and two cases being heard in the state of Louisiana. Overall, Florida
witnessed the majority of litigation with eight total cases being heard in the state.
The Pacific Region was another active region with nine cases brought forth to the
courts. Five of the cases were heard in the state of California with three relating to the
nested cases of Chapman v. The State Board o f Education. This region had the most cases
being settled out of court with Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, Noon et al. v. Alaska
State Board o f Education and the Anchorage School District, Kidd v. California
Department o f Education and The Superior Court ofAlameda County and Valenzuela v.
O ’Connell.
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Table 54
Question Four Regional Cases
Case

Northeastern

Northwestern

Southeastern

Southern

Southwestern

Pacific

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1979

X

Florida State Board o f Education and Turlington v. Brady, 1979

X

Brady v. Turlington, 1979

X
X

Wells v. Banks, 1980
Love v. Turlington, 1980

X

Debra P. v. Turlington, May 1981

X

Debra P. v. Turlington, Sept 1981

X

The Board o f Education o f the Northport-East Northport Union Free
X
School District et al. v. Ambach, 1981
Anderson v. Banks; Johnson v. Sikes, 1981

X

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1982

X

Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1983

X
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Case

Northeastern

Northwestern

Southeastern

Southern

Southwestern

Pacific

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1983

X

Debra P. v. Turlington, 1984

X
X

Johnson and Wilcox v. Sikes, 1984

X

Love v. Turlington, 1984
Crump v. Gilmer Independent School District, 1992

X

Williams v. Austin Independent School District, 1992

X

Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
X
Education, March 1994
Rankins v. Louisiana State Board o f Elementary and Secondary
X
Education, April 1994
Triplett v. Livingston County Board o f Education, 1997

X

Hubbard by Hubbard v. Buffalo Independent School District, 1998

X

GI Forum, Image de Tejas v. the Texas Education Agency and the
X
Texas State Board o f Education, 2000
Rene v. Reed, 2001

X
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Case
Rene v. Reed, 2002

Northeastern

Northwestern

Southeastern

Southern

Southwestern

Pacific

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

X
X

Advocates fo r Special Kids v. Oregon, 2001
New York Performance Standards Consortium v. New York State
X
Education Department, 2002
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, 2002

X

Smiley, Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association o f California, and
Chapman v. California Department o f Education, California Board

X

o f Education and Freemont Unified School District, 2002
Student v. Driscoll, 2002

X

Student 9 et al. v. Board o f Education et a l, 2004

X

Noon et al. v. Alaska State Board o f Education and the Anchorage
X
School District State Board o f Education, 2004
Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004

X

Hancock et al. v. Commissioner o f Education et al., 2005

X

Coachella Valley Unified School District v. State o f California, 2005

X
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Case

Northeastern

Northwestern

Southeastern

Southern

Southwestern

Pacific

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Region

Flores v. State o f Arizona, 2005

X

O ’Connell v. The Superior Court o f Alameda County, 2006

X

Californians fo r Justice Education Fund v. State Board o f
X
Education, 2006
Superior Court o f California County o f Alameda and Valenzuela v.
X
O'Connell, 2007
Mumid et al., v. Abraham Lincoln High School, The Institute for
X
New Americans, and Special School District 1, 2008
K idd v. California Department o f Education, 2008

X
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Recommendations
Recommendations for Leaders and Policy Makers
Over the 30 years since the high profile case of Debra P. v. Turlington, the
controversy over high stakes testing and the denial of a high school diploma created
impassioned conflict between parents, students and educational agencies. As the case law
evolved, it was evident that a transistion occurred regarding the use o f the Minimum
Compentency Tests to the comprehensive exit exams which caused the most controversy
in the courts. Currently, many states require the end-of-course tests thereby reducing the
controversy and the resulting litigation. The disagreement between the interests of the
states and the potential future of students fueled the conflict requiring judicial
intervention and revisions to the policy. The case law evolution documented the
modification of the overall policy to include specific caveats to ensure compliance with
the Constitution of the United States. From this case law evolution and the analysis of the
consistent issues presented to the courts, a framework for implementation was
extrapolated and presented. This information could be vital to leaders for future policy
implementation to avoid costly and hostile litigation. The overall framework provides
specific guidance to policy makers and educational leaders in order to implement policy
in a constitutionally consistent and appropriate format that support student rights and
positive public perceptions.
Although controversial, the testing requirement did result in some positive
impacts for the improvement of the educational systems throughout the country. States
designed and implemented curricular frameworks for provide structure for the day to day
instruction taking place in the classrooms, thereby establishing the curricular validty of
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the tests. Providing remedial opportunities for students to learn material which they had
not yet mastered helped students to become more successful learners of the material due
to multiple opportunities to leam the curriculum. Another positive impact of the high
stakes testing policies was the improvement o f the overall educational systems with the
focus on collecting data and improving student learning. Lastly, the high stakes testing
policies served as a catalyst for the entitlement of testing accommodations and
modifications for students with disabilities. These improvements in the nation’s
educational systems have benefited all students regardless o f whether they were impacted
by the policy or not.
The following recommendations to leaders are based upon this framework
resulting from the analysis of the cases and the themes that emerged. The
recommendations include suggestions in support of due process and the equal protection
clauses in the Constitution. Other recommendations involve caveats for remediation, and
fundamentally fair testing. Recommendations specific to students with disabilities and
students with 504 plans were also derived from the analysis of the data and the resulting
framework. A brief discussion of each issue with the recommendations is included in the
following text.
Due Process
The future implementation of any broad educational policy must be
constitutionally appropriate. As a result of the analysis of cases involving high stakes
testing and the denial of diplomas to high school seniors, the due process protections
ensured that the policy is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The state educational agency
did not have the authority to implement a policy that is “spontaneous” or did not have a
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nexus to the legitimate goals of the state. The due process clause afforded students
adequate notice of any sanction that may be employed due to the policy implementation.
The recommendation of this researcher is that leaders closely examine the policy for the
impact on students, particularly students from vulnerable populations such as students
with disabilities, minority students, and English Language Learners. These students may
need additional support to adjust to the policy prior to receiving a sanctions-based
consequence. The implementation plan of the policy should include a time frame that
provides the appropriate amount of time required for all students to prepare for the
change in policy. Additionally, leaders and policy makers should examine the policy
carefully to determine if there exists any component of the policy that is unfair or unjust
such as determining the validity and reliability of assessments used to evaluate the policy.
Equal Protection
Recommendations for policy implementation regarding equal protection rights of
students reflect the framework extrapolated from the data analysis. The recommendation
to policy makers and educational leaders are to consider the impact o f the policy on
minority students, particularly students from socio-economic conditions that could
impede their ability to demonstrate success in learning or achievement. Additionally,
leaders must ensure equitable educational funding for state public schools prior to
holding students accountable for learning outcomes.
Students must have a fair opportunity to learn any educational content for which
they would ultimately suffer sanctions. The opportunity to leam assists in ensuring that
the policy is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and affords the student a fair education
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advantage. Remedial programs also help to ensure the opportunity to learn, and avoid
arbitrary and capricious policies.
Leaders must be aware of the political environment in which educational
programs exist. As documented in the analysis, the judicial and political climates affect
the environment of schools and students. Understanding the climate and political
structures prevalent in the regions of our nation, helps leaders to promulgate and
incorporate policy congruent to the prevailing norms.
Recommendations for Practioners
This analysis revealed a framework for educational leaders and policy makers
regarding high stakes testing and their use as a criterion for the awarding of a diploma.
Additionally, the analysis revealed information relevant to educational practitioners as to
the preparation of students for the successful completion of the tests. The researcher
extrapolated the following suggestions for practioners in order to support the goals of the
states’ educational systems as well as assist students in preparation of the exams or
similar tests for diploma criterion.
The analysis revealed information of which would be helpful to educational
professionals in the field. As principal’s, teachers and support personnel strive to meet
the educational ambitions of the state, they also must interact with the needs of the
learners in the schools. In order to implement the high stakes testing policies fairly and
appropriately, these practioners need information regarding the specifics embedded in the
case law from which to base the implementation decisions. The information most
releveant to the practioners involves the remedial opportunities available to the students,
the multiple opportunities for students to test, and the curricular validity of the tests.
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Furthermore, for students with disabilities, the practioner knowledge is important in order
to craft the students’ IEPs to reflect these opportunities as well as specific learner goals
addressing the state requirement of successful completion of the test. The following
framework is relevant to the district level and school-based practioners regarding the
requirement of the exit exam or state-mandated assessment:
1. Personnel should ensure that the curriculum taught in the classrooms adheres to
the state expectation of material that would be presented on the test. State
curriculum frameworks, blueprints, and scope and sequence information as well
as observation and teacher evaluation help to support the curricular validity of the
tests.
2. Practioners need to provide multiple opportunities for remediation to students
who did not successfully complete the tests.
3. The test should not be considered as the sole criterion for the awarding of a
diploma. The academic program must include other criteria such as attendance,
student grades, and/or projects for the awarding of a diploma.
4. Multiple opportunities to retest the entire test or specific sections of tests help to
support the fundamental fairness of the tests.
In addition, for students with disabilities, practioners should be aware of the following:
5.

Students with disabilities are entitled to accommodations and modifications that
allow them to meaningfully participate and demonstrate their knowledge on the
tests. The students’ IEPs must describe the necessary accommodations and
modifications.
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6. The students’ IEP goals must address the intention of successful completion of the
state mandated tests or their equivalent in order for the court to uphold any equal
protection or due process complaint.
Researcher Reflections
The researcher in this analysis served in the classroom during the implementation
of the TAAS test in Texas. Having witnessed firsthand the impact of the TAAS test on
the educational context, the topic of this dissertation resonated with the researcher. As the
research progressed, the magnitude of the impact on students became more evident. The
researcher had the assumptions that the high stake testing policy had a negative impact
for students based upon the testing requirement being the sole criterion for graduation.
However, as the cases were analyzed, it became more apparent that efforts to remediate
students gave them fair opportunity to learn the material on the test. However, this was
not always true for the vulnerable populations, for which the testing requirement may
have been unfair.
Through the process, the researcher discovered that the state educational agencies
intended to improve the quality of their educational programs by setting standards of
expected knowledge and skills for productive citizenship. Moreover, the researcher
determined that students were expected to achieve an expected level of success with
multiple opportunities for passing. As the case law evolved, the researcher began to
understand the states’ position on the tests as a requirement for a diploma. However, the
researcher did disagree with the comprehensive nature of the tests and believes the use of
end-of-course tests to be a more fair and valid way to assess student learning. However,
even the end of course tests can be problematic for some students as the researcher
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witnessed while serving as the summer high school principal. However, in retrospect, the
states have a right and an obligation to ensure that the students, whom they educate, are
able to demonstrate the essential skills and knowledge in order to become productive
citizens. As our nation participates in the global economy, it is even more essential that
our students have the necessary skills to compete with students from other nations to
ensure that the United States is able to maintain its position as a democratic leader in the
world and for our democracy to remain a viable form of government.
Suggestions for Further Research
The number of students denied their diploma as the results of the high stakes
testing policies is currently unknown. It would be interesting to know the actual number
of students impacted by the policies. A suggestion for student follow-up would be to
interview students who were denied their diplomas to see the social impact of the policy.
The researcher recommends a qualitative study documenting the personal impact of the
policy on individual students as they faced the outcomes of the denial of their high school
diploma. As many states are requiring end of course tests, the data these tests generate
could be compared to the outcomes of high stakes tests to analyze the overall outcomes
for students. Additional suggestions for research related to this analysis are as follows:
1. A study to investigate the differences in graduation rates for states that required
the high stakes comprehensive exams and states that required End-of-Course
tests.
2. Researchers might study the number of students who were ultimately impacted as
they were denied their high school diplomas by the application of the policy.
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3. A study to determine if the students who were denied their diplomas were
eventually successful in completion of the requirements, and the length of time
that the students continued in school.
4. A continued investigation regarding the subgroups o f students who eventually
earned their diplomas despite the lack of success on the comprehensive
assessment.
5. Finally, a research study to determine the amount of funding needed to remediate
students who were not successful on the exams and the additional cost to
taxpayers when students remain in school until they can be successful on the
exams.
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APPENDIX
FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and RALPH
D. TURLINGTON, as Commissioner of Education of the
State of Florida, Appellants, v. JOHN F. BRADY and JOHN
G. BRADY, Appellees and Cross-Appellant
No. KK-378
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
368 So. 2d 661; 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14388
March 20,1979
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, state education officials, sought review o f a
final order entered by a hearing officer of the Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings holding that the scoring criteria of a basic skills test administered to all Florida
school children were invalid.
OVERVIEW: Appellees, a Florida public school student and his father, challenged the
scoring standard used for a basic skills test administered to all public school children.
Appellees contended that the scoring standard was not valid because it was not a rule
under Fla. Stat. ch. 120. The hearing officer held that the scoring standard was a rule
within the meaning of Fla. Stat. ch. 120.52(14) but that it was invalid because it was not
promulgated in accordance with Fla. Stat. ch. 120.54. Appellants, Florida education
officials, sought review and appellees brought a cross-appeal. The court held that the
legislature directed appellants to develop and administer basic skills testing pursuant to
Fla. Stat. ch. 229.57(2)(b) (1977) and that the authority to determine scoring criteria was
implicit therein. The court noted that the criteria were applied to all students without
discrimination. The court held that the scoring standard at issue was a valid exercise of
appellants' authority. The court therefore vacated and set aside the hearing officer's order
finding the scoring standard invalid.
OUTCOME: The court vacated and set aside the hearing officer's order that found that a
scoring standard used for a basic skills test was invalid because it found that the standard
was a valid exercise of appellant state education officials' authority.
CORE TERMS: scoring, grade, criterion, graduation, basic skills, proficiency,
educational, functional, literacy, testing, capitalization, apostrophe, noun, hearing officer,
medical school, contemplation, satisfactory, disciplinary, promulgated, progress,
supplied, evenly, senior
COUNSEL: [**1] James D. Little and Judith A. Brechner, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Jack McLean, Ralph Armstead and Anna Bryant Motter, Tallahassee, for appellees and
cross-appellants.
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OPINION BY: MELVIN
OPINION
[*661] MELVIN, Judge.
The appellants have timely brought for review their challenge to that portion of the final
order of date June 15,1978, entered by the hearing officer of the Division of
Administrative Hearings wherein it was held and determined:
"3. The scoring criterion is a rule within the meaning of the APA, F.S. §
120.52(14).
4. The scoring criterion by which mastery of the basic skills and satisfactory
[*662] performance in functional literacy are determined is invalid for its
failure to have been promulgated in accordance with the APA, specifically
F.S. § 120.54." (Due Process, Scoring Standard).
The order found and determined that Rule 6A-1.941, as promulgated by the State Board
of Education, was a valid rule within the contemplation of Florida Statutes, Chapter 120,
the Administrative Procedure Act. The sole question presented for determination here is
whether or not, during the time here pertinent, the scoring criterion by which knowledge
of the basic skills and satisfactory performance in functional [**2] literacy was measured
was a rule within the contemplation of Chapter 120. It is stipulated that the scoring
criterion referred to was not adopted as a rule pursuant to Chapter 120, but was set and
determined by Ralph D. Turlington, as Commissioner of Education of the State of
Florida, pursuant to Section 229.57(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977).(Due Process: Scoring
Standard).
John F. Brady, father of an 11th grade student, John G. Brady, brought this action. At the
conclusion of the hearing, a motion was granted to add John G. Brady as a party to the
cause. The basis for the Brady complaint was that John G. Brady had passed the
functional literacy test but had failed two parts of the basic skills test, relating to
apostrophe and noun capitalization. The local school board, pursuant to its obligation,
provided young Brady with extra study in the areas in which he reflected deficiency in
the test (Opportunity to Leam: Remediation). The sole basis of the Brady complaint was
that the scoring standard as determined by the Commissioner of Education of Florida is
not valid because such criterion was not a part o f the rule referred to nor was it adopted as
a separate rule under Chapter 120. With this contention, we do not agree. (Due Process:
Procedural: Validity: Scoring Standard).
The test and the scoring [**3] was evenly applied to all students in Florida at grade levels
3 ,5 ,8 and 11. Young Brady did not have a right to be free from testing. While it is true
that a student has a "substantial interest" in passing the various subjects in the various
grades through which he progresses towards graduation, he does not have a right to pass
any subject as to which he had not obtained the required proficiency. A high school
diploma stands for something more than testimony to the fact that a student has attended
that school for a given number of years. In order for those in the academic field to know
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that a student has obtained proficiency in any given subject, it would follow as a matter
of logic that there would have to be, and traditionally there always have been, tests given
to the students on the subjects on which they have received instruction.
Whether a student will be considered as having obtained proficiency in any subject is a
matter peculiar to the field of education and is not one, in our view, that was intended by
the legislature to be arrived at through promulgation of rules under the Administrative
Procedure Act. It is our view that the Legislature of Florida had this very [**4] subject
under consideration when it adopted Section 229.57(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977),
wherein the Commissioner of Education was required and directed to:
"Develop and administer in the public schools a uniform, statewide program
of assessment to determine, periodically, educational status and progress and
the degree o f achievement o f approved minimum performance standards.. .
." 1 (Emphasis supplied)
1 Authority is now vested in State Board of Education. See Chapter 78-424 which
was filed in the Office of Secretary of State June 27, 1978, and was effective upon
becoming a law.
Implicit in such direction to the Commissioner of Education is the granting to him of the
authority to determine scoring criteria. (STATE AUTHORITY).. We further note that no
adverse effect has been visited upon young Brady because, following a testing procedure,
he was required to gain a minimum knowledge with reference to the use of the
apostrophe and the proper capitalization of nouns. According to the record, young Brady
at the time [**5] of the hearing was in the 11th grade and had before him the 12th grade
courses to pass before any determination could be [*663] made with reference to his
entitlement to graduation. Graduation for him, as it is for all other students, will depend
also upon his passing his 12th grade courses. There is no testimony to the effect that his
graduation is in any way in peril by reason of his having first failed to demonstrate the
required knowledge and later having gained the required knowledge of the apostrophe
and capitalization of proper nouns. He should appreciate rather than complain about the
educational system in Florida that obviously has been of benefit to him.
O f interest in the consideration o f this area of school law is Board o f Curators, Univ. o f
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978). In Horowitz, the
Supreme Court of the United States considered the dismissal of a senior in a state medical
school because of her failure to meet academic standards. The court considered the case
utilizing the concept of liberty and property under the Fourteenth Amendment and
examined the degree of due process that is required in academic dismissal matters. [**6]
We perceive the reasoning employed by the court in disposing of the case to be of value
in the area of school law. First, the court distinguished academic discipline from
misconduct disciplinary proceedings and then observed that:
"Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary
determinations, bear little resemblance to judicial and administrative fact
finding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full hearing
requirement. * * * Like the decision of an individual professor as to the
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proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to
dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of
cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decision-making.
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of
educators and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring
a hearing. The educational process is not by nature adversarial; instead it
centers around a continuing relationship between faculty and students,..."
(Emphasis supplied)
If one who is a senior in medical school may be dismissed for academic reasons [**7]
(which necessarily were predicated upon testing) and such dismissal might be
accomplished without the necessity of any hearing, we find the requirement that an 11th
grade student submit to an evenly administered test to determine his knowledge of
grammar, reading, arithmetic, and writing, and then furnished an opportunity to correct
such deficiencies as may thus be revealed, is a proper exercise of the authority granted to
the Commissioner of Education of the State of Florida by the provisions of Section
229.57(2)(b).
We do not have here a case of discrimination in which the test required of one student
was not required of all others. We do not have a situation where one's test papers were
graded any differently than all the other students in the State of Florida similarly situated.
We hold that the scoring criterion complained of was a valid exercise of the authority
granting by the Legislature to the Commissioner of Education of the State of Florida and
that Rule 6A-1.941, Florida Administrative Code, is a valid rule.(Due Process: Scoring
Standard). It follows that the order of the hearing officer of date June 15, 1978, the
subject of this opinion, should be and is vacated and set aside to the extent it is [**8J not
consistent with the views herein expressed.
MILLS, Acting C. J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.
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Debra P., a minor, by Irene P., her mother and next friend, Wanda W., a minor, by
Ruby W., her mother and next friend, Luwanda K., a minor, by Willa K., her
mother and next friend, Terry W., a minor, by Doris W., his mother and next
friend, Brenda T., a minor by Willie T., her father and next friend, Vanessa S., a
minor, by Mamie S., her mother and next friend, Thomas J. H., Jr., a minor by
Thomas J. H., Sr., his father and next friend, Gary L. B., a minor, by Ezell B., his
father and next friend, Valisa W., a minor, by Charles W., her father and next
friend, Huey J., a minor, by Melvin G., his guardian and next friend, on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Ralph D.
Turlington, Individually and as Commissioner of Education, Florida State Board of
Education, Governor Bob Graham, Individually and as Chairman thereof,
Secretary of State George Firestone, Attorney General Jim Smith, comptroller
Gerald A. "Jerry" Lewis, Treasurer William Gunter, Commissioner of Agriculture
Doyle Conner, Commissioner of Education Ralph D. Turlington, all individually
and as members thereof, Florida, Department of Education, Roland H. Lewis,
Individually and as Chairman thereof, Cecil W. Essrig, Carl Carpenter, Jr., Ben H.
Hill, Jr., A. Leon Lowery, Sam Rampello, and Marion Rodgers, all Individually and
as members thereof, and, Raymond O. Shelton, Individually and as Superintendent
of Schools of Hillsborough County, Defendants.
No. 78-892 Civ. T-C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION
474 F. Supp. 244; 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11065
July 12,1979
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] As Amended August 7 and 8, 1979.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff black public school students challenged the
Florida Functional Literacy Examination, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 229.57 et seq., arguing that it
violated their U.S. Const, amend. XIV. rights; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d; and 20 U.S.C.S. §
1703. Plaintiffs sought an injunction from requiring the exam as a prerequisite to a high
school diploma and prohibiting the utilization of exam results as a means of structuring
remediation classes.
OVERVIEW: The court held that the separate facilities in Florida public schools for
white and black children during the period 1967-1971 violated plaintiffs' equal protection
rights and that past purposeful discrimination was perpetuated by the test and the diploma
sanction, regardless of its neutrality. The court held that utilization of the exam, as a
requirement for a high school diploma, was a violation of the equal protection clause, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d, and 20 U.S.C. § 1703, but the court held that the functional literacy test
did bear a rational relation to a valid state interest and thus was constitutional even when
applied only to public schools. The court held that plaintiffs had a property right in
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graduation from high school with a standard diploma and the inadequacy of the notice
provided prior to the invocation of the diploma sanction, the objectives, and the test was a
violation of the due process clause. The court held that the implementation schedule was
fundamentally unfair. The court, however, held that there was neither a constitutional nor
a statutory violation in using the test results as a mechanism for remediation.
OUTCOME: The court declared that the literacy examination was a violation of the
equal protection and due process clauses and enjoined the state from requiring passage of
the exam as a requirement for graduation for a period of four years. The court declared
that the remediation program was not constitutionally or statutorily invalid.
CORE TERMS: functional, educational, literacy, diploma, skill, public schools, black
students, graduation, remediation, testing, state board, private schools, segregation, grade,
basic skills, dual, literacy test, school system, white students, teacher, construct, inferior,
disproportionate, notice, school board, testing program, compensatory, real world,
discriminatory, mathematics
COUNSEL: Morris W. Milton, St. Petersburg, Fla., Stephen F. Hanlon, Robert J.
Shapiro, Bay Area Legal Services, Tampa, Fla., Diana Pullin, Roger L. Rice, Richard
Jefferson, Center for Law and Education, Cambridge, Mass., Terry L. DeMeo, Legal
Services for Greater Miami, Miami Fla., for plaintiffs.
James D. Little and Judith A. Brechner, State Board of Education, Tallahassee, Fla., W.
Crosby Few, Tampa, Fla., for Hillsborough County defendants.
OPINION BY: CARR
OPINION
[*246] MEMORANDUM OPINION
I
THE CLAIMS AND CLASSES
The Plaintiffs in the instant action present a broad based constitutional and statutory
challenge to the Florida Functional Literacy Examination (i. e. State Student Assessment
Test, Part II; hereinafter referred to either as the SSAT II or the functional literacy
examination). Fla.Stat. § 229.57, Et seq. Plaintiffs contend in a complaint filed October
16,1978, that the SSAT II violates their Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection rights and also violates their rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 20
U.S.C. § 1703.
The Court on March 21,1979, certified three classes o f Plaintiffs:
Class A are all present [**2] and future twelfth grade public school students
in the State of Florida who have failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT II.
Class B are all present and future twelfth grade black public school students
in the State of Florida who have failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT II.
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Class C are all present and future twelfth grade black public school students
in Hillsborough County, Florida who have failed or who hereafter fail the
SSAT n.
The Defendants in the case are Commissioner of Education, Ralph D. Turlington, the
Florida Board o f Education, Governor Bob Graham, Secretary of State George Firestone,
Attorney General Jim Smith, Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis, Treasurer William Gunter,
Commissioner of Agriculture Doyle Conner,1 the Florida Department of Education
(hereinafter referred to as the DOE), the School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida,
Roland H. Lewis, Cecile W. Essrig, Carl Carpenter, Jr., Ben H. Hill, Jr., A. Leon Lowery,
Sam Rampello, Marion Rodgers, and Superintendent of Schools of Hillsborough
County, Raymond O. Shelton.
1 The preceding named individual Defendants are the members of the Florida
State Board of Education (i. e. the Governor and Florida Cabinet).
[**3]
2 The preceding named individual Defendants through Mr. Lewis are the members
of the Hillsborough County School Board.
A brief summary of the Plaintiffs' claims in conjunction with the certified classes will
facilitate an understanding of the Court's opinion.3 The first claim asserts that the [*247]
Defendants have either designed or implemented a test or testing program (i. e., SSAT II)
which is racially biased and/or which violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 20 U.S.C. § 1703.
The first claim relates to Classes A, B and C.
3 A more extensive and analytical review of the Plaintiffs' claims is presented in
Parts IV, V. and VI.
The second claim contends that Defendants have instituted a program of awarding
diplomas without providing the Plaintiffs with adequate notice of the requirements (i. e.,
passage of the SSAT II) or adequate time to prepare for the [**4] required examination in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Due Process: Procedural: Adequate Notice) The
second claim, like the first, relates to Classes A, B and C.
The third claim asserts that the Defendants have used the SSAT II in conjunction with
Fla.Stat. § 236.088 as a mechanism for resegregating the Florida public schools through
the use of remedial classes for those students failing the examination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The third claim
relates to Classes B and C (Equal Protection).
The Plaintiffs' prayer for relief seeks a declaratory judgment finding that the requirement
for passage of the SSAT II as a prerequisite for a normal graduation diploma is a
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The Plaintiffs additionally request an injunction
restraining the Defendants from requiring SSAT II passage as a prerequisite to receiving
a high school diploma. Finally, Plaintiffs seek an injunction to both purge their scholastic
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records of any acknowledgement of the SSAT II failure and to issue an Order prohibiting
the utilization of the SSAT II results as a means of structuring classes [**5] in
remediation.
II
JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction to consider the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3) and (4) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202.

m
HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. THE TEST
In 1976, the Florida Legislature enacted a comprehensive piece of legislation known as
the " Educational Accountability Act of 1976." Laws of Florida 1976, Vol. 1, Chapter 76223, pp. 489-508. Part of the stated intent of the legislature was:
(a) to provide a system of accountability for education in Florida which
guarantees that each student is afforded similar opportunities for educational
advancement without regard to geographic differences and varying local
factors . . . (d) to guarantee to each student in the Florida system of public
education that the system provides instructional programs which meet
minimum performance standards compatible with the state's plan for
education . . . (f) to provide information to the public about the performance
of the Florida system of public education in meeting established goals and
providing effective, meaningful and relevant educational experiences
designed to give students at least the minimum skills necessary to function
[**6] and survive in today's society. Fla.Stat. § 229.55(2)(a), (d), (f).
In a subsection of the Act entitled "Pupil Progression" the legislature established three
standards for graduation from Florida public high schools. Fla.Stat. §§ 232.245(3)
(1977); 232.246(l)-(3). The first requirement mandated that the students complete the
minimum number of credits for graduation promulgated by their school board. The
second requirement made compulsory the mastery of basic skills and the third required
"satisfactory performance in functional literacy as determined by the State Board of
Education. Fla.Stat. § 232.245(3) (1977). The pupil progression subsection also provided
that each school district must develop procedures for remediation of students who were
unable to meet the required standards. The legislation also provided for a comprehensive
testing program to evaluate basic skill development at periodic intervals. Fla.Stat. §
229.57. [*248] 4 In 1978, the Act was amended by the Florida Legislature to require
passage of a functional literacy examination prior to receipt of a state graduation diploma.
Those students who completed the minimum number of required high school credits
[**7] but failed the functional literacy examination would receive a certificate of
completion. Fla.Stat. § 232.246.5
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4 Fla.Stat. § 229.51 provides:
(1) Statewide Testing. The primary purpose o f the statewide testing program is to
provide information needed for state-level decisions. The program shall be
designed to:
(a) Assist in the identification of educational needs at the state, district, and school
levels.
(b) Assess how well districts and schools are meeting state goals and minimum
performance standards.
(c) Provide information to aid in the development of policy issues and concerns.
(d) Provide a basis for comparisons among districts and between districts, the state,
and the nation, when appropriate.
(e) Produce data which can be used to aid in the identification of exceptional
educational programs or processes.
(2) The Statewide Assessment Program. The Commissioner is directed to
implement a program of statewide assessment testing which shall provide for the
improvement of the operation and management of the public schools. The
statewide program shall be timed, as far as possible, so as not to conflict with on
going district assessment programs. As part o f the program the commissioner shall:
(a) Establish, with the approval of the state board, minimum performance standards
related to the goals for education contained in the state's plan, including, but not
limited, to basic skills in reading, writing and mathematics. The minimum
performance standards shall be approved by April 1 in each year and they are
established, for a period of no less than three, nor more than five, years.
(b) Develop and administer in the public schools a uniform, statewide program of
assessment to determine, periodically, educational status and progress and the
degrees of achievement of approved minimum performance standards. The uniform
statewide program shall consist of testing in grades 3 ,5 ,8 , and 11 and may include
the testing of additional grades and skill areas as specified by the Commissioner.
[** 8 ]

5 Fla.Stat. § 232.246 provides: General requirements for high school graduation.
(1) Beginning with the 1978-1979 school year, each district school board shall
establish standards for graduation from its schools which shall include as a
minimum:
(a) Mastery of the minimum performance standards in reading, writing and
mathematics for the 11th grade, established pursuant to §§. 229.565 and 229.57,
determined in the manner prescribed by rules of the state board; and
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(b) Demonstrated ability to successfully apply basic skills to everyday life
situations as measured by a functional literacy examination developed and
administered pursuant to rules of the state board; and
(c) Completion o f a minimum number of academic credits, and all other applicable
requirements prescribed by the district school board pursuant to §. 232.245
(3) A student who meets all requirements prescribed in subsection (1) shall be
awarded a standard diploma in a form prescribed by the state board; provided that a
school board may, in lieu of the standard diploma, award differentiated diplomas to
those exceeding the prescribed minimums. A student who completes the minimum
number of credits and other requirements prescribed by paragraph (l)(c), but is
unable to meet the standards of paragraph (l)(a) or paragraph (l)(b), shall be
awarded a certificate of completion in a form prescribed by the state board.
[**9] At the time of trial the SSAT II had been administered on three separate occasions:
Fall, 1977; Fall, 1978; Spring, 1979. A review of the results of the three administrations
will be discussed in the following section.
B. THE TEST RESULTS
A review of the results of the October, 1977, administration of the SSAT II indicates that
there were substantial numbers of students who failed the test. Of the 115,901 students
taking both sections of the test, approximately 41,724 or 36% Failed one or both sections.
A breakdown of the results on a racial basis shows that 78% of the black students failed
one or both sections as compared to 25% of the white students. On the communications
section of the SSAT II, 26% Of the black students failed as compared to 3% O f the white
students.
The second administration results followed a similar pattern. Of the 4,480 black students
taking the test for a second time, 3,315 or 74% Failed one or both sections. The
percentage of failure among white students retaking both sections was 25% Or 1,675
students. Of the 13,345 black students [*249] being reexamined on the mathematics
section 46% Or 6,139 failed.
The results of the third administration of the [**10] SSAT II which were released during
the trial illustrate the same disparity in the failure rates among white and black students.
Sixty percent (60%) of the black students retaking the mathematics section of the test for
a third time failed as compared to 36% O f the white students. Between October, 1977,
and May, 1979, the number of students who were in Florida public high schools first as
juniors and then as seniors had been reduced to 91,000 students. Of the approximately
91,000 high school seniors, 3,466 or 20.049% of the black students had not passed the
test compared to 1,342 of 1.9% of the white students. The failure rate among black
students was approximately 10 times that among white students. In all, approximately
5,300 students or 5.8% had failed to pass the SSAT II by the time of the end of their
senior year in high school.
C. THE EFFECTS
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Rather than following a specific item by item format for the findings of fact, the Court
will utilize a narrative approach. The Court notes that in resolving conflicts in the
testimony it relied upon its evaluation of the witnesses and their demeanor while
testifying.
The denial of a standard diploma based on the failure of the SSAT II [**11] triggers a
number of economic and academic deprivations. The State of Florida Career Service
Department, for instance, employs only 10% of its labor force from those people who do
not have high school diplomas. The jobs found in this 10% "no diploma" category have
been described as both "menial" and "dead end" positions. The State o f Florida requires
only a high school diploma for another 10% of its work force. The remaining 80% of the
jobs in state government require a high school diploma and experience or some higher
academic degree. A certificate of completion will not be considered a diploma for
purposes of employment with the State of Florida.
Similarly, admission to one of the nine universities in Florida is predicated upon receipt
of a high school diploma. A certificate of completion will not be considered an adequate
substitute for the diploma. The denial of a diploma has a disproportionate effect on the
college attendance of black students. 6
6 The evidence provided by Dr. Eckland clearly illustrates that large numbers of
black students who graduate in the lowest two deciles of their high school classes
go on to participate in higher education if they have a diploma. The black students
in the lowest two deciles roughly correlates to those black students who failed the
SSAT II. Dr. Eckland's review of the National Longitudinal Study showed that the
denial of a diploma to the black students in Florida who failed the SSAT II upon
the second administration would result in a 20% Decline in black students college
attendance.
[**12] The stigma which results from the failure of the SSAT II is a very serious
problem. Students who have failed the test are often branded with the label "functionally
illiterate."
D. ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL NOTICE
Prior to the commencement of the trial, the parties agreed that certain facts need not be
proved. A list of those facts is contained in the parties' pretrial stipulation filed April 23,
1979. Those facts pertain primarily to the statutory duties and responsibilities of the
Florida State Board of Education and the Florida Department of Education. There is
agreement as to the existence of a dual school system in Florida, although the agreement
is without temporal boundaries, and as to the fact that historically black children have not
fared well on standardized tests in Florida schools.7
7 Numerous other facts have been admitted which if relevant, will be discussed in
the Section IV, V. and VI of this Memorandum Opinion. Further recitation of those
facts in this section is unnecessary.
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The [**13] Court on the first day of trial took judicial notice of certain relevant facts,
statutes, and judicial decisions. The majority of the matters which Plaintiffs requested
[*250] that the Court judicially notice were previously admitted by the Defendants.8 The
Court has specifically taken judicial notice both of the de jure segregation of Florida
schools in the period 1885 to 1967 and that as a result of attending segregated schools
prior to the implementation of unitary school systems many members of Classes B and C
received an unequal education to that received by white students during those years.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).
8 The Court's colloquy on the record with counsel as to those matters is clear as to
which facts were admitted and which were judicially noticed. See also Parties'
Pretrial Stipulation.
E. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND FLORIDA PUBLIC EDUCATION (1885-1967)
Although the Court's principal focus concerning racial discrimination in [**14] Florida
public education revolves around the period 1967-1979, and more specifically 19671971, it is helpful to provide a historical over-view of the conditions existing prior to
1967.9 From 1890 to 1967 Florida public education operated a dual school system; dual
in the sense that there were two complete and separate school systems for black and
white Florida public school children. See Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968); Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969). Likewise, there was
absolute segregation of school faculty on a racial basis. Black and white teachers even
maintained separate professional associations and unions. The physical facilities, the size
and scope of the curricula, the libraries, the duration of the school day and year, the
supplies, and the texts in black schools were inferior to those in white schools. Black
schools during this period were obviously inferior. 10 The dual school system and its
inherent inequality was perpetuated not only by the policies and practices of local school
boards, but also by the Florida Constitution and statutes. 11 [**15] Although the Supreme
Court's holding of separate but equal was the law of the land during the bulk of this
period, the corresponding component of equality was constantly overlooked and never
enforced in relation to black Florida public schools. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,16
S. Ct. 1138,41 L. Ed. 256(1896).
9 The Court at the commencement of trial specifically limited the focus of the
inquiry into discrimination to the period 1967 to present, but permitted Plaintiffs to
present expert opinion evidence regarding an overview of the history of
discrimination in the Florida public schools.
10 On this issue, the Court cannot help but refer to Judge Heebe's statement in a
case involving similar issues:
It becomes readily apparent to anyone familiar with the nature of white and black
schools in the South that children going to the white school would be provided with
better facilities, faculties, educational materials than their counterparts in the black
schools. Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 330 F. Supp. 1340, 1345
(E.D.La.1971).
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11 See Paragraphs 9 to 16 in Plaintiffs' Proposed Request for Judicial Notice.
These matters were admitted by the Defendants.
[**16] IV
FIRST CLAIM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs' first claim is a multi-pronged equal protection, Title VI and Equal
Educational Opportunities Act challenge to the SSAT II. The essence of the claim is the
Plaintiffs' contention that SSAT II perpetuates and reemphasizes the effects of past
purposeful discrimination. Beyond this core allegation, Plaintiffs contend (1) that the test
is unreliable, invalid and not correlated to the public school curriculum, (2) that the test
instrument is racially biased, and finally (3) that passage of the test was not required for
graduation in Florida private schools. Plaintiffs further contend that the higher percentage
of black twelfth grade failures was the probable and foreseeable consequence of
enactment and [*251] implementation of the statutory scheme by the Defendants.
B. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND FLORIDA PUBLIC EDUCATION (19671971)
All three classes of Plaintiffs embarked upon their public school educations in the school
term 1967-1968. The testimony has clearly indicated that almost all of the Plaintiffs
attended segregated public schools which were part of the dual school alignment of the
earlier period. While the expert witness [**17] testimony on this issue confirms the
existence of segregated schools in Florida on a broad geographic scale, the Plaintiffs have
placed special emphasis on Hillsborough County, Florida. A review of the appendix to
Judge Krentzman's Opinion in Mannings v. The Board of Public Instruction of
Hillsborough County, Florida, No. 3554 Civ. T-K (unpublished opinion, May 11, 1971)
12 illustrates the attendance during 1967-1971 by race at selected Hillsborough County
public schools. The evidence is clear and convincing that Hillsborough County schools in
the period 1967-1971 were uniformly racially segregated and that a unitary school system
did not exist during that period. This finding is applicable to the state as a whole during
the same period.
12 Although Judge Krentzman's Opinion in Mannings has been often cited as a
model decision in the area, it was never published. In Mannings v. Board of Public
Instruction of Hillsborough County, Florida, 427 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth
Circuit reversed Judge Lieb's desegregation order and held:
We proceed to a determination of the status with respect to each of the six essential
elements which go to disestablish a dual school system. Tested in this frame of
reference, we find the Hillsborough system deficient in student assignments to
certain schools, and to a degree in faculty and staff assignment throughout the
system. Mannings, supra at 876.
The Fifth Circuits finding above was made on May 11, 1970, exactly one year
before Judge Krentzman's final desegregation Order was entered. See also
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Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, Florida, 277 F.2d
370 (5th Cir. 1960).
[**18] In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal. Therefore, we hold that the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brown, supra, 347 U.S. at 495, 74 S. Ct. at 692.
Thus, it is clear that the separate facilities in Florida public schools for white and black
children during the period 1967-1971 violated Plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Brown finding that separate facilities were inherently
unequal is manifestly applicable. 13
13 See Plaintiffs "Request for Court to take Judicial Notice of Facts," No. 23, filed
April 20, 1979. The Court at the commencement of trial in light of Brown and with
the substitution of the word "unequal" for the word "inferior" took judicial notice
of Request No. 23. While Brown made an inherent inequality finding, Judge
Krentzman in Mannings found factual inequality in Hillsborough County Schools.
[**19] Beyond the question of inherent inequality due to segregation is the question of
the inferiority of black schools during the same period. While Plaintiffs contend that a
Brown showing which has been made is sufficient to shift the burden to Defendants, the
Plaintiffs produced vast amounts of evidence of the inferiority in fact of black schools
during the period 1967-1971. The evidence clearly indicates that black public schools in
Florida were inferior in their physical facilities, course offerings, instructional materials,
and equipment. There is little doubt but that the pervasive racial isolation condemned in
Brown 1 in conjunction with the inferiority of black schools created an atmosphere
which was not as conducive to learning as that found in white schools. 15 Further, this
educational [*252] environment constituted a serious impairment to Class B and C
Plaintiffs' ability to leam, especially in the early grades which most educators view as a
formative stage in intellectual development. 16
14 Brown, supra note 11, at 494, 74 S. Ct. 686.
15 The Defendants at trial attempted to illustrate that at least one white school was
older, or more in need of repair, than a black school. The inequality of only one
school vis-a-vis only one other school is not the issue in this case. The class action
proportion of the instant suit has forced the Court to view the relative quality o f the
black and white schools from a very broad perspective.
[** 20]

16 See Fla.Stat. §230.2311:
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(1) The Legislature recognizes that the early years of a pupil's education are crucial
to his future and that mastery of the basic skills of communication and computation
is essential to the future educational and personal success of an individual. .. .
Early childhood and basic skills development programs shall be made available by
the school districts to all school age children, especially those enrolled in
kindergarten and grades one through three, and shall provide effective, meaningful,
and relevant educational experiences designed to give students at least the
minimum skills necessary to function and survive in today's society.
C. THE TRANSITION PHASE (1971-1979)
By the commencement of the school term 1971-1972, the actual physical integration of
Florida public schools was generally completed. With integration came a host of human
problems. Although children of all races suffered in the initial years of integration, black
children suffered to a greater degree. The most significant burden which accompanied
black children into the integrated schools was [**21] the existence of years of inferior
education. Plaintiffs in Classes B and C had attended segregated schools which were
inferior for the first four years of their education. Other problems presented to black
children were disparate busing schedules, lingering racial stereotypes, disproportionate
terminations of black principals and administrators, and a high incidence of suspensions.
While the problems enumerated above do not constitute the denial of an equal
educational opportunity during this period, they do attest to the difficulty in making
significant academic gains. Additionally, the state during part of this period did not offer
the leadership or the funding to mount a wide-scale attack on the educational deficits
created during segregation. Remediation with specifically delineated objectives and
programs did not commence until 1977.
Black children in the period after segregation ended were presented with numerous
problems. Not only did the Class B and C Plaintiffs have to adjust to social, cultural and
linguistic differences of the integrated schools, but they had to do so without an adequate
educational foundation. The vestiges of the inferior elementary education they received
[**22] still are present and affect their performance. Although remediation is now
underway in a meaningful sense, the effects of past purposeful segregation have not been
erased or overcome.
D. THE INTENT TO DISCRIMINATE
While Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,96 S. Ct. 2040,48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1977), is
instructive that disproportionate impact is "not the sole touchstone of invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution", it is a relevant factor to be considered. Id.
at 242, 96 S. Ct. at 2049. The disproportionate impact of the diploma sanction on black
school children imposed by failure of the SSAT II is clear. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). The results of the first administration
of the SSAT II in October, 1977, indicated that 77% O f the black students taking the
mathematics section failed that portion of the test compared to only 24% O f the white
students. While numerically less students failed the communication section of SSAT II,
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the percentage of failure among black students was eight times that of white students (i.
e. 26% Black failures compared to 3% White failures).
The results of the second administration of [**23] SSAT II in October, 1978, followed a
similar pattern. The percentage of failure among black students was greatly
disproportionate to white students. The third and final SSAT II administration results
indicated that three times as many black students failed as white students. Since black
students comprise approximately one-fifth [*253] of Florida public schools, the ratio of
black to white failures based on the percentage of population is 10 to 1. Approximately
20% of black students who have taken the test three times have not passed as compared
to 1.9% of the twelfth grade white students.
As discussed previously, the policies and practices of local school boards together with
the Florida Constitution and statutes attest to the intentional creation and maintenance of
a dual school system in Florida. Until the school term 1971-1972, the condition of
segregated schools persisted throughout the state. The intent to discriminate in the period
1967-1971 has clearly been identified.
In addition to the evidence of past intent, the Plaintiffs presented evidence relative to
present intent. Numerous witnesses who were Florida Department of Education
employees testified that they anticipated [**24] a high percentage of black failure on the
SSAT II. The Defendant, Ralph Turlington, the Florida Commissioner of Education,
acknowledged that he also anticipated a high black failure rate with regard to the
implementation of the SSAT II testing program. Defendant Turlington additionally
admitted that a certain portion of the black failure must be attributed to the inferior
education the Plaintiffs in Classes B and C received during the dual school period.(Equal
Protection)
With Washington v. Davis, supra, the Supreme Court commenced the redefinition of
intent in discrimination cases. 17 Instead of relying solely on disproportionate racial
impact, the Court focused on whether an identifiable discriminatory purpose was present.
Noting that the Plaintiffs had not asserted a claim for intentional discrimination or
purposeful discrimination, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' finding of a
constitutional violation. In a concurring Opinion Justice Stevens addressed the type of
proof necessary to establish discriminatory purpose.
17 The Court in this section and Section V. has reviewed a number of law review
articles which have been o f considerable assistance. Baldwin and Nagan, Board of
Regents v. Bakke: The All-American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U.Fla.L.Rev. 843
(1978); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: "In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle," 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1976); Lewis, Certifying
Functional Literacy: Competency Testing and Implications for due process and
Equal Educational Opportunity, 8 J.L. and Educ. 145 (1979); McClung,
Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 Fordham L.Rev.
651 (1979); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 540 (1977); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection,
Procedural Fairness or Structural Justice, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 864 (1979); Vernon, due
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process Flexibility in Academic Dismissals: Horowitz and Beyond, 8 J.L. and
Educ. 45 (1979); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 Texas
L.Rev. 411 (1973); Developments in the Law Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev.
1065 (1969); Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and
the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 Yale L.J. 317 (1976); Note, Proof of Racially
Discriminatory Purpose Under the equal protection Clause; Washington v. Davis,
Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburg, 12 Harv.C.R-C.L.L.Rev. 725
(1977); Note, Proving Discriminatory Intent from a Facially Neutral Decision with
a Disproportionate Impact, 36 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 109 (1979).
[**25}
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence
of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective
state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have
intended the natural consequences of his deeds. Id. 426 U.S at 253, 96 S. Ct.
at 2054.
In United States v. Texas Education Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (1977), Rehearing denied, 579
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), Cert, denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S. Ct. 3106, 61 L. Ed. 2d 879
(1979) Judge Wisdom addressed the standard for intent after Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S. Ct. 2766, 53 L. Ed. 2d 851 (1977), Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 450 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, supra. Applying the "objective standard"
found in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961), Judge
Wisdom held that "official decisionmakers would be held to have intended the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of their decisions". Texas Education [*254} Agency, supra at
167. In the instant case, it is clear that the most significant official decision maker, the
Commissioner [**26] of Education, Ralph Turlington, foresaw that the effect of the
implementation of the SSAT II would result in greatly disproportionate numbers of black
failures. Even in the face of actual statistics regarding the number of black failures on the
field tests and the early administrations, the Commissioner persisted in his opinion that
the diploma sanction should be implemented in the 1978-1979 school term. This opinion
was maintained even after the Report of the Task Force on Educational Assessment
Program, also known as the McCrary Report.(Equal Protection)
The Supreme Court in a recent decision, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979), discussed the standard for
proof of discriminatory intent in a case challenging a veterans preference statute on equal
protection grounds. In rejecting a strict foreseeability test, the Court held
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. See United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179, 97 S. Ct. 996,1016, 51 L. Ed. 2d 229 (concurring
opinion). It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case, a state legislature,
selected [**27] or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

352

"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group. Id. at 279 99 S. Ct. at 2296.
In a footnote, however, the Court conceded that inevitability or foreseeability of a
consequence has a bearing on the discriminatory intent. Id. note 25, at 279, 99 S. Ct.
2282. While foreseeability was by no means dispositive or the touchstone, it was possible
to draw inferences from the action where the adverse consequences were clear and
obvious. Whether those inferences, if found, could be dispelled by other legitimate
interests was critical to the Court's final determination.
Plaintiffs have not asserted that the Florida legislature in creating the Educational
Accountability Act was motivated by racial animus. Plaintiffs, though, have contended
that the Commissioner of Education and certain members of the DOE had first hand
knowledge of the effects of the test on black school children and the obvious linkage of
their performance to the inferior education received during segregation. This information
was forwarded to the State Board of Education. The adverse consequences were clear to
the State [**28] Board of Education at the critical stages of the development and
implementation of the SSAT II. (Equal Protection).
The legitimate interest in implementing a test to evaluate the established state-wide
objectives is obvious. The minimal objectives established could be continually upgraded
and the test could be utilized not only to gauge achievement, but also to identify
deficiencies for the purpose of remediation. The legitimate interests in the test program
are substantial, but the timing of the program must be questioned to some extent because
it sacrifices through the diploma sanction a large percentage of black twelfth grade
students in the rush to implement the legislative mandate. While the state Defendants
have demonstrated a disregard of the reasons for the disproportionate black failure (i. e.
the inferior education received during segregation and the dearth of interim remediation),
the Court has not been presented with sufficient proof that the motivation for
implementing the program was in Feeney terms "because o f' the large black failure
statistics. (The Feeney decision was announced after the trial in this case was completed
and neither party addressed the issue of intent beyond that posed [**29] in United States
v. Texas Education Agency, supra, Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington Heights,
supra. The analysis of the instant decision is not affected by Feeney beyond the question
of intent because the Supreme Court has held that neutral mechanisms (i. e. tests) with
discriminatory effects are to be analyzed in the same vein as overtly discriminatory
mechanisms (i. e. veterans preferences). Feeney, supra, - - U.S. at —, 99 S. Ct. 2282.)
Although the proof of present intent to discriminate is insufficient, the Court is of the
opinion [*255] that past purposeful discrimination affecting Plaintiffs in Classes B and C
is perpetuated by the test and the diploma sanction regardless of its neutrality.
The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has invalidated facially neutral programs
which perpetuate past racial discrimination. Louisiana v. U. S., 380 U.S. 145, 85 S. Ct.
817,13 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1965); Guinn v. U. S., 238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340
(1915). In Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 89 S. Ct. 1720, 23 L. Ed. 2d
309 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the use of a literacy test as a method of
qualifying voters in North Carolina perpetuated [**30] the past denial of equal
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educational opportunities. Although the decision was premised on the interpretation of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Court addressed a number of issues similar to those
presented in the instant case. The Supreme Court focused particularly on the history of
educational discrimination in North Carolina finding the "historic maintenance of a dual
school system, but (also). . . substantial evidence that the County deprived its black
residents of equal educational opportunity". Id. at 291, 89 S. Ct. at 1723. In finding "it is
only reasonable to infer that among black children compelled to endure a segregated and
inferior education, fewer will achieve any given degree of literacy than will their bettereducated white contemporaries", the Court held "Impartial administration of the literacy
test today would serve only to perpetuate the inequities in a different form". Id. at 295,
297, 89 S. Ct. at 1725, 1726. The Fifth Circuit has followed the guidance of the Supreme
Court in the perpetuation area. Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 528
F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1976), Rev'd enbanc, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977); Meredith v. Fair,
298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. [**31] 1962). Several of the recent Fifth Circuit decisions are
worthy of close consideration. In McNeal v. Tate, 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975), and in
United States v. Gadsden County School District, 572 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1978), the
Fifth Circuit considered the constitutionality Vel non of ability groupings in public
schools. 18 In both cases, the ability groupings, which were derived by teacher evaluation
and standardized testing, resulted in a high concentration of white students in the upper
division or advanced classes and a high concentration of black students in the lower
divisions. The McNeal Court focused particularly on the nexus between the inferior
education in the dual system and the present ability categorization. Regardless of the fact
that the ability groupings fostered segregation, the Court in McNeal proceeded with an
analysis which, if proved, would legitimize the segregation. The Court stated:
18 The Court will address the application of McNeal And Gadsden County again in
Section VI(B) of this Memorandum Opinion relative to the Plaintiffs' allegation
that the results of the SSAT II were being used for purposes of resegregation.
[**32]
If it does cause segregation, whether in classrooms or in schools, ability
grouping may nevertheless be permitted in an otherwise unitary system if the
. . . method is not based on the present results of past segregation or will
remedy such results through better educational opportunities. McNeal, supra
at 1020.
The testing rationale of both Singleton 19 and Lemon 20 would bar the use of
this method of assignment until the district has operated as a unitary (school)
system without such assignments for a sufficient period of time to assure that
the underachievement of the slower groups is not due to yesterday's
educational disparities. Such a bar period may be lifted when the district can
show that steps taken to bring disadvantaged students to peer status have
ended the educational disadvantages caused by prior segregation. McNeal,
supra at 1020-21.
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19 Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th
Cir. 1969).
20 Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
Florida public schools in the main have been physically [**33] unitary since 1971.
Although the human problems recounted in a previous section have limited the lull
appreciation [*256] of the benefits of a unitary education, the conditions were not such
that the system cannot be called unitary. The Defendants have failed to rebut the fact that
the disproportionate failure of Class B and C Plaintiffs on the SSAT II resulted from the
inferior education they received during the dual school system portion of their education.
Defendants have stressed the third component of McNeal and contend the SSAT II, the
diploma sanction, and the remediation program will remedy the past effects of
discrimination through better educational opportunities. The Defendants emphasized the
increase in the percentage of Plaintiffs in Class B and C who have passed the test since its
first administration. While the increased passing rate is impressive and Florida teachers
and students are to be commended for their achievement, the Court has serious
reservations about attaching a constitutional imprimatur to a program which penalizes
students who have been denied equal educational opportunity. Certainly the Court wishes
that every student could and would pass the SSAT [**34] n, but it is not so naive as to
assume that there will not be failure regardless of the nature of the test or its takers. Yet
failure premised on equal educational opportunities, unaffected by the dual school system
of the past is of a completely different genre than that presented in the instant case.
In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 20
L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968), the Supreme Court reflected upon the import of Brown I and n.
It was such a dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I held unconstitutional
and a year later Brown II held must be abolished; school boards operating
(under) such school systems were required by Brown II "to effectuate a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system". Green at 435, 88 S.
Ct. at 1693.
Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems
tempered by an awareness that complex and multifaceted problems would
arise which would require time and flexibility for a successful resolution.
School boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual
systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary [**35] to convert a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. Green,
supra at 437-438, 88 S. Ct. at 1694.
After Green Not only was it necessary to eliminate physical segregation of public
schools, but it was also necessary to eliminate the effects of such purposeful
discrimination. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.
Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971). The Supreme Court's decisions in Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,99 S. Ct. 2941, 61 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1979) and Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 61 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1979)
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confirm the Court's analysis in this regard. The Supreme Court in Dayton and Columbus
focused on past purposeful segregation in public schools and the effects of such action.
The reiteration by the Supreme Court of the affirmative duty to remedy the effects of
segregative policies and practices announced in Brown II and followed in Green, Swann,
Columbus and Dayton is of particular significance. In the instant case, the principal effect
of the dual school system was the inferior education given black school children. The
evidence indicates that [**36] black school children, in the language of McNeal "still
wear (the) badge of their old deprivation underachievement". McNeal, supra at 1019. The
effects of racial isolation and the deprivation of equal educational opportunities are again
and again cited by Florida school districts in applications for federal funds for
educational remediation. While there has been a substantial, but recent effort to eradicate
the learning deficits created during the dual school period, the goals of such programs
have not been achieved. The results on three administrations of the SSAT II evidence this
fact.
The evidence and the ratios of passage of the SSAT II, both numerically and
proportionately, indicate that race more than any [*257] other factor, including socio
economic status, is a predictor of success on the test. The fact that 20% of the black
students failed the SSAT II compared to only 1.9% of the white students indicates that
peer status has not been achieved. In the Court's opinion, punishing the victims of past
discrimination for deficits created by an inferior educational environment neither
constitutes a remedy nor creates better educational opportunities. When students
regardless [**37] of race are permitted to commence and pursue their education in a
unitary school system without the taint of the dual school system, then a graduation
requirement based on a neutral test will be permitted. The Court must conclude that
utilization of the SSAT II in the present context as a requirement for the receipt o f a high
school diploma is a violation of the equal protection clause o f the Fourteenth
Amendment, (STUDENT PREVAILED)42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The
Court will discuss in a subsequent section the nature and duration of the injunctive relief
to be extended to the Plaintiffs in Classes B and C.
E. THE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDITY OF THE TEST INSTRUMENT
1. Introduction
In this section the Court will consider the manner in which the test was developed and its
validity from both a constitutional and professional testing perspective. The Court is
considering the claims in this section as they relate to Classes A, B, and C. The Court will
additionally address the effects of the public perceptions of the test as opposed to the
state's definition and perceptions of the test. Certain related issues, such as curricular
validity and whether the tests were equated, will be discussed in [**38] Section V.
FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TEST
2. Test Development
When the Educational Accountability Act became effective on July 1, 1976, it included a
provision which required satisfactory performance on an examination of functional
literacy for high school graduation in the school year 1978-1979. Fla.Stat. § 232.245(3)
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(1977). Although the State Board of Education (i. e. the Governor and Florida Cabinet)
was statutorily authorized to approve of the design of the test, the task of formulating a
test of functional literacy fell upon the Florida Department o f Education.
At the time of the passage of the legislation, the DOE was presented with a formidable
task, that of designing a test to meet the scanty legislative language within the strict time
limitations established. While the DOE had been working for some time on state-wide
objectives for basic skills, it had not been oriented toward designing a functional literacy
test. In fact, the Director of the Student Assessment Section of DOE, Dr. Thomas Fisher,
summed up the problem in a letter to Senator Donnell C. Childers:
It is also apparent that most educators have not thought in terms of functional
(i. e. practical or applied) skills for high school students, [**39] therefore the
Department of Education does not have a pre-existent set of functional
objectives which may be assessed.
This creates a situation in which we must either create such objectives and
then construct matching tests or purchase an existing test thus simultaneously
adopting the matching objectives. In other words, in the first case, we define
what Florida students should leam and measure it. In the second case, a
commercial company tells us what Florida students should leam and this is
then measured. Exhibit CT-396.
Soon after this letter, the DOE decided upon objectives for the functional literacy test.
Basically, the objectives enumerated in December, 1976, were the practical applications
of eleven reading and writing eleventh grade basic skills and thirteen mathematics
eleventh grade basic skills. At the same time the objectives were decided upon, the DOE
contracted with the Educational Testing Service to draft specific items or questions to
match the objectives.
During the period from June, 1976, to February, 1977, the DOE staff was continuing to
debate on exactly what "functional [*258] literacy" meant. A final definition was
promulgated by the [**40] DOE on February 18,1977.
For purposes of compliance with the Accountability Act of 1976, functional
literacy is the satisfactory application of basic skills in reading, writing and
arithmetic, to problems and tasks of a practical nature as encountered in
everyday life. Exhibit CT-332.
A slight modification of this definition appeared subsequently in both the State Board of
Education Rules and the 1978 amendments to the Educational Accountability Act. Rules
and Regulations of the State of Florida, Chapter 6A-1.942(2)(a) (1978); Fla.Stat. §
232.246(1 )(b) (1978 Supp.).
In March, 1977, the Educational Testing Service provided the DOE with sample items.
The DOE at the same time leased several items from another commercial testing
company. A field test was conducted in the latter part of March, 1977, in five Florida
counties. After the field test, the DOE entered into a contract with the Educational
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Testing Service to write item specifications from the items or questions previously
drafted. An item specification is essentially a blueprint for a particular question which
permits an item writer to design numerous questions using the same assessment criteria
but with different [**41] factual contexts.
The functional literacy examination which was administered in October, 1977, contained
117 questions covering the twenty-four skill objectives. The test is a criterion-referenced
examination; that is, one designed to assess whether the taker has a mastery or
competence in the particular skills tested. The functional literacy examination was not
designed to rank students vis-a-vis other students, although it obviously sorts out passers
and failers by use of a cut-score. The test was created to evaluate achievement in those
skills which the DOE and the State Board of Education deemed necessary to meet the
legislative mandate of functional literacy.
After the initial administration of the functional literacy test, the DOE contracted with
National Evaluation Systems to design additional test items. Utilizing the item
specifications created by the Educational Testing Center, National Education Systems
produced 240 additional test questions in January, 1978. Those items were field tested in
the Spring of 1978.
The test and the item specifications are secure documents. The DOE has labored
continuously since the creation of the test to make certain that no test is either [**42]
stolen or reproduced. Although there have been several breaches of the security
precautions, the test has remained, except to eleventh and twelfth grade public school
students, a well kept secret.
Before discussing the validity issues, the Court must refer to a matter which is at the crux
of the controversy between the litigants. The test as legislatively created was to be one of
functional literacy. Functional literacy has not been defined in a way which is acceptable
to either all educational academicians or the public. The testimony, in fact, indicates that
there are at least eleven known definitions of functional literacy. What is functional
literacy to one person may not be functional literacy to another person, but it is clear that
the term "functional illiterate" has a universally negative inference and connotation.
While "Illiteracy” is itself a negative and impact ladened word, "Functional illiteracy”
further compounds these implications by focusing on the individual's inability to operate
effectively in society. The categorizing of an individual without reference to a specific
standard can be both detrimental and debilitating without justification. As one of the
Plaintiffs' [**43] experts commented, students who fail the functional literacy test
perceive of themselves as "global failures". Another of the Plaintiffs' experts testified that
the biggest flaw in the Florida program was its name alone. The Court is in complete
agreement. Beyond the economic and academic implications of failure on the test, the
stigma associated with the term functional illiteracy is the most substantial harm
presented.
[*259] While the Court recognizes this, problem, it cannot be oblivious to die definition
of functional literacy provided by the DOE, ratified by the State Board of Education, and
legislatively approved. While the meaning of functional literacy is clear to the reader of

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

358

the amended statute or the Rules of the State Board of Education, it is not to the Florida
public. In an attempt to escape the impact of the terminology utilized in the original
statute, the State Board of Education adopted a new name for the functional literacy test:
the State Student Assessment Test II (SSAT II). Still the test remains the Florida
functional literacy examination in the mind of the public and the name change has not
dispelled the implications of the original denomination. Regardless [**44] of how the
public perceives the test, the Court must analyze it from the definition 21 provided by the
state in conjunction with the twenty-four objectives.22 The Court must not permit public
perceptions to be the guide for statutory interpretation.
21 See Exhibit CT-332, quoted at page 258 Supra.
22 Rules and Regulations of the State of Florida, Chapter 6A-1,942(2)(a) (1978)
provides:
(2) State Student Assessment Test Part II
(a) . . . The test shall be:
1. Designed to measure the student's ability to successfully apply basic skills to
everyday life situations.
2. Composed of two (2) standards, one (1) comprising functional communication
skills and one (1) comprising functional mathematics skills, as follows:
(a) Communications.
The student will, in a real world situation, determine the main idea inferred from a
selection.
The student will, in a real world situation, find who, what, where, which, and how
information in a selection.
The student will, in a real world situation, determine the inferred cause and effect
of an action.
The student will, in a real world situation, distinguish between facts and opinions.
The student will, in a real world situation, identify an unstated opinion.
The student will, in a real world situation, identify the appropriate source to obtain
information on a topic.
The student will, in a real world situation, use an index to identify the location of
information requiring the use of cross-references.
The student will use highway and city maps.
The student will include the necessary information when writing letters to supply
or request information.
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The student will complete a check and its stub accurately.
The student will accurately complete forms used to apply for a driver's license,
employment, entrance to a school or training program, insurance, and credit.
b. Mathematics
The student will determine the elapsed time between two (2) events stated in
seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, or years.
The student will determine equivalent amounts of up to one hundred dollars ($
100.00) using coins and paper currency.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving one (1) or
two (2) distinct whole number operations.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving decimal
fractions or percents and one (1) or two (2) distinct operations.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving
comparison shopping.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving rate of
interest and the estimation of the amount of simple interest.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving purchases
and a rate of sales tax.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving purchases
and a rate of discount given in fraction or percent form.
The student will solve a problem related to length, width, or height using metric or
customary units up to kilometers and miles, conversion within the system.
The student will solve a problem involving the area of a rectangular region using
metric or customary units.
The student will solve a problem involving capacity using units given in a table
(milliliters, liters, teaspoons, cups, pints, quarts, gallons), conversion within the
system.
The student will solve a problem involving weight using units given in a table
(milligrams, grams, kilograms, metric tons, ounces, pounds, tons), conversion
within the system.
The student will read and determine relationships described by line graphs, circle
graphs, and tables.
[** 45 ]

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

360

Prior to analyzing the evidence presented concerning the validity of the test, it is critical
to understand the applicable legal [*260] standards. The Plaintiffs contend that the test is
violative of both the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under the Plaintiffs' due process analysis, if the test were shown to be
arbitrary and unreasonable, then the Court would be compelled to invalidate it. (Due
Process) Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973). Similarly, if the test by
dividing students into two categories, passers and failers, did so without a rational
relation to the purpose for which it was designed, then the Court would be compelled to
find the test unconstitutional. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225
(1971); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U.S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369
(1911). While the Court can find no decision which is directly on point, several recent
decisions involving the utilization of tests for employment purposes warrant
consideration. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d
158 (1971), the Supreme Court focused on the statutory language in Title VII [**46] of
the Civil Rights Act to prohibit the utilization of required tests for purposes of
employment which have a discriminatory impact if they are unrelated to job qualification
or performance. In a case decided solely on constitutional grounds, the Fifth Circuit in
Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School District, 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972)
decided that the use of the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) for hiring and retention
of high school teachers was unconstitutional. Finding that the GRE scores created an
absolute classification of teachers into two categories, those qualified and those
unqualified, the Court then proceeded to determine whether the test was a valid and
reliable mechanism for making such a decision. In finding that it was not reasonably
related to its purpose, the Court held:
We agree with the lower Court's finding that GRE score requirement was not
a reliable or valid measure for choosing good teachers. It was undisputed that
the GRE was not designed to and could not measure the competency of a
teacher or even indicate future teacher effectiveness. However, it was
established that the cut-off score would eliminate some good teachers.
Consequently we [**47] find that it has no reasonable function in the teacher
selection process. Armstead, supra at 280.
In the instant case, the Court must determine whether the test utilized was a valid and
reasonable measure for dividing students into classifications for the purpose of high
school graduation (Due Process). While the Courts in Griggs and Armstead concerned
themselves with the job relatedness facet of the test, the Court in this case can only be
concerned with whether the test reasonably or arbitrarily evaluates the skill objectives
established by the State Board of Education. Thus, the Court must not focus on the title of
the test or the public perceptions of functional literacy, but rather must analyze the test
from the perspective of its objectives and the definition provided by its designers.
Both parties agree that the functional literacy test should have content validity, but they
disagree as to whether the test does, in fact, have content validity.
Evidence of content validity is required when the test user wishes to estimate
how an individual performs in the universe of situations the test is intended
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to represent. Content validity is most commonly evaluated for tests of skill or
knowledge; [**48] . ..
“To demonstrate the content validity of a set of test scores, one must show
that the behaviors demonstrated in testing constitute a representative sample
of behaviors to be exhibited in a desired performance domain. American
Psychological Association, Standards for Educational and Psychological
Tests, 28 (1974).”
The Plaintiffs have persistently contended that the Florida test domain or the boundary
for the designated skills or knowledge does not match any definition of functional
literacy. While the Court would agree that the domain of the Florida test does not equate
with every definition of functional literacy or for that matter with many definitions, it
does match the one given by the [*261] DOE and the State Board of Education. It would
also appear that the Florida legislature is satisfied with the manner in which the State
Board of Education has fulfilled its mandate. The Court is satisfied that the skill
objectives of the Florida test are adequately evaluated by the test items and that the test
has adequate content validity. DUE PROCESS
Whether the functional literacy test has or needs to have construct validity is another
disputed issue. The Plaintiffs contend [**49] that the test must have construct validity
and it does not. The Defendants contend that construct validity is not essential for the
test, but it has it anyway. A construct is a "theoretical idea developed to explain and
organize some aspects of existing knowledge". Id. at 29. Certainly "functional literacy"
is, in the abstract, like "anxiety" or "clerical ability" a construct. Functional literacy in the
instant case, however, is a construct about which only limited hypotheses can be made.
The definition of functional literacy provided by the state does not attempt to address and
resolve all the many hypotheses which can be made about functional literacy. In the
Court's evaluation it need not. Particularly instructive of this fact is a statement found in
the construct validity section of the American Psychological Association's Standards
covering testing.
It is important to note in this that the investigation of construct validity refers
to a specific test and not necessarily to any other test given the same label.
Id. at 30. (Due ProcesS).
Thus while other states may design tests of functional literacy, they need not all conceive
of functional literacy in the same fashion for their tests [**50] to have construct validity.
A construct is always capable of definition and the measure of a test's construct validity is
whether the hypotheses made about the defined construct will predict behavior. In the
instant case, the Court is satisfied that the Florida test has adequate construct validity.
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
The Court has also considered the other alleged flaws 23 in the test development and
instrument and find them to be without constitutional merit. The educational experts
presented by the Plaintiffs have given the Court an education in "state of the art"
educational measurement and testing. But the "state of the art" is not to be equated with
the constitutional standards for Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
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review. The Court is of the opinion the functional literacy test bears a rational relation to
a valid state interest and thus is constitutional (Nexus to State Goals).
23 The Plaintiffs mounted a frontal assault upon a number of practices and
procedures utilized by the DOE in the design and implementation of the test.
Among the flaws asserted and considered were: the failure of DOE to solicit public
input into the design of the test and its definition; the drafting of item specifications
after the writing of items; the continual use by DOE o f definitions of functional
literacy extraneous and inconsistent with the official definition; the inadequacy of
the research prior to the selection of a cut-score; the questionable research
methodology of the Defendants' construct validity study; the failure to follow the
APA standards for the design and implementation of tests which affect the lives of
the takers in a significant fashion; the failure of DOE to adequately publicize what
the test is and its inherent limitations; the inadequacy of the form notice sent to
parents and students regarding the interpretations of scores on the test; the
reliability of the test. While some of the above mentioned flaws were indeed errors
of considerable magnitude, they do not cross either individually or collectively the
line between inadequacy and constitutional infirmity.
[**51]
F. TEST ITEMS BIAS
The Plaintiffs contend that the functional literacy test consists of racially biased test
questions or items which are less likely to be correctly answered by black students than
by white students.
The evidence indicates that the professional testing companies which wrote the items for
the functional literacy test reviewed the items for possible racial or ethnic bias.
Additionally the DOE staff with the assistance of groups of teachers analyzed the test
questions for possible racial bias. The DOE also commissioned a scatter plot analysis of
the test to determine the possibility of item bias. While some of the questions do seem to
have factual settings unfamiliar to certain racial groups, the [*262] Court is of the opinion
that this distraction is minimal and unpervasive. The Court is not convinced by the
Plaintiffs' evidence that the test or any item should be invalidated for racial or ethnic
bias.(Equal Protection: Discrimination) EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
G. THE APPLICATION OF THE SSAT II TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS
1. Introduction
The Plaintiffs contend that the application of the SSAT II testing program to only public
schools is a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [**52] The Plaintiffs have set forth several arguments in this regard.
Plaintiffs in Classes B and C first contend that the application of the test to only public
schools creates a racial classification. Because of black students' financial inability to
attend private schools, they are unable to escape the effect of the test as readily as many
white students. Plaintiffs in all classes contend that the application of the test to only
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public schools does not bear a rational relationship to the alleged purpose of the
legislation. Plaintiffs on this ground assert that the state has an interest in assuring that
All of its students, not just public school students, receive instruction in basic practical
application skills.(Equal Protection: Discrimination).
2. Private Schools in Florida
Private schools in Florida today educate approximately 10% of the school age students.
Prior to desegregation, 8% of the school age children attended private schools. This
relative increase in attendance at private schools has outpaced the growth of the state
population. In 1960, black students composed 4% of the students attending private
schools. By 1970, the percentage of black students in private schools had increased to
5%. Thus at present, [**53] approximately 95% of the students attending private schools
are white. The racial composition of Florida public schools is 20% Black students and
80% White students.
3. The State Regulation of Florida Private Schools
Florida private schools are regulated only to a minimal degree. The principal form of
regulation is found in Fla.Stat. § 229.808 which requires annual registration. The entire
registration process consists of filing a form with only four questions: "the name and
address of the institution, names of administrative officers, enrollment, and number of
teachers." Id. at § 229.808(1). The exemptions to the registration act essentially void its
limited effectiveness. Id. at § 229.808(2). Besides registration, private schools' only other
state imposed regulation is that they keep attendance records. Fla.Stat. §§ 232.02,
232.021.
The State of Florida does not regulate any substantive matter affecting education in
private schools. There are no regulations regarding instruction in basic skills or in any
way mandating a curriculum. The State of Florida does not accredit private schools and
does not require them to be accredited by any professional accrediting association.
Instruction [**54] in Florida private schools need not be in English, in fact, at least ten
schools in Dade County which grant diplomas give instruction in Spanish. Additionally,
one school in West Florida teaches its students in Urdu (a Pakistani language). A
graduation diploma from any Florida private school meets the state's employment criteria
for jobs requiring a diploma. Likewise, a diploma from a Florida private school will meet
the initial requirement for admission to one of Florida's state universities.
4. Constitutionality
The Plaintiffs in Classes B and C have attempted to align race with the financial inability
(i. e. lack of wealth) to attend private schools. From this alignment, the Plaintiffs would
urge application of strict scrutiny to the legislative decision not to apply the SSAT II to
private schools. Such an analysis is constitutionally without merit.EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED
The Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1978) held that classifications based on [*263] wealth
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were not constitutionally suspect, thus not requiring strict scrutiny. The ability to attend
private schools is clearly affected by the student's or his [**55] parents' financial
resources. While it is also clear that blacks in America, as a class, are without substantial
financial resources, these two categories, wealth and race, do not merge in this instance
into one suspect classification. Quite often decisions of legislative or administrative
bodies affect certain groups disproportionately. This alone does not signal strict scrutiny.
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 99 S. Ct. 1355, 59 L. Ed. 2d
587(1979).
The legislative decision to apply the SSAT II only to public schools also passes
constitutional muster under the rational relation analysis. As the Supreme Court stated in
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 60 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1979), "(t)he State has
a stronger interest in ensuring that the schools it most directly controls, and for which it
bears the cost, are as effective as possible . . . ." Id. note 8, 99 S. Ct. at 1595. The state
need not correct all the problems of education in one clean sweep, but can attack the
problems it identifies in a logical fashion. The decision made in the instant case to apply
the SSAT II only to public schools over which the state already had significant curricular,
[**56] instructional, and financial control was both reasonable and constitutional.
Whether the state could require the taking and passage of the SSAT II for a diploma in
private schools and subsidize the cost is not the question presented herein. The Supreme
Court will address this issue in its next term .. Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y.1978) cert, granted, 440 U.S.
978,99 S. Ct. 1785, 60 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979).
V
SECOND CLAIM
A. INTRODUCTION
In this section, the Court will consider the allegations of the Plaintiffs in all classes in the
second count of the complaint concerning the adequacy of the notice prior to and since
the implementation of the functional literacy testing program. The Court will also
consider the adequacy of the time to prepare for the examination after the objectives were
first established. The Plaintiffs' allegations in this claim state that the schedule imposed
by the Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.(Due Process:
Procedural: Adequate Notice).
While the Court in Section IV. has discussed the development of the test instrument
itself, the Court in this section will review the development of the test in relation to
[**57] the testing objectives, the implementation schedule and the state-wide, in-school
instruction. The Court will also consider in this section whether the test instruments were
equated.
B. THE TESTING SCHEDULE
In April, 1977, the State Board of Education formally approved the DOE draft of the
Minimum Student Performance Standards. The Standards established objectives for
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instruction in mathematics and communication skills for grades 3, 5, 8 and 11. The
functional literacy objectives were derived from eleventh grade basic skills objectives.
While there had been considerable in-put from public school teachers during the
development of the basic skills objectives, the DOE staff designed all the functional
literacy objectives without external assistance. Basically, the DOE staff redesigned
twenty-four of the basic skill objectives so that they would present the objectives in
practical application contexts. During the summer of 1977, the DOE distributed to all
Florida public schools the basic skill and functional literacy objectives. It thus appears
that public school teachers were aware of the objectives of the functional literacy
examination four months in advance of the first administration [**58] of the test, but only
two months were available for instruction in the application of the skills. The results of
the first administration reflect the obvious inadequacy of the prior instruction in the stated
objectives.
[*264] From December, 1977, the date the results of the first administration were
released, until April, 1979, the date the third and last administration was held, only
thirteen months of instructional time intervened. During this period remediation classes
for those students who failed were held in almost every Florida county. The DOE had
designed instructional materials to assist in the remediation programs, but those materials
were not immediately available. During the Spring of 1978, the remediation programs
with the assistance of state funds were working effectively. The programs for remediation
in most counties are presently on-going and have received additional state funding. (Due
Process:Procedural: Adequate Notice)
C. INSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Aside from the questions of the sufficiency of the instruction since the announcement of
the functional literacy objectives and the adequacy of the time to prepare for the
objectives, the Court must inquire into the instruction of the objectives [**59] prior to the
implementation of the act. Historically, Florida public education has been administered
solely by sixty-seven autonomous county school boards. Each school board controlled the
design of the curriculum, the selection of the required textbooks and the establishment of
graduation requirements. With local school boards in a controlling position, the interests
of the county and their particular region of the state would dictate educational emphasis.
The nuances of instruction and objectives would differ greatly between the various
counties. The texts used in Florida counties varied a great deal. There was no uniformity
as to the selection of instructional materials until very recently. Even now when the DOE
approves several texts for use for individual courses in the schools, no one text contains
all of the functional literacy objectives. In fact, a review of several texts is necessary for
complete instruction in the mathematics or communications functional literacy
objectives. After the adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution, the legislature and the
DOE began to play a more centralized role in the education o f Florida public school
children. The DOE began to plan for basic [**60] skill objectives in 1972-1973 and
implemented testing programs to evaluate the success of such instruction, but throughout
the period of the Plaintiffs' education, the individual counties remained the single most
important entities for the design and implementation of instructional programs and the
selection of textbooks. CURRICULAR VALIDITY
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This problem is indicative of a much larger issue. Although there is evidence that certain
skills were not taught in Florida public schools, let us assume Arguendo that all the skills
were taught. The atmosphere of the instruction prior to the implementation of the basic
skills and functional literacy objectives was neutral and devoid of the present objectives.
While all instruction is important, there are obvious methods of motivating students and
emphasizing certain skills. The principal problem with the instant program is that the
instruction in previous years took place in an atmosphere without the specific objectives
now present and without the diploma sanction. Instruction of the skills necessary to
successfully complete the functional literacy test is a cumulative and time consuming
process. Knowledge of how to successfully perform the functional literacy [**61] skills
is not taught in any specific grade, in any specific class, or from any specific type of
teacher. It is critical that at the time of instruction o f a functional literacy skill, the student
knows that the individual skill he is being taught must be learned prior to his graduation
from a Florida public school. Instruction in the specific skills is critical, but likewise so is
identification of whether the skills have been learned. Teaching and learning are not
always coterminous. Fla.Stat. § 236.088. Until recently, there was no state-wide testing
program to evaluate learning and to direct remediation.
The Plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified that the principal problem with the testing
program was not the diploma sanction or the announcement of state-wide objectives but
the implementation schedule. The Court is in agreement that the present program [*265]
of instruction in specific basic skill and functional applications with periodic testing to
identify both mastery and deficiencies is a step forward. It sets objectives, defines goals,
evaluates achievement and, if necessary, remediates deficiencies. The program acclimates
students to standardized testing and will relieve [**62] some of the immense pressure
when it comes time to take the functional literacy examination. The benefits of the
overall program inure differentially to those students who have been in the system for
longer periods of time. But as asserted by one of the Plaintiffs' witnesses, "the functional
literacy program was a test looking for a plan of instruction".
The Report of Task Force on Educational Assessment Programs, which was appointed by
the State Board of Education, summarized the timing problems in the following fashion:
The problems created by the abrupt schedule for implementing the
Functional Literacy Test were most severe for the members of Florida high
school graduation class of 1979. At the eleventh hour and with virtually no
warning, these students were told that the requirements for graduation had
been changed. They were suddenly required to pass a test constructed under
the pressure of time and covering content that was presumed to be
elementary but that their schools may or may not have taught them recently,
well, or perhaps at all.
In retrospect, the Task Force believes that the schedule for implementing
state-wide high school graduation standards was too [**63] severe. We feel
that most of the problems that are identified in later sections of this report are
the result of trying to do too much in too little time. Consequently, we
believe that the problems can and will be solved over time. Task Force on
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Educational Assessment Programs, Competency Testing in Florida Report to
the Florida Cabinet (Part 1)4 (1979).
While the problems identified by the Court and the Task Force are major issues, they are
compounded by requiring passage of the functional literacy examination for graduation.
If the functional literacy testing program were designed to evaluate skills to aid in
remediation alone, then the Court would not find the program suspect in any fashion not
already identified. While the Defendants contend the diploma sanction is an essential
facet of the program which increases the stimulus to leam and the motivation to achieve,
the Plaintiffs contend that the diploma sanction is a punitive measure which is excessive
and not the least restrictive manner in which to achieve the goals identified by the state.
In Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit considered the
application of due process standards [**64] to the denial of an academic degree. In that
case the Plaintiff, who was pursuing a graduate degree in education, objected on
constitutional and contractual grounds to the university's decision to require a
comprehensive examination for receipt of the degree after the commencement of her
studies. While the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of injunctive relief, it
did so on the basis of an analysis of the facts. The Court, in doing so, implicitly
acknowledged that termination for academic reasons created a due process right to timely
notice.
The Supreme Court in Board of Curators of the University o f Missouri v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978), decided last term that Charlotte
Horowitz, the Plaintiff, who had been terminated from medical school for academic
reasons, had been afforded ample due process and refused to require a pre-termination
hearing. In support of the constitutional ruling, the Court singled out the manifest
problems with the intervention of the judiciary into the realm of academic evaluation.
Although the Court in a footnote cited with approval the statement that " "(t) here is a
clear dichotomy between the student's due [**65] process rights in disciplinary dismissals
and academic dismissals' ", the distinction between what the rights of the two classes o f
individuals are is not clearly and unequivocally drawn.
[*266] In Horowitz the Plaintiff had been evaluated in her clinical rotations by a number
of physicians in addition to having her work supervised and critiqued by her chief docent.
The Plaintiff received repeated warnings of her substandard performance and was placed
on academic probation by the Council of Evaluation, a group of physicians and medical
students who reviewed academic performance. After further review and
recommendations the Council of Evaluation decided that the Plaintiff should not be
permitted to graduate. This decision was approved by the Coordinating Committee and
the Dean of the Medical School and was also sustained by the University's Provost for
Health Services. Considering the practical problems with judicial reevaluation of
academic performance and the facts relative to Ms. Horowitz's particular case, the Court
decided that the Plaintiff had received adequate due process and a pre-termination
hearing was not necessary.
The practical problems in Horowitz were manifest. [**66] Sifting through an individual
student's past clinical record, rehashing physician evaluations, and litigating bedside
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manner were problems foreign to judicial expertise. The factual context in the instant
case is very different. The Court is not asked to evaluate an individual student's
performance, but to resolve a dispute involving the legislative decision to implement a
test which determines graduation from high school with the standard credential, a
diploma. While the factual inquiry is considerably different so are the parties. The
Plaintiff in Horowitz was pursuing graduate education in advanced studies. The Plaintiffs
in all classes in the instant case were participating in secondary education required by the
state compulsory education law. Fla.Stat. § 232.01 Et seq. Although some of the
Plaintiffs are beyond the sixteen year age limitation in the Florida Statute, the majority of
the time they have spent in the Florida public schools was required.
The Court is convinced that the Plaintiffs in Classes A, B, and C have a property right in
graduation from high school with a standard diploma if they have fulfilled the present
requirements for graduation exclusive of the SSAT II [**67] requirement (i. e. successful
performance on the SSAT I and completion of the necessary number of credits). Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,95 S. Ct. 729,42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975). The Supreme Court in Goss
recognized that even the suspension of a student for one day infringed upon the students'
property right in attending school. Students in Florida are required to attend school
pursuant to the state's compulsory attendance statute. Fla.Stat. § 232.01 Et seq.
Graduation is the logical extension of successful attendance. While the state has
redefined in a sense what successful attendance for purposes of a diploma should be, the
Court is of the opinion that the SSAT II requirement should be excluded for the same
reasons that the notice of the test has been shown to be inadequate. The Court is also of
the opinion that the Plaintiffs have a liberty interest in being free of the adverse stigma
associated with the certificate of completion. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,
91 S. Ct. 507,27 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1971). This stigma is very real and will affect the
economic and psychological development of the individual. Although public disclosure
of the different graduation credentials did [**68] not occur this year, the only reason for
this was a settlement between the parties so as to avoid the necessity of the Court hearing
preliminary injunction motions during the middle of the trial. (Due Process: Establishing
a Property Right and Interest).
Due process has and always will be a flexible standard dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of each individual case. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S. Ct. 1743,6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961).
" "Due process,' unlike some legal rules is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." It is "compounded
of history, reason, the past course of decisions." Id. at 895, 81 S. Ct. at 1748
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
162, 71 S. Ct. 624, 643-644, 95 L. Ed. 817 (1951)).
[*267] The Court finds the facts in the instant case compelling. The Plaintiffs, after
spending ten years in schools where their attendance was compelled, were informed o f a
requirement concerning skills which, if taught, should have been taught in grades they
had long since completed. While it is impossible to determine if all the skills were taught
to all the students, it is obvious that the instruction [**69] given was not presented in an
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educational atmosphere directed by the existence of specific objectives and stimulated
throughout the period of instruction by a diploma sanction. CURRICULAR VALIDITY
These are the two ingredients which the Defendants assert are essential to the program at
the present time. The Court is of the opinion that the inadequacy of the notice provided
prior to the invocation of the diploma sanction, the objectives, and the test is a violation
of the due process clause. (Due Process: Procedural: Adequate Notice) STUDENT
PREVAILED
Since the time of the release of the results of the first test, remediation classes have been
attempting to teach the skills. The effectiveness of the remediation programs is somewhat
in doubt at the present time because of the failure of the state defendants to carry out
equating studies REMEDIATION. These studies would have shown the relative degree
of difficulty among the three administrations of the functional literacy test. Based on the
present evidence it is impossible to determine whether the tests are becoming easier or
whether the remediation program is accomplishing its goal. In either event, large numbers
of students have not passed the functional literacy test. The evidence indicates that the
instruction of functional [**70] literacy skills to older students is more difficult,
particularly because the unidentified deficiencies of earlier years have become ingrained.
The expert testimony upon which the Court has relied indicates that four to six years
should intervene between the announcement o f the objectives and the implementation of
the diploma sanction.(Due Process: Procedural: Adequate Notice) While the Court is
loathe to interfere in the operations of the Florida public schools, it is compelled to act
because of its constitutional obligation. The Defendants had other constitutionally
acceptable alternatives such as phased introduction of the objectives in all grades without
the diploma sanction and longer term remediation. The Court cannot help but focus on
the fact that the present Plaintiffs in all classes have been the victims of segregation,
social promotion and various other educational ills but have persisted and remained in
school and should not now, at this late date, be denied the diplomas they have earned by
mastery of the basic skills and completion of the minimum number of academic credits.
The Defendants are concerned that the momentum, interest, credibility, and support of
Florida public education now present will be undermined [**71] if the Court finds the
test or the implementation schedule invalid. The Defendants are further concerned that
they will be without a sanction or deterrent if the Court voids the linkage of the functional
literacy test to the diploma. While the denial of the diploma has a certain deterrent value,
its application in the instant case would be analogous to asserting that the immediate and
indefinite incarceration without a trial of an individual upon the suspicion of the
commission of a crime would have a deterrent effect on other potential offenders. No
doubt it would. But in our country, the Constitution, including the due process clause,
stands between the arbitrary government action and the innocent individual. St. Ann v.
Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). The implementation schedule in effect relative to the
functional literacy testing program with the diploma sanction is fundamentally unfair.
The Court in Section VIII will discuss the nature and extent of injunctive relief to be
extended to all Plaintiffs.
VI
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THIRD CLAIM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs in Classes B and C contend in their third claim that the utilization of the
SSAT II to classify and group students for remediation [**72] pursuant to the
Compensatory Education Act of 1977, Fla.Stat. [*268] § 236.088, perpetuates the effects
of past purposeful discrimination and resegregates them in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The Plaintiffs in these classes
further assert that the Defendants foresaw that a substantial number of black twelfth
grade students would fail the SSAT II and thus would be placed in compensatory
education classes with high proportions of black children and low proportions of white
children. (Equal Protection)
B. RESEGREGATION
The evidence indicates that the compensatory education program for those students who
have failed the SSAT II is disproportionately composed of black children. This is
attributable to the fact that more black children have failed the SSAT II than white
children. The reason for this has been fully explained elsewhere in this Opinion.
Although the Court has found in a previous section that the test is valid and reliable, at
least for the purpose of identifying certain skill deficiencies, it has also found that the test
perpetuates the effects of past purposeful discrimination. The final question, one posed in
McNeal, supra, and Gadsden [**73] County, supra, is whether the testing program along
with the compensatory education classes, although they cause resegregation of certain
classrooms, will remedy the present effects of past discrimination through better
educational opportunities.
In addressing this question, the Court must reflect upon the evidence produced upon this
issue. While the compensatory education classification results in disproportionate
numbers of black children being placed in the classes, the evidence indicates that the
pupil alignment in the compensatory education programs is not static. The progression of
students out of the compensatory education program seems to be fluid and the increase in
the passage percentages evidence the efficacy of the program. Additionally, the
compensatory education program constitutes only at most two classes or hours per day.
The remainder of the school day is spent in regular classes which do not contain this
disproportionate racial composition. The defendants must be constantly wary that the
utilization of the SSAT I and II and the compensatory education program do not isolate
and stigmatize any children for longer than is necessary to compensate for the identified
deficits. [**74] Thus far the record is clear that the purpose o f the compensatory
education program is to assist students and not to resegregate them. The state's obligation
to instruct and remediate all students relative to the SSAT II skills has been commenced.
The results of the program are encouraging although serious questions concerning
equating are still unresolved. The legislature has given the program ample financial
support and hopefully it will do so in the future. By the end of the Court's injunction, all
students should be ready and able to compete on an equal footing. Thus while the
diploma sanction punishes those who suffered under segregation, the compensatory
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education program assists him. The McNeal rationale for permitting the program to exist,
regardless of its disproportionate racial composition has been satisfied as to the
compensatory education facet, but not by the diploma sanction. Accordingly, the Court
finds that there has been neither a constitutional nor a statutory violation because of the
utilization of the results of SSAT II as a mechanism for remediation even if the
compensatory education classrooms are disproportionately black.(Equal Protection:
Discrimination: Resegregation).EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
VII
CONCLUSION
In 1954 the Supreme [**75] Court recognized the essential role of public education in our
society.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed [*269] forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,493, 74 S. Ct.
686,691, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).
Because of this seminal role, it is critical to Provide and Administer education in a
manner which comports with our historical and constitutional notions of fairness and
equality. Any deviation from this course would seriously affect not only the individual
student but our society as a whole. The Court has herein noted several breaches of this
fundamental responsibility of government and has been compelled to act. [**76] The
injunctive relief granted will be of a limited duration, only that time necessary to purge
the taint of past segregation and inadequate notice. At the end of the injunctive period,
the state will be permitted to pursue its educational policies and goals free of
intervention.
VIII
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Pursuant to the findings in Sections IV. D. and V, the Court is of the opinion that
declaratory and injunctive relief are both appropriate and proper in the present instance.
In a separate Order the Court will declare that Fla.Stat. § 232.246(l)(b) (1978 Supp.) is,
as applied, in the present context a violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The
two remaining requirements for graduation found in Fla.Stat. § 232.246(1 )(a) and (c)
(1978 Supp.) remain in frill force and effect.
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In light of the evidence relating to the necessary period of time to orient the students and
teachers to the new functional literacy objectives, to insure instruction in the objectives,
and to eliminate the taint on educational development which accompanied segregation,
the Court is of the opinion that the [**77] state should be enjoined from requiring
passage of the SSAT II as a requirement for graduation for a period of four (4) years. In
the school term 1982-1983, the state will be permitted to utilize the SSAT II as a
requirement for graduation. In the interim the SSAT II can be administered as directed by
the State DOE to assist in the identification and remediation of the SSAT II skill
objectives. The state Defendants will be permitted to retain the SSAT II scores in a
fashion consistent with the manner in which the state retains other achievement test
scores. STUDENT PREVAILED
The Court is of the opinion that the present remediation program is not constitutionally or
statutorily invalid. The progress of students out of the program and the limited duration
of the daily instruction comports with applicable standards.EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Jacksonville, Florida this 12th day of July,
1979.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

373

JOHN G. BRADY, et al., Appellants, v. RALPH TURLINGTON, as Commissioner
of Education, et al., Appellees
No. MM-97
Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
372 So. 2d 1164; 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15192
July 17,1979
COUNSEL: [**1] Ralph Armstead, Anna Bryant Motter, Jack L. McLean, Jr., Larry K.
White and Kristine Knab of Legal Services of North Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, for
appellants.
James D. Little, Gen. Counsel, Miami, and Judith A. Brechner, Deputy Gen. Counsel,
State Board of Education, Gainesville, for appellees.
JUDGES: MILLS, Chief Judge, ROBERT SMITH, J. and HENRY CLAY MITCHELL,
JR., Associate Judge, concur.
OPINION BY: PER CURIAM
OPINION
[*1165] PER CURIAM.
In a rule challenge proceeding a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative
Hearings, Department of Administration, upheld a rule of the State Board of Education
requiring that students attempting to qualify for a high school diploma must show
attainment of minimum performance standards as measured by a State Student
Assessment Test taken before or after the effective date of the rale. As against appellants'
claim of an illegal retroactive application of the rale, the hearing officer held that "the
proposed rule simply defines mastery and ability and, through the rescoring of existing
test results, seeks to apply this definition to students who will graduate this year." In
operation the rule exempts from retaking the test those who satisfactorily [**2]
performed before the rule was adopted; and it does not irremediably disadvantage those
who did not so perform, for they may now have another opportunity to do so. The rule is
valid as against due process objections, due process : EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAJLED.See Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 43 S. Ct. 154, 67 L. Ed. 332 (1922); County
o f Palm Beach v. State, 342 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1976). See also Florida State Board o f
Education v. Brady, 368 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
AFFIRMED.
MILLS, C. J., and ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., and HENRY CLAY MITCHELL, Jr.,
Associate Judge, concur.
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WELLS et al. v. BANKS et al.
No. 58955
Court of Appeals of Georgia
153 Ga. App. 581; 266 S.E.2d 270; 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS
1909
November 6, 1979, Argued
February 22, 1980, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] Certiorari Applied For.
PRIOR HISTORY: Administrative appeal. Tattnall Superior Court. Before Judge
Findley.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant students challenged the judgment of the
Tattnall Superior Court (Georgia) that affirmed the Georgia State Board o f Education
(state board) decision in favor of appellee county members of the county board of
education. The students sought an exemption from a graduation requirement imposed by
the county board of education based upon standardized test scores.
OVERVIEW: The county board of education established, as a high school graduation
requirement, that students achieve standardized test scores indicating proficiency in math
and reading at the ninth grade level. The students' challenge to that requirement was
rejected by the county board of education, and the decision was affirmed by the state
board and the superior court. On appeal from that judgment, the court held that the
requirement was a valid exercise of the county board of education's authority. Although
under Ga. Code Ann. § 32-653a the state board was authorized to establish minimum
standards for public schools, state board policy specifically permitted localities to impose
enhanced standards. Under that policy, the county board of education was responsible for
establishing performance objectives and performance indicators for measuring "life role
skills," including reading and computing skills. The court rejected the students' claim that
the requirement constituted an unauthorized imposition of a "course of study." The court
also ruled that imposition of the testing requirement did not violate the students' rights to
due process or equal protection. The judgment was affirmed.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment upholding the state board decision in
favor of the members of the county board of education. The students challenged the
requirement that they achieve a certain standardized test score before graduating from
high school.
CORE TERMS: local board, graduation, skills, equal protection, courses of study,
diploma, testing, achievement test, school board, authority to impose, high school, boards
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of education, local school board, authority granted, achievement, scheduled, indicators,
score
COUNSEL: RichardD. Phillips, for appellants.
J. Franklin Edenfield, B. Daniel Dubberly, Jr., M. Francis Stubbs, for appellees.
JUDGES: Shulman, Judge. Deen, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.
OPINION BY: SHULMAN
OPINION
[*581] [**271] Appellants are students who were scheduled to graduate from high school
in Tattnall County in 1978. Prior to the scheduled date o f graduation, they formally
requested that the Tattnall County Board of Education rescind, or modify so as to exempt
appellants from complying with, a policy of the local board which established as a
requirement for graduation with a diploma that each student demonstrate by means of a
score on an achievement test that he or she possessed the skills in math and reading
expected of a student entering the ninth grade. The local board, following a hearing,
denied the request. That denial was affirmed by the State Board of Education. Appellants
appealed the decision of the State Board of Education to the Superior Court of Tattnall
County. It is from the judgment of that court, affirming the decision [***2] of the State
Board, that this appeal is taken.
1. In two enumerations of error, appellants present arguments to the effect that the local
board acted beyond its authority in imposing the achievement test requirement.
Appellants' first argument concerning the authority of the local board to impose the
requirement at issue here is founded on Code Ann. § 32-653a, which reads in pertinent
part as follows: "The State Board shall establish and enforce minimum standards for
operation of all phases of public school in Georgia and for operation of all public
elementary and secondary schools and local units of school administration in Georgia so
as to assure, to the greatest extent possible, equal and adequate educational programs,
curricula, offerings, opportunities and facilities for all Georgia's children and youth . . . "
Based on that statutory language, appellants urge that the local board had no authority to
impose a requirement for [*582] graduation in conflict with the requirements imposed by
the State Board.
However, appellants have not pointed out nor have we found, any conflict between the
action of the local board and the standards established by the State Board. In fact, [***3]
there appears in the record of this case a document from the State Board establishing the
requirements for high school graduation. Nowhere in that document is there any
indication that local boards may not impose additional requirements. On the contrary, the
State Board's policy specifically permits local boards to require additional [**272] credit
units for graduation and makes it the responsibility of local boards to establish
"performance objectives" (defined in the same document as "objectives established by
local boards of education as being acceptable levels of achievement for contemporary life
role skills defined by the State Board of Education"), and "performance indicators"
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(defined in the State Board's policy as "measures defined by local school systems to be
used as proof of the student's skills or knowledge.") (Emphasis supplied.) One of the "life
role skills" identified by the State Board is explained as follows: "Learner —Each citizen
should have proficiency in reading, writing, listening, analyzing and speaking. He should
also have basic computing skills." The State Board's policy on graduation requirements
also includes the following comment on "life [***4] role skills": "They are not to be
construed as a replacement for courses of study; rather, they are identified as a positive
reinforcement of skills and knowledge. High school graduation requirements will include
these areas in addition to the required clock hours and attendance specified. These broad
areas are identified in an effort to allow local boards of education to recognize the thrust
of this policy." Considering the authority granted the local boards by the policy
considered above, we find no merit in appellants' argument that the local board's
imposition of an additional requirement for graduation conflicts with the State Board's
requirements.
For the same reasons, we find unpersuasive appellants' argument that the local board's
action required prior approval from the State Board because of [*583] the responsibility
placed on the State Board by Code Ann. § 32-408 to prescribe "a course of study" for all
schools and the authority granted by that section to "approve additional courses of study
set up by the local units of administration .. . " The very language used by the State Board
shows that such objectives and indicators as are here involved are not "courses of [***5]
study." Testimony presented at the hearing before the local board established that the
requirement for a minimal level of achievement in reading and writing, as measured by
the testing requirement involved here, was for the same purposes advocated by the State
Board's policy.
We conclude, therefore, that the local board had full authority to impose the requirement
of which appellants complain. STATE AUTHORITY EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED
2. Appellants argue that, even assuming the local board's authority to implement the
achievement test score requirement for graduation with a diploma, its application denies
them due process of law and equal protection of law. We cannot agree.
We do agree with appellants that, having extended to all children in Georgia the right to
an education, the state cannot arbitrarily withdraw that right. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (95 SC 729,42 LE2d 725). We do not, however, find any application of that
principle to this case. In the first place, appellants have not been denied the right to take
part in the public education system. In fact, rather than denying appellants an education,
the testing requirement is clearly designed to ensure that they receive some actual benefit
from that system [***6] before leaving it with a diploma. In the second place, even if it
were conceded that appellants have been deprived of some property interest in an
education, the record in this case clearly shows that more than adequate notice of the
imposition of this additional requirement for graduation was given to appellants and their
parents. In addition, there is a statutorily provided procedure for contesting actions o f the
school board (Code Ann. § 32-910), which procedure was utilized by appellants. We find
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no merit in the claim of a violation of appellants' right to due process. EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED due process ADEQUATE NOTICE
The argument that appellants have been denied equal protection is also without merit.
That argument is [*584] based on appellants' contention that they are being treated
differently from students in other counties in Georgia. However, since, as we have held,
the local school board was acting within its statutory authority and since our Constitution
and Code provide the local school boards with sweeping authority in the governing
[**273] of local school systems (Code Ann. §§ 2-4302, 32-901, 32-912), the fact that
other school boards may choose to employ other methods to control the quality of
education [***7] in their systems does not evince a denial o f equal protection. We must
look to the administration of the requirement within Tattnall County rather than the state
as a whole. Since the evidence shows without contradiction that the testing requirement is
uniformly applied in Tattnall County, appellants have been accorded equal protection.
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
Judgment affirmed.
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In the Matter of the Board of Education of the Northport-East Northport Union
Free School District et al., Petitioners, v. Gordon M. Ambach, Individually and as
Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, Albany County
107 Misc. 2d 830; 436 N.Y.S.2d 564; 1981 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2101
January 23,1981
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners, students and Board of Education, filed a N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding, seeking to permanently enjoin respondent commissioner from
enforcing his order and a judgment validating the issuance o f certain diplomas.
OVERVIEW: Petitioners, students and Board of Education, filed a N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78
proceeding, to permanently enjoin respondent commissioner of education from enforcing
his order. Petitioners sought a judgment validating the issuance of the students' diplomas.
The court ruled in favor of petitioners and permanently enjoined the enforcement of
respondent's order. The court found that the diploma requirement contained in 8
N.Y.C.R.R. § 103.2(b) was improper as to the students. The court held that the denial of
the diplomas would have had an adverse effect on their fiiture employment
opportunities. The court ruled that denial of the diplomas was a deprivation of liberty;
therefore, the protections of the due process clause were invoked.
OUTCOME: The court permanently enjoined enforcement of respondent
commissioner's order and ruled that the diploma requirement was improper. The court
held that denial of the diplomas was a deprivation of liberty and would have had an
adverse effect on petitioner students.
CORE TERMS: diploma, handicapped, competency, notice, high school diploma,
educational, school district, functional, testing, literacy, handicapped children,
educational services, graduation, public education, deprivation, handicap, mathematics,
Rehabilitation Act, handicapped individual, educational institution, educational program,
applicability, elementary, bulletin, tier, Handicapped Children, rational basis, process
protection, testing programs, equal protection
COUNSEL: Ingerman, Smith, Greenberg & Gross for Board of Education of NorthportEast Northport Union Free School District, petitioner, John P. Bracken, guardian ad
litem, for Abby and another, petitioners. Robert D. Stone and Jean M. Coon for
respondents.
JUDGES: Robert C. Williams, J.
OPINION BY: WILLIAMS
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OPINION
[*830] OPINION O F THE COURT
[**566] This is a CPLR article 78 proceeding [***3] wherein the petitioners seek to
permanently enjoin the respondents from [*831] enforcing an order of respondent
Blaney, Acting Commissioner of Education, dated August 8, 1979. 1 Petitioners further
seek a judgment validating the issuance of certain diplomas by petitioner Board of
Education of the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District (Board) to the
individual petitioners.
1 That order decreed that: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Board of Education of
the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District transmit to the Commissioner of
Education, State Education Building, Albany, New York 12234, by certified mail
postmarked not later than 11:00 p.m. on August 17, 1979, the full names and residence,
addresses of all students to whom high school diplomas were awarded by the NorthportEast Northport Union Free School District in June, 1979, when such students had not met
the requirements for a high school diploma set forth in Part 103 of the Regulations o f the
Commissioner of Education (8 NYCRR Part 103)." [***4] The Board brought this matter
on by order to show cause issued by the Honorable Con. G. Cholakis on August 15, 1979.
Respondents moved to dismiss same on a number of grounds including the limitation
upon the review of legislative acts by way of article 78. In its decision and order of
September 18, 1979 this court citing Matter o f Town o f
Arietta v. State Bd. o f Equalization & Assessment (37 AD2d 431) found that the matter
was properly before it. The court further held that the respondents were enjoined from
enforcing the order complained of pending the determination herein.
The court sua sponte determined that the respective interests of the individual students
should be protected. John Bracken, Esq., was appointed guardian ad litem for the students
and permitted to interpose a petition on their behalf. Pursuant to CPLR 7804 (subd [h]) a
trial on the numerous issues of fact presented was held during a one-week period in the
summer of 1980. As directed at trial, following the completion of the lengthy transcript
thereof the parties presented posttrial memorandums and proposed findings, a further
opportunity to respond to the initial submissions was [**567] permitted, [***5] the case
was fully submitted as of January 16, 1981.
1. Abby and Richard are handicapped within the definition [*832] of the applicable
Federal and State statutes, Prior to their graduation in June of 1979 they were students in
the school district governed by the Board. At the time in question Abby was 20 years old
and attended James E. Allen High School in Dix Hills, New York, operated by the Board
of Co-operative Educational Services (BOCES). She suffers from a neurological
impairment which allegedly effects her ability to handle arithmetical computations.
Richard was 21 years of age in June, 1979. He was classified by the school district's
Committee on the Handicapped (COH) 6 as trainably mentally retarded and attended
James E. Allen School in Melville, New York, also operated by BOCES.
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2 (Education of All Handicapped Children Act [EHA] [US Code, tit 20, § 1401 et seq.];
Education Law, § 4401.) In order for a State to receive Federal aid it must provide an
educational program for handicapped students in compliance with the EHA. (US Code, tit
20, § 1412.) To effectuate same New York passed article 89 of the Education Law.
Accordingly, the provisions of article 89 and the regulations promulgated thereunder
parallel in substance many of the provisions of the EHA; therefore the court does not feel
duty bound in all instances to refer to both statutes. [***6]
3 As described by Dr. McNally, Director of Pupil Services for Northport-East Northport
School District, BOCES offers a "modified" high school program comprised of the
standard academic subjects required for a high school diploma plus a vocational
component. The educational program provided is apparently geared to the individual
student.
4 See 8 NYCRR 200.4 (a) (6), which provides for a neurologically damaged child being
classified as handicapped.
5 Pursuant to section 4401 of article 89 of the Education Law a handicapped individual is
entitled to a free education until he attains the age of 21.
6 The formation of a COH is mandated for every school district (Education Law, § 4402,
subd 1, par b), being charged with the evaluation and placement of handicapped students
within their respective school districts. (Education Law, art 89; 8 NYCRR Part 200.)
7 See 8 NYCRR 200.4 (a) (1). Abby and Richard were assigned individual education
plans (IEPs) in compliance with Federal and State statutes.
8. After being recommended for graduation by their respective schools, the COH [***7]
on March 18, 1979 recommended both Abby and Richard for graduation on the basis of
successful completion of their respective IEPs.
9 By resolution of the Board approved June 18, 1979 both Abby and Richard were
awarded local high school diplomas.
It appears that Abby was recommended for graduation in 1978 by her school. However
after consultation with her parents as required under statute she remained in school at
their request in order to allow her further participation in a vocational program (Arbor).
At the time of trial she was employed full time in the Arbor program. Absent the request
of her parents as set forth above it appears that Abby would have been granted a diploma
in 1978 prior to the testing requirement complained of herein.
[*833] At the time of the award of diplomas neither student had met the testing
requirement set forth in the Commissioner's Regulations for issuance of diplomas.
Section 103.2 of the Regulations of Commissioner [***8] of Education (8 NYCRR
103.2) provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Local diploma. In order to secure a local high school diploma, the following
requirements must be met:
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"(2) The demonstration of competency in the basic skills: (i) by passing the following
examinations: "(a) effective June 1,1979 through May 31, 1981, either the Basic
Competency Test in Reading or the Regents Comprehensive Examination in English, and
either the Basic Competency Test in Mathematics or a Regents examination in
mathematics".
Both the Basic Competency Test (BCT) in reading and mathematics were administered to
Abby. She successfully completed the English exam but failed the mathematics one.
Neither BCT was administered to Richard apparently based on a belief that it [**568]
would be futile for him to attempt to pass the exams.
Robert R. Spillane, Deputy Commissioner of Education, by way of a letter to Eleanor
Roll as President of the Board informed the Board that the award of diplomas to Abby
and Richard violated Part 103 of the Commissioner's Regulations (8 NYCRR Part 103).
The letter further indicated that "Any students who have been issued diplomas but not
completed all State requirements [***9] have invalid diplomas. You are hereby required
to provide the Education
Department with the names and addresses of any students to whom you have awarded
diplomas in violation of State regulations. These students will then be notified by our
Department that their diplomas are not valid." In response to the above direction the
Board by way of letter from Joseph F. Beattie, President, to Commissioner [*834]
Ambach dated July 24, 1979 respectfully "[declined] to produce the names of the
students to whom these diplomas were awarded." Thereafter the State Education
Department issued an order requiring the Board to submit the names requested.
10 See n 1, supra.
Both the State and local school district receive Federal monetary assistance. The
petitioners seek relief from said order alleging same to be "arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable and unlawful". They contend that the respondent in issuing the order
complained of and in requiring the passing of BCTs by the individual petitioners as a
prerequisite [***10] for the award of a high school diploma violated section 11 of article
I and section 1 of article XI of the New York State Constitution, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (US Code, tit 29, § 794), the EHA (US Code, tit 20, § 1401 et
seq.), section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (this cause of action is derivative
of the alleged violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the EHA),
the equal protection and due process guarantees afforded by the United States
Constitution.
A number of eloquent and engaging arguments have been propounded by the petitioners
touching on broad questions facing the educational community, however it must be
emphasized that the decision of this court is meant to speak solely to the factual
circumstances presented and the issues revolving around same in respect to the individual
petitioners, Abby and Richard. While the issues surrounding the propriety of competency
testing in general, and morespecifically the testing of handicapped children as a "class"
are tangentially addressed by this decision it is not the duty nor the intent of this court to
resolve same.
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The Legislature of this State is charged with [***11] the obligation of providing for the
"maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children
of this state may be educated." (NY Const, art XI, § 1; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School Dist., Al NY2d 440.) The Constitution 11 and the statutes of this State 12 vest
[*835] the control and management of its educational affairs in the Board o f Regents, that
power is concomitantly
shared with the Commissioner of Education. ( Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., supra; Matter o f New York City School Bds. Assoc, v. Board o f Educ., 39 NY2d
111.)

11 NY Const, art XI, § 2.
12 Education Law, § 207.
Pursuant to that broad grant of power the Regents and the Commissioner have
historically formulated standards for the granting o f diplomas. The standards adopted in
Part 103 of the Commissioner's Regulations (8 NYCRR Part 103) cannot be said to be
beyond the scope of the power vested in the Regents and the Commissioner. While the
court agrees with the respondents [***12] that the powers set forth above are extremely
broad and that the courts have "unalteringly eschewed" making judgment in respect to
broad education policy ( Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., supra, p 445) it
is not contended nor would [**569] such a contention be palatable that alleged violations
of constitutional or statutory provisions can be hidden behind the cloak of a claim of
"educational policy" and as such be beyond judicial review. ( James v. Board o f Educ.,
42 NY2d 357.)
The State has a legitimate interest in attempting to insure the value of its diplomas and to
improve upon the quality of education provided. Use of competency testing to effectuate
the goals underlying those interests is within the discretion o f the Board of Regents and
the Commissioner.
13 The petitioners contend however that the application of BCT requirements in respect
to Abby and Richard violates section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973 (US Code, tit
29, §794) in that it denies them a benefit or alternatively that it discriminates against
them. The statute provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this [***13] title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of. or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
[*836] under any program oractivity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service." (Emphasis added.) Though the testing in question has not
been shown to be part of a Federally approved program, statute provides for the
availability of Federal financial assistance in instituting competency testing programs.
The presence of such a program seemingly indicates the acceptance of competency
testing as a legitimate method of improving educational services. (Education Amendment
of 1978, § 921 [US Code, tit 20, § 3331].)
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The petitioners have failed to convince this court that the denial of diplomas to Abby
and Richard on the basis of their failure to meet the testing requirement of Part 103 (8
NYCRR Part 103) would violate section 504. Webster's Third New [***14] International
Dictionary Unabridged defines a diploma as a "document bearing record of graduation
from or of a degree conferred by an educational institution". It cannot be said that the
denial of a diploma based on inability to meet the BCT requirements is the denial of a
benefit "solely by reason o f' a handicap. An analogy can be drawn to the handicapped
person who is wheelchair bound. Section 504 may require the construction of a ramp to
afford him access to a building but it does not assure that once inside he will successfully
accomplish his objective.
Likewise, section 504 requires that a handicapped student be provided with an
appropriate education but does not guarantee that he will successfully achieve the
academic level necessary for the award of a diploma.
The Supreme Court interpreted section 504 in Southeastern Community Coll. v. Davis
(442 U.S. 397). While the factual content o f Davis is distinguishable from the case at bar
14 the court's construction of section 504 is pertinent (supra, p 405): "[This] is the first
case in which this Court has been called upon to interpret § 504. It is elementary that
'[the] starting point in every case involving [***15] the construction of a statute is the
language itself.' * * * Section 504 by its terms does not compel educational institutions to
disregard the disabilities o f handicapped individuals or to make substantial modifications
in their programs to allow disabled persons to participate. Instead, it requires only that
an 'otherwise qualified handicapped individual' not be excluded from participation in a
federally funded program 'solely by reason of his handicap,' indicating only that mere
possession of a handicap is not a [*837] permissible ground for assuming an inability to
function in a particular context." (Emphasis added.) [**570] In Kampmeier v. Nyquist
(553 F2d 296,299) 15 the Second Circuit stated that the "exclusion of handicapped
children from a school activity is not improper if there exists a substantial justification for
the school's policy." Even if the court were to determine that this situation was within the
ambit of section 504, it would be compelled to defer to the discretion of the Board of
Regents and the Commissioner in their establishment of educational policy. ( Donahue v.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 NY2d 440, supra; Matter o f New York [***16]
City School Bds. Assoc, v. Board o f Educ., 39 NY2d 111, supra.)
Under the statutes implemented to effectuate the Federal policy enunciated in the EHA
the power and the duty is placed upon the State Education Department "[to] formulate
such rules and regulations pertaining to the physical and educational needs of such
children as the commissioner of education shall deem to be in their best interests."
(Education Law, § 4403, subd 3.) 16 In light of the above it cannot be said that the
respondents in denying diplomas to the individual petitioners would be violating section
504.
14 Davis addressed the application o f section 504 to a hearing impaired woman's attempt
to gain admission to nursing school. Thus, the distinction between post secondary
education and level of educational services provided in the present case.
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15 In reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction the court therein held the exclusion
of students who were blind in one eye from participation in contact sports by their school
did not violate section 504, therefore the petitioners failed to establish the requisite
showing of probability of success on the merits.
[***17]
16 See Battle v. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania, 629 F2d 269,272 (discussion of the
intent of the EHA and the burden placed upon the State).
Petitioners further allege that the denial of diplomas by the respondent would be a
violation of the EHA in that it would deny the individual petitioners a "free appropriate
education" as guaranteed under the EHA. "The term 'free appropriate public education'
means special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards o f the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414 (a) (5)
of this title." (US Code, tit 20, § 1401, subd 18, emphasis added.) As set forth supra,
article 89 of the [*838] Education Law was promulgated to insure compliance with the
EHA, subdivision 3 of section 4403 thereof granting the Education Department
discretionary [***18] power in the development of regulations providing for the
education of handicapped students.
"[The] Act contemplates that the determination of appropriate educational goals, as well
as the method of best achieving those goals, are matters which are to be established in the
first instance by the states." ( Battle v. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania, 629 F2d 269,
278, supra.) Accordingly, deference should be given to the method employed by the State
in attempting to reach their goals.
( Battle v. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania, supra; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School Dist., 47 NY2d 440, supra.) The Commissioner's interpretation of the Education
Law is certainly entitled to great weight. ( Matter o f Eisenstadt v. Ambach, 79 AD2d
839.)

The EHA does not require specific results ( Battle v. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania,
supra) but rather the availability of a "free appropriate public education". The award o f a
diploma has not been shown to be a necessary part o f an "appropriate public education"
therefore denial of same on the basis of failure to meet BCT requirements does not
amount to a violation of the EHA.
The provision of educational services is one of the most [***19] important functions
performed by a State. ( Brown v. Board o f Educ., 347 U.S. 483.) "But importance of a
service performed by a State does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental for purposes of examination under the equal protection Clause." ( San
Antonio Schoo Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30.) Indeed, education is not a fundamental
right 17 invoking the application [**571] of the "strict scrutiny" test. ( San Antonio
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School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra; Matter o f Levy, 38 NY2d 653; Bukovsan v. Board o f
Educ., 61 AD2d 685.)

17 The propositions contained in the discussion of equal protection herein are applicable
to both the Federal guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York guarantee
enunciated in section 11 of article I of the New York Constitution.
The status of the individual petitioners as handicapped does not place them in a suspect
classification. (Matter o f [*839] Levy, supra.) The Court of Appeals, in Matter o f Levy
(supra, p 658) succinctly [***20] addressed the equal protection questions presented
herein. "At the threshold of consideration of any equal protection claim is the
determination of the applicable standard of review. Handicapped children as such do not
constitute a 'suspect classification' (cf. Matter o f Lalli, 38 NY2d 77 [illegitimate
children]; Matter o f Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568 [illegitimate children]; contrast
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 [race]; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 [national origin];
Matter o f Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 [alienage]). Nor is the right to education such a
'fundamental constitutional right' as to be entitled to special constitutional protection (
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,6). Accordingly, the appropriate
standard is not the so-called strict scrutiny test or anything approaching it, but rather the
traditional rational basis test. ( Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 59; cf. Matter o f
Jesmer v. Dundon, 29 NY2d 5, app dsmd 404 U.S. 953.)" (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners contend that a "middle tier" analysis as enunciated by the Court of
Appeals in A levy v. Downstate Med. Center o f State ofN. Y. (39 NY2d 326), 18 [***21]
is applicable. In sum the "middle tier" test requires a showing of a substantial relationship
to an important governmental interest. (See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190; Alevy v.
Downstate
Med. Center o f State o f N. Y., supra.)

18 A levy proposed the "middle tier" test in respect to allegations of "reverse
discrimination".
The court does not agree that the "middle tier" test is applicable. The Appellate Division
of this Department, in Lombardi v. Nyquist (63 AD2d 1058, 1059, lv. to app den 45
NY2d 710), decided more than two years subsequent to Alevy, reaffirmed the decision in
Matter o f Levy by holding that "[the] appropriate standard to be applied in reviewing the
application of such legislation [article 89 of Education Law] is 'not the so-called strict
scrutiny test or anything approaching it, but rather the traditional rational basis test'".
The respondents have set forth a number of reasons underlying the development of the
BCTs and their use as [*840] a standard for the award [***22] of a diploma; the
improvement of educational services by the detection of areas of deficiency, remediation,
protection of the value of high school diplomas. Fully recognizing the policy of
noninterference with State educational decisions ( San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1,43, supra; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 NY2d 440,
445, supra; Lombardi v. Nyquist, supra, p 1059) it has not been shown that the
implementation of a BCT program and the applicability of that program to the individual
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petitioners falls short of having a rational basis and thus violates the equal protection
clause.
We now turn to the issue of due process. On this point the court finds that the respondents
have fallen short of the necessary constitutional requirements. As discussed more fully
above, "[it] is true that courts will ordinarily defer to the broad discretion vested in public
school officials and will rarely review an educational institution's evaluation o f academic
performance of its students
Notwithstanding [**572] this customary 'hands-off policy, judicial intervention in school
affairs regularly occurs when a state educational institution acts [***23] to deprive an
individual of a significant interest in either liberty or property. It is well established that
when such a deprivation occurs the procedural safeguards embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment are called into play, and courts will not hesitate to require that the affected
individual be accorded such protection." (Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F2d 5,7; see, also,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574; James v. Board o f Educ., 42 NY2d 357, supra.)
The first question which must be addressed is whether the individual petitioners have a
property or liberty interest in the receipt of a high school diploma which falls within the
ambit of the due process protection? Property interests are not stagnant and fixed
concepts but rather "they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law —rules or
understandings" (Board o f Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577). It is clear that absent the
BCT requirements in Part 103 of the Commissioner's Regulations there would be no
[*841] question before this court in respect to the diplomas issued to Abby and Richard.
Indeed those diplomas [***24] would be issued in the manner in which the Board has
reviewed and issued them presently.
The court believes that Abby and Richard had a legitimate expectation o f the receipt of a
diploma therefore the diploma represents a property interest for the purposes of the due
process protection. ( Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F Supp 244; Matter o f Goldwyn v.
Allen, 54 Misc 2d 94.) The petitioners have produced testimony tending to indicate that
the denial of a diploma will have grave consequence in respect to the future life chances
of the individual petitioners, while those factors come into the balance in determining
what standards the respondents must meet the gravity of the deprivation is irrelevant in
deciding that the due process clause applies. ( Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, supra.)
Further "[the] due process clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty" ( Goss v.
Lopez, supra, p 574). By stigmatizing an individual or imposing an obstacle which
forecloses his freedom in pursuing employment opportunities the State deprives a person
of a liberty interest. ( Board o f Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, supra; Greenhill v. Bailey,
519 F2d 5, supra.) [***25]
The testimony at trial tends to indicate that the denial of a diploma would have an adverse
effect upon the future employment opportunities of the individual petitioners.
More importantly the court finds that such denial may stigmatize the individual
petitioners. Judge Carr in Debra P. v. Turlington (474 F Supp 244,258) presents a cogent
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argument addressing this point. "Before discussing the validity issues, the Court must
refer to a matter which is at the crux of the controversy between the litigants. The test as
legislatively created was to be one of functional literacy. Functional literacy has not been
defined in a way which is acceptable to either all educational academicians or the public.
The testimony, in fact, indicates that there are at least eleven known definitions of
functional literacy. What is functional literacy to one person may not be functional
literacy to another person, but it is clear that the term 'functional illiterate' has a [*842]
universally negative inference and connotation. While ' illiteracy ' is itself a negative and
impact ladened word, 'functional illiteracy' further compounds these implications by
focusing on the individual's [***26] inability to operate effectively in society. * * * As
one of the Plaintiffs' experts commented, students who fail the functional literacy test
perceive of themselves as 'global failures'. Another of the Plaintiffs' experts testified that
the biggest flaw in the Florida program was its name alone.
The Court [**573] is in complete agreement. Beyond the economic and academic
implications of failure on the test, the stigma associated with the term functional illiteracy
is the most substantial harm presented." While Debra P. dealt with functional literacy
tests in respect to black students the above discussion is relevant to the case at bar. Will
Abby and Richard be labeled as incompetent because of their failure to pass basic
competency tests and thus considered unable to function in society?
Chancellor Theodore Black in a letter dated August 16,1979 stated, "To grant
handicapped students a certificate (an inferior academic award) based on attendance or
any other academic standard is to brand a group of students as second-rate and incapable
of running the race reserved for other students. Furthermore, such a certificate or any
other substitute diploma, does not provide [***27] the recipient with the same
opportunities for gaining employment or college entrance which accompanies a
diploma." In fact a certificate is exactly what the Board of Regents proposes to grant to
Abby and Richard. (8 NYCRR 103.5.) Denial of a diploma is a deprivation of liberty,
thus the protections afforded by the due process clause are invoked.
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due." ( Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481.) due process is apractical and flexible
concept. ( Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, supra; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra.) [HN8] In
determining the applicable requirements the court balances the private interests o f the
petitioners, the risk of an improper deprivation of such interest and the governmental
interest involved. ( Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319.)
[*843] Petitioners request that the court find the BCTs as applied to handicapped students
invalid thus violative of the due process clause, in that it does not accurately measure
"Basic Competency" in respect to handicapped students. While questions o f validity are
raised by the record (no clear definition of "Basic Competency"; testimony by Winsor
[***28] Lott, Chief of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Testing Programs, that
the handicapped student population was not taken into account in development and
construction of the exam; applicability of the American Psychological Association,
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and compliance therewith), the court
in deference to the broad discretionary powers constitutionally and statutorily granted to
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the Board of Regents and the Commissioner as discussed more fully above, and more
importantly due to the rule of judicial restraint does not determine this case on the basis
of whether the BCTs are valid in respect to handicapped children. The court finds that the
respondents failed to provide timely notice of the diploma sanction contained in Part 103
of the Commissioner's Regulations (8 NYCRR Part 103).
The record reflects that Abby and Richard attended public schools for 12 and 15 years
respectively. It is apparent that their programs of instruction were not developed to meet
a goal of completing a BCT in order to receive a diploma but rather were developed to
address individual educational needs. Indeed, since the requirement of BCTs was first
noticed to the administrators [***29] of their schools in April of 1976 there was no way
the developers of their educational programs could have considered the ultimate
requirement of passing a BCT and built that goal into their educational programs.
The school district was notified in April, 1976 that the Board of Regents passed a BCT
requirement effective June, 1979 as a precondition to the award of a diploma. There
appears to have been continuous discussion within the Education Department as to the
applicability of the BCT requirement to handicapped students and confusion on the part
of the school administration as to such applicability. [*844] In April, 1979 Information
Bulletin No. 9, which addressed the BCT in respect [**574] to handicapped students,
clarified that handicapped students must satisfy the requirements of 8 NYCRR 103.2 to
be awarded a diploma. The bulletin further elaborated upon alternative testing procedures
for certain handicapped students, none of which are applicable to the individual
petitioners. The petitioners ostensibly contend that the various reconsiderations and
review mechanisms employed set the date that the court should consider as the point of
notice on April, 1979 a few [***30] short months prior to the June, 1979 graduation date.
The court while recognizing that the procedures followed did not provide for the clearest
and most articulate notice considers April, 1976 as the point o f notice to the Board. It
does not appear that any notice was provided to the individual petitioners or their parents.
Article 89 of the Education Law clearly favors a policy of providing notice to the parents
of handicapped students of matters which effect their children's education. (See
Education Law, § 4402, subd 1, par b, cl [3], subdcl [c].) The court however does not find
the lack of individual notice to the parents dispositive of this point.
The court finds that based on the factual circumstances presented the notice provided was
not timely. The denial of a diploma could stigmatize the individual petitioners and may
have severe consequences on their future employability and ultimate success in life.
Accordingly, early notice should have been provided in order to afford them every
opportunity to pass the BCTs. Doctor Madus, an eminently qualified expert in the area of
competency testing, testified that in light of the importance attached to these tests early
[***31] notice was essential. In response to an inquiry by the court he stated that, "I
would like to have seen the students know about that in the middle —sometime in the
middle of their elementary school; fourth or fifth grade". In reviewing the time frame
requirement for notice it must be emphasized that while these students participated in a
program of instruction in the same basic subjects taught to all students die methods and
goals utilized were directed to their individual needs therefore the time frame for notice
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to [*845] them is much more crucial than that for nonhandicapped students in
conventional programs.
Robert R. Spillane, Deputy Commissioner of Education, in a memorandum dated August,
1978 states: "1. Early Identification, One of the most important features of the new
Regents competency testing program is the early identification o f students who need
special help in developing their skills in reading, writing, and mathematics. This
identification process must begin at the first point o f contact between student and school
and must continue throughout the student's years in school.
The process should make use of both formal and informal assessment [***32] techniques
and should lead to a meaningful and effective program of special help." (Emphasis
added.) The necessity of early notice is further emphasized by the following direction
contained in Information Bulletin No. 29 dated February, 1980. "The purpose of this
bulletin is to inform districts that all children identified as handicapped by Committees on
the Handicapped and who exhibit academic competency, must have available to them
every educational opportunity to attain a high school diploma. These opportunities
include: the handicapped pupil's fu ll participation in the school-wide administration o f
the Pupil Evaluation Program (PEP) tests in grades 3 and 6, as well as the preliminary
competency tests in grades 8 or 9, appropriate remedial instruction as indicated by the
test results, and access to the required curriculum sequence of course work necessary to
attain a high school diploma. These opportunities must be made available to all identified
handicapped children in any school placement including those conducted by the Boards
of Cooperative Educational Services." (Emphasis added.)
Early notice would allow for proper consideration o f whether the goals of the students
[***33] IEP should include preparation for [**575] the BCT and would afford an
appropriate time for instruction aimed at reaching that goal. The period of notice
provided, in essence less than two school years, was inadequate. The court is not
compelled nor is it deemed provident at this juncture to set a specific time period which
would be adequate. [*846] Accordingly, the enforcement of the order issued by
respondent Blaney dated August 8,1979 is permanently enjoined. Further the court finds
that the diploma requirement contained in 8 NYCRR 103.2 (b) is improper as to the
individual petitioners Abby and Richard.
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DEBRA P., a minor by Irene P., her mother and next friend
et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Ralph D.
TURLINGTON, individually and as Commissioner of
Education et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
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644 F.2d 397; 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13618
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PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant commissioner of education sought review o f a
judgment from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which
found that Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.246(l)(b) (1980), as applied, violated the equal
protection clause of the U.S. Const, amend. V. Appellee black students cross-appealed,
claiming that the district court erred in limiting the injunction to four years, and in
upholding the validity of the test.
OVERVIEW: The state, concerned about the quality of its public education, enacted
statutory provisions that required the passing of an examination before receiving a high
school diploma. The failing group included a disparate number of black students.
Appellee black students filed an action challenging the constitutionality of the Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 232.246 (1980), and related statutes. The district court found that Fla. Stat. Ann. §
232.246(1 )(b) (1980), as applied in the case, violated U.S. Const, amend. XTV. Appellant
commissioner of education contended that the district court erred in finding that the test
violated due process because there was adequate notice and property rights were not
involved. Appellees cross-appealed on the basis that the test was valid and the injunction
was limited to four years. On review, the court held that neither it nor the district court
was in a position to determine a state's educational policy, but that a state could not
constitutionally deprive appellees of diplomas unless it submitted proof of the curricular
validity of the test. The judgment from district court was affirmed in part and vacated in
part and remanded for further findings of fact.
OUTCOME: The judgment from the district court, which held that the test as applied in
the present context was in violation of due process, was affirmed in part and vacated in
part and remanded for further findings of fact. The court held that a state could not
constitutionally deprive appellees of diplomas unless the curricular validity of the test had
been established, and the racially discriminatory impact was not due to educational
deprivation.
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functional, literacy, black students, school system, state board, public schools, school
students, testing, dual, attendance, classrooms, exam, basic skills, high school diploma,
testing program, white students, task force, judicial notice, state constitution,
administered, remediation, construct, deprive, teacher
COUNSEL: W. Crosby Few, Tampa, Fla., James D. Little, Gen. Counsel, Judith A.
Brechner, Deputy General Counsel, State Board of Education, Tallahassee, Fla., for
defendants-appellants cross-appellees.
Irving Gomstein, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae, U. S. A.
Stephen F. Hanlon, Robert J. Shapiro, Bay Area Legal Services, Inc., Tampa, Fla., Diana
Pullin, Cambridge, Mass., Roger L. Rice, Richard Jefferson, Center for Law and Ed.,
Peter M. Siegel, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.
David Rubin, Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae.
JUDGES: Before FAY and VANCE, Circuit Judges and ALLGOOD *, District Judge.
* District Judge of the Northern District of Alabama sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: FAY
OPINION
[*400] The State of Florida, concerned about the quality of its public educational system,
enacted statutory provisions leading to the giving of a competency examination covering
certain basic skills. Many students passed the examination but a significant number
failed. The failing group included a disparate number of blacks (Equal Protection:
Discrimination). This class [**2] action, brought on their behalf, challenges the right of
the state to impose the passing of the examination as a condition precedent to the receipt
of a high school diploma. The overriding legal issue of this appeal is whether the State of
Florida can constitutionally deprive public school students of their high school diplomas
on the basis of an examination which may cover matters not taught through the
curriculum CURRICULAR VALIDITY. We hold that the State may not constitutionally
so deprive its students unless it has submitted proof of the curricular validity of the test.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further findings
of fact. CURRICULAR VALIDITY. STUDENT PREVAILED
I.
In 1976, the Florida Legislature enacted the Educational Accountability Act of 1976.
Laws of Florida 1976, Vol. 1, Ch. 76-223, pp. 489-508. The intent of the legislature was
to provide a system of accountability for education in the state and to ensure that each
student was afforded similar educational opportunity regardless of geographic location.
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 229.55(2)(a) (West 1977). The legislature established three standards for
graduation from Florida public schools. First, the students were required to complete
[**3] a minimum number of credits for graduation. Second, they were required to master
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certain basic skills. Third, they were required to perform satisfactorily in functional
literacy as determined by the State Board of Education. 1 [*401] Each school district was
directed to develop procedures for remediation, and a statewide testing program was
outlined. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 229.57 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980). In 1978, the Act was
amended to require passage of a functional literacy examination prior to receipt of a state
high school diploma.
1 The requirements are set out in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 232.246 (West Supp. 1980) to
which we will frequently refer:
232.246 General requirements for high school graduation
(1) Beginning with the 1978-1979 school year, each district school board shall
establish standards for graduation from its schools which shall include as a
minimum:
(a) Mastery of the minimum performance standards in reading, writing, and
mathematics for the 11th grade, established pursuant to §§. 229.565 and 229.57,
determined in the manner prescribed after a public hearing and consideration by the
state board;
(b) Demonstrated ability to successfully apply basic skills to everyday life
situations as measured by a functional literacy examination developed and
administered in a manner prescribed after a public hearing and consideration by the
state board; and
(c) Completion o f a minimum number of academic credits, and all other applicable
requirements prescribed by the district school board pursuant to §. 232.245.
(2) The standards required in subsection (1), and any subsequent modifications
thereto, shall be printed in the Florida Administrative Code even though said
standards are not defined as rules.
(3) The state board shall, after a public hearing and consideration, make provision
for appropriate modification of testing instruments and procedures for students
with identified handicaps or disabilities in order to ensure that the results of the
testing represent the student's achievement, rather than reflecting the student's
impaired sensory, manual, speaking, or psychological process skills, except when
such skills are the factors the test purports to measure.
(4) A student who meets all requirements prescribed in subsection (1) shall be
awarded a standard diploma in a form prescribed by the state board; provided that a
school board may, in lieu o f the standard diploma, award differentiated diplomas to
those exceeding the prescribed minimums. A student who completes the minimum
number of credits and other requirements prescribed by paragraph (l)(c), but who
is unable to meet the standards of paragraph (l)(a) or paragraph (l)(b), shall be
awarded a certificate of completion in a form prescribed by the state board.
However, any student who is otherwise entitled to a certificate of completion may,
in the alternative, elect to remain in the secondary school on either a full-time or a
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part-time basis for up to 1 additional year and receive special instruction designed
to remedy his identified deficiencies. This special instruction shall be funded from
the district's state compensatory education ftmds.
(5) The public hearing and consideration required in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
subsection (1) and in subsection (3) shall not be construed to amend or nullify the
requirements of security relating to the contents of examinations or assessment
instruments and related materials or data as prescribed in §. 232.248.
[**4] At the time of the trial of this lawsuit, the examination, the SSAT El, had been
administered three times. The failure statistics showed a greater impact on black students
than on white students. In the Fall, 1977 administration, 78% of the black students taking
the exam failed one or more sections of the test as compared with 25% of the white
students. Of the 4,480 black students taking the test for the second time in Fall, 1978,
74% failed one or both sections. Twenty-five percent of the whites retaking the test
failed. On the mathematics section alone, 46% of the blacks retaking the test failed. The
results of the third administration in Spring, 1978, which were released during trial,
indicated that 60% of the blacks taking the mathematics exam for the third time failed as
compared with 36% of the whites. In May, 1979, of the approximately 91,000 high
school seniors in Florida public schools, 3,466, or 20.049% of the black students had not
passed the test as compared with 1,342, or 1.9% of the white students.2
2 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 248-249 (M.D.Fla.1979).
[**5] Plaintiffs-appellees, Florida high school students, filed this class action in the
United States District Court for the Middle District o f Florida, challenging the
constitutionality of the Florida State Student Assessment Test, Part II (SSAT II) under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also
challenged the test under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976) and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976). Plaintiffs
were certified in three classes:
Class A all present and future twelfth grade public school students in the
State of Florida who have failed or hereafter fail the SSAT II
Class B all present and future twelfth grade black public school students in
the State of Florida who have failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT II
Class C all present and future twelfth grade black public school students in
Hillsborough County, Florida, who have failed or hereafter fail the SSAT II
Class A, B, and C claimed that appellants 3 designed and implemented a testing [*402]
program which is racially biased and violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[**6] These three classes also claimed that appellants violated the Fourteenth
Amendment in instituting a program denying diplomas without sufficient notice or time
to prepare for the exam.
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3 Named defendants-appellants are: Commissioner of Education Ralph D.
Turlington; the Florida State Board of Education: Governor Bob Graham,
Secretary of State George Firestone, Attorney General Jim Smith, Comptroller
General Gerald A. Lewis, Treasurer William Gunter, Commissioner o f Agriculture
Doyle Conner; the Florida Department of Education (DOE); the School Board of
Hillsborough County, Florida: Roland H. Lewis, Cecile W. Essrig, Carl Carpenter,
Jr., Ben H. Hill, Jr., A. Leon Lowrey; and Superintendent of Schools of
Hillsborough County, Raymond O. Shelton. Defendants were sued in their
individual as well as official positions.
Classes B and C, the black students, claimed that the SSAT II is a device for
resegregating the Florida public schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d, and 20 U.S.C. [**7] § 1703 because those failing the test are placed in
remedial classes which tend to contain more blacks than whites. Plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief.
The District Court, Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D.Fla.1979) found that
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 232.246(l)(b)4 as applied in the present context, violated the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act as to plaintiffs in classes B and C. It
held that section 232.246(1 )(b) (West Supp. 1981) violated the due process clause of the
United States Constitution as to plaintiffs in classes A, B, and C. Defendants-appellants
were enjoined from the use of the test as a requirement for receipt of diplomas until the
1982-1983 school year. The court found that the use of the examination for remediation
violated neither the Constitution nor statutes.
4 See note 1 supra.
On appeal, the appellants contend that the court erred in finding [**8] that the use of the
test violates due process because there was adequate notice and no property right was
involved. They contend that the graduation requirement is not a punishment, does not
deprive students of a "liberty" interest and does not violate the equal protection clause.
Appellants contend that the court erred in finding 20 U.S.C. § 1701 and 42 U.S.C. §
2000d to be applicable. In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs-appellees contend that the district
court erred in limiting the period of the injunction to four years and in upholding the
validity of the examination.
We find, based upon stipulated facts, that because the state had not made any effort to
make certain whether the test covered material actually studied in the classrooms of the
state and because the record is insufficient in proof on that issue, the case must be
remanded for further findings. If the test covers material not taught the students, it is
unfair and violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution.
II.
At the outset, we wish to stress that neither the district court nor we are in a position to
determine educational policy in the State of Florida. The state [**9] has determined that
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minimum standards must be met and that the quality of education must be improved. We
have nothing but praise for these efforts.5 The state's plenary powers over education
come from the powers reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment, and usually
they are defined in the state constitution.6 As long as it [*403] does so in a manner
consistent with the mandates of the United States Constitution, a state may determine the
length, manner, and content of any education it provides.
5 As of March, 1978, 33 states had taken some type o f action to mandate minimum
competency standards, and movements were under way in three more. See C.
Pipho, Minimum Competency Testing in 1978: A Look at State Standards, 59 Phi
Delta Kappan 585 (1978); M. S. McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal
and Educational Issues, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 651 (1959).
6 Florida's original grant of educational authority appeared in the Constitution of
1868, Art. W I, § 2. The section stated that the "legislature shall provide a uniform
system of common schools, and a university," and further provided that they would
be free. Present authorization is found in the Florida Constitution of 1968, Art. IX,
§§ 1- 5[**10] The United States courts have interfered with state educational directives only
when necessary to protect freedoms and privileges guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. In 1899, for example, in the case of Cumming v. Board of Education, 175
U.S. 528,20 S. Ct. 197,44 L. Ed. 262, the Court upheld the decision of a local board to
close a black school while keeping a white school open. Finding that the decision was
based on economic reasons, the Court said:
(T)he education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part of
Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of the rights secured
by the supreme law of the land.
175 U.S. at 545, 20 S. Ct. at 201,44 L. Ed. at 266. While the outcome of the Cumming
case might be questioned in this post Brown era, it must be remembered that it was not
until just before the First World War that compulsory school attendance laws were in
force in all states.7 Public education was virtually unknown at the time o f the adoption of
the Constitution. In 1647 [**11] Colonial Massachusetts directed its towns to establish
schools, and in 1749, Franklin proposed the Philadelphia academy. Until after the turn of
the century, education was primarily private and usually sectarian. Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 645-47, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2127-28, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 774-75 (1976). Once
part of the government, however, education became a significant governmental
responsibility. As the Court noted in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,493, 74
S. Ct. 686, 691, 98 L. Ed. 873, 880 (1954):
7 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 n.4, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691, n.4,
98 L. Ed. 873, 878 n.4 (1954).
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Today, education is perhaps the most important function of State and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society.
Stating that the provision of education ranks at the apex of the functions of a state, the
Court in Wisconsin [**12] v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1971) was required to balance the state's need for its citizens to be educated against the
citizens' hallowed right to free exercise of religion. "There is no doubt," the Court said,
"as to the power of a state, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education." 406 U.S.
at 213, 92 S. Ct. at 1532, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 24.
Though the state has plenary power, it cannot exercise that power without reason and
without regard to the United States Constitution. Although the Court has never labeled
education as a "fundamental right" automatically triggering strict scrutiny of state actions,
see San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16
(1972), it is clear that if the state does provide an educational system, it must do so in a
non-discriminatory fashion. "Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a
student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which may be
protected by the due process Clause..." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574, 95 S. Ct. 729,
736,42 L. [**13] Ed. 2d 725, 734 (1975).
III.
It is in the light of the foregoing discussion o f the relationship between the state and
federal governments that we must analyze the plaintiffs' claims that SSAT II violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is clear that in
establishing a system of free public education and in [*404] making school attendance
mandatory,8 the state has created an expectation in the students. From the students' point
of view, the expectation is that if a student attends school during those required years,
and indeed more, and if he takes and passes the required courses, he will receive a
diploma. This is a property interest as that term is used constitutionally. (Establishment of
Property Interest). See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738,42 L. Ed. 2d
725,737 (1975). Although the state of Florida constitutionally may not be obligated to
establish and maintain a school system, it has done so, required attendance and created a
mutual expectation that the student who is successful will graduate with a diploma. This
expectation can be viewed as a state-created "understanding" that secures certain benefits
and that supports claims of entitlement [**14] to those benefits. Board o f Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701,2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). As the trial court
noted, "graduation is the logical extension of successful attendance." 474 F. Supp. at 266;
and as appellees note in brief, before SSAT II, a student completing the necessary
number of credits would graduate with a diploma. (Brief of Appellees at 52).
8 Fla.Stat.Ann. § 232.01 (West Supp.1981) mandates that children between the
ages of 6 and 16 attend school.
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Based upon this implied property right, we find that the trial court was correct in holding
that the implementation schedule for the test violated due process of law. In its finding,
the court quoted from the report of the state's own task force:
The problems created by the abrupt schedule for implementing the
Functional Literacy Test were most severe for the members of Florida high
school graduation class of 1979. At the eleventh hour and with virtually no
warning, these students were told that the requirements [**15] for graduation
had been changed. They were suddenly required to pass a test constructed
under the pressure of time and covering content that was presumed to be
elementary but that their schools may or may not have taught them recently,
well, or perhaps at all.
In retrospect, the Task Force believes that the schedule for implementing
statewide high school graduation standards was too severe. We feel that most
of the problems that are identified in later sections of this report are the result
of trying to do too much in too little time. Consequently, we believe that the
problems can and will be solved over time. Task Force on Educational
Assessment Programs, Competency Testing in Florida Report to the Florida
Cabinet (Part 1)4 (1979).
474 F. Supp. at 265.
The due process violation potentially goes deeper than deprivation of property rights
without adequate notice. When it encroaches upon concepts of justice lying at the basis of
our civil and political institutions, the state is obligated to avoid action which is arbitrary
and capricious, does not achieve or even frustrates a legitimate state interest, or is
fundamentally unfair. See St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d [**16] 423, 425 n.5 (5th Cir. 1974).
9 We believe that the state administered a test that was, at least on the record before us,
fundamentally unfair in that it may have covered matters not taught in the schools of the
state. (DUE PROCESS: CURRICULAR VALIDITY)
9 In St. Ann, two students were indefinitely suspended because of their mother's
behavior. The court considered this punishment without personal guilt to be a
violation of a fundamental concept of liberty. Although the St. Ann case is
factually dissimilar to the one we here consider, it is clear that in neither case can
the state arbitrarily interfere. The case o f Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448
(5th Cir. 1976) is distinguishable in that in that case the plaintiff sought to require
the state to give her a college diploma despite her failure to take a comprehensive
examination. The court found that there was no denial of procedural or substantive
due process because plaintiff had refused the university's efforts to tailor a special
program to her needs. The expectations of college and high school students would
certainly be different.
[**17] Testimony at trial by experts for both plaintiffs and defendants indicated that
several types of studies were done before and after the administration of the test. [*405]
The experts agreed that of the several types of validity studies,10 a content validity study
would be most important for a competency examination such as SSAT II. The trial court
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apparently found that the test had adequate content validity, 474 F. Supp. at 261, but we
find that holding upon the record before us to be clearly erroneous. In the field of
competency testing, an important component of content validity is curricular validity,
defined by defendants' expert Dr. Foster, as "things that are currently taught." (Tr.2845)
11 This record is simply insufficient in proof that the test administered measures what was
actually taught in the schools of Florida.
10 Basic types of validity as defined by the American Psychological Association,
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests (1974) are as follows:
Criterion related validity measurements of how well the test items predict the
future performance of the test takers and how well the test results correlate with
other criteria which might provide the same type of information.
content validity measurements of how well a test measures a representative sample
of behaviors in the universe of situations the test is intended to represent.
construct validity how well the test measures the construct (defined as the
theoretical idea developed to explain and organize some aspects of existing
knowledge) for which it was designed.
For an excellent discussion of the APA Standards as they relate to competency
testing, see M.S. McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational
Issues, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 651, 683 (1979).
[** 18]

11 There is evidence in the record that care was taken in constructing a test which
would match the objectives of the schools. The trial court's discussion of the
development 474 F. Supp. at 257-259, indicates that the test was probably a good
test of what the students should know but not necessarily of what they had an
opportunity to learn.
During the course of pre-trial litigation, defendant-appellants stipulated as follows:
No effort was made by the Florida Department of Education to ascertain
whether or not all the minimum student performance standards were in fact
being taught in Florida public schools. (Stipulation 114)
The Florida Department of Education did not conduct any formal studies
which showed whether or not the skills measured on the test were in fact
taught in the public schools in the State of Florida. (Stipulation 117)
On oral argument before this Court, counsel for the appellants stated that the stipulations
meant only that the state did no formal studies of the correspondence between what was
tested and what was taught. She assured this Court that [**19] the state could prove that
the test covered things actually taught in the classrooms. That may be the case, but this
record does not establish such proof.
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Dr. Thomas H. Fisher, Administrator of the Student Assessment Section, Department of
Education, testified that the DOE merely assumed that things were being taught.
(Tr.2844) Dr. John E. Hills, professor of Educational Research at Florida State
University, testified that the test reliably and validly assessed applications of basic
communications and math skills to everyday situations (Tr.2945), but he agreed that
everything on the test might not have been taught. 12 Appellants placed into evidence
[*406] some math books and communications teaching materials, but at least one teacher,
Mr. Crihfield, testified that he did not cover the whole book in class. (Tr.3055).
12 A portion of Dr. Hill's testimony appears below:
Q You're saying then that an item which might include an element that had not
been taught in school might cause some problems in this regard?
A Well, an item which is not part of the objectives of what we're trying to teach in
school. I don't think you can probably comfortably say that every single thing that a
person might have to do on a practical application problem has to be specifically
taught. I would feel uncomfortable with that, because I don't think schools can
teach every single thing.
But the objective may be. They can apply the problem, the techniques to a tin roof.
Did we teach about tin roofs in school? Well, I don't know that we do.
But you sort of assume that that's available to most people.
Q We have no way of knowing though whether something that is included in an
objective is in fact included in all of the classrooms in the State of Florida. We
have already had that testimony from Dr. Fisher. So it would be possible that a test
item might impact more severely on a particular minority group because those
children simply did not have as part of their educational experience attention to that
particular matter?
A Well, if they have not been taught the basics that it seems are part of the schools'
essential material, then I'd say you're right. You know, there's let's turn now to
construct validity.
[**20] We acknowledge that in composing items for a test, the writer is dealing with
applications of knowledge, and therefore the form of the test question would not
necessarily be the same as the form of the information taught in class. We think,
however, that fundamental fairness requires that the state be put to test on the issue of
whether the students were tested on material they were or were not taught.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
We note that in requiring the state to prove on remand that the material was covered in
class, we are not substituting our judgment for that of the state legislature on a matter of
state policy. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731, 83 S. Ct. 1028, 1031, 10 L. Ed.
2d 93,98 (1963); Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.
Ct. 1554,1560, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39 (1978). We do not question the right of the state to
condition the receipt of a diploma upon the passing of a test so long as it is a fair test of
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that which was taught. Nor do we seek to dictate what subjects are to be taught or in what
manner. We do not share appellants' fear that our decision would prevent new items from
being added to the curriculum. Those decisions would properly be left [**21] with the
school authorities. As the United States Supreme Court said in San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,43, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1302, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16,49 (1972):
The ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not
likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly
debate the issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to
refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that
could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to
keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.
Just as a teacher in a particular class gives the final exam on what he or she has taught, so
should the state give its final exam on what has been taught in its classrooms.
It follows that if the test is found to be invalid for the reason that it tests matters outside
the curriculum, its continued use would violate the equal protection Clause. In analyzing
the constitutionality of the examination under the equal protection Clause, the trial court
stated, "(i)f the test by dividing students into two categories, [**22] passers and failers,
did so without a rational relation to the purpose for which it was designed, then the Court
would be compelled to find the test unconstitutional." 474 F. Supp. at 260. Analyzing the
test from the viewpoint of its objectives, the court found that it does have adequate
construct validity, that is, it does test functional literacy as defined by the Board. 13 We
accept this finding and affirm that part of the trial court's opinion holding that having a
functional literacy examination bears a rational relation to a valid state interest. That
finding is, however, subject to a further finding on remand that the test is a fair test o f that
which was taught. If the test is not fair, it cannot be said to be rationally related to a state
interest. REMAND FOR FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TEST
13 Functional literacy is defined as "the ability to apply basic skills in reading,
writing, and arithmetic to problems and tasks of a practical nature as encountered
in everyday life." Exhibit CT 26 at 23 (Task Force Report).
We affirm the trial [**23] court's finding that the test items were not biased and that the
test does not violate due process or equal protection by the fact that it is given only in
public schools. As the court pointed out, the state need not correct all the problems of
education in one fell swoop and it [*407] has a stronger interest in those for which it pays
the cost. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,77, 99 S. Ct. 1589,1595 n.8, 60 L. Ed. 2d
49, 57 (1979). At present, the State of Florida exercises very limited control over private
schools. 14 EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
14 See Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 232.021, 229.821 (West 1977).
TV.
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In considering appellees' equal protection claim, the trial court was required to consider
the impact of the legislative action upon the community, the historical background, and
the sequence of events leading up to the legislative action. Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-268, 97 S. Ct. 555, 56365, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450,4d6566 (1977). The trial judge found that until [**24] 1967, Florida
operated a dual school system intentionally segregating on the basis of race. The court
found that the period from 1967 to 1971, segregation persisted and predominantly black
schools remained inferior in physical facilities, course offerings, instructional materials,
and equipment. 15 Appellant Turlington admitted that in part the failures of the black
students taking the SSAT II could be attributed to the unequal education they received
during the "dual schools" period. The record clearly indicates that appellants were aware
of the possibility that more blacks than whites would fail the test.
15 In making this finding, the trial court relied on "vast amounts of evidence" and
upon judicial notice as well as expert testimony. The plaintiffs had originally asked
the court to take judicial notice that as a result of attending segregated schools prior
to the implementation of unitary school systems, many of the members of Classes
B and C received an education inferior to that received by white students during the
period. Based upon Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,495, 74 S. Ct.
686, 692, 98 L. Ed. 873, 881 (1954) and upon Mannings v. Board of Public
Instruction of Hillsborough County, Florida, 427 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1970), the trial
court took judicial notice that the education received by the blacks was unequal. Tr.
36; 474 F. Supp. at 251, n.13.
[**25] Finding insufficient evidence to support a holding that there was present intent to
discriminate as defined by the Court in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979) (that the law was enacted in spite of or because
of the foreseen racial impact), the trial court held that the past purposeful discrimination
affecting appellees in classes B and C is perpetuated by the test and diploma sanction. In
attempting to justify the use of an examination having such a disproportionate impact
upon one race, the appellants failed to demonstrate either that the disproportionate failure
of blacks was not due to the present effects of past intentional segregation or, that as
presently used, the diploma sanction was necessary to remedy those effects. See McNeal
v. Tate County School District, 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975). The trial judge was,
therefore, correct in holding that the immediate use of the diploma sanction would punish
black students for deficiencies created by the dual school system. 16 STUDENT
PREVAILED
16 The trial court took judicial notice that many of the students in classes B and C
attended segregated schools prior to the implementation of the unitary school
system. As stated by the trial court, the remedy was as follows:
In light of the evidence relating to the necessary period of time to orient the
students and teachers to the new functional literacy objectives, to insure instruction
in the objectives, and to eliminate the taint on educational development which
accompanied segregation, the Court is of the opinion that the state should be
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enjoined from requiring passage of the SSAT II as a requirement for graduation for
a period of four (4) years.
474 F. Supp. at 269.
[**26] With respect to the question whether administration of the test violates Title VI,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), 7 counsel for the United States conceded on oral argument
before this court that if the test was found to be a fair test of what was taught in the
schools, its use as a graduation [*408] requirement would not violate Title VI. 18 We
agree with this conclusion CURRICULAR VALIDITY REMAND FOR FURTHER
PROOF OF CURRICULAR VALIDITY
17 Appellees argue that further studies of the "differential validity" o f the test
should be done to determine whether the SSAT II tests blacks as blacks. We
decline to disturb the trial court's finding that the test was valid in this respect. See
474 F. Supp. at 261 n.23.
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000d:
§ 2000d. Prohibition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of,
and discrimination under Federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or
national origin
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
[**27] Because the test perpetuates past discrimination as to classes B and C, the diploma
sanction violates the EEOA, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976) which requires an educational
agency to take affirmative steps to remove the "vestiges" of dual school systems. 19 We
affirm the holding that there is neither constitutional nor statutory violation in using the
results of SSAT II as a mechanism for remediation only. 474 F. Supp. at 268. STUDENT
PREVAILED
19 If, upon remand, the appellants demonstrate that the examination is a fair test of
that which is taught, we assume that the subject of the "vestiges" of the dual school
system will again be examined by the trial court. A clarification of the role and
effect of the "vestiges" of past discrimination upon appellees in classes B and C
would be necessary in order to fashion a remedy.
CONCLUSION
We recognize that the interests of the State of Florida in both the remediation and
diploma denial aspects of the basic competency program are substantial. The trial court
noted an impressively [**28] increasing passing rate for which Florida teachers and
students are to be commended. We hold, however, that the State may not deprive its high
school seniors of the economic and educational benefits of a high school diploma until it
has demonstrated that the SSAT II is a fair test of that which is taught in its classrooms
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and that the racially discriminatory impact is not due to the educational deprivation in the
"dual school" years.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANKS, et al., Defendants;
JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SIKES, et al., Defendants
Nos. CV478-138, CV479-323
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, SAVANNAH
DIVISION
520 F. Supp. 472; 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15463
June 17,1981
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs, a class of minority students who were or would
have been denied a high school diploma solely because of a high school's exit exam
policy, brought a due process and equal protection racial discrimination action to
challenge defendant school district's requirement that in order to receive a high school
diploma, each student was required to pass the California Achievement Test (CAT).
OVERVIEW: Plaintiffs claimed that the diploma policy violated the equal protection
and due process clauses. The court found that the diploma policy was reasonably related
to legitimate educational goals, but held that it should be evaluated in light of past de jure
segregation in the district, for students required to take the test had been educated under
the dual system. The court found that the test policy had a significant racial impact, that
minority students had been misplaced in classes despite their achievement and I.Q.
scores, and that the racial makeup of the classes was a potent predictor of success on the
test for minority students. The court held that the exit exam had a discriminatory impact
in violation of the equal protection Clause, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d et seq., and 20 U.S.C.S.
§ 1703(b), and that it could not be imposed until all minority students whose poor
performance was attributable to their participation in the dual system had graduated. The
court held that the due process clause was violated as well, because defendants failed to
show that the items tested were actually taught in the schools.
OUTCOME: The court ordered diplomas awarded to all students denied them by the
exit exam, ordered that no further diploma sanctions be imposed until graduation of the
first group who began their education after the abolition of the dual system, at which time
a continued benefits showing would be required. The court scheduled a hearing to
determine the particular procedures and timetable necessary to remedy the
misclassification of students.
CORE TERMS: score, diploma, grade, achievement, tracking, school districts,
educational, placement, mentally retarded, dual, math, discriminatory, segregation,
elementary, remedial, testing, school board, classified, measurement, teacher's, high
schools, notice, exit, school authorities, high school diploma, curriculum, grouping,
classroom, black children, taught
COUNSEL: [**1] Richard D. Phillips, Ludowici, Ga., for plaintiffs in No. CV478-138.
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J. Franklin Edenfield, Swainsboro, Ga., M. Francis Stubbs, Reidsville, Ga., for Ben F.
Sikes, in both cases.
B. Daniel Dubberly, Jr., Glennville, Ga., Charles Rippin Adams, Adams, Brennan &
Gardner, Savannah, Ga., for defendants in both cases.
David Arnold, Ga. Legal Services Programs, Central Office, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs in
No. CV479-323.
Spivey & Carlton, P. C., Swainsboro, Ga., for defendants in No. CV479-323.
OPINION BY: EDENFIELD
OPINION
[*476] ORDER
1. Background of the Cases, the Claims and Causes Involved
The impetus for this litigation was the institution by the Tattnall County School District
of an exit examination. Beginning with the graduating class of 1978, all diploma
candidates have been required, in addition to other already existing diploma
requirements, to achieve a grade equivalency score of 9.0 on both the mathematics and
reading sections of the California Achievement Test (CAT). Claims were initially raised
in an administrative proceeding which progressed from the local school board, to the
State Board of Education, and ultimately to the Georgia Court of Appeals. The issues
raised [**2] in that proceeding were: (1) whether the Tattnall County School Board had
the authority under state law to adopt an additional graduation requirement
AUTHORITY; and (2) whether a violation of the equal protection clause had occurred
since a greater burden was placed on the students of Tattnall County than on the students
in other Georgia counties EQUAL PROTECTION. The first suit in this Court
challenging the exit exam, styled as Wells v. Banks, CV478-138, was then filed asserting
due process and equal protection claims as well as the state law claims. An additional
claim concerning irregularities in the School Board voting districts was voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiffs before trial. While the case was pending here, the authority of
the School Board to require the examination was upheld in the Georgia courts
AUTHORITY. The Georgia courts also found no equal protection violation in the fact
that children in other counties were not subjected to the requirement equal protection .
There were no black plaintiffs remaining in the case in this Court at time of trial. The
case was restyled Anderson v. Banks. In addition, plaintiffs counsel adopted in his
proposed pretrial order the outline o f legal issues set forth by plaintiffs counsel [**3] in
Johnson v. Sikes, thus further narrowing the scope o f issues in this case to the due
process claim. Since Anderson v. Banks is a suit for damages, it was agreed among all
[*477] counsel and the Court that liability only would be tried presently and a separate
trial on the issue of damages would be held later if necessary.
2. The second action here consolidated for trial was filed in October, 1979, by Kathy
Norris Johnson. In October, 1979, she moved to proceed in forma pauperis and to
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consolidate her case with Wells v. Banks. The motions were granted. The Court certified
the following classes:
1. All black children who have attended, are attending, or will attend public
schools in Tattnall County, Georgia, and who have completed, will complete,
or are eligible to complete all valid and legal requirements for receipt of a
high school diploma established by Defendant Board of the Georgia State
Board of Education, but who did not or will not achieve a particular score on
the California Achievement Test, and who, as a result of having failed to
achieve a certain score on said test, have been or will be denied a high school
diploma by Defendants.
1.a. All black children [**4] who have attended, are attending, or will attend
public schools in Tattnall County, Georgia; and who have completed, or will
complete all requirements for receipt of a high school diploma established by
Defendant Board or the Georgia State Board of Education, other than
achieving a particular score on the California Achievement Test, and who,
solely as a result of having failed to achieve a certain score on said test, have
been or will be denied a high school diploma by Defendants.
2. All children who have attended, are attending, or will attend public
schools in Tattnall County, Georgia, who have been or will be classified by
the Tattnall County School District or Board as Educable Mentally Retarded,
and who have been or will be foreclosed from receiving a high school
diploma by Defendants because of said classification. EQUAL
PROTECTION
The issues in the Johnson case are as follows: (1) whether the exit exam violates the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether the diploma
requirement is violative of due process; (3) whether the policy violates Title VI; (4)
whether the policy violates 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1706; and (5) whether the policy of
excluding educably mentally [**5] retarded (EMR) students from the possibility of
obtaining a diploma violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. EQUAL
PROTECTION
The case was brought to trial on August 7,1980.
After a thorough analysis of the issues, the Court sent a copy of its proposed order to the
parties for comment. The Court then reworked the order in light of these very helpful
comments. The Court has been very cautious in this matter which is o f vital importance
to the educators of this state. The recent opinion in Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397
(M.D.Fla.1981), has caused the Court to reconsider major portions of its reasoning.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) over plaintiff's claims
asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

407

§ 794; and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., because
each constitutional or statutory provision provides for the protection of equal or civil
rights. Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 have noted the strong similarities
in statutory language and [**6J legislative history to civil rights legislation. See
University of Texas v. Camenisch, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), review granted, 449
U.S. 950,101 S. Ct. 352, 66 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1980), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 390, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 68 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1981). Jurisdiction over the
Equal Opportunities Act claim is also found under 20 U.S.C. § 1708. EQUAL
PROTECTION
Defendants have strenuously argued that the plaintiffs' case is basically a challenge to an
academic program and academic regulations, which, in the absence of a bad motive, are
not subject to judicial scrutiny. As support they cite Mahavongsanan v. [*478] Hall, 529
F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). Yet in Mahavongsanan the Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiff had
no action on the merits of the case. The Court did review plaintiffs arguments and
decided that no rights of the plaintiff had been violated. In underscoring the reluctance of
the courts to review purely academic decisions, the Fifth Circuit did not suggest that the
district court should have refused to hear the case at all because it concerned academic
matters. A substantive rule of law rather than a jurisdictional rule is announced there. In
addition, the [**7] diploma of a graduate student rather than a high school student was at
stake. Arguably, a high school diploma represents a very different interest, in light of
compulsory attendance laws and the realities of our society which would not be
applicable to a graduate degree.
In addition, a large portion of plaintiffs' claims here rest on allegations of racial
discrimination which, even in an academic setting, are clearly subject to judicial scrutiny.
See United States v. Gadsden County School System, 572 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1978).
Insofar as the claims allege that particular statutes giving rise to private litigation have
been violated the claims are clearly justiciable. Insofar as the due process claims are
concerned, in the absence of a protectible liberty or property interest, defendants'
argument may have some validity. In that case, plaintiffs fail on the merits. So while
agreeing with defendants that, in general, purely academic decisions are not within the
province of the judiciary, as a threshold consideration, discussion of this point adds little,
due process EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILS
III. Historical Background
A. Tattnall County
Evidence was submitted concerning the history of race relations in Tattnall County [**8]
and the sociological makeup of the area. The Court admitted evidence of this nature for
the purpose of the determination of whether discriminatory intent played a role in the
implementation of the exit exam policy and for the purpose of evaluating the Board's
prior efforts in desegregating the schools. However, the Court is also mindful that for the
most part the social and racial history of Tattnall County is a history shared with all o f the
South and standing alone sheds limited light on these recent events.
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Tattnall County is located in the coastal area of Georgia. In 1970, its population of 16,557
was 30.8% black. While the population of Tattnall County as a whole is poor with more
than 35% having incomes below the poverty line, the black population is poorer
according to the 1970 census. More than 64% of the blacks had incomes below the
poverty line. Median income for blacks lags behind that of whites. This state of affairs is
not peculiar to Tattnall County.
B. The School System
The Tattnall County Board of Education is an elected body which conducts the business
of the Tattnall County School District. The superintendent is Ben F. Sikes who is also
elected. Mr. Sikes was superintendent [**9] at the time the Tattnall County School
District abolished separate schools for whites and blacks in the 1970-1971 school year
and has held that post to the present.
The Tattnall County Board of Education operates two high schools, Reidsville High
School and Glennville High School. These schools are located in the towns whose names
they bear. Reidsville is also the location of Tattnall Elementary School which contains
classes from kindergarten through sixth grade. Two additional schools are located in
Glennville. These are Seckinger Primary School, housing grades kindergarten through
fourth grade, and Glennville Middle School which contains grades five through eight. A
third primary school is located in Collins, the Collins Junior High School, which, despite
its name, houses grades kindergarten through eight. The Tattnall County School District
also operates the Ben Sikes School which is a separate school for the trainable mentally
retarded students.
C. The History of Segregation in Tattnall County
Plaintiffs introduced evidence to illustrate that racial prejudice was pervasive in [*479]
Tattnall County prior to and at the time when the Tattnall County School District
abolished [**10] the dual system. For example, newspaper clippings did indicate a less
than substantial dedication to the equality of the races. However, such items are only
marginally helpful in assessing the conduct of the School Board in implementing the exit
exam policy fifteen years later. EQUAL PROTECTION
The emergence of Tattnall County into the era of integration was not an easy transition.
The schools were totally segregated until 1965 when the School Board agreed to
introduce a Freedom of Choice program. Four black students applied for admission to the
all-white high schools. These were Gail Strong, Roxie Ann Smiley, Johnny Harrison, and
Ronald Johnson. At the School Board meeting which took place on September 7,1965,
directly before the plan was to be implemented, the principals were asked to talk to their
students and explain "the situation they are facing, stressing the fact that there will be no
preferential treatment for any child." School Board Minutes, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 58.
One of these students, now Mrs. Gail Strong Small, testified that she believed that she
and her friend Roxie had been chosen to be the ones to integrate the all-white high
school. Mrs. Small had graduated from Collins Elementary [**11] in 1962, a black
school that was closed in 1970 when the dual system was abolished because it was
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substandard. Mrs. Small was attending Tattnall Industrial High, the all-black high school
at the time of her decision. However, she was induced to change her mind about changing
schools. She and her friend were informed at a meeting at Collins High School that
because their scholastic training had been so inferior, they would have to be put back a
year, or perhaps two, even though Mrs. Small was an honor student at Tattnall Industrial
High School. The students decided to remain in the black school.
Mrs. Small testified that during this period she was subjected to harassing phone calls and
that strangers shot at her house.
Miss Ophelia McIntosh testified to the condition of Collins Elementary School
throughout this period. Classes were crowded with 40 to 60 children in a classroom. The
books were old and written in. There were never any maps or other teaching aids. Mrs.
Small testified to the poor plumbing facilities and the lack of playground facilities.
Another black child who attempted to attend a white school under the Freedom of Choice
plan was Ronald Johnson. His father testified [**12] hat during the period when Ronald
attended a white school under the Freedom of Choice plan shots were fired into the house
from passing cars. Harassment culminated in the burning o f the Johnson's bam which
destroyed their livestock. The Federal Bureau of Investigation began investigation and
the harassment ceased. Ronald Johnson spent only that school year in the white school.
The dual system remained intact in the 1966-1967 school year. On January 20, 1967, the
Board voted to forego federal funds rather than integrate the schools. On May 11, 1967,
Tattnall County was found to be in violation of Title VI and federal funds were cut off.
There were no federal funds received by Tattnall County in the 1968-1969 school year.
Ben Sikes, the present superintendent of schools in Tattnall County, was first elected to
his post in 1968 after having been principal of Glennville Middle School for five years.
He was superintendent at the time the dual system was abolished. The final impetus for
the abolition of the dual system came from a court order. The Georgia Department of
Education was under court order to withhold state school funds to any district which had
not submitted its desegregation [**13] plan. The letter sent by the Board of Education to
the citizenry, dated July 14,1970, clearly spells out that the reasons for integration were
financial. The 1970-71 academic year was the first in which blacks and whites attended
the same schools. In the reorganization, Collins Elementary School, the formerly all
black elementary school, was closed as substandard.
[*480] Mr. Sikes testified that once the decision had been made, he attempted to
implement the plan in a positive manner. He called a meeting of all the teachers and
informed them that the dual system was at an end and that anyone who felt unable to
work in the integrated system "had better go elsewhere." A university course designed to
ease the transition to the unitary system was offered locally but, except for the
administrators, few attended. As a measure to aid in the transition to an integrated
system, summer school for Title I children was held in the summers of 1970 and 1971.
Both blacks and whites attended this program which was financed through Title I funds.
Several hundred children attended.
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However, Superintendent Sikes' files contained minutes of a meeting with the principals
on January 19,1970, the [**14] winter preceding integration. According to the minutes,
the principals were informed that attendance laws would not be as important in the
biracial schools as they were in the dual system. At that same meeting, according to the
minutes, it was suggested that two separate tracks be initiated one for college-bound
students and the other for non-college bound students.1
1. This two-track system was not implemented.
Even after the abolition of the dual system, the bus transportation to Reidsville High
School from Collins, Georgia continues to be racially segregated. Two buses driven by
black drivers transport the black students while two buses driven by white drivers
transport the white students. Paul Walden, a black student at Reidsville High School,
testified that Mr. Rhodes, the principal of Collins Junior High, had instructed the students
that they were to ride a bus containing students of their own race. Buses carrying students
to extracurricular activities are not segregated.
Except for the programs [**15] discussed above, no special effort was made to insure
that the establishment of integration in the schools would be successful. The black
students who had attended the substandard black schools were incorporated into the
schools without any effort at that time to provide remediation.
Dr. Spencer, plaintiffs expert on child psychology and development, testified that it
would be very difficult for a child to overcome his early training in a substandard
segregated school. In addition, if a child perceives himself as inferior and a low achiever,
he tends to divorce himself and his energies from the source of the unpleasant
information. Thus, as Dr. Spencer testified, if a child is exposed to those who believe
black is inferior or if he is exposed to those who brand him as a low achiever, he is likely
to protect his self esteem by ignoring the source. Here, the black children attended
inferior schools before they were permitted to attend integrated schools. Both factors
worked against the black children and tended to retard their achievement. They had
received a poorer education in the segregated schools and they were perceived by
themselves and others as inferior. A possible example [**16] of this phenomenon is
Kathy Johnson, a named plaintiff in the litigation, who had a non-verbal IQ score which
fell from 112 to 58 during her school career in Tattnall County.
D. The Tracking System
While a remedial program for the black students was not instituted, a tracking system was
adopted in 1970-1971 school year. Defendants characterized this grouping as by
achievement rather than by ability but as plaintiffs expert, Mrs. Bryan, testified, the
distinction between achievement grouping and ability grouping is an illusory one since it
is impossible to measure raw ability.
Tracking was employed in the elementary and junior high schools with the exception of
Collins Junior High School which employed heterogeneous grouping. The tracking
system often resulted in racially identifiable classrooms. For example, at Seckinger
Elementary School in 1971, while the first grade classes were equally proportioned, the
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second grade includes a 100% white class, a 100% black class, and an identifiably white
class. The Fourth grade [*481] which consisted of five classes included all white classes
and two predominantly black classrooms. In 1972, almost half of twenty-four classes
significantly [**17] departed from the one-third black, two-thirds white makeup which
one might expect. Racially identifiable classes persisted at Seckinger until 1979-1980
when the school system abandoned its tracking system as a result of an investigation by
the Office of Civil Rights. Similar patterns consisting of a large number of racially
identifiable classrooms occurred in the other Tattnall County schools which employed the
tracking system. 2
2. Charts giving the exact racial percentages in each school in the years during
which the tracking system was in force are attached as Appendix A.
Mr. Sikes testified that it was not intended that the black children be placed in the lower
tracks it simply turned out to be the case. That a disproportionate number of blacks were
enrolled in the slower moving classes is even more surprising in light of the IQ data
which came to light during the litigation. In examining the files of the students who have
had to meet the CAT requirement in order to graduate, it was discovered that [**18]
some files contained IQ scores from 1968-1969. There were 137 scores in the files.
Ninety-five of the scores were for white children. Defendants strenuously objected to the
use of these scores as a basis for any conclusions in the case on the grounds that the test
given was a group test and was therefore unreliable and on the basis that there was no
way to judge whether the sample composed of the students for whom early IQ scores are
available is representative of the population o f students who were subjected to the CAT
requirement in order to graduate.
Ms. Driver, a psychometrist employed by the Tattnall County School District, testified
that she did not believe that group scores were reliable and would make no decisions
based on group scores. Dr. Leon Hurley, plaintiffs expert, testified that while he agreed
that the placement of an individual child should never be based on an IQ obtained from
group testing, his opinion was that the scores were reliable for the group. He also testified
that an individual child was likely to do better in an individual testing situation than in a
group testing situation. The Court agrees with Dr. Hurley that the group scores are
reliable on a group [**19] basis.
The problem of the representativeness of the sample for whom IQ scores were available
presents a more difficult problem. The number of children for whom scores were
available, according to plaintiffs' statistical expert, Mr. Cole, was numerous enough for
meaningful statistical analyses to be performed on the data. But the fact that the data are
numerous enough does not necessarily indicate that the data are also representative.
However, support for their representativeness comes from the data themselves. When the
individual IQ scores were plotted, they were normally distributed with a mean of 102,
almost exactly duplicating the distribution in the general population. Before the Court,
then, is the situation in which the distribution o f scores for the 137 students whose files
contained early IQ scores is known. The scores of the 137 students appear to be
representative of the scores of the general population. If the 137 scores are not
representative, then the early IQ scores of all the students who had been subjected to the
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CAT graduation requirement are not similar to the scores of the population at large.
Instead of believing that the missing scores differ from both those [**20] of the entire
population and the Tattnall County students for whom scores are available, it is more
likely that the scores which are available are representative of those of the group scores
which are missing.
Analysis of these early IQ scores according to Mr. Cole and Mr. Huberty, defendant's
expert on statistics, demonstrated that race and IQ were not related. The Court therefore
concludes that the black and white children who were later subjected to the CAT diploma
requirement began their academic careers with generally equal abilities.
In view of this fact, the disproportionate number o f black children in the lower [*482]
groups is difficult to justify. Mr. Sikes testified that children were not placed in the lower
tracks by IQ scores. Achievement, not ability, was the criterion used for placement
according to Mr. Sikes.
However, even ignoring the difficulty discussed above of distinguishing meaningfully
between achievement and ability, it appears that the black students in Tattnall County
have not been placed fairly according to any objective criterion. The Court here relies on
the factual findings of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) based on its investigation of
student [**21] class assignments conducted December 10-13, 1979, after a complaint had
been filed alleging that the grouping practices violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Defendants' present tracking policies were implemented in the 1972-1973 school
year. Before integration was implemented, achievement grouping was not practiced. The
primary determinant for placement of children entering the first grade is the Scott
Foresman Initial Placement Score. Possible scores range from 0 to 57. Teacher judgment
also plays a heavy role in placement. The CAT given to the kindergarten children in the
eighth month of their kindergarten year plays a role primarily in the placement of
borderline cases. The children were placed in one group for all subjects.
OCR found that black students were over-represented in the lower achievement groups
and under-represented in the higher groups. This occurred in many cases despite rather
than because of the scores achieved by the children.3 There were no absolute cutoffs for
particular groups and the over-lap worked to the disadvantage of the black students. At
Seckinger Elementary there were many examples o f black children who had been placed
in lower groups [**22] than white children who had the same scores. Black children were
placed as many as three classes below their white counterparts with the same scores. At
Tattnall Elementary School, first graders were placed by adding their Scott Foresman
scores to their CAT scores. However, the only use which was made of the composite
scores was to make an absolute cutoff to determine the A and B groups. Those falling
below the cutoff were placed in C, D, and E groups essentially without additional regard
to their abilities. These grouping practices at Tattnall Elementary resulted in racially
identifiable classrooms on the first grade level and the pattern of racially identifiable
classrooms continued in each grade.
3. Specifically, OCR found that the scores overlapped as follows:
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Achievement Group

Range o f Reading Scores

1A

45-57

IB

37-56

1C

40-50

ID

24-49

IE

30-45

UNKNOWN
The tracking system as employed moved the lower groups through the same material
which was utilized for the high achievement [**23] groups. No particular remediation or
enrichment was offered. Students were promoted on the basis of their chronological age
rather than their having successfully completed the requirements for a particular grade.
Plaintiffs bolstered their attack on the tracking system with statistical evidence. Two
types of statistical analysis were used throughout the trial. The first type of analysis
compares the actual distribution of data with its expected distribution. A chi square is the
term used to describe the analysis of two variables, each of which is divisible into two
mutually exclusive categories. A particular combination of these variables is compared to
the expected value. A distribution is considered statistically significant if it would occur
no more than five times out of one hundred. This .05 is the level of statistical
significance. The second type of analysis is the correlation or linear regression. This
analysis seeks to determine the existence of a relationship between two continuous
variables or between one continuous variable and two mutually exclusive categories. This
relationship is expressed by "Pearson r." Pearson r measures the strength of a
relationship. If the value [**24] of Pearson r is squared ("r squared"), the resulting figure
indicates the extent to [*483] which one variable is dependent on or can be predicted by
the other variable. Another way of expressing this type of relationship is the probability
or "P value." In order to be statistically significant, the P value must be less than .05; in
other words, in order to be considered statistically significant, the relationship can be
expected to occur by chance fewer than five out of 100 times.
Plaintiffs determined for each child for whom an early IQ score was available, the "race
percent average." This figure was obtained by figuring the percentage of black children in
a particular student's classes each year after the dual system was abolished and then
averaging these figures. Dr. Huberty, defendant's expert on statistics, at one point in his
testimony, strongly disagreed that race percent average was a proper variable because it
lacked independence. Dr. Huberty argued that since all of the children in a particular
class would share the same percentage for that year, the final figures for the race percent
average would not be independent many children would necessarily share the same
numbers. [**25] Dr. Shapiro, plaintiffs expert, disagreed that the data were not
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independent and argued that if Dr. Huberty was correct, the data for race percent average
when plotted should line up in columns. When Dr. Shapiro plotted the coordinates, the
data were scattered. Thus, the Court concludes that race percent average is an appropriate
variable for use in their correlation studies.
Plaintiffs' experts determined the correlation between the early IQ scores and race percent
average for blacks and whites. The results support the inference that the black children
were not placed according to their abilities while the white children were. For white
students there was a significant negative correlation between their early IQ scores and
being in a predominantly black class. In other words, for white children, the higher their
early IQ scores, the fewer black children were likely to be in the same classroom. The
actual data respecting this comparison were likely to occur by chance fewer than once in
a thousand instances. However, for black children, the correlation between early IQ
scores and being in a predominantly black class was not significant. 4 Thus, even if one
posited a generally lower [**26] level of intelligence for the black children, an
assumption which the evidence in no way supports, one would expect that high IQ black
children would have fewer black students in their classes. But the correlations run on the
actual figures support the conclusion that, while early IQ scores were not correlated to
race, black children were placed disproportionately in the lower levels, placements which
were not supported by early IQ scores or the achievement tests administered.
4. Dr. Shapiro testified that the results of the correlations were changed only
marginally by ignoring the student's own race. The significant negative correlation
between IQ and race percent average for whites and the lack of significant
correlation between IQ and race percent average for blacks held true.
Achievement grouping was not attempted at Collins Junior High which used a system of
stratified homogenous grouping. Since two of the elementary schools in Tattnall County,
Seckinger and Tattnall Elementary, profess to group by [**27] achievement levels, a
comparison can be made between the performance o f the students who were grouped and
the performance of those who were not grouped. Two objective bases of comparison exist
in the Georgia Criterion Reference Test and the CAT.
A criterion referenced test is one which tests specific skills which the students
presumably have been taught. Such a test differs from a norm referenced test. A norm
referenced test compares the performance of the test taker to the performance of the testtaking population. The score is essentially a relative one. An individual score on a norm
referenced test indicates how overall performance compares to that of the group on which
the test was normed. The score does not indicate what particular skills are possessed by
the student. A criterion referenced test indicates which specific skills have been mastered
by [*484] the test taker. While a criterion referenced test tells only the skills which have
been mastered, obviously these results can be compared between schools or between
school districts.
The Georgia Criterion Reference Test (CRT) is given to many Georgia school children
every year. This test is constructed to evaluate students' [**28] mastery of particular
concepts appropriate to the students' particular level. Plaintiffs submitted CRT results for
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eighth graders in Tattnall County. Illustrated by means o f bar graphs, plaintiffs' exhibits
compared the average results achieved in 1977,1978, and 1979 by the eighth graders in
three schools; Collins Junior High, the non-tracked elementary and junior high school;
Glennville Middle School, the tracked middle school which is fed by Seckinger
Elementary, also tracked; and Reidsville High School which is fed by Tattnall
Elementary School which is tracked. In the mathematics sections of the CRT in the
category of sets, in 1977, the three schools scored closely together with Reidsville
slightly ahead of Collins which was slightly ahead of Glennville. However, in 1978 and
1979 Collins was dramatically ahead. In operations, Collins was well ahead for all three
years. In measurements, Collins was ahead in all three years. In probability and statistics,
Reidsville was slightly ahead of Collins in 1977 but Collins was the leader in 1978 and
1979. In relations and functions, Reidsville was slightly ahead in 1977, Collins was ahead
in 1978 and 1979. In geometry Collins was dramatically [**29] ahead in all three years.
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 122.
The reading areas of the CRT appear to reflect similar results for the eighth graders in the
three schools. In word recognition, Reidsville High was slightly ahead of Collins in 1977,
but Collins was dramatically ahead in 1978 and 1979. In comprehension, Collins was
well ahead in all three years. In language usage, Collins was ahead in all three years. In
study, Collins was dramatically ahead for all three years.
Defendants did not contradict the above stated evidence but attempted to refute the
inference that students learned more efficiently when they were not grouped by
achievement by submitting additional evidence. One such item of evidence was the drop
in scores of the eighth graders at Collins in 1980 when a new edition of the CRT was
introduced.
In addition, students at Collins are using a different curriculum based on different
teaching materials. Defendants introduced comparative scores made on the CRT for
second and third grade students in 1979 and 1980. The pattern apparent in the scores for
both the reading and mathematics sections is that the second graders at Collins do
relatively poorly on the CRT while third [**30] graders at Collins do very well. The
suggested explanation of this discrepancy in the scores of the Collins students offered by
plaintiffs was that the different curriculum used by Collins introduced particular concepts
at different times than the curriculum used at the other two schools. This explanation
makes a great deal of sense.
Although the eighth grade figures appear to support strongly the premise that the non
tracked children out-perform the tracked children, the sixth grade CRT scores apparently
demonstrate the opposite. The Collins students performed poorly.
Mr. Akins, principal of Tattnall Elementary School, performed research and came up
with some interesting figures. Reidsville High School graduates students from both the
non-grouped Collins Junior High line and the grouped Tattnall Elementary line. He
determined that more black students who had progressed through tracked programs
achieved 9.0 on the CAT. The precise figures for black students meeting die CAT
requirement were as follows:
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1980 80.5% of tracked, 66.7% of non-tracked;
1979 81.8% of tracked, 63.6% of non-tracked;
1978 77.8% of tracked, 66.7% of non-tracked.
On the basis of all [**31] the evidence recited on the merits and non-merits of
achievement grouping, I am unable to reach any firm conclusion on whether such
grouping is beneficial. [*485] The strong showings of the Collins third graders and eighth
graders on the CRT appear to demonstrate the benefits of non-grouping and the sixth
grade scores and experience of ex-Collins students in passing the CAT appear to show
otherwise. The differences in the curriculum used at Collins further cloud the question.
Throughout the comparisons, Seckinger, at which achievement grouping is practiced,
generally performed poorly, and more significantly, not similarly to Tattnall Elementary
where achievement grouping was also practiced. Tattnall County operates only three
elementary schools. Since the non-tracked school also uses a different curriculum, I find
it impossible to accurately evaluate the effects of achievement grouping. In addition,
since children were not grouped in a fair manner, it is difficult to reach any conclusion on
the operation of a fairly administered tracking system. I see no basis, however, for
concluding that achievement grouping as practiced in Tattnall County has obvious
benefits, equal protection STUDENT PREVAILED
IV. The Test
[**32] A. Its Inception
The diploma requirement in Tattnall County that each graduating student must perform at
ninth grade level in the mathematics and reading portions of the California Achievement
test was first conceived by Mr. Akins, principal of Tattnall Elementary School, and Mr.
Russell, principal of Reidsville High School, on an automobile trip. They were concerned
that some of the schools in Tattnall County were considered substandard by the State of
Georgia. At that time, there was no formal existing procedure to identify those who were
not performing at grade level in high school. No remedial programs existed and there was
no method of requiring students to enroll in particular courses in high school to improve
their basic skills.REMEDIATION Mr. Akins and Mr. Russell passed their idea
concerning competency testing onto other teachers and the idea was eventually presented
to Superintendent Sikes and the School Board. The School Board adopted the policy in
Spring, 1976, but did not impose the diploma sanction until Spring, 1978. Previous to the
implementation of the CAT requirement, receipt of a diploma had been conditioned on
successful completion of a certain number of credit hours and [**33] sufficient
attendance. DUE PROCESS
Superintendent Sikes and the School Board did not perform some of the preliminary steps
suggested as appropriate by plaintiffs. They did not examine the Technical Bulletin
published by CTB McGraw-Hill, the test publishers. They did not perform a local
validation of the CAT. They did not specifically address the effect that the CAT would
have on students in the lower tracks or students who had previously attended all-black
schools. However, Superintendent Sikes testified that he did look up the test in the
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Mental Measurement Yearbook, the authoritative source on testing according to
plaintiffs' expert on testing, Mrs. Bryan. That source gave a favorable review to the 1970
edition, including a favorable review by Mrs. Bryan. VALIDITY
When questioned about the choice of test, Superintendent Sikes testified that the CAT
was chosen because the school district had had good experience with the test. A norm
referenced test was chosen rather than, for example, a particular score on the CRT,
because the Board wanted to graduate students who compared favorably to national
achievement levels. It was felt that in light of the mobility o f contemporary society, the
school system should [**34] prepare its graduates to compete on a national scale.
VALID TY
The school system had had success with its Title I programs. By administering the CAT
during the high school years, students who needed remedial help could be identified and
required to attend remedial classes in reading or math as indicated REMEDIATION. By
employing the diploma sanction, the Board and administration hoped to spark student
motivation in both the sense that consequences attached to failure to achieve and that the
diploma, for the first time in years, would meaningfully represent a particular level of
achievement. Mrs. Bradley, head of the math department at Reidsville, testified that she
and others believed that part [*486] of the students' poor achievement was due to an
overwhelming lack of motivation on the part of the students.
Although Mr. Sikes testified that he did not expect that every student would pass the
CAT and acquire a diploma, there was no evidence that the policy was adopted with
racial intent. There was no evidence that defendants actually foresaw that the policy
would work to the disadvantage of the black students. The testimony of the School Board
members was that the policy was intended to improve student [**35] performance and
not to discriminate in any way. The Court agrees with plaintiffs in that had the Board and
administration directed their attention to the possible racial impact of the policy, it would
have been apparent that considering the history of the dual system in Tattnall County, a
disproportionate number of blacks would be denied diplomas. EQUAL PROTECTION
Thus, the policy adopting the CAT diploma requirement and establishment of remedial
classes was accepted by the School Board in 1976 although implementation was deferred.
REMEDIATION. Evidence was conflicting on when students and parents were officially
notified of the new policy. DUE PROCESS. Loretta Wilcox, a named plaintiff who was a
member of the class of 1978 who failed to meet the CAT requirements, testified that she
found out about the requirement when she was in the eleventh grade. James Farmer who
failed the CAT twice testified that he found out about the CAT requirement by
overhearing a conversation when he was in the eleventh grade. However, Mr. Akins
testified that the students were informed at the end o f the 1975-1976 school year. This
testimony was corroborated by Mr. Greg Moran, assistant principal at Reidsville High
School. The Court credits the testimony [**36] presented by defendants that parents and
students were specifically notified. It is incredible that the School Board would adopt a
policy of such importance and fail to notify the parents and students. It is more likely that
a particular family might not recall the letter or misplace it. However, the notification still
occurred only two years before the diploma sanction was imposed. DUE PROCESS
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B. Its Implementation
Testing of students was begun at the beginning of the 1976-1977 school year. Remedial
classes were established for those who failed to achieve 9.0. REMEDIATION The same
procedure was employed at the beginning of the 1977-1978 school year. The 9.0
requirement was applied to the class of 1978 and thirty students, out of a class of 219,
received a certificate of attendance instead of a diploma as a result of the imposition of
the requirement. Seventeen of those who received a certificate were black. In the
graduating class of 1979, twelve students, out of 192, received a certificate of attendance
for failing to meet the CAT requirement. Ten of these were black. In 1980, six students,
out of 192, received a certificate of attendance due to failure to pass the CAT. All six
were black. EQUAL PROTECTION
The graduating [**37] class of 1978 was exposed only to the 1970 edition of the CAT. In
the 1978-1979 school year, the school system switched to the 1977 edition o f the CAT,
Form C & D. This test is currently used in the school system.
Students who fail to achieve 9.0 on the CAT by graduation are permitted to retake the
CAT and to enroll in further course work if they wish. MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES
C. The Racial Impact of the CAT Requirement
The evidence was overwhelming and essentially uncontradicted that the CAT
requirement had a disproportionate impact on the black students in Tattnall County. Mr.
Cole, who was qualified as an expert in statistics, testified about the methods employed
by a statistician in order to determine whether or not certain data can occur by chance,
equal protection The statistician begins by positing that no relationship exists between the
two variables. The actual values are then compared to the data which could be expected if
there were no relationship between the variables. The chi square is used to measure
proportionality for two sets of non-overlapping data. For example, a chi square analysis
would be appropriate if one [*487] were checking to determine whether there was a
relationship between religious belief [**38] and political affiliation by constructing a
square with four cells, one for Catholic/Democrat, one for Catholic/Republican, one for
Protestant/Democrat, and one for Protestant/Republican. These actual values would be
compared to what would be expected in the absence of any relationship. It is agreed that a
value of 3.841 for chi square is the level of statistical significance.
The probability value tells the likelihood of the occurrence in the absence o f a
relationship. The level of significance is .05, which means that a result is significant if it
can be expected to occur by chance five times or less out of every hundred instances. Any
value equal to or less than .05 demonstrates statistical significance according to
established statistical convention. The standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion
of data from the mean. The measure of standard deviation is significant at between two
and three standard deviations.
Dr. Cole, a statistical expert, testified for plaintiffs. According to his calculations, the
statistical analyses of the racial differences in receiving or failure to meet the CAT
requirement are as follows:
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Year

Chi Squared

P. Value

Standard Deviation

1978

12.223

.0005

3.496

1979

24.697

.0000

4.970

1980

15.474

.0001

3.934

1978-80

49.020

.0000

7.001

[**39] The significant racial impact of the CAT requirement is obvious.
Mr. Cole also performed correlation studies on the data. A correlation study, as opposed
to those statistical analyses which detect the existence of a relationship, measures the
strength of the relationship between two variables. For the purpose of the analyses
contained in plaintiffs' Exhibit 91, "education" denotes the receipt of a diploma. A strong
correlation, as noted above, existed between race percent average and meeting the
graduation requirement, the more blacks in a student's classes, die less likely he was to
meet the requirement. In addition, for whites, the early IQ scores were positively related
(.3541) to success on the CAT. For blacks, there was no significant relationship (.1039)
between early IQ scores and success on the CAT and what slight relationship appeared
was in a negative direction for blacks. Those with higher IQ's were slightly less likely to
perform well on the CAT. EQUAL PROTECTION
A multiple regression analysis was also performed by plaintiffs. A multiple regression
analysis makes use of the Pearson or correlation coefficient to analyze the roles played by
several variables in an attempt to explain [**40] a particular phenomenon. The variables
are regressed, that is, considered in order of statistical importance. The r 2 is the
percentage of the phenomenon accounted for by a particular variable. As the variables are
regressed in order of statistical importance, the change in the 2 represents only that
amount of variance attributed solely to the newly regressed variable.
Plaintiffs' expert performed such an analysis correlating High CAT Reading and High
CAT Math 5 with race percent average, early IQ scores, special education placement and
race. Race percent average, the average of the percent of black children in a student's
class from the third to eighth grades, was the most potent predictor of CAT scores. The r
squared for race percent average and High CAT reading was .48636. [*488] This means
that the racial composition of a student's classroom alone accounted for 48% of the
variance in scores on the CAT reading section between blacks and whites. Race percent
average accounted for 33% of the variance between whites and blacks on the math
portion of the CAT. EQUAL PROTECTION
5. These terms mean a student's highest score on the CAT reading or math sections.
The scores also reflect corrections made necessary by mistakes in grading.
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[**41] The Court finds these figures fairly remarkable in that of all the universe of
possible influences race percent average is such a potent predictor. Of course, these
figures do not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. They do indicate a high
correlation.
The effect of the racial composition of the classroom on CAT scores is especially
remarkable in light of the early IQ scores o f the students. Those scores accounted for only
1.4% of the variance in the reading section and .5% of the variance in the math section
for the black students. Nor can the IQ factor be perceived as subsumed in the race percent
average figure since IQ was not related to placement for blacks. Since, as discussed
above, placement for blacks was not carried out on an acceptable, consistent rationale and
blacks were often placed in spite of rather than because of their achievement scores, the
fact that race percent average can account for such a large portion of the variance is
remarkable. EQUAL PROTECTION
D. The CAT Itself
The California Achievement Test is a norm referenced test o f achievement in reading and
math. National norm-referencing means that by testing a large random sample of students
and determining what the [**42] normal level of achievement is, a basis for comparison
is established so that an individual's scores can be compared to his peers' across the
nation.
CTB McGraw-Hill used a stratified random sampling procedure in test development.
First, examples of curriculum were solicited from state boards of education and many
school districts across the country. Then experts are asked to develop test items after
studying the curricular objectives obtained. The test is tried out in a pretest on a group
which is not as large as the group used for norming purposes. After the pretest, item
analyses are performed. The item analyses include checking for item validity. The
concept of item validity is discussed more fully below. The test is then standardized on a
large stratified random sample of students. School districts are identified as urban, small,
etc. and each region of the country is represented. Within these established strata, groups
of students are selected randomly. This method insures that school systems representative
of the types of systems existing in the country are represented in the norming group.
Although there were no Georgia students included in the 1977 norming groups, students
[**43] in the Southeast were well represented. For the 1970 edition, 203,684 students
from 36 states participated in the standardization. Approximately 200,000 students were
involved in the standardization process for the 1977 edition. After the standardization
process, grade equivalency scores were calculated. Grade equivalency means the typical
performance of a student in the standardization sample for that grade. Although the CAT
was not given to the norming group in every month, the scores were extrapolated to give
a grade equivalency score for each month. For example, the test might have been
administered to the norming group in November and May. The grade equivalent scores
for the third and ninth month would actually correspond to the typical performance of
those in the norming sample. Steady progress was assumed, according to Ms. Bryan, in
order to provide grade equivalency scores for those months in which the test was not
actually administered to the norming group.
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The methods of test construction for the 1970 and 1977 editions were similar. However,
the 1977 edition was constructed with more attention to the elimination of bias in the test.
The national norms for both editions included [**44] proportional representation of
minority groups, but in preparing the 1977 edition, particular attention was paid to
reviewing items for racial and ethnic bias.
[*489] Both editions of the CAT were well-received in the testing community and the
1970 edition received favorable reviews in the Mental Measurements Yearbook. Both
tests were constructed in accord with the standards for educational and psychological
testing developed by the American Psychological Association.
Further discussion of the test is aided by the understanding o f some terms used in the
testing field. The first of these is the standard error of measurement. The concept of the
standard error of measurement reflects the fact that it is impossible to say with certainty
that a particular score represents the exact achievement level of a particular student. The
score instead is indicative of a range in which the student's real score falls. One can be,
according to Ms. Bryan, 67% sure that the real score falls between one standard error of
measurement above and one standard error o f measurement below the observed score.
One can be 96% sure that the actual score is between two standard errors of measurement
below [**45] and two standard errors of measurement above the observed score.
According to Dr. Findlay, defendant's expert on testing, the standard error of
measurement is less important in the situation where the highest score only is of import
and a student takes the test repeatedly, since he will not always fall in the lower part of
his range.
"Validity" in the testing field indicates whether a test measures what it is supposed to
measure. The degree of difficulty for a particular item is one relevant factor in assessing
the validity of the test. The degree of difficulty is the percentage of children who
answered the item correctly. If almost none or almost all of the children answer correctly
the item is of little worth since it does not differentiate between the test takers. Ms. Bryan
testified that an acceptable range of difficulty is from .20 to .90 with the mean on a
multiple choice test of .60.
The point biserial is a measure of the validity of a particular item. It measures the
relationship between success on a particular item to success on the test as a whole. The
point biserial is used in the testing industry as a whole and by CTB McGraw-Hill in order
to determine that validity. Ms. [**46] Bryan testified that, in her opinion, an item should
be discarded if its point biserial is below .30. CTB McGraw-Hill uses .20 as its cutoff
figure.
Bias in the test items affects the validity of the test. "Bias" as it is used in the testing
industry means results do not have the same meaning for different groups. In other words,
when an item or test is biased it is measuring different things for different groups. This
concept is distinct from the possibility that one group may not achieve as well as another
group.
Except as already noted, no serious attacks were raised by plaintiffs on the test
construction and validation performed by CTB McGraw-Hill. VALIDITY
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E. The CAT in Tattnall County
Plaintiffs have taken the position that, while viewed alone the CAT is a respectable test
instrument, the circumstances of its use in Tattnall County, even apart from problems
created by historical racial discrimination, cause the test to be unreasonable and unrelated
to any legitimate educational goal, due process RATIONAL RELATION
One of these objections to the use of the CAT in Tattnall County is that defendants have
not taken into account the standard error of measurement when assessing a student's
performance. Ms. Bryan testified [**47] that had one standard error of measurement been
taken into account in evaluating their scores that at least eight students who were denied
diplomas in 1978 and 1979 would have graduated. The Court is reluctant to place much
weight on this particular factor since the School Board's policy might be described as
requiring a slightly higher level of performance. The 9.0 points represent one standard
error of measurement below the actual required score. In addition, since the CAT is
administered to the students on several occasions, the Court credits the testimony of Dr.
Findlay that the errors in measurement are reduced over [*490] successive
administrations. Thus, that the announced policy set the cutoff standard at 9.0 when,
taking into account the standard error of measurement and the fact of repeated test
administrations the actual cutoff point was slightly higher than 9.0, does not seem to be
of much legal significance. DUE PROCESS
A second criticism of the CAT's use in Tattnall County is that no local validation study
was performed. A validation study is not normally necessary before a standardized test is
used by a local district since such a requirement would negate the reasons for selecting
[**48] a norm referenced test in the first place. Dr. Shapiro testified that when a test is
used for a purpose other than that for which it was designed, it should, according to APA
guidelines, be revalidated locally. Mr. Donald Green and Mr. Robert Long, testing
experts employed by CTB McGraw-Hill, both testified by deposition that the CAT had
not been designed to be used as an exit examination. To some extent, the analysis
depends on the definition of "exit exam." Mr. Sikes testified that the CAT was chosen in
order to compare the achievement of students in Tattnall County to the achievement o f
students nationwide. Essentially, according to the testimony of Mr. Sikes, the CAT was
employed for its usual function to compare children to the norm group. It was this
comparison which was then used to make decisions about the students; i. e., whether or
not they would receive diplomas.
The local validation performed by plaintiffs in preparation for trial clearly demonstrates
that the CAT did not perform as well in Tattnall County as it had on the groups selected
by CTB McGraw-Hill. While, according to the testimony of Mr. Green, the CAT had
been examined for bias by the publisher and biased items [**49] removed, the test was
not free from bias when administered in Tattnall County.
CTB McGraw-Hill utilized a point biserial analysis to determine the existence of bias.
The point biserial relates to the student's performance on the test as a whole or on a
relevant subtest. A high point biserial a strong relationship between doing well on an item
and doing well on the test indicates that the test is valid.
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The specific standard utilized by the test publisher in rejecting items appears on page 141
of the Technical Manual for CAT 1977: Point biserials under .20 were considered
unsatisfactory for either the "Black" or "other" group, and differences between the groups
in excess of .20 were considered evidence o f bias. Thus, the item was rejected if either
group had a point biserial less than .20 or if the difference between the point biserials was
greater than .20. Dr. Huberty, defendant's expert, had a different interpretation of the
standard which the Court rejects in light of the plain language of the Technical Bulletin.
Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Shapiro, performed an item analysis on the performance o f Tattnall
County students on the CAT 1970 and CAT 1977. He defined bias and utilized [**50] the
point biserial analysis as defined in the publisher's Technical Bulletin. He found that for
students at Reidsville High School, 52.9% of the questions on the reading portion of the
1970 CAT and 69.4% of the questions on the math portion of the 1970 CAT were biased
by CTB McGraw-Hill's standards. At Glennville, 62.4% of the questions on the reading
portion and 62.2% of the math questions on the 1970 CAT were biased. In 1979, both
schools used the same form of the CAT 77 and 60% of the questions on the reading
portion and 45.9% of the questions on the math section were biased.
Examining the scores of the Tattnall County students only for validity, that is, point
biserials equal to or greater than .20 for the items, many items do not appear to be valid.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 95 lists the point biserial calculated. At Reidsville in 1978, more than
50% of the items had biserials below .20. At Glennville in 1978, more than 44% of the
items had unacceptably low point biserials. In 1979, almost 42% of the items had
unacceptably low point biserials. VALIDITY
The Court is uneasy noting these facts. Plaintiffs' evidence on the bias and validation
points was not successfully challenged at trial. Yet [**51] it is difficult to believe that
[*491] the results obtained in Tattnall County can be so different from those obtained by
CTB McGraw-Hill VALIDITY. Ms. Bryan testified that there must be significant
differences between the students in Tattnall County and the national sample. She did not
elaborate on the possible explanation for such a phenomenon.
Plaintiffs also challenged the CAT graduation policy on grounds that the CAT did not test
what was being taught in the Tattnall County schools. To some extent, plaintiffs appear to
be arguing that an achievement test should not be used to determine who can be awarded
a diploma. In arguing that a nearly exact correlation should exist between what the
students were taught and the material included in the test, plaintiffs essentially assert that
only a criterion referenced test would ever be appropriate as an exit examination.
Defendants' expert, Ms. Larson, an employee of CTB McGraw-Hill, was employed to
demonstrate the relationship between the curriculum taught in Tattnall County and the
CAT. Her results appear in Defendants' Exhibits 44 and 45. The Court places little weight
on her results. She matched objectives in the curriculum, assuming [**52] use o f the
Scott-Foresman Series, to objectives purportedly tested by the CAT. She found that 91%
of the Scott-Foresman math skills were tested by CAT 1970 and 71% of Scott-Foresman
reading skills were tested by CAT 1970. Comparable results were obtained for CAT 1977
and the Scott-Foresman program. The High Intensity Learning Systems (HELS 2) which
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was used for students in the remedial classes fared less well as Ms. Larson testified. CAT
1977 tested 70.4% of the HILS 2 objectives and CAT 1970 tested 67.3%.
Ms. Larson did not limit her correlation to Level 19 of the CAT 1977 or Level 5 of CAT
1970, the actual tests used to determine receipt of a diploma. She included the objectives
for all the levels of the CAT. Plaintiffs' point is well taken that lists of curriculum
objectives and test objectives are not precisely defined and categories overlap to some
extent. It would have been more helpful to establish generally that most of what was
taught was tested by the CAT but, more importantly, that the questions posed on the CAT
could be traced to the curriculum employed in Tattnall County. This was not done and
would be a very difficult task. About a third of the students, those at Collins, [**53] do
not use the Scott-Foresman curriculum at all. In addition, the Scott-Foresman program
was phased in over years so that during some periods of their education, only portions of
classes of 1978, 1979, and 1980 were exposed to the Scott-Foresman curriculum.
Evidence on this point was vague.
Ms. Larson's testimony also assumes that the students were exposed to the full
curriculum. Ms. Bradley, a math department head in Tattnall County, testified that some
students in the remedial mathematics program do not complete the curriculum. Ms. Bryan
testified that in the areas of geometry, algebra, and measurement that the students do less
well the same areas that are the last to be covered in the remedial program.
However, it is important to note that Ms. Bryan agreed that the type of questions covered
on the CAT should be included in any standard recognized curriculum. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
In addition to problems with the CAT, validation, bias, curricular correspondence,
plaintiffs have brought a few additional disturbing matters to the Court's attention. One
additional problem is the prevalence of misgrading the tests, which plaintiffs contend
adds to the aura of arbitrariness of the policy as perceived by [**54] the students. The
tests have been hand-scored in Tattnall County. Ms. Bryan testified that in the testing
industry, scoring errors of no more than 3-4% are expected in hand-scoring. However, at
Glennville High School in 1978,58.44% of the math papers and 20% of the reading
papers were scored incorrectly. In 1979,10% of all papers were scored incorrectly.
However, it is important to note that no errors in correcting resulted in denying a diploma
to a student who qualified under the exit exam policy. Further, the Court is of the opinion
that having had [*492] these errors brought to their attention, the Tattnall County School
Board will insure that errors of this dimension will not reoccur. There is no reason to
believe that the errors were anything but inadvertent and may have been precipitated by
the use of a stencil to go over answer sheets, which caused some items for which two
answers were given to be marked correct.
A more disturbing problem was raised by plaintiffs as to the reliability of the test in
Tattnall County. "Reliability" is that characteristic of a test which insures that comparable
results will be obtained on a retest given shortly after the initial test. In [**55] addition,
testimony was uncontradicted that for slower children, a gain of only one-half a year in
achievement was expected. Yet the test results for some of the students were plainly
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bizarre. For example, defendants' Exhibit 52 shows CAT scores for 1978 Glennville
seniors for the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grade administrations o f the test and the
twelfth grade reexamination where necessary. Mickey A."s reading score on the CAT in
the tenth grade was 3.8. One year later the score was 8.0. At the time of his senior retest,
his score had regressed to 4.1. Renwick F. went from a 4.3 in reading and 3.9 in math in
the eleventh grade to 10.0 and 9.8 less than two years later. Darlene J., according to
Defendants' Exhibit 53 which gives the respective figures for Reidsville, jumped from 3.3
in reading and 5.8 in math in the tenth grade to scores of 9.9 and 9.2 in the twelfth.
Kennie K's scores improved from 2.8 in reading and 4.6 in math in the tenth grade to 9.0
and 9.5 on the twelfth grade retest. Vemie A. at Reidsville obtained the following reading
scores: 4.9, ninth grade; 2.5, tenth grade; and a whopping 11.5 in the eleventh grade.
Progress was not steady. According to Defendants' [**56] Exhibit 12 showing the gains
by year for 1980 Reidsville seniors in the math section, Talmadge F. showed a gain o f 5.0
in his freshman year's CAT score. His score deteriorated each year thereafter. The
corresponding exhibit for Glennville, Exhibit 14, shows Ricky B., after having regressed
.1 in the ninth grade, showed an incredible gain of more than 7 grade levels in his tenth
grade math score.
Ms. Bryan testified that these variant results could be attributed to the test itself, to
coaching or cheating, or to differences in student motivation. The Court was not
convinced that the school personnel had been guilty o f an impropriety in administering
the tests and keeping them secure. Ms. Bryan suggested that the teachers had been
"teaching to the test. "VALIDITY Yet the Court agrees with Dr. Findlay that if teaching
to the test means that the students were educated to be able to answer the kinds of items
that appear on the CAT then the teachers are performing as they should. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY. No serious criticisms of the CAT as constructed by CTB McGraw-Hill were
advanced. Ms. Bryan opined that the group of students in Tattnall County varied
significantly from the national norm group. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Court is quite hesitant [**57] to assume that the students in Tattnall County are so
deviant. A more obvious explanation is that some students were not performing up to
potential on these tests and were motivated to apply themselves both to the test and to the
remedial courses after the diploma policy was initiated. Other than motivational
differences on different occasions, the Court can arrive at no sensible explanation of the
varying test results. EQUAL PROTECTION
F. The Benefits
There can be little doubt that scores on the CAT in Tattnall County are improving. The
number of non-retarded students who failed the CAT has decreased from thirty in 1978 to
six in 1980. As discussed above, the CAT requirement still affects blacks
disproportionately. All six of those who failed to graduate because o f the CAT
requirement in 1980 were black. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Spencer, agreed that educational
progress was being made in Tattnall County. EQUAL PROTECTION
Witnesses from the ranks of the teachers and administrators of the Tattnall County
schools uniformly believed that the diploma policy was having a good effect in Tattnall
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County. Superintendent Sikes testified that he believed the policy was beneficial. [*493]
Ms. Ann Kennedy, a former teacher [**58] who is about to retire from her position of
counselor, was of the opinion that the students were responding favorably to the
responsibility which had been placed on them. Apparently, the CAT policy provides one
of the few areas in which the student is forced to take some responsibility since it was
generally agreed at trial that the Carnegie unit system had been so debased by the practice
of social promotion as to be meaningless.
Phillip Russell, principal of Reidsville High School, testified that he believed that the
students overwhelmingly supported the policy and that pride and morale were greater
among the student body than before the policy was implemented. William Harrell,
principal of Glennville High School, testified that he believed that the students' attitude in
general had improved and that there were fewer fights and instances of tardiness. Betty
Davis, a teacher, testified that she believed the students were reading more on their own
and that they turned in better book reports. Ms. Bradley, a math department head,
testified that, as more students become proficient in basic skills, they were electing more
math courses. Although thirteen remedial math classes were necessary [**59] formerly,
only six are needed currently. REMEDIATION
Admittedly, the testimony of the school system's teachers is not as precise as some
statistical comparisons might be, yet the Court finds the testimony of these teachers
credible. Defendants bolstered these impressions with numbers indicating the progress
that had been made. Defendants' Exhibits 38 and 39 demonstrate this progress. The
increases shown by the graduating class of 1980 at Glennville High School showed a
three-year increase of 3.7 in reading and 2.8 in math. The 1980 graduating class at
Reidsville High School showed a 4.28 increase in reading scores and 2.55 increase in
math scores over the same period. Although the gains for the graduating classes over the
years were impressive, more impressive is the change which is, apparently, taking place
throughout the system, including the pre-high school classes. While freshmen at
Glennville in 1978 averaged 8.0 in reading and 8.7 in math, the Glennville freshmen in
1980 scored 8.4 and 9.6. At Reidsville, the freshmen of 1978 scored 7.59 in reading and
9.05 in math. The 1980 Reidsville freshmen were scoring 8.7 and 9.72. Since these gains
occurred before the students were exposed to the [**60] high school remediation
program, REMEDIATION some progress must be ascribed to the diploma policy itself
since it is more plausible that the threat of denial of a diploma to a teacher's students
motivates both die teachers and students below the high school level to work harder on
the basic skills.
Dr. Findlay testified that he believed the policy had been helpful to black students, even
though the diploma sanction fell disproportionately on black students EQUAL
PROTECTION. He pointed out that only fourteen black students had passed the CAT
requirement without the help of remedial classes while 112 had passed with remediation.
He was of the opinion that the policy had been beneficial to blacks. REMEDIATION
In addition to their argument that the remedial program which they do not attack, and not
the diploma sanction, is responsible for the educational progress being made, Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 121 compares the scores made by Tattnall County tenth grade students on the
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criterion reference test given by the State of Georgia to the average statewide scores for
the years 1978, 1979, and 1980. The impression given by these graphs is that Tattnall
County's performance is essentially unchanged and generally below the state average.
[**61] Specifically, in the reading comprehension section, Tattnall County showed, over
the three years, gains on seven items, some of them slight, and no change on three items.
For communication skills, Tattnall County showed gains on two items, losses on one, and
no change on one. In writing, there were four gains, three losses, and no change on two
items. In numbers systems, Tattnall County gained on four items and remained the same
on one. In personal finances, Tattnall County gained on two, [*494] lost on one, and
remained the same on two. In probability and statistics, Tattnall County gained on two
and remained the same on one. In relations/functions, Tattnall County gained on two. In
measurement, Tattnall County had two gains and one loss. In geometry, Tattnall County
had losses on two items and one remained the same. In problem solving, Tattnall County
remained the same on three items.
The scores are generally favorable but not dramatic. These results do not reflect the
dramatic increase shown in the CAT scores. However, the tenth grade scores were
obtained before the students were fully exposed to Tattnall County's remedial programs.
The Court does not conclude that these [**62] results obtained by tenth graders Georgia
Criterion Reference indicate that the diploma policy does not have a good effect. The
Court finds that the policy is producing some educational benefit in Tattnall County.
V. Special Placement
The Tattnall County School District operates special education programs which are
financed in part through Title VI-B of the Education of All Handicapped Children's Act
of 1975. The School District assures the federal government that Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, will not be violated. The District in the operation
and regulation of its special education programs utilizes the Rules and Regulations for
Exceptional Children, promulgated by the State Board of Education. These standards are
also found within the District's Annual Program Plan for Title VI-B funding, equal
protection SPECIAL EDUCATION
The Court finds plaintiffs' expert on special placement, Dr. Leon Hurley, to be highly
qualified and relies substantially on his testimony. Dr. Hurley was a Fulbright scholar
who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in mental retardation. Mental
retardation occurs when a child is significantly subaverage in intelligence and, at the
same time, shows serious [**63] deficits in adaptive behavior, which is defined as his
ability to cope with his environment. In deciding whether or not to classify a child as
retarded, his IQ must first be determined as within the range of mental retardation. Of the
mentally retarded, the category with the highest level of functioning is the educable
mentally retarded (EMR). To be placed in an EMR program, a student must have an IQ
which registers between two and three standard deviations below the mean on the test
utilized. The child placed in EMR classes should have an IQ between 55 and 69. To be
classified as trainable mentally retarded (TMR), the next lower level of mental
retardation, the tested IQ must be within the range from 55 to 30, which is more than
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three standard deviations below the mean. The Court agrees with Dr. Hurley that the
regulations as they currently appear in the Georgia Department of Education's regulations
do not allow for placement of children whose IQ's are "borderline," that is, above the
cutoff scores.
To be included in the retarded range, a child must exhibit abnormalities in addition to his
low IQ score. A child who adjusts well to his environment and who possesses good social
skills [**64] should not be classified as mentally retarded, according to Dr. Hurley.
A specific learning disability (SLD) occurs when a child suffers from a disorder in one or
more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written. There is a discrepancy between an SLD child's intelligence
and his performance in school. Some problems included in the SLD category are minimal
brain dysfunction and dyslexia. An SLD student's poor achievement cannot be attributed
to mental retardation. If a child of normal intelligence who suffers from a specific
learning disability is not diagnosed properly, he may continue to fall behind academically
and may eventually test in the retarded range.
The expected incidence of mental retardation nationwide is 2.3%. The evidence of
specific learning disabilities can be expected to be about the same according to Dr.
Hurley. Some environmental factors such as general health care, diet, and prenatal care
can influence the incidence of mental retardation. [*495] Biased evaluation procedures
can also influence the incidence of special placement.
Tattnall County places a far larger percentage of its students in classes [**65] for the
mentally retarded than is normal throughout the United States. In the 1977-78 school
year, 7.07% of the student population in Tattnall County were classified as mentally
retarded. The average percentage in the United States was 2.3%; the average in Georgia
for that year was 3.31%. In 1978-1979, the Tattnall County School District placed 5.17%
of the student population in classes for the mentally retarded. That year the average in
Georgia was 2.3%.
Placement in a class for educable mentally retarded students is advantageous to those
who are genuinely retarded. These students profit by the emphasis on social and
vocational, rather than academic, skills. The students have potential for unskilled and
some semi-skilled jobs. However, placement in the EMR program for a student who is
not truly retarded is disastrous. Teacher and peer expectations are far lower for a child
placed in EMR classes than for children in regular classrooms. Academic subjects are not
emphasized and a child who has been misplaced in an EMR class will not be exposed to
material necessary to achieve his potential. The longer the child is misclassified, the more
severe and difficult to repair the damage caused [**66] by the misclassification becomes.
In addition, a social stigma attaches to the children enrolled in the EMR classes. The
EMR students may be called names by the other students. Other children may not be
permitted to play with retarded children. It is clear that in an appropriate placement for a
truly retarded child the benefits of EMR placement outweigh the problems associated
with placement. For a child who is not retarded, misclassification is a disaster.
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The procedures used for placing children in classes for the mentally retarded or the
learning disabled are set out by state regulations. According to these regulations
submitted to the Court as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 69, a child is first referred for evaluation.
This referral is made usually by a teacher but a parent, judicial officer, social worker, or
physician may request that the child be evaluated. Parents must consent to the evaluation
and should be notified in advance of the placement committee meetings which they may
attend.
Before any educational or psychological testing is performed, the student is tested for
physical problems such as poor sight or hearing. Individual psychological tests are then
performed. After this testing [**67] is completed, the student becomes the subject o f a
meeting o f the Special Education Placement Committee which is to review all the
available information and determine the appropriate program for that child. The
committee is to consider all the pertinent data not only the information developed
specifically for the placement decision. Records are to be kept of the meeting so that one
might examine the minutes and discover the basis for the decision. Before the student is
placed in a special program, parental consent must be obtained. An individual educational
program (IEP) is worked out and reviewed annually. The placement decision itself is
reevaluated every three years.
These placement procedures were observed in the Tattnall County School District,
according to the testimony of Ms. Driver, the psychometrist for the district. There were
two glaring exceptions. In Tattnall County, the practice was to send a consent form to the
parents before the evaluation was performed. No additional consent form was used.
Perhaps even more importantly, minutes were not kept to reflect accurately the reasons
put forth in the Placement Committee meeting supporting a recommendation that a
student be [**68] classified as EMR. The explanation offered by Ms. Driver was that
members of the Committee wished to speak freely and did not wish that their remarks
regarding a particular student be recorded. This practice flies in the face of the regulation
and its obvious rationale, equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION
The pattern of placement produced in the Tattnall County School District evidenced
[*496] that a grossly disproportionate number of black children were classified as
mentally retarded while the classes for children with specific learning disabilities were
mostly white. The actual figures are as follows: EQUAL PROTECTION
1976
EMR

LD

Black

103

2

White

27

15
1977

EMR

LD
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Black

117

16

White

27

41
1978

EMR

LD

Black

71

9

White

21

47

Mr. Cole testified that these figures were extreme and the possibility of their having
occurred by chance was almost non-existent. The 1976 figures produced a probability
value of 0.0000, and the Pearson Chi Square equaled 33.531 with the level of
significance being 3.8. The data represented 5.791 standard deviations. For the 1977 data,
the probability value was again 0.0000, the Pearson [**69] Chi Square 72.487, and the
number of standard deviations 8.514. For the 1978 data, the probability value was again
0.0000, the Pearson Chi Square 52.331, and the number of standard deviations 7.234.
Obviously, placement procedures in the Tattnall County School District are having a
severe racial impact.
The figures themselves give rise to the inference of misclassification. No tenable
explanation of these figures was offered at trial by defendants. Although, as discussed
above, the blacks in Tattnall County are generally poorer than the whites and plausibly
eat less nutritious foods and may not enjoy adequate health care, it is difficult to find a
causal relationship between the poorer position of blacks in Tattnall County and their
overrepresentation in the EMR classes and underrepresentation in the LD classes. While
a poor environment may possibly cause some increase in the incidence of mental
retardation, it is difficult to understand how the same poor environment results in a
greatly lowered incidence of learning disabilities. According to the testimony of Dr.
Hurley, a non-treated learning disability may eventually result in a lowering of IQ scores.
This fact does not explain [**70] the disparity in special placement for blacks and whites
since the date of misdiagnosis is simply pushed into the past. Ms. Driver testified that
when one of the named plaintiffs, Kathy Johnson, was in the primary grades, there were
no programs for the learning disabled student. However, this phenomenon of untreated
LD students slipping into the mentally retarded range of IQ scores should occur equally
in the black and white student populations. Ms. Driver testified that some white parents
refused to allow their children to be placed in EMR classes because of the predominance
of black children in those classes. Of course, that a predominance of black children exists
in the EMR classes is a problem not an answer, and this fact does nothing to explain why
black children are underrepresented in the classes for the learning disabled. The
inescapable conclusion is that some children are being misplaced. EQUAL
PROTECTION
This conclusion is buttressed by the figures set out in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 110. In 19761977, at which time the current regulations were in force with a cutoff score of 69 or 70,
26% of the students were classified as educable mentally retarded and had scores of 71 or
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above. Overclassification [**71] continued in the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 school
years. Ms. Driver explained that, in her view, the regulations had changed and that
"borderline" cases were permitted at the time many of these students had been classified.
Complete reevaluation is required every three years. But an opportunity to review so easy
a matter as checking a recorded IQ score against the state regulation could easily be
performed during the required annual check of the student's IEP. Such a check is
particularly appropriate [*497] when the serious effects of a misclassification are
considered.
A complaint was made to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) concerning special placement
in the Tattnall County School District on February 14,1980, by Kathy Johnson. Pursuant
to this complaint, a team of OCR investigators visited Tattnall County. They randomly
selected 39 students placed in EMR classes and examined their files. Thirty-one black
and eight whites were included in the sample. The OCR team found that twenty-three of
the thirty-one did not have adaptive behavior assessments. Seventeen of these were black.
Eleven students did not fall within the correct IQ range. Five of the students who were
missing adaptive [**72] behavior assessments also had IQ scores above 70. Two blacks
were assigned to EMR classes in violation of both the adaptive behavior and IQ
requirements. Twenty-three black students, in addition to these obviously misplaced two,
did not satisfy EMR placement requirements.
Some individual records further document this pattern of misplacement. The school
records of Kathy Johnson, a named plaintiff in this action, are an unsettling illustration of
the tragedy of a child for whom the educational system has failed. When she was in the
third grade, Kathy Johnson was given an IQ test. Her non-language IQ was 111. Her total
IQ was 98. The subtest scores were charted. She was above average generally except in
her language subtest. She was severely below average in delayed recall. This sort of
pattern, according to Dr. Hurley, is typical of children with learning disabilities. There is
no doubt that Kathy Johnson was not retarded when she was in the third grade. There was
evidence of many absences in the first grade and of some neglect. She did not learn well
but was not diagnosed as a child in need of help. She was passed on. Her fifth grade
report card indicates that while Kathy could understand [**73] what she was told and
could express herself orally, she could not read, spell, or write. Nevertheless, she was
passed. In the seventh grade, her grades did not reflect what must have been an abysmal
state of achievement. She passed every subject and received an 80 in English.
In the tenth grade, she was considered for special placement. At that time, she was
performing six grades below her actual grade level. The evaluation was performed by the
Cooperative Educational Service Agency (CESA) who contracted to perform testing
services for the Tattnall County School District before their full-time psychometrist, Ms.
Driver, was employed. As a matter of fact, Ms. Driver participated in some evaluations
with CESA at that time. She performed the adaptive behavior assessment on Kathy
Johnson.
Kathy Johnson's results on the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale did not fall within the
range of mental retardation. Her verbal IQ range was 72-83; her performance IQ range
was 69-79; her full scale IQ range was 70-80. Thus, Kathy appears not to meet the IQ
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requirements. The adaptive behavior portion of her evaluation can only be described as
outrageous. As discussed above, the adaptive behavior requirement [**74] is an
important part of the placement process and a child who does not exhibit abnormalities in
this area should not be classified as retarded. For Kathy Johnson, the oldest of seven
children, the following observations were thought to support the conclusion that she was
retarded: "she does not write letters, does not have her own spending money, she buys her
own clothing, she goes out unsupervised, she does not follow current events, and she is
left to care for others." The Court is at a loss to understand how any o f these
characteristics support a finding of mental retardation, nor was Ms. Driver's testimony on
this point helpful.
Kathy Johnson was misclassified as an EMR student. Other misclassifications occurred.
Dale M., a student at Reidsville High School, spent four years in EMR classes before
returning to regular classes in the ninth grade. At that time, he scored 3.8 and 3.7 in the
reading and math portions of the CAT. By the time of this twelfth grade testing, Dale was
able to score 9.2 and 9.0, respectively, this even though slow [*498] students can be
expected to gain in achievement at a slower rate than the average students who are
expected to gain about a year in [**75] achievement for each chronological year. Another
student, Linda J., after having spent two years in EMR, was able to score 9.1 and 12.0 on
her twelfth grade retest only months after having scored 8.1 and 6.3 on the reading and
math portions of the CAT. The Court cannot escape the conclusion that misclassification
has occurred. EQUAL PROTECTION
Plaintiffs also complain that children enrolled in classes for the mentally retarded are
foreclosed from receiving a high school diploma. The State Board of Education, at least
at the time evidence was presented in this case, recommended that these students be
given diplomas. Sparked by the institution of this suit, the Tattnall County School District
has now agreed to give diplomas to any EMR students who meet the CAT requirement.
Previously, not all EMR students were allowed to take the CAT. Dr. Hurley testified that
although it was very unlikely that a child correctly placed in the EMR program could
achieve a 9.0 on the reading and mathematics portions of the CAT, it was possible that a
particular child might in time be able to meet the requirement. This policy, which
involves the giving of certificates of attendance rather than diplomas to those who fail
[**76] the CAT, involves no additional factual disputes. The legal implications are
discussed below. EQUAL PROTECTION/SPECIAL EDUCATION
VI. The Legal Conclusions
A. The Racial Discrimination Claims
1. equal protection Claims
There are two separate racial classification equal protection claims before the Court, the
first being that the institution and administration of the diploma policy in itself violates
the Fourteenth Amendment and the second being that the diploma policy constitutes a
perpetuation of prior de jure segregation.
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In order to find that the diploma policy itself, without regard to history, violates the equal
protection clause, plaintiffs must show both that the policy has a discriminatory racial
impact and that the policy is tainted by a discriminatory purpose. Unquestionably, the
diploma policy in the Tattnall County School District has had a disproportionate racial
impact. This part of the test is adequately met by the evidence. But, beginning with
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040,48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976), an
identifiable discriminatory purpose became a necessary component of a racial
discrimination claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the subjective state
of mind of those [**77] implementing a challenged decision is almost always impossible
to establish by direct evidence, recent jurisprudence had addressed the question of how
circumstantial evidence be employed to prove intent while preserving the requirement
that racial animus be proven. The requirement of actual discriminatory intent, first
enunciated in Washington v. Davis was repeated in the context of school segregation case
in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S. Ct. 2766, 53 L. Ed. 2d
851 (1979).
The Fifth Circuit addressed the question of intent in light of Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman, Washington v. Davis, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977), in United
States v. Texas Education Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), rehearing denied, 579
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S. Ct. 3106, 61 L. Ed. 2d 879
(1979). In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that the evidence overwhelmingly supported
the conclusion that a pervasive intent existed to segregate Mexican-Americans. There, the
Fifth Circuit apparently adopted an objective standard for discriminatory intent in a
challenge [**78] based on equal protection. However, the court there made clear that
foreseeability alone will not necessarily support a finding of constitutional violation, but
that the absence of justifying factors in the light of clearly foreseeable discriminatory
impact can support such a conclusion. The Fifth Circuit stated, "When the official actions
challenged as discriminatory include acts and decisions [*499] that do not have a firm
basis in well accepted and historically sound non-discriminatory social policy,
discriminatory intent may be inferred from the fact that those acts had foreseeable
discriminatory consequences." Texas Educational Agency, supra, 564 F.2d, at 168.
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have made clear that satisfaction of a list of factors
is not necessarily sufficient to support a finding of discriminatory purposes. This
shopping list approach was clearly rejected in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,99 S. Ct. 2282,60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979). There the fact that the
discriminatory effect of a statute on women was clearly foreseeable did not mandate a
holding that the law was unconstitutional. The Court, in discussing the proper test [**79]
to evaluate discriminatory purpose explained, " "Discriminatory purpose'... implies more
than intent as volition or intent as an awareness of consequences .... It implies that the
decision m aker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because of not merely "in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
Feeney, supra, 442 U.S. at 279,99 S. Ct. at 2296. Reading Feeney and Texas Educational
Agency together, the Court concludes that foreseeability alone is insufficient to make out
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a clearly foreseeable impact which
is unexplained by any permissible rationale could support such a finding. The fact of a
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constitutional violation would then rest not on the fact of foreseeability but on a finding
of actual discriminatory purpose reached because die circumstances admit no other
explanation.
Defendants point to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55,100 S. Ct. 1490, 64 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1980), in which an at-large method of electing city
officials was challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. There, in assessing
the probative value of evidence demonstrating [**80] that Negroes suffered
discrimination in jobs at the hands of those who were elected under the at-large system,
the Court remarked that such evidence of discrimination by white officials after they
were elected was relevant only as the most "tenuous and circumstantial" evidence of the
constitutionality invalidity of the at-large system under which they obtained their offices.
Similarly, the Supreme Court noted that the "substantial history of official racial
discrimination" in Alabama could not taint present governmental actions in the manner of
original sin. Discriminatory purpose must be proved in each instance.
Defendants argue from Bolden that all evidence of past discrimination is irrelevant in this
case and evidence on the question of racial purpose should be limited to events
immediately surrounding the decision in favor of the CAT policy and its subsequent
implementation. The Court disagrees. In the Court's opinion, Bolden does not hold or
advise that evidence in such a case must be so severely limited. Instead, it underlines the
fact which actually must be demonstrated and warns against basing such an important
and well-defined fact as purposeful discrimination on marginally [**81] relevant facts
from which only weak inferences may be drawn.
Accordingly, the Court allowed much historical evidence to be admitted. Facts
concerning the history of racial segregation in Tattnall County were admitted. The
witnesses testifying to the origin of the CAT policy and the reason behind it were
carefully observed by the Court. The Court concludes that the policy of requiring a 9.0 on
the reading and math portions of the CAT as a graduation requirement was adopted
without racial animus. That blacks would suffer a disproportionate impact was
foreseeable but not actually foreseen. This is not a case in which foreseeability can
arguably be proof of racial animus due to the total lack of justification for the policy.
EQUAL PROTECTION. The improvement of the performance of the district's school
children is a legitimate and important goal for the Tattnall County School District due
process RATIONAL RELATION. The Court finds no evidence whatsoever that the
policy was a subterfuge to increase the value of the diploma while denying access to the
diploma to [*500] black children. Considered alone, the diploma policy does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment on grounds of racial discrimination. EQUAL PROTECTION
However, the diploma policy cannot [**82] be considered alone and must be evaluated in
light of the past de jure segregation of the Tattnall County School District. The system of
achievement grouping followed close on the heels of the disestablishment of the dual
system. The system did not operate fairly. There was substantial overlap of scores
between sections with the black children generally being placed in die lower possible
group and the white children being placed in the higher group.6 The racial makeup of the
classes was a potent predictor of success on the CAT while for black children, their early
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IQ scores were not related to their later performance on the CAT. EQUAL
PROTECTION
6. Since defendants have voluntarily abandoned their tracking system after an
investigation by the Office of Civil Rights, the constitutionality of that system is
not before the Court, except as it relates to the constitutionality of the exit exam
policy.
Undoubtedly, the discriminatory impact of the exit exam cannot be considered separately
from the de jure segregation, which [**83] preceded it and the tracking system which
perpetuated, and, in some instances, exacerbated the effects of prior segregation. Dr.
Hurley testified that the first several years of schooling are crucial in a child's educational
development. Yet, the black children who have thus far been subjected to the CAT
requirement attended segregated schools during these crucial years. Intentionally
segregated schools are illegal per se. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.
Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955). In addition, it has been demonstrated that the former
black elementary school, by the School District's contemporaneous admission, was
closed as being substandard when the dual system was abolished in the 1970-1971
academic year. The Court does not hesitate to conclude that the formerly all-black
elementary school was substandard as a matter of fact.
The duty of a school board in a school system that once operated a de jure segregated
school system is clear. Those officials have an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary
system in which discrimination is to be eliminated root and branch. Keyes v. School
District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S. Ct. 2686, 37 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972);
[**84] Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1,91 S. Ct. 1267,
28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971). It is also clear that if present facially neutral actions serve to
perpetuate past intentional discrimination, there is no requirement that intent be proved
again. That present segregation be substantially caused by past intentional discrimination
makes out plaintiffs prima facie case even absent proof of a present discriminatory
intent. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 61 L. Ed.
2d 720 (1979); Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D.Fla.1979), afifd, 644 F.2d
397 (5th Cir. 1981). In the presence of an unsatisfied duty to abolish a dual system, the
test is the effectiveness, not the purpose of actions in increasing or decreasing the
segregation caused by the dual system. Brinkman, supra, 443 U.S. at 538-539, 99 S. Ct.
at 2979,61 L. Ed. 2d at 734; Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.
Ct. 2196, 33 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1972). Thus, insofar as the poor performance of the black
children is attributable to their participation in the dual system, the diploma sanction must
fall. It cannot be constitutionally imposed on those who attended [**85] classes in the
dual system, equal protection STUDENT PREVAILED
Yet, in the case at bar, the exit exam policy has a disparate impact said to be caused by
both absolute segregation in the cmcial primary years of the subject students and the
tracking system employed by the defendants. The Court is mindful that the exit exam
policy complained of here is two causal links removed from the factual situations in the
above-cited cases (with the exception of Debra P. v. Turlington). In those cases, schools

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

436

remained segregated, a situation difficult to justify in any circumstance and nearly
impossible to justify in light of prior de jure segregation.
[*501J The Fifth Circuit has set out guidelines under which tracking practices are to be
evaluated. In McNeal v. Tate County School District, 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975) the
Court of Appeals evaluated a "faculty-predicted ability grouping system." The system
produced some all-black sections in the elementary grades and a few all-white sections in
the advanced grades. The Court stated, "Notwithstanding the fact that tract assignments
are made without regard to race, children who have been the victims of educational
discrimination in the dual systems of the past may find [**86] themselves resegregated in
any school in the district solely because they still wear a badge of their old deprivation
underachievement." McNeal, supra, 508 F.2d at 1019. Classroom segregation is
proscribed. See Adams v. Rankin County Board of Education, 485 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.
1973). When such segregation in the classroom is the result of a facially neutral tracking
system, the tracking plan will not be permitted until a unitary system has been
established. "At a minimum, this means that the district in question must have for several
years operated as a unitary system." Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F.2d
1400,1401 (5th Cir. 1971). In McNeal, the Fifth Circuit charged the district courts with
scrutinizing any plan which assigns students to segregated classrooms with "punctilious
care." Such a grouping plan may be approved "if the school district can demonstrate that
the assignment method is not based on the present results of past segregation or will
remedy such results through better educational opportunities." McNeal, supra, 508 F.2d
at 1020; United States v. Gadsden County School District, 572 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1978).
The tracking system practiced until this academic [**87] year in the Tattnall County
School District clearly cannot pass constitutional muster. The system was adopted on the
heels of the abolition of the dual system. The system was not administered fairly; when
overlap occurred in placement test scores, black children were placed in die lower section
and white children were placed in the higher, equal protection No specific remediation
programs were utilized those in the lower levels were simply exposed to less material.
REMEDIATION
If the tracking system in an otherwise unitary school system has a discriminatory effect,
yet will remedy such effects through better education opportunity, the system may pass
muster under the McNeal balancing test. In a system which has not operated as a unitary
system, the school system must show that the educational disadvantages caused by prior
segregation have ended.
The Court is of the opinion that the CAT policy should be analyzed similarly to tracking
systems. The decision to implement tracking and the decision to impose the diploma
sanction are both essentially educational decisions but ones which can perpetuate
intentional segregation. In order to draw an analogy to the tracking cases, the McNeal
reasoning would have to be applied [**88] as follows: the now abandoned tracking
system in Tattnall County occupies the analytical spot held by de jure segregation in
McNeal; the CAT diploma policy here, with its disparate effect on blacks, must be
analogized to the tracking system in McNeal. Thus, plaintiffs argue, the Fourteenth
Amendment is violated here as it was in McNeal because at present the School Board
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cannot show that the educational disadvantages caused by prior segregation have ended.
"Prior segregation" here means the discriminatory tracking system equal protection
7. The remedial classes, whose racial makeup may differ from the school
population as a whole, are not challenged here. Such classes fit the McNeal criteria
in that the level of racially identifiable classrooms tainted by prior segregation is
offset by the compensatory educational benefits. Unquestionably, these classes
have aided the learning of those who had been previously disadvantaged.
However, the Court is not entirely easy with the prospect of superimposing the current
issue over [**89] the analysis of McNeal. This concern is limited to the substitutions in
the analysis; the Court has no qualms [*502] about disallowing the imposition of the
diploma sanction on those who spent their primary years in the dual system. Yet the
Court has some difficulty in equating the tracking system recently abandoned in Tattnall
County with the dual system recently abandoned in McNeal. In McNeal, the dual system
was such a powerful historical factor that it could taint the resulting tracking system.
Although the Fifth Circuit there, in dicta, permitted tracking in a unitary system, even
where such tracking caused segregation, if the results of past segregation were being
remedied through better educational opportunities, the standard for a system not yet
unitary was far stricter. Where a unitary system has not been in effect for a sufficient
period to assure that underachievement of the slower groups is not due to former
educational disparities, the school district must show that the steps taken to bring
disadvantaged students to peer status have ended the educational disadvantages caused by
prior segregation. McNeal, supra, 508 F.2d at 1021. Plaintiffs urge the Court that the
[**90] CAT policy cannot be enforced until the school district has shown that any
underachievement of the black children is due to some other factor than prior segregation.
Thus, plaintiffs urge that there is no reason to believe that the school district will be able
to meet this standard in regard to the graduating class of 1983, the first class never to
have attended class under the dual system.
Under plaintiffs' reasoning and if the present case can be successfully analogized to
McNeal, the burden on the school district is enormous. The burden on the school district
would be to demonstrate that the educational disadvantages brought about by prior
segregation have ended. If disparities were still apparent, the school district would be
obliged to prove that any disparities could not be traced to the extinct tracking system.
The Court has serious reservations about applying McNeal in this manner. First, the
discriminatory tracking system practiced in Tattnall County is not a social evil of such
horrible magnitude as the dual system. As undesirable as the tracking system in the
Tattnall County School District was (it has been abandoned), it did not affect all of the
students. Approximately [**91] one-third of the students were never tracked. Not all of
the students who were tracked were placed in racially identifiable classrooms. These facts
are not stated in defense of the tracking system, which the Court would not hesitate to
strike down were it still viable, but rather to show that the tracking system is not identical
to a dual system in which a black child goes to school in a substandard building, uses
substandard materials, and sees only black teachers and other black students which, he
may unfortunately assume, are also substandard.
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The second problem in imposing the McNeal reasoning on the facts here is that the
practice attacked in McNeal discriminatory tracking is qualitatively different from the
diploma policy attacked here. Discriminatory tracking is a whole system, a way of
conducting the business of the school. The CAT, on the other hand, is a method of
evaluation. The CAT policy does not affect day to day student life, equal protection The
CAT policy does affect enrollment in remedial classes but all parties agree that those
classes are beneficial REMEDIATION. However, it must be emphasized that the CAT is
an evaluative device.8 The Court is reluctant to hold the school district to the [**92]
stricter McNeal standard over its choice of an evaluative device. For example, there was
testimony at trial that the Carnegie unit had become so devalued as to be meaningless.
Both sides decried this state of affairs. By way of illustration, suppose that the school
district had tried to rejuvenate the Carnegie unit system by allowing teachers to test on
the subject matter by weekly tests and to refuse to credit those who did not achieve
passing grades. If more blacks than whites failed, could it be said that teachers should not
be allowed to give any tests on the [*503] subject matter taught until enough years had
passed to make sure that former discriminatory tracking played no part in the results? The
criticisms aimed at the CAT could be aimed at any classroom testing. Surely the school
district cannot be locked into a system of social promotion until 1992 when no member
of the graduating class will have been exposed to discriminatory tracking.
8. The Court does not read the Fifth Circuit's decision in Debra P., supra, as
requiring a different analysis since the discussion here focuses on the tainting
effects of the tracking system.
[**93] The directives in McNeal must act primarily as a guide to this case with its very
different facts. Insofar as McNeal stands for the proposition that the lingering effects of
the dual system cannot be allowed to prejudice students whose educational careers were
compromised by their participation in that system, the Order of this Court is in full
agreement. Clearly, no diploma sanction may be imposed until June, 1983, when those
graduating will never have been exposed to the dual system.
The question remains, what will happen in 1983? Plaintiffs strenuously argue that the
Court is in no position to assess what the situation will be in 1983, even though the Court
has recognized that the discriminatory effect on blacks has been steadily decreasing. Yet,
McNeal appears to the Court to have assumed that several years of operation as a unitary
system have a purging effect and allow school authorities to again exercise their best
judgment and remedy the learning needs of the students, even if some remnants of the
dual system in the form of disparate achievement levels remain. The Court believes the
higher McNeal standard is applicable when school authorities adopt a program which has
a racial [**94] impact without the intervening period of unitary operation. Showing that
educational disadvantages have ended is far more difficult than showing that the policy
will remedy the results of past segregation through better educational opportunities,
which is the standard set out in McNeal under which to judge tracking in an otherwise
unitary system. EQUAL PROTECTION
Because of the factual differences between this case and McNeal, the Court is of the
belief that if the equal protection claims were the only bases for challenging the CAT
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policy, the school district could reinstate the diploma sanction in June, 1983, if it could
then show that the increased educational opportunities outweigh any lingering causal
connection between the discriminatory tracking system and the imposition of the diploma
sanction EQUAL PROTECTION. Because this area of the law is quickly developing, the
Court is careful to analyze plaintiffs' grounds separately. The conclusions on the due
process claims dictate a harsher result for the school district than do the equal protection
claims DUE PROCESS.
2. The Statutory Claims
In light of this Court's holding that the diploma policy is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it 1**95] follows that the policy is also violative of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. See Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,98 S. Ct. 2733,57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978).
In light of the Court's holding that the CAT policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment at
least until 1983, it is not necessary that any distinction be made at this time between the
respective applicable standards. Title VI, at the least, prohibits acts forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, in light of the holding on plaintiff’s equal protection
claim, the Court concludes that the imposition of the diploma requirement on black
students who previously attended substandard segregated schools and who were then
subjected to the tracking system in the Tattnall County schools violates the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(b). That section states:
"No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, b y ... the failure of
an educational agency which has formerly practiced such deliberate
segregation to take affirmative steps ... to remove the vestiges of the dual
[**96] system." STUDENT PREVAILED
[*504] B. The due process Claims
Plaintiffs' due process claims essentially concern two themes. The first is the adequacy of
the notice and the second is the reasonableness of the CAT requirement in Tattnall
County.
The questions here do not easily lend themselves to a traditional procedural due process
analysis, due process standards applicable when an individual suffers academic
consequences from a failure to achieve certain academic standards are not burdensome.
In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct.
948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1977), the Supreme Court addressed the question o f what
constitutes proper procedural due process in an academic dismissal. There a medical
student challenged on constitutional due process grounds her dismissal from medical
school for academic reasons. The Supreme Court assumed that the medical student had
been deprived of a liberty or property interest for purposes of analysis. The Court agreed
with the district court that the student had been given ample opportunity "to be absolutely
certain that their grading of the (respondent) in her medical skills was correct." Horowitz,
supra, at 85, 98 [**97] S. Ct. at 952. The Court apparently envisioned that procedural
guarantees were directed toward assuring the student that she actually had failed to meet
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the standard. Similarly, in Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), where, inter
alia, procedural due process claims were made in regard to the Georgia bar examination,
the Court of Appeals stated, "(W)hether due process requires a particular procedure in a
given situation must be determined by balancing the individual's interest in avoiding the
loss which lack of procedure inflicts upon him against the interests which the
Government seeks to advance by denying it." Tyler, supra, 517 F.2d at 1089 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals also noted that if a hearing were
required, which the Court decided was not the case, "the issue, of course, would not be
whether the examiner had given an applicant the "correct1grade, but rather whether either
a mechanical error had been made in computing the grade or the grade given by the
examiner was arbitrary, capricious, and without foundation." Tyler, supra, 517 F.2d at
1104.
The Fifth Circuit in Debra P. has decided that receipt of a high school diploma is a
property [**98] interest. 9 Still, the Court concludes that a procedural due process
analysis is not applicable here despite plaintiffs' argument that the procedural and
substantive due process issues are "intertwined." Plaintiffs are not complaining that the
students in Tattnall County have no opportunity to be heard on how well they actually
scored on the CAT. The question of what action would be taken by the school officials in
such circumstances has not been litigated and the Court has no reason to assume that a
constitutionally satisfactory arrangement would not be developed as it was by the
educational authorities involved in Horowitz and Tyler. The school authorities in this
case might be well-advised to give thought to such a mechanism in light of the scoring
errors brought to light here even though the Court is confident that, having been informed
of scoring problems, the school authorities will make every effort to prevent their
reoccurrence.
9. There was no evidence that the fact of any student's failure to attain a diploma
has been publicized in any manner by school authorities. Thus, no liberty interest
was involved. Compare Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975) with Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074,48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976).
[**99] An additional problem with a procedural due process analysis is that such an
analysis focuses on the interest affected by the lack of due process here, a high school
diploma. Traditionally, the due process right concerns an opportunity to be heard on the
factual basis underlying the loss of a liberty or property interest, rather than the standard
upon which that interest was lost. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011,
25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970). Under this reasoning, procedural due process would be required
because no diploma was awarded, [*505] not because of the nature of the standard
applied. Thus, the procedural due process problems are not different from those entailed
when a student is denied a diploma for any reason, be it lack of attendance or sufficient
credits, due process PROCEDURAL
Language in the opinion of several courts, cautions against judicial interference in school
affairs where disciplinary matters are not involved JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE. See
Horowitz, supra; Greenhill v. Bailey, supra, 519 F.2d at 7; Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d
843 (8th Cir. 1975), and cases noted therein.
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Plaintiffs' complaint that the notice of the CAT requirement provided was constitutionally
inadequate is more properly [**100] considered as part of their substantive due process
claims. In the Court's view, notice becomes constitutionally inadequate when it renders
the rule or regulation unreasonable. To the Court's knowledge, only two reported
decisions deal with the constitutional adequacy of notice to students of a changed
academic regulation. In Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth
Circuit noted the "wide latitude and discretion afforded by the courts to educational
institutions in framing their degree requirements." 529 F.2d at 450, citing Militana v.
University of Miami, Fla.App.1970, 236 So.2d 162, cert, denied, 401 U.S. 962, 91 S. Ct.
970, 28 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1971). Mahavongsanan concerned a graduate student who was not
awarded a degree because she failed a comprehensive test which became a requirement
after she had begun her graduate studies. On the student's claim that she had been denied
substantive due process, the Fifth Circuit stated,
A review of the record plainly shows that the university's decision to require
the comprehension examination was a reasonable academic regulation within
the expertise of the university's faculty. Moreover, appellee received timely
notice [**101] that she would be required to take the comprehensive
examination. This is underscored by the fact that the university gave her
ample notice to prepare a second time for taking the test.
Mahavongsanan, supra, 529 F.2d at 450. The Court of Appeals does not make clear
whether the notice problem is one of procedural or substantive due process. The district
court, believing that the issue was one of procedural due process, held that the notice of
the examination requirement was constitutionally inadequate under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381
(N.D.Ga.1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 448. The student had enrolled in January, 1974. The
requirement was imposed in Fall, 1974. Absent the requirement, Mahavongsanan would
have graduated in June, 1975. The district court opinion does not distinguish between
notice of and imposition of the exam requirement. However, since the student did not
know of the requirement when she enrolled, maximum notice possible under the facts
was slightly over a year. The Fifth Circuit found this notice was "timely," particularly in
light of the opportunity for reexamination.
Public school education does differ [**102] from state-supported graduate education in
several important respects. Attendance for most of a student's school years is required by
law. A community has a vital interest in the proper functioning of its primary and
secondary schools although this system is directly responsive to the community through
the elected school board. Even considering these differences, there appears to be no
reason to depart from the reasoning in Mahavongsanan. In the case at bar, a notice period
of more than two years, the provision that the test may be retaken, and the provision of
remedial courses considered together are not constitutionally inadequate. In view of the
judicial system's traditional deference to the educational expertise of school authorities
this Court cannot hold that the notice was unreasonable, due process EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED
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In Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. at 264 (M.D.Fla. 1979), affd, 644 F.2d at 347 (5th
Cir. 1981) the district court was upheld in a similar case, in its decision that thirteen
months' notice was unconstitutionally brief. In Debra P., major coordination problems
were presented by the exit examination [*506] which was applicable to the entire state. In
the present case, twenty-four months [**103] passed between the notice and the
implementation of the diploma sanction. Remedial courses were provided during the
period. The district court in Debra P. stated that the Fifth Circuit in Mahavongsanan
implicitly acknowledged that termination for academic reasons which have not remained
static created a due process right to timely notice. The Fifth Circuit approved this
reasoning. Nevertheless, this Court is of the opinion that notice was timely here. No one
could seriously contend that academic requirements could never be changed during the
twelve years a child typically spends in school. It is also obvious that the CAT
requirement could not have been constitutionally imposed a day prior to graduation. Such
late notice could serve no academic purpose. Plaintiffs contend that since many skills are
taught in the primary grades and defendants' system of social promotion resulted in some
students being moved through these grades without having mastered the material
appropriate to those grades, it is fundamentally unfair to deny a diploma on the basis o f a
requirement added at the eleventh hour. This argument overlooks the availability and
efficacy of the remedial program, and the motivational [**104] value of the diploma
sanction .DUE PROCESS
In addition to their attack on the reasonableness of the notice, plaintiffs' general standard
by which to judge substantive due process is well-defined in the law. The School Board's
actions are entitled to a presumption of legislative validity and the burden is on plaintiffs
to show that there is no rational connection between the Board's action and its legitimate
interest in improving the educational experience of the students in Tattnall County
STATE AUTHORITY. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 99
S. Ct. 1062, 59 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1978). The individual is to be protected against arbitrary
government action. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,96 S. Ct. 2532,49 L. Ed. 2d 451
(1976). If an academic decision by a public educational institution is to be reviewed at
all, the standard is that it may not be arbitrary and capricious. Horowitz, supra, 435 U.S.
at 92,98 S. Ct. at 956. 10
DUE PROCESS
10. The Court is aware of the factual distinction between Horowitz and the case at
bar: that compulsory secondary education is arguably subject to a stricter standard
of review. Yet the Court does not find support for this view in the case law or in
the reasoning underlying the decisions in Horowitz and Mahavongsanan. The ready
accountability of school board members to the community arguably weighs the
argument against a stricter standard.
[**105] The objective of the CAT policy, to improve the educational product of the
Tattnall County School District, is an obviously legitimate goal within the proper
province of the school board. The Court has no reason to doubt that the motives for the
CAT policy were as testified to here. Defendants wished to imbue the diploma with
additional meaning. They wished to motivate the students to strive for greater academic
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achievement and provide the means necessary in remedial classes for students to attain
that level of achievement. The Court agrees with the district court in Debra P. that the
goal of the exit exam policy is a legitimate goal of the Tattnall County School District,
due process
As the Supreme Court has recently reemphasized, the determination of rationality is
made at the time of the legislative decision. Whether or not an empirical relationship
exists, the legislative purpose and the action taken is not the question. Instead "those
challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true
by the governmental decision maker.1Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. (93), at [**106] 111
(99 S. Ct. 939,59 L. Ed. 2d 171)." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company, 449
U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1981).
Plaintiffs' attack centers on the contention that the means employed, the requirement that
each student achieve a 9.0 rating on the CAT in order to receive a diploma, is not
reasonably related to the goals expressed. Some of plaintiffs' attacks on the rationality of
the CAT requirement are more troublesome than others. DUE PROCESS
[*507] The failure of the requirement of the 9.0 level to take into account the standard
error of measurement does not render the CAT requirement irrational. As noted above,
Dr. Findlay testified that the importance of the standard error of measurement diminishes
with repeated test administrations since the error of measurement will not always operate
to a student's disadvantage. In addition, the problem may be one of semantics rather than
of constitutional proportion since the concept of the standard error of measurement
simply redefines the cutoff score as one somewhat above the announced 9.0. In the
absence of convincing argument that the 9.0 level represents the highest level of
achievement which may be constitutionally [**107] required, the Court is not persuaded
that recognition of the fact that a standard error of measurement exists mandates the
conclusion that the test requirement is unreasonable. DUE PROCESS
Nor is the Court persuaded that use of Level 19 rather than Level 18 is an irrational
decision for purposes of constitutional evaluation. According to Defendants' Exhibit 7,
Technical Bulletin for the CAT, Level 19 is appropriate for use from grade 9.6 to 12.9.
Plaintiffs argue that since 9.0 is the cutoff point, that level o f the test which encompasses
the 9.0 point, Level 18, is more appropriate. However, the majority o f the CAT testing
takes place after the middle of the ninth grade. Thus, except for a small portion of the test
administration, the test is being administered in accordance with the instructions in the
technical bulletin. The Court finds no denial of substantive due process in use of Level
19. due process EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILS
Plaintiffs also contend that the test was not designed for the purpose for which it is being
used invoking the need for special safeguards. Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate
School District, 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972). In that case, a requirement that school
teachers achieve a certain score [**108] on the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) was
struck down. The GRE was designed to determine the test taker's aptitude for graduate
study. In Armstead, the superintendent of schools admitted that he knew that the GRE
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had nothing to do with teacher competency. However, the case at bar presents an entirely
different set of facts. The CAT is being used to determine how a student is achieving in
relationship to other students across the country. That the CAT is well-designed to
perform this task was not successfully disputed at trial. Ms. Bryan, plaintiffs' chief expert
witness, testified that she favorably reviewed the 1970 edition of the CAT when it was
published. Here the school authorities have redesigned the criteria for graduation stating
that a student must perform at least on a level four years below his average counterpart
across the nation. The CAT was capable of producing just such a comparison. That a
student be able to perform at an average ninth grade level was a legitimate and relevant
expectation for the school authorities to hold for their students. This state of affairs is in
contrast to the situation in Armstead where a teacher's aptitude for doctoral studies
admittedly [**109] had no relevance to his ability to teach. DUE PROCESS
Since the CAT is being used to measure what it was designed to measure, i. e., relative
achievement levels in mathematics and reading, the Court is of the opinion that local
revalidation was not necessary. Basing the receipt of a diploma on a ninth grade
achievement level was not unreasonable. Defendants did not concoct a homemade
examination but chose instead to rely on a professionally constructed and well-regarded
examination. VALIDITY
Yet plaintiffs' contentions go beyond the conclusions above. Even if the decision to
require achievement at the ninth grade level on the CAT was not in itself unreasonable,
plaintiffs contend that, contrary to nationwide experience, the CAT results in Tattnall
County schools are neither reliable nor valid. This argument attacks the results of
implementing the CAT policy rather than rationality of its adoption. Legislative action
may not be invalidated on the grounds that the evidence shows that the legislature was
mistaken. Clover Leaf Creamery, supra, — U.S. at —, 101 S. Ct. at 724, 66 L. Ed. 2d at
669. [*508] However, even if the results of the CAT policy were relevant, those results
would demonstrate [**110] that the beneficial result of the policy is "at least debatable."
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154,58 S. Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.
Ed. 1234 (1938).
The evidence resulting from the adoption of the CAT policy is only marginally probative
on the issue of the rationality of its adoption. However, the results were generally
supportive of rationality. On the issue of reliability, plaintiffs' unrefuted evidence showed
test results which varied greatly for some students over a period of time. As discussed
above, some students made gains beyond what could have been hoped for while some
others lost ground on some administrations. While the standardization conducted by CTB
McGraw-Hill must have included aberrations in the performance of individual students,
the opinion of plaintiffs' expert was that reliability of the CAT in Tattnall County was
below what was professionally acceptable. VALIDITY
The issue of validity presents similar difficulties. Although the Court disagrees with
plaintiffs' contention that school authorities should have conducted local validation
studies before the CAT policy was implemented, those studies have been performed by
plaintiffs. As outlined above, [**111] many items did not meet the standards set by CTB
McGraw-Hill.
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Yet the Court is not of the opinion that these difficulties render the CAT policy an
irrational means to a legitimate end. The CAT is not a hastily constructed vehicle, but
rather a test instrument constructed with the utmost care. It is difficult to explain the
disparity of the results obtained in the Tattnall County public schools. The Court cannot
conclude that this well-respected test instrument is unsuitable for use in Tattnall County.
VALIDIDTYEDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
The only apparent explanation, other than that the students in Tattnall County are very
different from students in the rest of the United States, is that the students experienced
differences in motivation on successive testings. The fact is difficult to explain.
Nevertheless, evidence of the success of the CAT policy in Tattnall County is enough to
sustain the policy against the charge of irrationality, were such results the basis for
deciding this issue. The educational plan which combines the diploma sanction with a
remedial program is drastically reducing the numbers of departing seniors who cannot
score at the beginning ninth grade level on the CAT. The testimony o f defendants
[**112] was essentially uncontradicted that the need for remedial classes has lessened.
REMEDIATION. The motivational change in the students and teachers was testified to
and defendants' figures show that those entering high school outperform their
counterparts of a few years earlier. It is true that the increases in the CAT scores have not
yet been reflected in the Georgia CRT scores. Yet since the results of the policy include
better academic performance, an increased enthusiasm for learning, and a reduced need
for remediation, the Court holds that the CAT policy, insofar as the above-discussed
grounds are concerned, is rationally related to a legitimate goal of the School Board.
STATE AUTHORITY
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
However, an additional and dispositive argument must be discussed. Plaintiffs have
argued that there must be a nearly exact match between the questions on the test and the
curriculum. This view was recently upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Debra P., supra. There
the Fifth Circuit declared a Florida exit examination violative of substantial due process
standards in that it may have covered matters not taught in the schools. The Court of
Appeals later stated that the test must be a "fair test" of that which was taught.
VALIDITY
This standard [**113] is not easily applied to the facts in this case. Ms. Larson's
testimony made it clear that not everything that was taught by the Scott-Foresman series
was covered by the CAT. Those in remedial classes had even less of their material
covered by the CAT. More importantly, because of the difficulties outlined supra, at 491,
the match was not performed the other way, and Ms. Larson did not determine whether
all of the materials appearing [*509] on the CAT had actually been taught. However, Ms.
Bryan did testify that the type of questions included on the CAT should be covered by
any recognized standard curriculum.
There are factual distinctions between this case and the situation presented in Debra P. In
Debra P. the state hastily concocted an examination and implemented it in a statewide
area in the space of slightly more than a year. In the case at bar, the school authorities
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selected a reliable and well-established test instrument. This appears to the Court to be
sound practice in that the school authorities took advantage of the expertise of
professional test constructors rather than hastily put together their own instrument.
However, in light of the strong language in Debra P., [**114] the Court has no choice but
to conclude that the Tattnall County School District has not sustained its burden. The
Fifth Circuit in Debra P. concluded that "fundamental fairness requires that the state be
put to test on the issue of whether the students were tested on material they were or were
not taught." Debra P., at 406. The Court can only conclude that where the award of a
diploma depends on the outcome of a test, the burden is on the school authorities to show
that the test covered only material actually taught. 11
11. The Court is curious as to whether the ruling in Debra P. will mean that in the
future any diploma determinative test, perhaps a final exam in senior English, will
require this justification by school authorities.
Since Ms. Bryan's testimony says no more than that the test probably contains items that
were taught, the Court must conclude that the school authorities have not met the test of
Debra P. Because it has not been demonstrated that the items on the CAT were actually
taught in [**115] the Tattnall County schools, the use of the CAT as an exit exam must
fall on substantial due process grounds. This conclusion must be reached in spite of the
demonstrated success of the CAT policy. CURRICULAR VALIDITY STUDENT
PREVAILED
C. The Claims of Those Students Classified as Mentally Retarded
Plaintiffs' claim on behalf of this group is essentially two-pronged. First, it is argued that
the diploma policy unlawfully forecloses the possibility that mentally retarded students
may obtain diplomas. Secondly, it is argued that the diploma policy is unlawful in light of
the fact that many children presently classified as mentally retarded have been classified
improperly.
1. The Effect of the Diploma Policy on Children Accurately Classified
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794, prohibits
discrimination or denials of benefits or participation in programs if the discrimination is
based on the fact that the individual is handicapped but is otherwise qualified for such
program or benefit. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1, § 84.4. The Tattnall County School District is the
recipient of federal funds.
The Fifth Circuit has indicated that § 504 is enforceable in a private cause of action.
University [**116] of Texas v. Camenisch, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), review granted,
449 U.S. 950, 101 S. Ct. 352,66 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1980), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 390,101 S. Ct. 1830, 68 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1981). This decision is in
accord with decisions in other circuits. See Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority,
548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2nd Cir. 1977).
That no exhaustion of administrative remedies is required is indicated by Camenisch. The
Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether a private cause of action exists is clearly
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bound to the question of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite
to suit under § 504. The court reasoned that while the HEW procedures could result in a
termination of funding for an educational institution, those procedures "do not provide
the most appropriate or exclusive remedy to vindicate personal § 504 rights." Camenisch,
supra, 616 F.2d at 134. The court reasoned that the administrative remedies would
provide no relief to plaintiff and would worsen plaintiffs position.
[*510] It is true that in the case at bar, a class of individuals is suing and there are
procedures [**117] available to challenge individual placement decisions. Yet, in light of
the Fifth Circuit's pronouncements, this Court has no hesitancy in deciding that a private
cause of action exists under § 504 and that exhaustion is not required. See Larry P. v.
Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D.Cal.1979), at 56.
In evaluating the claim that the diploma policy violates § 504, the question which must be
answered is whether the children in the special education programs are "otherwise
qualified" to receive a diploma. The Court notes that, although children who are
classified as mentally retarded have not been awarded diplomas in the past, school
authorities have now agreed to allow the children so classified to take the CAT. Dr.
Hurley testified that it was possible, although unlikely, that a child properly classified as
mentally retarded might eventually reach the 9.0 level on the CAT. Thus, the situation in
which the children classified as mentally retarded are automatically foreclosed from
competing for a diploma does not now exist in the Tattnall County schools.
However, plaintiffs argue that by placing those children classified as mentally retarded in
special classes these children are never [**118] exposed to a curriculum which would
enable them to pass the CAT. As Dr. Hurley testified, this is essentially true. The
emphasis in programs for the mentally retarded is not on academic matters but on
practical skills. While a child who is truly mentally retarded will profit more from such
an individualized program of instruction than from the instruction in a regular classroom,
he will be less well prepared for a test like the CAT. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the
mentally retarded are benefited by the special programs but argue that to deny a diploma
to one who has successfully completed the appropriate program of instruction is to
discriminate against an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual.
The case law has not provided a set of circumstances identical to the ones at hand.
However, an examination of the cases which do deal with the concept of "otherwise
qualified" rely on the concept that if the handicap is extraneous to the activity sought to
be engaged in, the handicapped person is "otherwise qualified." In Kampmeier v.
Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2nd Cir. 1977) two high school students, each of whom had
vision in only one eye, tried to enjoin the public school authorities [**119] from
excluding them from participation in contact sports. The Second Circuit upheld the denial
of a preliminary injunction. In discussing the meaning of "otherwise qualified" the
Second Circuit stated:
As we read § 504, however, exclusion of handicapped children from a school
activity is not improper if there exists a substantial justification for the
school's policy. Section 504 prohibits only the exclusion of handicapped
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persons who are "otherwise qualified." Here the defendants have relied on
medical opinion that the children with sight in only one eye are not qualified
to play in contact sports because of the high risk of eye injury.
Kampmeier, supra, 553 F.2d at 299.
The increased risk of injury was inseparable from the combination of the physical
handicap and the sought activity, equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 60 L. Ed. 2d
980 (1979), the Supreme Court followed this reasoning. The case concerned a woman
with serious hearing disability who was not admitted to a program which culminated in
an Associate Degree of Nursing which would have made her eligible for state
certification as a registered nurse. However, she [**120] could understand normal spoken
speech only by looking directly at the speaker. Thus, she was at a large disadvantage in
the operating room where masks are worn or in any instance when a physician or patient
needed to get her attention without being able to face her squarely.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court and held that plaintiff was not
"otherwise qualified." The Court stated that mere possession of a handicap is not a
permissible ground for assuming inability to function in a particular context. The Court
[*511] went on to define "otherwise qualified" as "one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 442 U.S. at 406, 99 S. Ct. at 2367. Ms.
Davis' handicap was inseparable from her ability to perform as a registered nurse. The
Court recognized that "the line between a lawful refiisal to extend affirmative action and
illegal discrimination against handicapped persons will not always be clear. 442 U.S. at
412,99 S. Ct. at 2370. Yet, the opinion clearly stands for an interpretation of Section 504
which recognizes that if the handicap itself prevents the individual from participation in
an activity program, the individual is not [**121] "otherwise qualified" within the
meaning of the statute.
In the case at bar, actual participation in a program is not at issue. All agree that the
special education programs offered to the mentally retarded benefit them more than
would the normal academic program available. These children, by the very nature o f their
handicap, cannot fully participate in the normal academic programs. What the Court is
faced with is essentially an argument that an educational institution has no right to define
its standards. The definition of "diploma" is what is challenged rather than a barrier to a
program. Plaintiffs argue that because the school authorities have chosen to define their
diploma to reflect a certain level of academic accomplishment, unlawful discrimination
exists against those who cannot meet that standard because of their handicaps. The
Supreme Court in Davis stated: "Section 504 imposes no requirement upon an education
institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a
handicapped person." 442 U.S. at 413, 99 S. Ct. at 2370. While the school authorities are
free to award regular diplomas to any student, no matter what the level of achievement
[**122] reached, the Court concludes that Section 504 does not require such action.
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
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The Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the reasoning in Davis does not
apply here because postsecondary education is encompassed by Subpart F, 45 C.F.R. §
84.41 et seq. of the regulations under the Act while Subpart D dealing with preschool,
elementary, and secondary education is relevant here. Plaintiffs point to 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(k) which defines "Qualified handicapped person" as any person of an age where
non-handicapped persons are provided such services. The definition appears to aid a
school district in determining who must be provided free appropriate education. To
suggest that by virtue of that language in the definition, any standard or requirement
which has a disparate effect on the handicapped is presumed unlawful is far-fetched. The
repeated use of the word "appropriate" in the regulations suggests that different standards
for the handicapped are envisioned by the regulations.
The Court notes that it does not believe that the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in S-l v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), requires a different result here. In that case,
several students were [**123] expelled for misconduct which may have been a
manifestation of the very handicaps the students possessed. To provide for expulsion of
students on the basis of their handicap would fly in the face o f the statute which
guarantees that all school-age handicapped children shall receive an appropriate
education. However, in the case at bar, it is not questioned that those properly classified
as EMR students are receiving an appropriate education. Whether the recognition of the
fact that this appropriate education is not the academic equivalent of the regular
scholastic program is not touched on in S-l v. Turlington.
2. The Effect of the Diploma Policy on Those Misclassified as Mentally Retarded
Section 504 and the regulations issued thereunder do seek to protect the rights of those
who have been misclassified as handicapped. Section 84.3(j) of Title 45, Code of Federal
Regulations (1979) defines "Handicapped person" as any person who "(i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has
a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having [*512] such an impairment."
Section 84.3(2) (iii) makes clear that one who is [**124] misclassified as having such a
mental impairment is covered by the statute and regulations. The regulations promulgated
under Section 504 set out the criteria which are to be used in evaluating a student for
special placement. 45 C.F.R. § 84.35(c). As found above at pp. 45-47, many instances of
misclassification or lack of necessary placement procedures have occurred. The records
of only a sample of the students classified as mentally retarded have been examined by
the Office of Civil Rights. The Court holds that Section 504 has been violated by
misclassification and absence of proper procedure. Counsel for plaintiffs and defendants
shall meet and submit a plan to the Court to provide for the reevaluation of those
presently so classified, equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION The parties shall also
submit a plan to provide for the remediation of those students who have been
misclassified. REMEDIATION
3. The equal protection Claims of the Handicapped
The Court is at a loss to understand how the equal protection clause is violated. The
Court will insure that those who have been misclassified will be identified and provided
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with remediation. The Court does not find any intentional misclassification. Nor does the
Court conclude that [**125] the diploma policy creates a quasi-suspect class. Plaintiffs
have pointed to no opinion by a court of appeals holding that mentally retarded persons
are a quasi-suspect class. In addition, since the diploma policy merely sets out an
academic qualification for a diploma, it no more discriminates against the mentally
retarded than does a requirement that a certain number of Carnegie units be earned. Many
academic requirements may be beyond the abilities of these children. Yet, academic
standards are obviously important to the legitimate interest of educating students. To
applaud the efforts in recent years to develop the potential of these unfortunate students is
not to require that a diploma be issued to cover all degrees of academic achievement, no
matter how meager. 12
12. Judge Bua's opinion in Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D.I11.1979)
finding that statutory classifications based on mental illness are quasi-suspect is not
helpful here. The Supreme Court reversed in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,
101 S. Ct. 1074, 67 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1981), without deciding whether the mentally ill
were a suspect class.EQUAL PROTECITON SPECIAL EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
[**126] VI. Summary
In conclusion, since the CAT policy violates due process, all plaintiffs, including those in
Anderson v. Banks, prevail. Defendants are ordered to award diplomas to all students
who would have received them except for the existence of the CAT policy. No exit exam
policy may be utilized until it is demonstrated that the test used is a fair test of what is
taught.
In Johnson v. Sikes, Classes 1 and la prevail on their equal protection claim. Defendants
may not impose the diploma sanction on any member of these classes until the graduation
of the Class of 1983 which will mark the first group who began their education after the
abolition of the dual system. The period between this date and June, 1983 will also
provide an opportunity for the remedial programs now available to overcome the effects
of the now-abandoned tracking system. The school authorities are to outline the
continued benefits to the Court in 1983 before any denial of diplomas takes place. O f
course, defendants must also remedy the due process violation before any exit exam may
be reinstated.
Class 2 in Johnson v. Sikes prevails insofar as misclassification has occurred. Insofar as
the students in Class [**127] 2 who have been accurately classified, and who are given
the opportunity to take the CAT, should it be properly reinstated, the Court finds no fault
with the diploma sanction.
Defendants shall submit their proposals for reevaluation of the students classified as
related by June 29,1981. Plaintiffs may respond on or before July 8,1981, at 1:30 P.M.
A hearing will be held at that time to determine the particular procedures and timetable
necessary to remedy the misclassification.
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DEBRA P., a minor by Irene P., her mother and next friend
et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Ralph D.
TURLINGTON, Individually and as Commissioner of
Education et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
No. 79-3074
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH
CIRCUIT
654 F.2d 1079; 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 17977
September 4,1981
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida; George C. Carr, District Judge.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: A poll of the court was requested by a member of the
court for the reconsideration of the cause en banc in which the court rendered an opinion
regarding public education.
OVERVIEW: A majority of the judges voted not to reconsider the cause in response to a
request by a member of the court, thus, rehearing en banc was denied. However, two of
the judges filed dissenting statements from the court's refusal to consider the case en
banc, thus, the court filed a statement that explained the panel opinion. The court held
that it did not forbid a state from providing quality education, decree that the aim of
public education was to confer a diploma rather than educate, find that black children
were not ready for quality education, or order educational requirements. The court found
that a diploma had unique value, that the state required attendance in school, that the state
established a public school system, that if attendance requirements were met and courses
were passed, a diploma would be awarded, that mutual expectations were created
between the state and students, and that there was a property right in the expectation o f a
diploma. Further, the court held that to suggest that the state had allowed, or that the
panel approved, the awarding of a diploma to any child who had received no learning was
to misread both the record and the court's opinion.
OUTCOME: The court denied rehearing en banc because a majority of the judges voted
against reconsideration of the cause, however the court filed a statement to further
explain the panel opinion regarding public education.
CORE TERMS: diploma, functional, educational, literacy, exam, en banc, educational
systems, school system, illiterate, property interest, unequal, skills, public education,
segregation, taught, panel opinion, achievement, learning, teaching, literacy test,
certification, disciplinary, graduation, segregated, black students, inherently, classroom,
black and white, educational institutions, high school diploma
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COUNSEL: W. Crosby Few, Tampa, Fla., James D. Little, Gen. Counsel, State Board of
Education-Knott Judith A. Brechner, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, Fla., for
defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.
Irving Gomstein, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington D.C., for amicus curiae U.S.A.
Stephen F. Hanlon, Bay Area Legal Services, Inc., Robert J. Shapiro, Tampa, Fla., Diana
Pullin, Center for Law and Education, Roger L. Rice, Richard Jefferson, Cambridge,
Mass., Peter M. Siegel, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.
David Rubin, Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, Washington, D.C., amicus curiae.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(5 Cir., 1981,644 F.2d 397).
JUDGES: Before FAY and VANCE, Circuit Judges and ALLGOOD *, District
Judge.Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, and RONEY, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE,
KRAVITCH, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., HENDERSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON,
and THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judges.
* District Judge of the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: PER CURIAM:
OPINION
[**2] [*1079] A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the
reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not
having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.
In dissenting statements from the court's refusal to consider this case en banc, two o f our
brothers have expressed concern about the ramifications of the panel opinion. With great
respect for their views but shocked at their misinterpretations, we file this statement in
hope of assisting others involved.
Specifically, the panel assigned this matter did n o t:
a. Forbid a state from providing quality education.
b. Decree that the aim of public education is to confer a diploma and not to educate.
c. Find that black children were not ready for quality education.
d. Order any educational requirements (high or low) for a state school system.
e. Inject itself in any way in the curriculum of the state school system.
f. Suggest that black students be treated differently from white students.
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To suggest that the panel opinion has somehow found a constitutional right to a diploma
in the absence of an education is to play word games which we feel are [**3J both
inappropriate and unfounded. Apparently our dissenting brothers would approve of
"social promotions" coupled with a denial of a diploma as complying with the legal
requirements of equal educational opportunities within a unitary school system. Even
[*1080] more distressing is the assumption inherent in the language of the dissents that
the black students involved here had not attended class and satisfactorily passed all
examinations given in those courses prescribed as necessary for the receipt of a diploma.
What the record in this case clearly establishes and what the panel of this court did hold
includes:
a. That a diploma has a unique value in the market place.
b. That the State of Florida requires attendance in school between certain ages.
c. That the State of Florida has established a public school system.
d. That if certain attendance requirements are met and if specified courses of study are
satisfactorily completed (passed) a diploma will be awarded.
e. That mutual expectations are thus created between the state and the students.
f. That if a student complies with the established requirements and if he or she has
satisfactorily passed these required courses [**4] of study, there is a property right in the
expectation of a diploma. DUE PROCESS: PROPERTY RIGHT
g. That if a state is going to impose as a condition for receipt of a diploma a functional
literacy test over and above whatever tests, examinations or grading requirements exist
for specific single classes (world history, business mathematics, etc.), that test must be a
fair test of material presented within those required courses of study. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
h. That the State of Florida is to be commended for its concern over the quality of the
education being furnished by its public school system.
i. That the State o f Florida may utilize a functional literacy examination for both remedial
purposes and as a condition for the awarding of a diploma.
To suggest that the State of Florida has allowed, or that the panel approved, the awarding
of a diploma to any child who had received no learning is to misread both the record and
the court's opinion.
CONCUR BY: RONEY
CONCUR
RONEY, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
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It has been two years since the district court decided this case. Both parties appealed from
that decision. Neither party has suggested the case be heard by the en banc court. This is
sufficient reason for this Court to [**5] decline to consider the case en banc, even without
considering the record, the issues and all of the matters discussed by my dissenting
colleagues, which have neither been briefed nor argued to nonpanel members, and
whether or not the dissents have correctly or incorrectly read the panel decision. In this
kind of litigation, the parties' decision as to where they next want to attempt to resolve
these complex problems is entitled to great deference without the interference of
unrequested, judicially forced, prolonged and expensive en banc procedures which could
delay any decision from this Court by at least a year. This Court exists to decide cases, to
serve the litigants. We do well when we remember that simple fact. The denial of en banc
consideration is justified, whatever the merits of the particular matters argued in the
dissents and for whatever reasons an individual judge may have voted.
DISSENT BY: TJOFLATHILL
DISSENT
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
A panel of this court has held that public high school students have a constitutionally
protected property interest in receipt of a high school diploma, and that the state may not
withhold that diploma, despite a student's inability [**6] to pass a functional literacy
exam, unless the state can prove that it has taught, and perhaps taught well, Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981), the material covered on the exam. Thus, this
federal court has told the State of Florida that it is constitutionally required to award
diplomas to students who are functionally illiterate.
[*1081] Moreover, the panel has held it constitutionally impermissible for the State of
Florida to presently require the same level of functional literacy from black and white
high school students. This constitutional prohibition is to continue until the state
demonstrates that racially disproportionate student illiteracy cannot be attributed to the
educational deprivations of past racial segregation in the schools. The panel has provided
no guidance concerning how the state is to go about proving this negative proposition.
These holdings are obviously of great moment; they will have far-reaching effect
throughout the six states of the Fifth Circuit and will signal to all other states the futility
of attempting to improve educational systems in the face of federal interventionism. In
one blow our circuit has created a mighty [**7] disincentive for the pursuit of excellence
in education. This case undoubtedly is en banc worthy, and I vigorously dissent from the
court's refusal to rehear it.
The panel opinion states the facts of this case clearly. Debra P., at 400. My concern is not
with the panel's interpretation of those facts, but rather with both the substantive
character and the practical ramifications of the law the panel creates and applies to those
facts.
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To focus this dissent I will restate briefly the two holdings of the panel that are, in my
mind, most problematic. The first holding concerns due process. The panel finds that
Florida has created a property interest in the expectation of receiving a high school
diploma, and that this property interest is protected by the due process clause. Moreover,
despite finding that Florida's functional literacy exam accurately tests basic functional
literacy skills, Debra P., at 406, the panel holds that refusing diplomas to students failing
the exam will violate the students' due process rights if the exam tests matters not covered
in the classroom, due process According to the panel, an exam covering such matters is
fundamentally unfair. I believe this holding is [**8] contrary to establish Fifth Circuit
precedent and that it flies in the face of the spirit of the Supreme Court case law on
students' educational rights.
The second panel holding that poses great difficulty for me concerns the equal protection
clause. The record below indicates that the functional literacy test has a disproportionate
impact on black students. The panel views the higher incidence of black failure on the
exam as linked directly to the unequal education blacks received during the years of
racial segregation. Thus, the argument goes, denying a diploma for failure of the literacy
exam perpetuates past racial discrimination. Because the state has failed to demonstrate
that denying a diploma is necessary to remedy the continuing effects of past
discrimination, the state scheme must fall as violative of the fourteenth amendment. I
believe this panel holding is a grievous affront to the fundamental principles underlying
the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L.
Ed. 873 (1954).
The due process Analysis
I believe the panel is incorrect in identifying receipt of a diploma as a property interest
protected by the due process clause. [**9] The panel relies upon Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 95 S. Ct. 729,42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975), to support its discovery of this protected
interest, Debra P., at 403, yet Goss should not be read to encompass purely academic
matters; in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98
S. Ct. 948,55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978), the Supreme Court indicated that the minimum due
process requirement of Goss is limited to disciplinary determinations that inhibit a
student's access to education. Horowitz at 87-91, 98 S. Ct. at 954-56. The Court,
therefore, has distinguished the role a court may play when called upon to interfere with
state disciplinary proceedings and its role in reviewing academic decision making in an
educational system. Id. Thus, denying access to education triggers rigorous due process
analysis; denying academic certification does not. Other courts have recognized this
distinction, see Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975), and indeed, I
believe [*1082] it to be the basis of controlling case law in this circuit.
In Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976), this circuit held that a
university's decision to require students [**10] to pass a comprehensive examination as a
prerequisite to receiving an M.A. degree was a reasonable academic regulation. In so
holding, this court stressed that educational institutions have "wide latitude and discretion
... in framing their academic degree requirements." Id. at 450. Indeed, the court went on
to emphasize that a state educational institution is entitled to modify its rules and
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regulations "so as to properly exercise its educational responsibility." Id. This was so
despite the district court's determination, Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381, 383
(N.D.Ga.1975) rev'd, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976), unrefuted in the Court of Appeals,
that the exam in question tested "abilities and materials which may not necessarily be
instructed within the student's program of study." A contrary holding, this court
emphasized, could only be explained by confusing "the court's power to review
disciplinary actions by educational institutions on the one hand, and academic decisions
on the other hand." Mahavongsanan, 529 F.2d at 449. Despite this exhortation, the panel
in Debra P. has done just that, converting this confused perspective into law. Thus, I am
at a loss in attempting [**11] to square Debra P. with the prior, controlling authority of
Mahavongsanan.
It follows directly from Horowitz, Bruton and Mahavongsanan that education, not receipt
of a diploma, is a property interest deserving of rigorous due process protection. To
confuse the two is entirely inappropriate, as education is quite distinct from receipt o f a
diploma. A diploma supposedly signifies attainment of a certain level of academic
proficiency. Tims, ideally, a diploma indicates that the state has performed fully its self
assumed duty to provide a student with an education and that the student has been
successful in participating in that education. Therefore, as the panel stresses, at 403, a
diploma illustrates successful progress through one's education. Academic success is not
a property right the relevant right is to a full and fair opportunity for an education.
By positing a rigorously safe-guarded property interest in receipt of a diploma, the panel
has triggered a due process analysis that fails to correspond to the true constitutional
character of the student expectation in question. A student's expectation is protectible
only insofar as that expectation comports with the reasonable [**12] demands of the
relevant educational institution. One simply should not be said to have a due process
property interest in a diploma absent performance equaling established academic
standards, for a student has only a conditional right to a diploma. Horowitz. The panel
has turned this reasoning on its head, providing rigorous protection for the diploma
interest before student compliance with purely academic requirements.
Even more troublesome than the identification of the diploma property right, however, is
the panel's inquiry into the fundamental fairness of Florida's functional literacy exam. No
one contests that the Florida Legislature instituted the functional literacy exam as a
diploma prerequisite out of a concern for "the quality of its public educational system."
Debra P., at 400. Moreover, as noted earlier, the district court has found and the panel
accepts that the examination tests validly the everyday, practical application of the basic
functional literacy skills of reading, writing and arithmetic. VALIDITY. Id. at 406. For
example, the exam tests a student's ability to complete an employment application, to
"determine the inferred cause and effect of an action," to comparison-shop, [**13] to
solve problems "involving purchases and a rate of discount," and to demonstrate other
skills of undoubted everyday utility. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 259 n.22
(M.D.Fla.1979). We must recognize, therefore, that Florida is testing fundamental,
indeed minimal, intellectual maturation; the test inquires not into abstract academic
matters but rather into the ability to apply basic skills in the context of real-life
performance situations. We also must recognize that the decision to impose this exam
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requirement is a clear [*1083] articulation o f state policy: the Florida Legislature has
decided that successful completion of a public high school education necessarily entails
achievement of a minimum level of practical literacy. It would be difficult to formulate a
more reasonable or more skeletal policy of public education.
With these considerations in mind, I find very disquieting the panel's determination that
the exam must be labeled unfair and constitutionally impermissible if Florida fails to
demonstrate that it tested material actually taught in each of its classrooms. This holding
places a very onerous burden on the state, for it must prove that each and [**14] every
student sitting for the functional literacy test was taught, and perhaps taught well, Debra
P., at 404, each bit of knowledge that plays a role in the examination. One can only
hypothesize what threshold of proof the district court, in the absence of adequate
direction from this court, will require of the state. Several difficulties are clear, however.
First, the state will have to prove that the material covered on the functional literacy exam
was taught, and, by definition, taught adequately, while simultaneously justifying an
inevitable amount of underachievement on the exam CURRICULAR VALIDITY. In
effect, the state will have to show that a student's failure to achieve functional literacy
after twelve years of public education is not attributable to ineffective instruction. Surely
one cannot assert that adequate teaching always produces true learning, yet it is much less
self-evident that this disharmony is subject to proof in a court of law. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
Second, this imposing theoretical difficulty of proof will be compounded, for the state
must carry this burden for every complaining student in the context of each course that
student attended. There is great potential for litigation concerning the [**15]
effectiveness of individual teachers. Will a student be entitled to a diploma simply
because one of his teachers "did not cover the whole book in class," Debra P., at 406?
How will Florida be able to test students who transfer into the Florida educational
system? The potential for litigation is almost endless; the state's burden is oppressive at
best. CURRICULAR VALIDITY
Third, the nature of the matter tested, functional literacy, belies the reasonableness o f the
state's burden. As I have stated, to test functional literacy is to test whether a student has
absorbed basic skills and, during the process of growth, learned to convert those skills
into the attributes of minimum intellectual maturity. One can, with an acceptable degree
of error, attempt to measure the teaching of basic skills, but trying to measure the
teaching of the process of maturation derived from acquiring those skills is extremely
difficult. Under Debra P. the state certainly will have to prove the link between teaching
and maturation, and will have to validate the methods employed, (potentially in each
classroom), to convey the fruits of that linkage to the student. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
These few reflections illustrate clearly the message Debra [**16] P. conveys to the states.
That message is that the federal judiciary will create significant disincentives for state
efforts to improve the quality of education. To my mind, the barriers the panel places
between the State of Florida and achievement of its educational goals can only be
characterized as constitutionally unjustifiable. Furthermore, those barriers portend

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

459

subsequent federal intrusions inhibiting state educational policy. For example, will Debra
P.'s federally-imposed curricular validity requirement lead to a federally-dictated basic
curriculum, or federally-mandated text-book uniformity, thus eliminating the flexibility
the states must have in implementing their education programs?
The panel's approach simply paves the way for extremely vexatious litigation, while
demonstrating the very intrusiveness into state educational concerns that the Supreme
Court has so clearly denounced.
The Supreme Court has recently noted that " "Judicial interposition in the operation o f the
public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint.... By and
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of [*1084] state and
local authorities.' [**17] " Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91, 98 S. Ct. at 955, quoting Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104, 89 S. Ct. 266,270,21 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1968). The Court
expresses similar sentiment in the landmark case of San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez: "(T)he judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the states
inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued
research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems ." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1302, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1972).
Even the panel acknowledges that
"(T)he education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part of
Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of the rights secured
by the supreme law of the land." JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE
Debra P., at 403, quoting Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 545, 20 S. Ct.
197, 201, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899). In the face of this authority the panel nevertheless insists
upon placing itself between the state of Florida and its high [**18] school students.
In sum, the panel has misidentified a property interest and consequently has applied an
entirely inappropriate, because both incongruent and excessively instrusive, constitutional
analysis to the facts of this case. The decision frustrates an admirable state policy
decision to require that public school students be literate before they are certified as
academically proficient. One need not be proficient to understand that this frustration will
be more than temporary. STATE AUTHORITY. This circuit has given the state a choice
between escaping expensive, time-consuming and demoralizing litigation and fighting an
expensive two-front war: attempting to improve education while looking over its
shoulder to assure that everything possible is being done to prepare for the inevitable
onslaught of due process actions founded upon the most arcane of alleged educational
deficiencies. See, e.g., Debra P. at 406 (evidence in record that "at least one teacher" did
not cover an entire textbook in one of his courses). It is not our place to put state idealism
to such a test.
In one step the panel has removed the state incentive to provide quality education, for
each state attempt to demand academic [**19] proficiency will be subject to the same
eviscerating analysis used to reject Florida's attempt to demand functional literacy from
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its public school graduates. We have only ourselves to blame if Florida abandons its
present policy and reverts to the old, admittedly deficient system of social promotion,
graduation and certification. Moreover, we should not be surprised if other states in this
circuit heed the panel's signal and avoid even attempting a reformation of their
educational policies. The transitory impact of the state gesture will simply not be worth
the subsequent sting of federal interventionism. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE
The equal protection Analysis
The state of Florida has decided that it will demand equal performance from both black
and white students on its fimctional literacy exam. The panel, in the most paternalistic
fashion, has found this race-neutral approach violative of the equal protection clause. Its
holding, stated simply, is that the constitution prohibits the State of Florida from treating
black and white students equally. Besides the inevitable impact this decision will have on
black pride and white hubris, it is, in the most fundamental sense, a perversion of the
principle [**20] of equality enunciated by the high Court in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).
If Brown stands for anything, it is that in the educational arena a state must treat black
and white students equally. Any inherently unequal educational treatment of the races is
unconstitutional racial discrimination of the most nefarious sort. That discrimination is
iniquitous because it is the prerequisite for successful state imposition of unequal status
to sanction racially unequal educational achievement is to cripple [*1085] and stigmatize,
it is forcibly to lock a race of people into a deprived class with cruelly limited horizons
and illusory hopes. For me, therefore, it is inexcusably iniquitous to compel the state to
certify as academically proficient an avowedly functionally illiterate minority student
based on the institutionalized assumption that he cannot be expected to achieve on the
same level as white students. Quite simply, it is to celebrate and perpetuate the hollow
certification that accompanied black graduation pre-Brown.
The record in Debra P. demonstrates that the functional literacy exam has a
disproportionate impact on blacks. [**21] There also is evidence in the record indicating
that the higher incidence of black failure may be attributable in significant part to the
legacy of the inherently unequal education provided by Florida's previously segregated
educational system, equal protection When these facts are joined with the construct
validity of the literacy exam, VALIDITY they speak volumes. Yet, their message may be
put succinctly: at least partly because of racial segregation, black students in Florida are
ending their high school years as functional illiterates. The panel has held that the state
must give these illiterate students a diploma certifying successful completion of twelve
years of public education. This poses a most incongruous resolution of the dilemma.
Black students have a right to an equal education. The state has failed to provide that
equal education, and thus a significant number of minority students are functionally
illiterate. To correct this, Florida established the prerequisite of the literacy exam,
coupled with a statutory authorization that "special instruction designed to rem edy...
identified deficiencies," Debra P., at 401 n. 1, quoting Fla.Stat.Ann. § 232.246 (West
Supp. 1980), be provided to those [**22] who demonstrate an inability to pass die
examination. Moreover, Florida has decided to hold back a high school diploma until a
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student does demonstrate literacy, thus providing an added incentive for pursuit of
essential skills. To this the panel responds by asserting that Florida has violated the
Constitution.
To be in compliance with the fourteenth amendment, the panel asserts, Florida must give
illiterate black students a diploma. I can think of no more otiose, worthless equality than
this distribution of paper credentials. To deny a student a diploma is, at worst, a
regrettable necessity. Under McNeal v. Tate County School District, 508 F.2d 1017, 1020
(5th Cir. 1975), I believe the denial of a diploma is a necessary and entirely reasonable
means to remedy the evil, indeed, the badge of slavery, which is black functional
illiteracy. In the long run, this state decision seems the wise approach, and it is not for us
to second-guess the state. Functionally illiterate graduates possessing a diploma may have
less trouble than non-diploma holders in initial employment opportunities, but their
futures are bleak. Inadequate performance at work, severely limited opportunities for
[**23] social mobility, every ill that afflicts the illiterate minority individual will be
theirs. It is no remedy for these students, disadvantaged at the hands of the state, to be
meaninglessly certified. The wrong has been suffered and now it must be corrected. It is
no answer to cover the fundamental hurt with an empty equality of form that ignores the
underlying substance. Indeed, if anything, this empty equality is the most wicked
perpetuation of the legacy of segregation. EQUAL PROTECTION
Certainly any resolution of this case would be difficult. It will never be easy to try to
correct the manifold evils created by generations of racial discrimination. We must
however, never lose sight of the fundamental goal of equality. Our duty is to further
attempts to eliminate the vestiges of inequality, not to intrude paternally on good-faith
state attempts to ensure real educational equality.
To conclude, I simply cannot believe that the fourteenth amendment requires us to force a
state to abandon a rational scheme designed to correct the palpable heritage of
segregated, inherently unequal education in favor of mandatory state certification of
illiterate students. The panel rules that the state must [**24] continue to sanction this
meaningless graduation until it can demonstrate that disproportionate black student
functional [*1086] illiteracy is "not due to the educational deprivation (of) the "dual
school' years." Debra P., at 408. The state disincentive here is remarkable: how long will
it take before the heritage of educational segregation is eradicated? Furthermore, how
much litigation will it take before the federal courts determine that each school district in
the Fifth Circuit, with its unique history and demography, has outlasted the effects of
segregation? We have lived too long with the legacy of racial inequality to believe that
the effects of history are o f short duration. Indeed, they are all-pervasive, and we do a
great deal to extend these all-pervasive effects by requiring Florida to give diplomas
signifying educational proficiency to black functional illiterates. We perpetuate the cycle;
instead of racial hatred generating racially separate and inherently unequal systems, the
spirit of federal paternalism has intervened to impose racially unequal standards of
educational proficiency within a single school system. Now the inequality is to be
imposed under [**25] a single roof, yet the affront to basic racial equality is not lessened.
And this racial affront is all the more demeaning because it acts as a great deterrent to
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black student achievement why strive to achieve if the rubber stamp of academic
certification is available to all?
In my mind, these disincentives are real; they will shape the conduct of both educators
and pupils to the detriment of society. When it is appropriate for a federal court to
exercise jurisdiction, it should strive to further the spirit of equality. Today, we have done
just the opposite. The state should be allowed to correct the deficiencies of the segregated
years immediately by requiring of black students the equality of performance that is the
only demonstration of equal respect, and by providing the means for these students to
attain the necessary level of performance, as Florida has done here. Debra P., at 400-01 n.
1. It will be in the dignity of certification for equal achievement that the proof of social
equality is revealed. To mandate anything short of this is to consign the teachings of
Brown to the realm of mere idealism. EQUAL PROTECTION
I respectfully dissent. *
* This dissent was written and circulated among the judges before the panel
entered its order denying rehearing en banc. In entering its order, the panel has
chosen to comment on this dissent, and that of my Brother Hill, to the denial o f en
banc rehearing. This commentary takes the form of an attempted explanation of
Debra P., and purportedly is issued "in hope o f assisting others" in interpreting the
decision. This commentary, however, has no legal implications for the
interpretation and application of Debra P.; that decision must stand on its own. The
commentary of the panel judges has no precedential significance despite its
appearance as well-intentioned judicial gloss. It does, however, cast further doubt
upon the wisdom of the denial of en banc consideration if Debra P., as originally
drafted, requires such a thorough-going attempted explanation, further
consideration o f the case, if only to clarify with the force of law its holding, seems
appropriate.
[**26] HILL, Circuit Judge, dissenting from Court's denial of Petition for Rehearing En
Banc.
A majority of the active judges in Administrative Unit B of the court, acting under our
rules for the entire court, has voted against rehearing and reconsidering this case en banc.
I dissent from this action of our court.
This case finds it constitutionally sound indeed, mandated that a state continue the preBrown 1practice of handing out meaningless high school diplomas to black boys and
girls who have not been required to achieve even a minimal education. Our court’s refusal
to reconsider this case en banc can only be premised upon a conclusion, unstated though
it be, that those who labored so long and hard to strike down segregated education were
not working to achieve quality education for minority race children but sought to deny it
to all children.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686,98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).
Specifically, our court has held 2 that:
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2 Since the preparation of this dissent, the panel has entered its order denying
rehearing. Further, there is added to that order a statement by two judges of this
court and a senior district judge writing in the nature of a response to this dissent
and to the dissent of Judge Tjoflat. The response undertakes to interpret the panel's
opinion.
Assuming without deciding that the panel opinion needs interpretation, its holding
for our court does not. Subject to the limited remand discussed in footnote 4
hereafter, the panel opinion affirms the district court's judgment. It is abundantly
clear that the district court enjoins the State of Florida from requiring passage of
the functional literacy test as a condition for the awarding of a diploma during the
next four years. The panel affirms this injunction forbidding the State from using
that test. The interpretation of the panel opinion proffered by two of our judges
who were on the panel says that the panel held "That the State of Florida may
utilize a functional literacy examination ... as a condition for the awarding of a
diploma." Rehearing en banc being denied, such a reversal of the district court's
injunction cannot be accomplished without rehearing and reconsideration by the
panel. If the use of this test be not enjoined in this litigation, my concerns are
largely put to rest. What I write is upon the assumption that the district court's
injunction has been, on appeal, affirmed.
[**27]
[*1087] (1) The Constitution forbids a state from providing quality education
to, and requiring a modicum of learning by, the children in its public school
system.
(2) The aim of public education must, under law, be to confer a diploma and
must not be to provide an education.
(3) By operating a public school system, a constitutionally protected
expectation is created in the attendee that he or she will receive a diploma,
not an education.
(4) That, at the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483,74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), the black
children of this land were not ready for non-segregated education in schools
providing a quality education and requiring some minimal level of
attainment for graduation.
(5) Because black children are a part of the student body, educational
requirements of a state school system must be kept at a low level!
None of the teachings of decided cases supports this assault by our court upon the
aspirations of the people of Florida for quality education for their children. The goal of
the civil rights movement, that minority race children be provided quality education,
[**28] are frustrated by this holding. The vestiges of segregated education, which handed
out public school diplomas to minority race children but did not provide them quality
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education, are perpetuated. Before this holding became the law of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, careful and full en banc reconsideration should have been indulged. EQUAL
PROTECTION
My expression of concern ought not be taken as a whimsical disregard for the serious
attention given this case by our court's panel and by Hon. George C. Carr, the district
judge whose opinion, Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D.Fla.1979),
evidences great care and painstaking consideration. Rather, I seek to express my
conviction that the judgment is contrary to law and that its premise is the wrong premise.
The premise accepted by the court, from which the entire syllogistic exercise is derived,
is that, in education, the diploma is the thing. The child's expectation that he or she will
receive a diploma without having achieved even a minimum degree of education is held
to be a constitutionally protected property right, due process Yet, before Brown, the evil
that existed was largely that diplomas were being awarded to minority race children
[**29] even though, in "inherently unequal" systems, they were not being afforded
education equal to that being administered to others. Nowhere does the court consider the
real value of an educational system to the pupil learning. The Supreme Court was not
misled by the free and easy award of diplomas. It emphasized the real value of the
educational system to the pupil by observing:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition [*1088] of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
347 U.S. at 493, 74 S. Ct. at 691.
It is undoubtedly [**30] true that the appearance of having been educated may be
accomplished by the conferring of a diploma. Nevertheless, if the child has received no
learning, even the most emphatic judgment and order of the most diligent court cannot
supply it.
The panel's holding makes Mr. Bumble correct.3 Happily the panel's holding is not the
law.
3 "If the law supposes that," said Mr. Bumble ... "the law is a ass, a idiot." C.
Dickens, Oliver Twist, Ch. 51 (1838).
The panel pays lip service to the law: "Neither the district court nor we are in a position
to determine educational policy in the State of Florida." At 402. Nonetheless, they
conclude that the expectation of receiving a diploma is a property interest protected by
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the Fourteenth Amendment, due process This holding enables the panel (and will require
all bound by our opinion) to analyze the diploma requirements established by the State of
Florida. Specifically, the panel, in affirming the district court, embraces the view that use
of the State's functional literacy [**31] test even though validated as to content
CURRICULAR VALIDITY 4 see 474 F. Supp. at 261, and not infected with cultural bias
towards minority students, equal protection see 407 n. 17, may not be a requirement for
graduation under the Constitution of the United States. Today, the court finds a functional
literacy test wanting. Tomorrow, the court may find the state's math requirements are
unfair. And the next day, the court may find that history is unnecessary to the high school
curriculum or that, its teacher being less than adequate, a history test or examination is
unconstitutional. I hope this never comes to pass. The fact remains, however, that the
panel has established a constitutional basis for the judiciary to assume the role of state
educators.
4 Of course, the panel held that the test "may have covered matters not taught in
the schools of the state." At 404 (emphasis in original). One would suppose that on
remand this ambiguity in the record could be quickly resolved in favor of the State
by testimony from one familiar with the State's high school curriculum.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
[**32] The panel cites Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,95 S. Ct. 729,42 L. Ed. 2d 725
(1975) as authority for its intrusion into the State's educational system. Goss v. Lopez
provides no such authority. Rather, Goss v. Lopez simply required "effective notice and
(an) informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of the events" before the
student could be suspended for ten days and thus denied participation in the learning
process for disciplinary reasons. Id. at 583, 95 S. Ct. at 740 (emphasis added). Nowhere
in its opinion does the Court approve of judicial review of state academic policy.
Furthermore, four members of the Court dissented from the limited holding of Goss v.
Lopez reasoning that "(t)he decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial
intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality of
education." Id. at 585, 95 S. Ct. at 741.
In Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d
124 (1977) the court vigorously refused to sanction judicial intervention into academic
decisions.
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations
bear little resemblance [**33] to the judicial and administrative fact finding
proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing
requirement. In Goss, the school's decision to suspend the students rested on
factual conclusions that the individual students had participated in [*1089]
demonstrations that had disrupted classes, attacked a police officer, or caused
physical damage to school property. The requirement of a hearing, where the
student could present his side o f the factual issue, could under such
circumstances "provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action." Ibid.
The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic
judgment of school officials that she did not have the necessary clinical
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ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making
insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature more
subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the
average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as
to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to
dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of
cumulative information [**34] and is not readily adapted to the procedural
tools of judicial or administrative decision making.
Id. at 89-90, 98 S. Ct. at 954-955. The same logic prohibits a court from reviewing the
graduation requirements established by a State. Indeed, our circuit has long been of the
view that academic decisions should be left to the states and the appropriate educational
bodies. Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). In sum, there is a bright
line of demarcation between extending minimal due process safeguards to protect a
student's access to learning, see Goss v. Lopez and using the due process clause to make
decisions regarding the quality of education for the State of Florida. See Horowitz. DUE
PROCESS
The district court had presented only the difficulties encountered by minority race
students said to result from their having attended the first three grades of elementary
education in a segregated system, equal protection Thus, on this record, the district court
merely postponed a quality education for three years. See 474 F. Supp. at 269. O f course,
a pupil's achievement in an educational system may be affected by home and other social
environment outside the classroom. Upon the principle [**35] laid down by this case,
may we not expect the assertion that it is unconstitutional to provide and require quality
education and achievement as long as the environment outside the classroom is affected
by previous segregation in society and in education. In short, this case at least suggests
that minority race children shall not be subjected to and afforded quality education until
history has been repealed and the fact that there was segregation be no longer a fact. We
may hand down judgment after judgment, but we will not alter historical fact. EQUAL
PROTECTION
It has been said that public education has been in decline in recent years. If it is so, it is
deplorable. If it is so, it is not difficult to find at least a cause. There is a limit to the time,
effort, funds and other resources that state officials and taxpayers can devote to education
and related matters. One has but to review litigation in this court during recent decades to
obtain an idea of the amount of those limited resources that have been diverted from the
process of educating to devious, clever efforts to thwart the teachings of Brown. There is
evidence in the record in this case that at least one state has now resolved to [**36] turn
from such untenable frustrations and return to the restoration of quality to its educational
system. I submit that the judges of this court, charged in brief after brief and argument
upon argument with the destruction of public education, should, judiciously (and
personally for what that's worth), rejoice at such a development.
Instead, we endorse the charge leveled against the courts and solemnly find that the
Constitution and the law mandate that quality education, since Brown, be forbidden.
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT
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October 25, 1982, Argued
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PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central
District of Illinois, Springfield Division. No. 81 C 3089 - Robert D. Morgan, Judge.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff handicapped students challenged defendant
school district's requirement that they pass a minimal competency test in order to receive
high school diplomas. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois,
Springfield Division, held that there was no due process violation and reversed the state
superintendent and board of education's order directing the school district to issue
diplomas. The students appealed.
OVERVIEW: The students claimed that denial of the diplomas violated the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) and constituted discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act (RHA). The court held that denial of diplomas to the students, who
had been receiving the education and services required by the EHA but were unable to
pass the test, was not a denial of a "free appropriate public education." The EHA only
required access to specialized services, not specific results. A student who was unable to
learn because of his handicap was not an individual qualified in spite of his handicap and,
thus, denial of a diploma because of inability to pass die test was not discrimination under
the RHA. The court held that the school district failed to satisfy due process because the
students had a liberty interest in receiving a diploma and, by changing the diploma
requirement, the school district deprived the students of a right previously held under
state law. The process due included adequate notice of any new diploma requirement in
order to allow time to prepare. Given the students' lack of exposure to the goals and
objectives of the test, the notice given was constitutionally inadequate.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the district court's judgment and directed the district
court to order the school district to issue high school diplomas to the students who
satisfied all graduation requirements other than the minimal competency test.
CORE TERMS: school districts, diploma, handicapped, notice, graduation, educational,
preparation, competency, modification, adequate notice, special education, liberty
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interest, reputation, handicap, exposure, prepare, high school diploma, public education,
property interest, Handicapped Children Act, state law, process rights, educational
program, handicapping, awarding, teacher, tested, skills, Rehabilitation Act, law requires
COUNSEL: Gary E. Kerr, Kerr & Longwell, Springfield, Illinois
Marilyn Longwell, Chicago, Illinois, (Kerr & Longwell), for Plaintiffs-Appellants, CrossAppellees.
Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Ofce. of 111 Atty. Gen., Chicago, Illinois
Julian E. Cannell, Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White & Fredrick, Peoria, Illinois, for
Defendant.
JUDGES: Cummings, Chief Judge, Wood, Circuit Judge, and Marovitz, Senior District
Judge.
* The Honorable Abraham Lincoln Marovitz, Senior District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: CUMMINGS
OPINION
[*181] CUMMINGS, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs are fourteen handicapped 1 elementary and secondary students who are
challenging a Peoria School District (School District) requirement that they pass a
"Minimal Competency Test" (M.C.T.) in order to receive a high school diploma. After a
hearing, the Illinois State Board of Education (State Board) issued an Administrative
Order (A-46 to A-58) in which the State Superintendent of Education decided in favor of
eleven of the plaintiffs, [**2] stating:
(1) The State Board of Education has jurisdiction of this matter, (2) [The]
Peoria Board of Education [has] the right to impose reasonable additional
standards for graduation with a regular high school diploma, (3) Neither the
Education fo r All Handicapped Children Act, (20 USC 1401 et seq.), nor
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973, (29 USC 794), prohibit local
school districts from requiring that exceptional students meet all otherwise
reasonable standards for graduation including, on its face, the Minimal
Competency Test, (4) Federal law requires that school districts make
reasonable modifications to tests such as the Minimal Competency Test in
order to minimize the effect of an individual student's handicapping
condition, equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION (5) Peoria District #150
violated the "due process" rights of the petitioners by failing to give them
adequate and timely notice that the Minimal Competency Test would be a
prerequisite to the receipt of a diploma. Accordingly, the Board of Education
of Peoria District #150 is ordered to issue the petitioners regular high school
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diplomas in a manner consistent with this opinion and the individual orders
attached hereto. DUE PROCESS
[**3] The State Superintendent also found that three of the plaintiffs did not have
standing to challenge the M.C.T. An appeal by plaintiffs and the Peoria School District
was taken to the district court2 which held that there was no due process violation and
reversed the order directing the School District to issue diplomas.3 We reverse.
1 Plaintiffs manifested a broad spectrum of handicapping conditions. One student
was physically handicapped, one was multiply handicapped, and four were
educably mentally handicapped. The other eight were learning-disabled. (PI. Br. 6.)
2 Plaintiffs asked the court to sustain the order directing issuance o f the diplomas
and requiring appropriate modification of the M.C.T. for handicapped students, but
also sought an order invalidating the M.C.T. and promulgating validation and
modification guidelines. The State Board asked the district court to uphold the
order and direct the School District to implement it. The School District asked the
district court to affirm the portion of the order upholding the facial validity of the
M.C.T. program but reverse the order insofar as it mandated issuing diplomas.
[**4]
3 The district court's jurisdiction was based on the Education of All Handicapped
Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), which provides that
any party aggrieved by the findings and decision under subsection (c)
of this section [providing for a hearing before the State educational
agency], shall have the right to bring a civil action . . . in any State
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United
States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action
brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records o f the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the
evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
In the spring of 1978, the School District decided to require all students eligible for
graduation in the spring of 1980 to pass an M.C.T. as a prerequisite to receipt o f a
diploma. The test is given each semester. It contains three parts -- reading, language arts,
and mathematics —and a student must score 70% on [**5] each part in order to receive a
diploma. If a student fails any particular part, he is eligible to retake that part until he
passes or becomes 21 years of age. Refresher courses are available during the school term
and over the summer, though the summer program was on a tuition basis and scheduling
problems made it impossible for a student to attend refresher courses in all three areas.
Students who do not pass, but otherwise qualify for graduation, receive a Certificate of
Program Completion at graduation time, and may continue to take the M.C.T. until age
21. MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES
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[*182J After the M.C.T. policy was adopted in 1978, the School District undertook to
notify students of the additional requirement through distribution of circulars in the
schools, individual mailings to some parents, and repeated announcements in the mass
media. The State Board said in its Administrative Order that "the record does not clearly
establish how well these efforts succeeded, and in particular does not establish that they
were adequate to bring notice of the additional requirement with all of its possible
consequences to the attention of the parents o f the exceptional children involved in these
complaints." [**6] A-49. While apparently accepting this finding, the district court said
that "there is neither evidence nor contention that any plaintiff here did not know of the
graduation requirement of passing the M.C.T. more than a year before his or her
scheduled graduation." Brookhart v. Illinois State Board o f Educ., 534 F. Supp. 725, 727
(C.D. 111. 1982). We disagree that such notice was adequate as discussed in Part 3 infra.
due process ADEQUATE NOTICE
Plaintiffs claim that the M.C.T. as applied to handicapped students violates federal and
state statutes, as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We note at the outset that in analyzing these claims deference is due the
School District's educational and curricular decisions. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 644
F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981), rehearing denied, 654 F.2d 1079 (1981); Board o f Educ. v.
Ambach, 107 Misc. 2d 830,436 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1981). The School District's desire to
ensure the value of its diploma by requiring graduating students to attain minimal skills is
admirable, and the courts will interfere with educational policy decisions only when
necessary to protect individual statutory or constitutional rights. JUDICIAL
RELUCATANCE
[**7] Before turning to the merits, we must address the question of standing to challenge
the M.C.T. During the 1978/79 and 1979/80 school years, eleven of the plaintiffs who
anticipated graduation in 1980 took the M.C.T. one or more times. None passed all three
parts. O f the remaining three plaintiffs, one was eight years old at the time of the
administrative hearing and had taken a portion of the third grade pilot M.C.T. while she
was a special education pupil in the second grade; one was eleven years old and one was
fifteen years old at the time of the hearing and both had not yet taken any portion of the
M.C.T. (State Bd. Br. 8). None of these three plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
institution of the M.C.T. as a graduation requirement. Two of the plaintiffs did not take
the test; the third took a pilot test, the failure of which could not have affected the
awarding of a diploma, since she was only in the second grade. These plaintiffs may
renew their claims, if appropriate, at a later date. 4
4 In support of their claim that these three plaintiffs have interests which diverge
from those of the other eleven, the State Board points to a 1981 amendment o f 111.
Rev. Stat., ch. 122, para. 14-6.01. Prior to September 25,1981, Illinois law
authorized but did not require a school district "to issue certificates of graduation to
handicapped pupils completing special education programs." The statute was
amended in 1981 to read:
No handicapped student may be denied promotion, graduation or a
general diploma on the basis of failing a minimal competency test
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when such failure can be directly related to the student's handicapping
condition. For the purpose of this Act, "minimal competency testing"
is defined as tests which are constructed to measure the acquisition of
skills to or beyond a certain defined standard.
The State suggests that the new statute might well preclude denying a diploma to
these three even if their inability to learn is a result of a handicapping condition
(State Bd. Br. 19). The question is presently premature for resolution.
[**8] 1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act
Plaintiffs claim that the denial of diplomas in this case violates the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EHA) because it denies the individual handicapped students
a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). The Supreme Court recently
examined this statutory requirement in Board o f Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.
Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690, 50 U.S.L.W. 4925 (1982), a suit brought by a deaf
elementary [*183] school student seeking a sign language interpreter. The Court noted
that the Act expressly defines a "free appropriate public education" to mean
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the
State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18). The Court recognized that the "intent of the Act was more to open
the [**9] door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to
guarantee any particular level of education once inside." 5 50 U.S.L.W. at 4929.
5 The Court expressly rejected the district court's interpretation in Rowley that the
disparity between the deaf student's "achievement and her potential" meant that she
was not receiving a free appropriate public education. Id. at 4928.
This analysis implies that the EHA does not require "specific results," Board o f Educ. v.
Ambach, supra at 570, but rather only mandates access to specialized and individualized
educational services for handicapped children. Denial of diplomas to handicapped
children who have been receiving the special education and related services required by
the Act, but are unable to achieve the educational level necessary to pass the M.C.T., is
not a denial of a "free appropriate public education." Board o f Educ. v. Ambach, supra;
see also Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
Plaintiffs further [**10] contend that the imposition of the M.C.T. violates the EHA and
corresponding regulation mandating that "no single procedure shall be the sole criterion
for determining an appropriate educational program for a child." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C);
see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (1981). Yet plaintiffs admit that graduation requirements in
Peoria are threefold: earning seventeen credits, completing State requirements such as a
constitution test and a consumer education course, and passing the M.C.T. (PI. Br. 31). In
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the face of this admission, passing the M.C.T. is clearly not the sole criterion for
graduation. 6 SOLE CRITERION
6 For the same reason, the M.C.T. requirement does not violate the State Board's
regulation ensuring that "no single procedure is used as the sole criterion for determining
an appropriate educational program for a child." Rule 9.1 l(6)(d), Rules and Regulations
To Govern the Administration and Operation o f Special Education.
2. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Plaintiffs also argue that application of [**11] the M.C.T. requirement constitutes
unlawful discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RHA),
providing
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 794. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 60 L. Ed.
2d 980, 99 S. Ct. 2361, the Supreme Court held that an "otherwise qualified" individual
entitled to the protection of Section 504 is "one who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap." Id. at 406. The Court held that a State nursing
program could deny admission to an applicant with a serious hearing disability because,
inter alia, the training program required that students be able to communicate orally
while attending patients or assisting in operations. The statute does not require "an
educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to
accommodate a handicapped person." Id. at 413. [**12]
Plaintiffs in this case have no grounds on which to argue that the contents [*184] of the
M.C.T. are discriminatory solely because handicapped students who are incapable of
attaining a level of minimal competency will fail the test. Altering the content of the
M.C.T. to accommodate an individual's inability to leam the tested material because of
his handicap would be a "substantial modification," 442 U.S. at 413, as well as a
"perversion" of the diploma requirement. 534 F. Supp. at 728. A student who is unable to
leam because of his handicap is surely not an individual who is qualified in spite of his
handicap. Thus denial of a diploma because of inability to pass the M.C.T. is not
discrimination under the RHA. Board o f Educ. v. Ambach, supra; Anderson v. Banks,
520 F. Supp. 472, 511 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
However, an otherwise qualified student who is unable to disclose the degree of learning
he actually possesses because of the test format or environment would be the object of
discrimination solely on the basis of his handicap. It is apparent, as the district court said,
that "to discover a blind person's knowledge, a test must be given orally or in braille . ..
." 534 [**13] F. Supp. at 728. According to the Superintendent, the School District
"concedes that modification of the Minimal Competency Test must be made available to
the handicapped," and offered to readminister the test with certain modifications.7 We
agree with the Superintendent that federal law requires administrative modification to
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minimize the effects of plaintiffs' handicaps on any future examinations, equal protection
SPECIAL EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
7 After the Administrative Order was issued, the School District agreed to
administer the language arts test to plaintiff Ellen Ioerger with a large print booklet
and to administer the mathematics and language arts test to plaintiff Deborah
Brookhart in a small, quiet room. Neither plaintiff took advantage of this offer.
(School Dist. Br. 29 and n. 12.)
Plaintiffs make one additional argument, urging that federal law requires tests to be
validated separately for handicapped students. The purpose o f validation is to determine
whether tests are suited to the purposes for which they are used with respect to a [**14]
particular testing population. Cf. Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 968-973 (N.D. Cal.
1979). It is true that federal regulations under both the RHA and the EHA specify that a
test, at least with respect to evaluation and placement, must be selected and administered
so that the "results accurately reflect the student's aptitude or achievement level or
whatever other factor the test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the student's
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills .. .." 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.35(b)(3) and
300.532(b)(3). However, we need not interpret the scope o f these regulations to decide
this case. Rather than issuing a broad order to the School District that might affect the
validity of the M.C.T. for all handicapped students, we are deciding this case on less
intrusive grounds, as explained infra, equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION
3. The due process Claim
Plaintiffs' final argument is that the School District provided them inadequate notice of
the M.C.T. requirement, thus depriving them of a protected liberty or property interest
without due process of law .8 Although the issues in this case do not fit easily into a
traditional procedural due process analysis, we conclude, [**15] after close
consideration, that the School District failed to satisfy constitutional requirements, due
process ADEQUATE NOTICE/STUDENT PREVALED
8 Plaintiffs also raise an equal protection claim for the first time on appeal. They
appear to argue only that the M.C.T. requirement is invalid as applied to
handicapped students, conceding that the "Peoria School District. . . does have the
prerogative to determine that the competency o f graduating students is best ensured
by determining that certain minimal standards of achievement have been met." (PI.
Br. 16.) Neither the Superintendent nor the district court addressed this issue, and
for that reason we decline to do so now. Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F.2d
423,424 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 826, 96 S. Ct. 2868. equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION
The first question to be decided is whether the plaintiffs have a protected liberty or
property interest at stake. Denial of a diploma clearly affects a student's reputation. It
attaches a "stigma" that will [*185] [**16] have potentially disastrous effects for future
employment or educational opportunities. See Board o f Educ. v. Ambach, supra, at 572573. Though the Supreme Court held that injury to reputation alone does not implicate a
liberty interest, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-702,47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155, it
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went on to say in the same opinion that liberty interests are implicated when injury to
reputation is combined with "governmental action [that] deprived the individual of a right
previously held under state law." Id. at 708-709. The Court in Paul reviewed its holding
in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,42 L. Ed. 2d 725,95 S. Ct. 729, involving the procedural
due process rights accorded a student suspended from school on charges of misconduct.
In holding that such a suspension implicated a protected liberty interest under the due
process clause, the Court pointed to two factors. Not only could charges of misconduct
seriously damage the student's reputation, but in addition "Ohio law conferred a right
upon all children to attend school, a n d . . . the act of the school officials suspending the
student there involved resulted in a denial or deprivation of that [**17] right." Paul v.
Davis, supra at 710. It was the removal of the right or interest "from the recognition and
protection previously afforded by the State, which we found sufficient to invoke the
procedural guarantees contained in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 711.
Plaintiffs in this case have more than merely an interest in protecting their reputations and
avoiding the stigma attached to failure to receive a high school diploma. They, too, as in
Goss v. Lopez, supra, had a right conferred by state law to receive a diploma if they met
the requirements imposed prior to 1978: completion of seventeen course credits and
fulfillment of the State's graduation requirements. In changing the diploma requirement,
the governmental action by the School District deprived the individual of a right or
interest previously held under state law. Plaintiffs thus have a liberty interest sufficient to
invoke the procedural protections of the due process clause. Board o f Educ. v. Ambach,
supra at 572-573. 9
9 Some courts have held that state law creates a legitimate expectation of receipt of
a diploma, thereby creating a property interest for purposes of due process analysis.
See Board o f Educ. v. Ambach, supra at 572; Debra P. v. Turlington, supra at 403404.
[** 18 ]

The consequence of identifying a protected liberty interest is that governmental action
cannot be used to deprive an individual of that interest without due process of law.
Traditionally, a procedural due process right means "an opportunity to be heard on the
factual basis underlying the loss of a liberty or property interest. . . ." Anderson v. Banks,
supra at 504. A determination of what process is due involves defining the appropriate
contours of the "opportunity to be heard." See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,25 L. Ed.
2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011. This case does not fit into the traditional procedural due process
mold. Plaintiffs here do not contest the factual basis underlying the loss of a liberty
interest; in fact, they admit that they did not pass the M.C.T. Rather, they demand
procedures which would provide sufficient notice o f the M.C.T. to enable them to prepare
adequately to satisfy the new requirement.
We think that procedural due process protections are flexible enough to encompass notice
of this kind. This approach has been followed by the Fifth Circuit and the New York
State Appellate Division. In Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976),

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

476

[**19] Georgia State University instituted a new degree requirement (consisting of a
comprehensive examination) after plaintiff had begun the masters program but before her
matriculation. In rejecting both procedural and substantive due process claims, the court
emphasized that plaintiff received "timely notice" of the new examination; "ample notice
to prepare;" and a "reasonable opportunity to complete additional course work in lieu of
the comprehensive examination." Id. at 450. The issue arose again in Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 403-404 [*186] (1981), where the Fifth Circuit stated its view
that inadequate notice to students that they would be required to pass an exit examination
before qualifying for a diploma violated procedural due process. Board o f Educ. v.
Ambach, 107 Misc. 2d 830,436 N.Y.S.2d 564, 573-575 (1981), was a case essentially
"on all fours" with this one. After finding that two handicapped plaintiffs had a protected
liberty or property interest in receipt of a diploma, the court held that the school board
unconstitutionally deprived them of their interest because inadequate notice precluded
preparation for the exam. Following these precedents, [**20] we hold that plaintiffs were
entitled to notice permitting reasonable preparation for the M.C.T.
This holding does bear some resemblance to a substantive, rather than a procedural due
process holding. 10 See Anderson v. Banks, supra at 505. As a matter of procedural due
process, plaintiffs have a liberty interest in receipt o f a diploma that cannot be infringed
without notice. Yet, as a matter of substantive due process, the nature of plaintiffs' right is
by necessity limited by the School District's authority to change the diploma
requirements. Plaintiffs' substantive right therefore is better defined as a right to adequate
notice of any new diploma requirement in order to allow time to prepare. Denial of
sufficient notice would make denial of a diploma and its attendant injury to reputation
fundamentally unfair. Debra P. v. Turlington, supra at 404.
10 For a discussion of their overlap, see Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev.
We must now consider whether the notice [**21] provided to plaintiffs was sufficient to
satisfy constitutional requisites. The older eleven plaintiffs were informed that they were
subject to the M.C.T. requirement during their junior year in high school. The State
Superintendent found they therefore had approximately one and a half years to master the
skills necessary to pass the M.C.T. (App. 56); the district court found that all plaintiffs
had notice of the M.C.T. requirement one year prior to graduation. 534 F. Supp. at 727.
Despite the fact that plaintiffs had been a year and a year and a half to be exposed to the
material on the M.C.T., the record shows that individual petitioners lacked exposure to as
much as 90% of the material tested (App. 56). due process ADEQUATE NOTICE
Plaintiffs' educational programs were developed in accordance with 20 U.S.C. §
1414(a)(5) requiring that each handicapped student receive an individualized educational
program (IEP). An IEP is developed through the cooperative efforts of parents, teachers,
and school administrators. Tr. Vol. I, at 148. Plaintiffs' expert at the hearing developed a
matrix by which to compare the goals and objectives of the M.C.T. with the goals and
objectives of plaintiffs' IEP's. The matrix [**22] indicated that as much as 90% of the
material on the M.C.T. did not appear on the EEP's (App. 50, 56). The district court found
that the "only possible reason" for the lack of exposure was that the students were
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incapable of learning the material, 534 F. Supp. at 730, and that therefore the amount of
time provided the students for preparation was irrelevant. We agree with the State
Superintendent's argument that this was error (State Bd. Br. at 28). First, several plaintiffs
passed various parts of the M.C.T., thus indicating that the problem is not uniformly a
lack of innate mental capacity. Second, Dr. Aaron Gray, Assistant Superintendent of
Special Services in Peoria School District #150, testified at the hearing that it is
impossible to know which special education students will pass the M.C.T. and which will
not, and that predicting whether a child has die ability to pass "is something that a
responsible professional would not do." Tr. Vol. I, at 134. One of the School District's
experts, Dr. Siegfried Mueller, first testified that one should not assume that any student
cannot pass the M.C.T. The answer was then modified to allow for such an assumption if,
for example, a [**23] twenty-one-year-old student who has been working [*187] with a
teacher or administrator for sixteen years is still scoring only ten instead of seventy on the
exam, and then only "after a lot of evidence." Tr. Vol. I, at 72-73. The fact that the
School District requires all handicapped students except those classified as trainable
mentally handicapped to take the M.C.T. at least once (Tr. Vol. I, at 91 -92) indicates that
administrators are reluctant to speculate on the innate abilities or limitations of their
students.
Finally, rather than reflecting an incapacity to pass the M.C.T., the record reflects that the
plaintiffs' programs of instruction were not developed to meet the goal of passing the
M.C.T., but were instead geared to address individual educational needs. Since plaintiffs
and their parents knew of the M.C.T. requirements only one to one and a half years prior
to the students' anticipated graduation, the M.C.T. objectives could not have been
specifically incorporated into the IEP's over a period of years. If they were incorporated
at all, it could only have been during the most recent year and a half. As the
Superintendent found, "in an educational system that [**24] assumes special education
students learn at a slower rate than regular division students," a year and a half at most to
prepare for the M.C.T. is insufficient. Thus the length o f the notice, rather than a
deliberate decision not to instruct plaintiffs because o f their incapacity to master the
material, explains the overwhelming lack of exposure to M.C.T. goals and objectives.
There is some evidence in the record that after being informed of the M.C.T. requirement,
several parents preferred to emphasize aspects of plaintiffs' education other than M.C.T.
preparation. In the long run, as Dr. Mueller pointed out, parents and teachers may
evaluate students and conclude that energies would be more profitably directed toward
areas other than M.C.T. preparation; toward, for example, vocational training. Here
however parents had only a year to a year and a half to evaluate properly their children's
abilities and redirect their educational goals. We agree with the parents and the State
Board that this was insufficient time to make an informed decision about inclusion or
exclusion of training on M.C.T. objectives.
The analysis prescribed by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge [**25], 424 U.S.
319,47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893, also dictates advance notice. The private interest at
stake here is an interest in protecting reputation and in qualifying for future employment
opportunities. The governmental interest in upgrading the value of a diploma is also
significant. However, the risk o f an erroneous deprivation of plaintiffs' interest in this
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case is overwhelming because of the near-total lack of exposure to the material tested.
Requiring earlier notice and the attendant opportunity to learn the material will greatly
decrease the risk of erroneous deprivation.
As described in Board o f Educ. v. Ambach, supra at 574-575, early notice would thus
have benefitted plaintiffs in two ways: it "would allow for proper consideration of
whether the goals of the students' IEP's should include preparation for the [M.C.T.] and
would afford an appropriate time for instruction aimed at reaching that goal." We
conclude that a year to a year and a half, in light of plaintiffs' overwhelming lack of
exposure to the goals and objectives of the M.C.T., is constitutionally inadequate notice.
See Board o f Educ. v. Ambach, supra, at 574-575 (less than two school years [**26] is
inadequate notice); but see Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 505-506 (S.D. Ga.
1981) (twenty-four months is adequate notice); Wells v. Banks, 153 Ga. App. 581, 266
S.E.2d 270 (1980) (adequate notice though no specific time mentioned). Though we are
unable on this record to define "adequate notice" in terms of a specific number of years,
the School District can be assured that the requirement would be satisfied if one of the
following two conditions for adequate notice is met. due process ADEQUATE NOTICE
SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENT PREVAILED The School District can, first, ensure
that handicapped students are sufficiently exposed to most of the material that appears on
the M.C.T., or, second, they can produce evidence o f a reasoned and well-informed
decision by the parents and teachers involved that a particular high school student will be
better off concentrating on educational objectives [*188] other than preparation for the
M.C.T.
We turn finally to the question of remedy. Plaintiffs argue that the only proper remedy is
issuance of diplomas, and the district court apparently agreed, stating that "if the M.C.T.
program is constitutionally invalid as applied to these students, there is no impediment to
issuance of the diplomas." [**27] 534 F. Supp. at 729. The School District suggests that
plaintiffs should be denied diplomas, but allowed more time to participate in remedial
classes and further opportunities to take the M.C.T.
The School District's position is not without merit. Some plaintiffs might have failed the
M.C.T. despite decades of preparation; others might have opted out of it even if notified
years in advance. By awarding these plaintiffs diplomas, the School District would be
putting them in a better position than they would have been in had there been no due
process violation. Traditionally, procedural due process remedies provide plaintiffs only
with an opportunity to prove their eligibility for a benefit, rather than providing the
benefit itself. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011
(welfare benefits provided on interim basis pending hearing on eligibility and subject to
recoupment). Awarding diplomas here would amount to awarding the benefit itself.
Substantively, the due process right is not a right to a diploma, see supra p. 186, but
rather a right to adequate notice in order to prepare for the new requirement. Thus the
appropriate remedy for the [**28] denial of this right is an extended period for
preparation.
Plaintiffs argue that it is impossible to put them back in the position that they would have
been in had they received adequate notice while still in school. Several are employed and
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would be forced to leave their jobs in order to participate in the remedial program and
prepare for the M.C.T. Eleven plaintiffs have been away from school for over two years,
since June of 1980, and it would be difficult, both psychologically and academically, for
them to make up for lost time. They ask, essentially, why they should endure these
hardships when the School District was at fault for providing inadequate notice.
We agree with the School District that, in theory, the proper remedy for a violation o f this
kind is to require it to provide free, remedial, special education classes to ensure exposure
to the material tested on the M.C.T., and a reasonable opportunity for plaintiffs to learn
that material REMEDIATON. We take note of the fact that the School District presently
offers such courses (Tr. Vol. I, at 143-144), and we advise future handicapped students to
bypass the courts and enroll in those courses when necessary. In this particular [**29]
case however it is unrealistic to assume that eleven o f these plaintiffs would be able to
return to school without undue hardship. Consequently, the School District may not
require those plaintiffs to pass the M.C.T. as a prerequisite for a diploma.
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN: REMEDIATION: STUDENT PREVAILED
The judgment of the district court is reversed with directions to order the School District
to issue high school diplomas to the eleven plaintiffs who satisfy the remaining
graduation requirements.
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DEBRA P., a minor, by Irene P., her mother and next friend, Wanda W., a minor,
by Ruby W., her mother and next friend, Luwanda K., a minor, by Willa K., her
mother and next friend, Terry W., a minor, by Doris W., his mother and next
friend, Brenda T., a minor by Willie T., her father and next friend, Vanessa S., a
minor, by Mamie S., her mother and next friend, Thomas J. H., Jr., a minor by
Thomas J. H., Sr., his father and next friend, Gary L. B., a minor, by Ezell B., his
father and next friend, Valisa W., a minor, by Charles W., her father and next
friend, Huey J., a minor, by Melvin G., his guardian and next friend, on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Ralph D.
TURLINGTON, Individually and as Commissioner of Education, Florida State
Board of Education, Governor Bob Graham, Individually and as Chairman thereof,
Secretary of State George Firestone, Attorney General Jim Smith, Comptroller
Gerald A. "Jerry" Lewis, Treasurer William Gunter, Commissioner of Agriculture
Doyle Conner, Commissioner of Education Ralph D. Turlington, all Individually
and as members thereof, Florida Department of Education, School Board of
Hillsborough County, Florida, a Corporate Body Public, Roland H. Lewis,
Individually and as Chairman thereof, Cecile W. Essrig, Carl Carpenter, Jr., Ben H.
Hill, Jr., A. Leon Lowery, Sam Rampello, and Marion Rodgers, all Individually and
as members thereof, and, Raymond O. Shelton, Individually and as Superintendent
of Schools of Hillsborough County, Defendants
Case No. 78-892-Civ-T-GC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION
564 F. Supp. 177; 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17193; 13 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan)
1041
May 4,1983
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff students filed a class action against defendants,
school board and officials, challenging the constitutionality of a literacy test requirement.
The students' case was before the court on remand from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District for further factual findings.
OVERVIEW: The appellate court remanded the students' case to make further findings
on whether on not the functional literacy test covered material actually taught in Florida's
classrooms. The appellate court also requested the court to reexamine the role and effect
of the vestiges of past discrimination upon the students. On remand, the court entered an
order in favor of the school board and the officials, concluding that the literacy test was,
at least, curricularly valid. The court concluded further that the proper focus was on
whether the skills were included within the curriculum and not on whether each student
had identical educational experiences. The court found that the school board and the
officials had carried their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
test was instmctionally valid and therefore constitutional. The court reaffirmed its finding
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that the vestigial problems did not constitute the denial of an equal educational
opportunity. The court found that there was no causal link between the disproportionate
failure rate and the present effects of past school segregation. The state could deny
diplomas to the students who had not passed the literacy test.
OUTCOME: The court entered an order in favor o f the school board and the officials on
remand from an order of the appellate court in the students' class action challenging the
constitutionality of the literacy test requirement.
CORE TERMS: skill, teacher, instructional, diploma, educational, vestige, segregation,
grade, black students, taught, instructionally, mastery, public schools, site, purposeful,
testing, administrators, remedial, school students, curriculum, classroom, teaching,
preparation, instructional materials, basic skills, mathematics, insure, school districts,
failure rate, preponderance
COUNSEL: [**1] Stephen F. Hanlon, Diana Pullin, Richard Jefferson, Roger Rice, for
Plaintiff.
William Dorsey, Judith A. Brechner, for Defendant.
JUDGES: Carr, J.
OPINION BY: CARR
OPINION
[*179] MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In 1978, the Florida Legislature approved an amendment to the Educational
Accountability Act of 1976, Fla. Stat. § 229.55 et seq., which required public school
students in the State of Florida to pass a functional literacy examination in order to
receive a state high school diploma. Fla. Stat. § 232.246(1 )(b). Shortly after its
enactment, Florida high school students filed a class action challenging the
constitutionality of the literacy test requirement. 1This Court found that the test violated
both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution and enjoined its use
as a diploma sanction until the 1982-83 school year. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp.
244 (M.D. Fla. 1979). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed many of
this Court's findings. Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). However, the
appellate court remanded the case for further factual findings on two key issues.
Specifically, this Court was directed [**2] to make further findings on whether or not the
functional literacy test, the Florida Student State Assessment Test, Part II (SSAT-II),
covers material actually taught in Florida's classrooms.CURRICULAR VALIDITY. 644
F.2d at 406. In addition, the Court of Appeals requested this Court to reexamine the "role
and effect of the 'vestiges' of past discrimination" upon twelfth grade black students. 644
F.2d at 408 n. 19. EQUAL PROTECTION
1 For an outline of the history of this litigation as well as a more detailed
summary of the plaintiffs' claims and the defendants' defenses, see Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 400-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
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2 Class B was certified as "all present and future twelfth grade black public
school students in the State of Florida who have failed or who hereafter fail the
SSAT-n." 474 F. Supp. at 246. Class C was certified as "all present and future
twelfth grade black public school students in Hillsborough County who have
failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT-II." Id.
Following receipt of the mandate from the [**3J Court of Appeals,3 this Court held a
series of status conferences aimed at determining the most effective way to comply with
the appellate court's directives. It was decided that the issues could best be resolved
separately. Thus, trial of the first issue —the question of instructional validity —was
scheduled for the week of February 28,1983. An evidentiary hearing on the vestige
question was held during the week of April 25, 1983.
3 The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing
en banc. Debra P. v. Turlington, 654 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1981).
I. The Instructional Validity Issue
The SSAT-II is a test of a student's ability to successfully apply basic communications
and mathematics skills to everyday life situations. See Fla. Stat. § 232.246(1 )(b); Fla.
Admin. Code Rule 6A-1.942(2)(a). The test covers 24 basic skills. Of these, 11 are
designated as communications [*180] skills and 13 are designated as mathematics skills.
4 Defendants'Exs. [**4] 77 & 78.
4 The communications skills are: main idea, details, cause/effect, fact/opinion,
unstated opinion, references, index, maps, letters, checks, and forms. Defendants'
Exs. 11 and 78. The mathematics skills are: elapsed time, monetary amounts,
whole numbers, decimals/percents, comparison shopping, interest, sales tax,
discounts, linear measurement, area, capacity, weight, and graphs/tables. Id. See
Fla. Admin. Code Rule 6A-1.942(3)(a), (b).
As of October, 1982, 3809 members or 2.77% of the Class of 1983 had not yet passed the
mathematics portion of the SSAT-II; 301 or. 16 of 1% had not yet passed the
communications test. Defendants' Ex. 106. If these students do not pass the examination
which was given in April of 1983, and this Court does not continue the injunction, they
will receive a certificate of completion rather than a diploma when they graduate.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
The Court of Appeals has upheld the denial of a diploma to these students so long as the
"test is a fair test of that which was taught." [**5] 644 F.2d at 406. The Court reasoned
that "if the test is not fair, it cannot be said to be rationally related to a state interest" and
therefore it would be violative of the equal protection Clause. Id. In other words, the
SSAT-II is only constitutional if it is instructionally valid. EQUAL PROTECTION
Before determining whether or not the SSAT-n is instructionally valid, it is necessary to
define the term and to determine the scope of the appeals court's mandate with regard to
this issue. Although professional educators might dispute its meaning, the parties
generally agreed that the term, as used by the Court of Appeals, can be summarized in
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just one question.5 Put simply, the task assigned to this Court by the Court of Appeals
was to find out if Florida is teaching what it is testing. Unfortunately, the answer to this
apparently easy question is quite complex.
5 Although the parties have agreed that the concept described by the Court of
Appeals is that of instructional validity, it should be noted that the Court actually
referred to this term as "curricular validity." 644 F.2d at 405.
[**6] In an effort to carry its burden of proving that the test is instructionally valid, the
defendants commissioned IOX Assessment Associates, a private consultant firm, to
develop a study design. IOX designed a study which consisted of four separate
components. First, IOX devised a teacher survey which was sent to every teacher in
Florida. The survey asked teachers whether they had provided instruction relating to the
24 skills tested on the SSAT-II. If they had, the teachers were then asked if they had
provided sufficient instruction for a student to master the skills. The teachers were
required to answer separately for each individual skill. In addition, although the survey
was anonymous, the teachers were asked to identify whether they were an elementary or
secondary teacher and, if a secondary teacher, they were to identify their major field of
emphasis.
The second part of the study designed by IOX was a survey sent to the 67 school districts
and 4 university laboratory schools in Florida. 6 The districts were required to fill out a
set of six forms. The forms were titled:
I. SSAT-II Skills by Grade Summary
II. Major SSAT-II Instructional Program Variations
III. [**7] Description of SSAT-n Remedial Programs
IV. Summary of SSAT-II Staff Development Activities
V. Instructional Materials Analysis for SSAT-n Skills
VI. Additional SSAT-II District Activities
6 For the purposes of this opinion, references to the individual school districts
should be read as including the individual laboratory schools.
The Skills by Grade Summary asked the districts to estimate at what grade students
received preparation in the various SSAT-n skills and when the majority of students
would have attained mastery of these skills. Form n asked the districts to report any
major instructional variations among the schools in the district. Form in , the Remedial
Program Form, asked the districts to describe any remedial programs specifically [*181]
related to attaining mastery of the SSAT-n skills. Form IV. required the district to
identify and describe any staff development activities conducted by the district to
promote mastery of SSAT-n skills. In response to [**8] Form V. the districts were
required to list instructional materials that specifically prepared students for any of the

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

484

SSAT-II skills. The final form, Form VI, asked the districts to identify any programs
directed specifically toward helping students pass the SSAT-II.
The third component of the IOX study consisted of a series o f site visits to verify the
accuracy of the district reports. The site visit teams were comprised of one employee of
the Florida Department of Education and two educators from the districts. At least one
site visit team visited each district. The site visitors spent two days in each district
interviewing administrators and teachers and comparing the instructional materials used
in the district with those listed in the district report. At the conclusion of their visit, the
site visitors prepared a report of their findings and impressions about the accuracy of the
district report.
The fourth component of the IOX study was a student survey administered by the site
visitors to one or two eleventh grade social studies and english classes. The survey asked
the students to state whether or not they had been taught in school how to answer the
types of questions [**9] found on the SSAT-II. The sample questions provided to the
students included questions on all 24 SSAT-II skills.
At trial, the defendant offered three expert witnesses who opined, based on the array of
data outlined above, that Florida was teaching what it was testing. Specifically, Dr. W.
James Popham, the President of IOX and the person primarily responsible for the IOX
study design, testified that the results of the study convinced him that the SSAT-II was
instructionally valid. After explaining how the study was developed and detailing how it
had been modified to insure accuracy, Dr. Popham stated that it is clear that the school
districts in Florida are adequately preparing their students for the test. In large part, Dr.
Popham found support for his opinion in the results of the Mastery Exposure Index
prepared by the Department of Education. The Index, which was prepared at Dr.
Popham's suggestion, attempts to distill the statistics adduced from the teacher survey. In
essence, it shows how many opportunities a Florida public school student is given to
attain mastery of the various SSAT-II skills. The end result o f this statistical analysis is
that students are given an [**10] average of 2.7 opportunities to attain mastery of the
SSAT-II skills. According to Dr. Popham, a student need only be exposed once to
mastery level instruction for the test to be instructionally valid. As a result, 2.7 exposures
were more than sufficient to insure the fairness of the test and the attendant diploma
sanction.
The State also called Dr. Donald Henderson as an expert witness. Dr. Henderson
accompanied one of the site visit teams on their audit of the Pinellas School District. Dr.
Henderson generally described his visit and offered his opinion, based on the survey
results and on what he had observed, that the test was instructionally valid. Dr.
Henderson also described in detail the efforts being undertaken by the State to monitor
remediation throughout the districts. Dr. Henderson explained that the principals of every
school were sent questionnaires concerning students who had failed the SSAT-II. The
principals were required to describe the steps taken to remediate these students. Followup questionnaires were sent to gain more information on the students who were reported
as not receiving remediation. The follow-up results showed to Dr. Henderson's
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satisfaction
that steps had been taken to guarantee that any student who wanted
remediation was receiving it.
The defendant's final witness was Dr. Robert Gagne. Dr. Gagne also accompanied a site
visit team during one of its audits. In addition, Dr. Gagne testified that he had examined
the results of all four parts of the IOX study and that, in his professional opinion, he was
convinced that the SSAT-II was instructionally valid. Dr. [*182] Gagne also opined that
students who flunked the SSAT-II in the tenth grade could learn the necessary skills prior
to graduation provided they received suitable instruction. Moreover, he found evidence
that suitable instruction was being offered.
The plaintiffs attempted to controvert the defendants' case through the testimony of two
experts, Dr. Robert Linn and Dr. Robert Calfee. Dr. Linn testified that instructional
validity requires a sufficient degree of preparation and that some students may need more
than one exposure to mastery in order for the test to be fair. Dr. Linn also suggested that
the survey conducted by the State was not a reliable indicator of what actually went on in
the classrooms. In particular, he noted that the survey only [**12] covered the 1981-82
school year rather than a twelfth grader's entire school career. In addition, Dr. Linn
indicated that the survey was constructed in such a way as to invite positive responses
from the teachers and that the survey responses should have been checked by visits to
actual classrooms in which SSAT-II skills were taught.
Dr. Calfee studied the teacher responses from all the districts and concluded that the
teacher responses were related to the performance o f students on the test. Thus, teachers
in districts in which students did poorly on the test generally reported that they were not
teaching as many SSAT-II skills as their counterparts in high success districts. In
particular, Dr. Calfee found a wide variation in the responses of teachers who stated that
they taught math skills. Dr. Calfee noted that this disparity in teacher responses was in
line with students' actual performance on the test since students were having a much
harder time with the math skills on the test than with the english skills.
In addition to presenting these experts, the plaintiffs argued that the Court should not
receive the survey results offered by the defendants since they were inadmissible [**13]
hearsay. The defendants argued that the survey results should be allowed in under
Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(c) or under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid.
803(24). After hearing argument by the parties, the Court ultimately ruled that the survey
results were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(24). In the alternative, they were admitted
under Fed.R.Evid. 703 as being the basis of the expert opinions presented at trial. 7
7 The landmark case dealing with the admissibility of surveys and polls is Zippo
Manufacturing v. Rogers Imports, 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. N.Y. 1963). Zippo was
a trademark infringement case in which the trial judge allowed the introduction of
a consumer study which attempted to show consumer confusion. The Court
reasoned that the hearsay rule should not bar the admission of properly conducted
surveys, and held that surveys should be allowed if there is a "circumstantial
guaranty of trustworthiness" surrounding the making of the out of court statement.
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The Zippo decision is in line with the recommendation of the Judicial Conference
Study Group which issued a Handbook o f Recommended Procedures fo r the Trial
o f Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351,425 (1960). In the Handbook, the Panel
recognizes the need for both polls and surveys in certain types of cases. Although
the Panel acknowledged that polls which are offered to prove the truth of the
matters asserted by the interviewees are hearsay, it suggested that they should be
admissible in certain circumstances.
The Panel went on to advise that a poll's admissibility should depend on the type
of methodology used. If it was a proper scientific poll, it should be allowed.
Factors which cut against admissibility, according to the Panel, would be a close
nexus between the attorneys and the interviewers or knowledge by the
interviewers and interviewees of the purpose of the poll.
Because the Panel's Handbook and the Zippo decision were issued before the
codification of the Evidence Code, they do not directly discuss the applicability of
Rule 803(24). More recent authority has directly addressed this issue. For
example, in Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 757-60 (3rd
Cir. 1978), the Court did hold that survey results are admissible under Rule
803(24). Based on the facts of that case, however, the Court found that the survey
results were inadmissible because they were not sufficiently trustworthy. Like
Pittsburgh Press Club, the interviewees in this case were aware of the purpose of
the poll. Yet, unlike Pittsburgh Press Club, the pollsters in this case have
attempted to put in safeguards to assure the poll's trustworthiness. Indeed, the
plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Calfee, admitted that he had no problem with the survey
procedures used by the defendants. Moreover, even if the survey results were not
admissible under Rule 803(24), this Court has wide discretion under Rule 703 to
allow an expert to explain the basis of his opinion. Baumholser v. A max Coal
Company, 630 F.2d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1980). Since all of the defendants'
experts testified that they had relied on the survey data, and the plaintiffs were
given a substantial opportunity to cross-examine the experts on the study's
reliability and to present their own expert opinions of the data, admission of the
raw data was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs. Id. at 553. Finally, the Court
carefully considered the plaintiffs' arguments in deciding what weight, if any,
should be given to the survey results.
[**14] [*183] As the foregoing outline of the evidence suggests, the resolution of the
instructional validity issue depends both on whose experts are believed and on what sort
of proof is required. With regard to the former, it is important to understand that the
instructional validity issue, and the related concept o f minimum competency testing, are
relatively new and highly controversial subjects which seem to have polarized the
educational community.8 Thus, in large part, this Court has been called upon to settle not
only a legal argument but also a professional dispute. At times, the distinction between
these two spheres has blurred. The experts for both sides spoke in terms of "fairness,"
"adequacy" and "sufficiency." Yet, these terms are not necessarily synonymous with
constitutionality. As noted in a law review article cited frequently by the appellate court,
any judicial decision on this issue "will reflect only the minimum standards essential to
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fairness under our legal system. Policymakers must meet, but are not limited to, the
minimum standards in pursuing the goal of educational equity for students." M. S.
McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational [**151 Issues, 47
Fordham L. Rev. 651, 712 (1979). 9 In other words, even though the defendants might
have implemented a much more equitable program, their actions might still pass
constitutional muster.
8 For example, the National Institute of Education sponsored a symposium on the
pros and cons of minimum competency testing in 1980. The plaintiffs' two experts
as well as plaintiffs' lead counsel participated in the symposium and represented
the opposition faction. Dr. Popham, the defendants' key witness and the person
responsible for designing the state's survey, was the leader of the group who
favored the testing.
9 It is interesting to note that Mr. McClung was an attorney at the Center for Law
and Education when he authored this article and that Diana Pullin assisted him in
the preparation of the section on instructional validity. The Center for Law and
Education has represented the plaintiffs throughout this litigation and Ms. Pullin,
who is one of its attorneys, has acted as lead counsel. CURRICULAR VALIDITY
But, [**16] what does the Constitution require in this instance? It may not be fair to
expect students with differing interests and abilities to leam the same material at the same
rate, but is it unconstitutional? Similarly, it may be inequitable that some students,
through random selection, are assigned to mediocre teachers while others are given
excellent instructors, but does this inequity rise to the level o f a constitutional violation?
10

10 In Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings o f Fact at para. 48, the plaintiffs suggest that
the disparity in teachers' abilities should be taken into account.
These questions lead to other issues concerning the appropriate burden of proof. The
plaintiffs argue that the defendants have not carried their burden because they have not
attempted to follow students throughout their entire careers. They also assert that there is
insufficient evidence of what actually goes on in the classrooms. 11 [*184] But, absent
viewing a videotape of every student's school career, how can we [**17] know what
really happened to each child? Even assuming that such videotapes were available, how
could this Court decide, in constitutional terms, which students received appropriate
instruction and which did not? Suppose that there is one student who never encountered
a teacher who taught'the SSAT-II skills, or a teacher who taught the skills well, should
the entire test be declared invalid? What if the number of students were 3,000 rather than
1? CURRICULAR VALIDITY 12
11 One o f the plaintiffs' principal attacks on the defendants' evidence concerns the
appropriate burden of proof. Citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L. Ed.
2d 323,99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979), the plaintiffs argue that the defendants have the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a
preponderance, that the SSAT-II is instructionally valid. Although the plaintiffs
have cited a number of cases in which a more rigorous standard of proof is
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appropriate, they have not shown why proof of a preponderance of the evidence
would be improper on the instant facts.
Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires that 'the
litigants .. . share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion.'. . it
rationally should be applied only when the interests are of roughly equal
societal importance.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599,102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
While the plaintiffs' property interests in obtaining their diplomas are of great
importance, these interests are roughly equal in societal importance to the State's
interest in insuring quality public education for all Florida students. See Fla. Stat.
§ 229.55(2)(a). It follows that the defendants should not be required to carry a
heightened burden of proof in this case. Accord, San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973); 644 F.2d at
402-03. DUE PROCESS
[**18]
12 The Court recognizes that the plaintiffs would answer this question
affirmatively. Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions o f Law at para. 25 and para. 26.
It is necessary to consider these questions in order to appreciate the dilemma confronted
by this Court. Instructional validity is an elusive concept. Moreover, unlike some of the
other claims made by the plaintiffs at the first trial, the instructional validity issue strikes
at the heart of the learning and teaching process. It also lends itself to individualized
determinations rather than objective treatment.
Instructional validity is a subpart of content validity which together with curricular
validity, insures that a test covers matters actually taught. As the Court of Appeals noted,
and as this Court previously found, the SSAT-II is a "good test of what the students
should know." 644 F.2d at 405 n.l 1. That is, the subjects tested parallel the curricular
goals of the State. 13 To this end, the Department of Education publishes minimum
performance standards and also "periodically examine[s] and evaluate[s] procedures,
records, [**19] and programs in each district to determine compliance with law and rules
established by the state board." Fla. Stat. § 229.565(2). Thus, although the individual
districts are still somewhat autonomous, they no longer have the authority to decide that
they will not teach certain minimum skills. 4 See Fla. Stat. § 230.23(4)(f)(l); §
230.23(7)(a); § 230.33(9)(a). In the same vein, the Department of Education, the
individual districts, and the separate schools are required to submit annual reports of how
well school instructional programs are helping students acquire minimum performance
skills. In sum, since at least 1979, school administrators and teachers have been well
aware of the minimum performance standards imposed by the State and their duty to
teach these skills.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

489

13 The plaintiffs correctly point out that the State has not listed the SSAT-II skills
in Chapter 233 as a mandatory course of study. The minimum student
performance standards, however, were distributed to the individual schools as
early as 1978. Defendants' Exs. la-72a.
14 Passing the SSAT-II is not the only graduation requirement mandated by the
Educational Accountability Act. Students must also demonstrate mastery of the
minimum performance standards which are approved by the State Board of
Education in reading, writing, and mathematics for the eleventh grade (the SSATI), and they must complete a minimum number of academic credits. Fla. Stat. §
232.246(1 )(a), (c). Although the emphasis o f the programs is different, many of
the skills learned in fulfilling one requirement aid in satisfying another
requirement. For example, a basic knowledge of reading is required to pass both
the SSAT-I and the SSAT-II. As a result, the overall statutory scheme outlined
above is directed towards satisfying all three graduation requirements.
[**20] In addition, the districts now have access to state-approved instructional materials;
materials which have been screened by the state instructional materials council in an
effort to determine the degree to which they "implement the curricular objectives o f the
schools of the state." Fla. Stat. § 233.09(4). The districts are also required to use their
annual allocation of state funds for the purchase of books from the state-approved list. 15
Fla. Stat. § 233.34(2).
15 Up to 50 percent of the annual allocation may be used for books not on the list
or for the repair and renovation of textbooks and library materials. Fla. Stat. §
233.34(2).
[*185] The districts also receive funding from the State to remediate students who need
special educational assistance in order to master the basic skills. Fla. Stat. § 236.088.
Evidence was presented at trial which demonstrated that the State has kept track of these
students and has monitored the efforts being taken to remediate them. Defendants’Ex. 74.
[**21] Each district school board is also required to establish pupil progression plans to
insure that students are not promoted without consideration of each student's mastery of
basic skills. Fla. Stat. § 232.245. The State has also established uniform testing standards
for grades 3 ,5 ,8 and 11 to monitor the acquisition of basic skills by students statewide.
Id.
These legislative requirements bolster the conclusion that the SSAT-II is, at least,
curricularly valid. They lend support to the opinions of the defendants' experts that the
SSAT-II is instructionally valid. It is clear from the survey results that the terms of the
Educational Accountability Act are not just hollow words found in a statute book. Rather,
the district reports, teacher surveys, and site visit audits, as interpreted by the defendants'
experts, all indicate that the directives of the Act are a driving force in all of Florida’s
public schools.
Nevertheless, it is the plaintiffs' position that the instructional validity of the test cannot
be established by showing that the skills tested are included in a recognized curriculum.
To the contrary, they believe that the only touchstone of the test's validity [**22] is proof
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of what graduating seniors were actually, not theoretically, taught. Without such proof,
the plaintiffs posit that no one can tell whether the students had a "fair" opportunity to
learn.
The plaintiffs are particularly concerned that the districts are not offering uniform
preparation on the SSAT-II skills. Indeed, the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Calfee, demonstrated
that the degree o f preparation on SSAT-II skills varied significantly from district to
district. The defendants have not suggested that preparation is identical in all the districts.
To the contrary, the defendants' expert, Dr. Popham, admitted that no two students will
have exactly the same academic experience and that every student will encounter poor
teachers and poor administrators during his or her school career. E.g., Popham at 66, 347.
Nevertheless, despite the disparity among districts, the defendants' experts still believed
that students in all of Florida's districts were given an adequate opportunity to leam the
SSAT-II skills before the end of twelfth grade.
As noted above, it is impossible to prove conclusively the degree to which every one of
the more than 100,000 graduating seniors [**23] were exposed to the SSAT-II skills.
What is known, is that the districts have reported that these skills are included in their
curriculum and that a substantial number of public school teachers have stated that they
adhere to this curriculum by including these skills in their course of instruction. In
addition, and of even greater significance in determining the constitutionality of the test,
it is known that students are given five chances to pass the SSAT-II between the tenth
and twelfth grades of school and that, if they fail, they are offered remedial help. They
also have the option of staying in school for an additional year in order to "receive special
instruction designed to remedy [their] identified deficiencies." Fla. Stat. § 232.246(4). 16
Certainly, some remedial programs and teachers will be more effective than others.
However, this disparity cannot be said to be unfair in a constitutional sense. While it
might be preferable from an educator's standpoint to insure that students leam the
requisite skills during their regular courses [*186] rather than in remedial sessions, the
Constitution clearly does not mandate such a result. What is required is that the [**24]
skills be included in the official curriculum and that the majority of the teachers
recognize them as being something they should teach. 17 Once these basic facts are
proven, as they have been in this case, the only logical inference is that the teachers are
doing the job they are paid to do and are teaching these skills. Accord, Anderson v.
Banks, 540 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ga. 1982). It strains credibility to hypothesize that
teachers, especially remedial teachers, are uniformly avoiding their responsibilities at the
expense of their pupils. CURRICULAR VALIDITY
16 A student who has not passed the SSAT-II may stay in school for the extra
year on either a full-time or part-time basis. Fla. Stat. § 232.246(4). In addition, a
student who has received a certificate of completion rather than a diploma may
take adult education courses aimed at remediating SSAT-II skills. Fla. Stat. §
228.072. A student who has received a certificate of completion rather than a
diploma may also take the SSAT-II after leaving school even though he or she is
not enrolled in an adult education course. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 6A1.942(2)(b)(2).
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[**25]
17 The conclusion that the proper focus is on whether the skills are included
within the curriculum and not on whether each student had identical educational
experiences, is supported by the language used by the appellate court in
announcing its holding. The Court wrote, "if the test is found to be invalid for the
reason that it tests matters outside the curriculum, its continued use would violate
the equal protection Clause." 644 F.2d at 406 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals held that the State has the right to impose the diploma sanction
provided the test covers what is taught. 644 F.2d at 406. If the burden asserted by the
plaintiffs were accepted, the State would never be able to exercise that right because
instructional validity could never be proven as to every student. 18 Such a result is not
mandated either by the Constitution or the Court o f Appeals. To the contrary, the
appellate court cautioned against,
Imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even
[**26] partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of everchanging conditions.
644 F.2d at 406, quoting San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,43, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1972).
18 Significantly, several of the plaintiffs' own witnesses at the first trial suggested
that their concerns about the instructional validity of the test could be resolved
within a few years. E.g., Dr. Madaus at 1780-83; Dr. Tyler at 2118, 2120, 2141 42. See Final Argument o f Mr. Rice at 3281.
For the reasons stated above, and based on a review of the evidence presented by both
sides, the Court finds that the defendants have carried their burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the SSAT-II is instructionally valid and therefore
constitutional. Although the instruction offered in all the classrooms of all the districts
might not be ideal, students are nevertheless afforded an adequate opportunity to leam the
skills tested on the SSAT-II before it is used as [**27] a diploma sanction.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
II. The Vestiges Issue
As noted earlier, deciding that the SSAT-II is a fair test of that which is taught in the
Florida public schools does not end this Court's inquiry. The Court must still decide
whether or not the State should be enjoined from imposing the diploma sanction because
the vestiges of past purposeful discrimination have an unconstitutional impact on black
high school students.
No one disputes the fact that the SSAT-II failure rate among black students is
disproportionately high. Of the three thousand twelfth grade students who have not
passed the test, about 57% are black even though blacks only constitute about 20% o f the
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entire student body. While these statistics are alarming, they do not, standing alone,
answer the constitutional question this Court must confront.
In order for this Court to continue to prohibit the State from using the SSAT-II as a
diploma sanction, the disproportionate failure rate among today's high school seniors
must be found to have been caused by past purposeful segregation or its lingering effects.
If the disparate failure of blacks is not due to the present effects of past intentional
segregation or if [**28] the test is necessary to remedy those effects, then the [*187] four
year injunction entered in 1979 can not be extended. 644 F.2d at 407.
The Court has already found that the vestiges of past purposeful segregation did exist in
the Florida public schools from 1971 to 1979. 474 F. Supp. at 252. At the more recent
trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence which indicates that black students are still being
suspended more often than white students, that several counties still do not have black
administrators, that racial stereotypes still persist, and that blacks are being assigned to
EMR classes more readily than whites.
In addition, the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Roderick McDavis, testified that the racial bias of
teachers is a significant problem within the Florida public schools. Dr. McDavis, an
expert in the counseling of ethnic minorities who has held workshops in a number of
Florida's school districts, related that students and counselors often reported to him that
teachers called black students derogatory names and had low expectations for them. The
plaintiffs' second expert, Dr. Na'im Akbar, a clinical psychologist, stated that racial
animus among teachers and the lack of [**29] black administrators in the schools would
detrimentally affect the ability of black students to leam by eroding their "self-concept."
In other words, if black students feel that they are in an alien environment and are
exposed to negative experiences in school, their academic motivation will be diminished.
Consequently, minority students might never acquire the basic skills necessary to master
more difficult academic tasks.
The testimony offered by Drs. Akbar and McDavis reinforced the testimony which Dr.
Gordon Foster offered at the first trial and convinces the Court that the vestiges of past
purposeful segregation continue, to some extent, until the present day. The Court does not
find, however, that the problems related by the plaintiffs' experts are as widespread as
they contend. While it seems clear that some individual teachers, both black and white,
carry with them biases which impair their teaching abilities, the Court rejects Dr.
McDavis' estimate that as many as 30% of the teachers in Florida's public schools are
overtly or covertly racist. Similarly, the evidence belies Dr. Akbar's conclusions
concerning the causative effect of the problems he identified. 19 For [**30] example, the
record reveals that more than 90% o f the black students in Florida's schools have
successfully taken the test and that black students in counties where there are black
administrators have not done appreciably better on the SSAT-II than black students in
counties where there are no black authority figures. As a result, the Court reaffirms its
finding that the vestigial problems outlined earlier "do not constitute the denial of an
equal educational opportunity. .. ." 474 F. Supp. at 252.
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19 The value of the plaintiffs' expert testimony is undercut by the fact that it is not
based on reliable scientific data. Instead, as the defendants have argued, the
experts' conclusions were largely based on anecdotal reports rather than on
empirical studies.
The mere fact that black students are not doing as well as white students on the test does
not direct a different result. As Dr. Akbar pointed out, many of the impediments to
learning faced by black students do not have their source in the classroom. To [**31] the
contrary, according to Dr. Akbar, black students also experience significant difficulties
because they are growing up in a predominantly white society. Unfortunately, no matter
how much all of us might wish it, these problems are not going to go away today,
tomorrow, or even by the end of the decade. Indeed, as long as past purposeful
segregation remains part of our collective memory, its vestiges will, sadly, remain with
us, not only in our schools, but in every aspect of our lives. EQUAL PROTECTION20
20 Implicit in this Court's 1979 Opinion was the finding that the vestiges of past
purposeful segregation have continued to dissipate over time.
Relying on Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 23 L. Ed. 2d 309, 89 S. Ct.
1720 (1969), the plaintiffs seem to argue that the SSAT-II will be invalid as long as any
vestiges of discrimination exist. [*188] Indeed, they have suggested that the test is unfair
because the black parents of this year's graduating class received an inferior education
and therefore [**32] have a more limited ability to help their children succeed in school.
While there may well be some factual validity to the plaintiffs' argument, it does not
follow that the test should be enjoined until every vestige of past discrimination, no
matter how faint, is erased. The Supreme Court's decision in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board o f Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971), is
instructive. The Court wrote,
We are concerned in these cases with the elimination of the discrimination
inherent in the dual school systems, not with the myriad factors of human
existence which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial,
religious, or ethnic grounds... . The elimination of racial discrimination in public
schools is a large task and one that should not be retarded by efforts beyond the
jurisdiction of school authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of
baggage.
402 U.S. at 22-23.
The same limits apply in the present case. Thus, it must be remembered that the SSAT-II
is constitutionally impermissible only if the disproportionate failure rate among black
students is due to the learning deficits created by [**33] the past segregation of the
Florida public schools or its effects. For the following reasons, the Court finds that there
is no causal link between the disproportionate failure rate and the present effects of past
school segregation. Moreover, even if there was a causal connection, the defendants have
carried their burden of showing that the SSAT-II is necessary to remedy those effects.
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The State's principal witness on the vestiges issue was Dr. Barbara Lemer. Dr. Lemer
was an extraordinary witness. Although the Court does not accept all of her opinions, her
testimony on the key issues in this case was highly persuasive. In sum, it was Dr. Lemer's
position that the vestiges of school segregation do not affect a student's academic
achievement. In particular, she did not believe that the lack of role models or the presence
of racial stereotypes were responsible for the disparate performance of blacks on the
SSAT-II. Instead, she testified that the empirical data demonstrated that other factors
such as the educational background of a student's parents, the class size, and the amount
of homework required were more directly related to student achievement.
Dr. Lemer's testimony [**34] concerning the necessity of the SSAT-II to remedy the
effects of past segregation was even more significant. According to Dr. Lemer, children
need a "climate of order" to be able to leam. Pointing to studies which demonstrate that
Catholic school youngsters, regardless of their race or religion, do better than their public
school peers on standardized tests, Dr. Lemer opined that the learning process of all
students is aided by clear demands, fair testing and appropriate sanctions. She stated
without equivocation that the SSAT-II program, with its standardized goals and diploma
sanction, met these criteria. She stated further that the test was necessary to overcome
whatever effects of past purposeful segregation remain in the schools. By enacting the
SSAT-II, the State set equal goals for all children and told students, teachers, and
administrators that sanctions would be imposed if these goals were not met. In Dr.
Lemer's opinion, knowledge of these goals and sanctions would add to a student's
motivation and his or her ability to succeed academically.
The injunction entered in 1979 was premised on the finding that it would be
unconstitutional to deny a diploma to a student [**35] who did not have an opportunity to
gain an equal education. In particular, the Court was concerned about imposing the
diploma sanction on students who had attended schools which did not have the same
textbooks, curricula, libraries and attendance requirements. 474 F. Supp. at 250. The
Court found further that "punishing the victims of past discrimination for deficits created
by an inferior educational environment neither constitutes a remedy nor [*189] creates
better educational opportunities." 474 F. Supp. at 257.
In the 1979 trial, this Court found, "the most significant burden which accompanied black
children into the integrated schools was the existence of years of inferior education." 474
F. Supp. at 252. This burden is not shouldered by the Class of 1983. Unlike the Class of
1979, black and white members of the Class of 1983 have had the same textbooks,
curricula, libraries and attendance requirements throughout their public school years.
Thus, while no two students can have an identical academic experience, their educational
opportunities have nonetheless been equal in a constitutional sense. Moreover, to the
extent that insidious racism is a problem in the schools, [**36] it would seem that a test
like the SSAT-II, with objective standards and goals, would lead to its eradication.21
Testimony of Dr. Lemer; Defendants' Ex. 114 (Deposition of Herb A. Sang).
21 This finding also resolves the question of whether or not the defendants, have
violated the EOAA, 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The Act is not violated, even if the
vestiges of past purposeful segregation still exist, so long as the defendants have
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taken "affirmative steps" to remove the vestiges. The SSAT-II, as presently
implemented, is such an "affirmative step."
Twelve years have passed since the Florida public schools became physically unitary.
Since that time, the State of Florida has undertaken massive efforts to improve the
education of all of its school children. The SSAT-II is an important part of those efforts.
Its use can be enjoined only if it perpetuates the effects of past school segregation or if it
is not needed to remedy those effects. 644 F.2d at 397. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d
989, 996-97 (5th [**37] Cir. 1981). Applying this standard to the facts presented at both
the 1979 and 1983 trials, the Court finds that the injunction should not be extended. The
State of Florida may deny diplomas to the members of the Class of 1983 who have not
passed the SSAT-II. equal protection EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
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Superintendent of the Tattnall County Schools, the Tattnall
County School Board, and the Tattnall County School
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April 23,1984
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] As Amended.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia.
DISPOSITION: DISMISSED.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants challenged a finding from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, which found that appellee school
district could require future students to pass an exit examination to obtain a high school
diploma.
OVERVIEW: Appellants challenged appellee school district's requirement that students
pass an exit examination to obtain a high school diploma. The complaint alleged that the
exit examination discriminated against appellants because of their race. The court held
that appellants prevailed on their equal protection claims and ordered appellees not to
impose the diploma sanction until the graduation of the class who began their education
after the abolition of the segregated school system. The court further held that the school
district could reinstate the diploma sanction if it could then show that the increased
educational opportunities of the exam outweighed any lingering causal connection
between the discriminatory tracking system and the imposition of the diploma sanction.
The question of ripeness affected the court's subject matter jurisdiction and could be
raised sua sponte at any time. The judgment was affirmed because all students who were
denied a diploma because of the exit exam policy were awarded a diploma; therefore,
only those future students who might be given the exam would be affected by a review of
the district court's rulings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for ripeness.
OUTCOME: The court found that the case was not ripe for appellate review because the
court would be in a better position later to confront any constitutional questions raised in
this case involving a high school exit examination.
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OPINION BY: HILL
OPINION
[*645] JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:
Appellants challenge the Tattnall County School District's requirement that students pass
an exit examination to obtain a high school diploma. We dismiss the appeal for lack o f
ripeness.
BACKGROUND
The Tattnall County School District ("the District") abolished separate schools for white
and black students beginning with the 1970-71 academic year. During the same school
year, the District instituted a tracking or ability grouping system for assigning students in
the elementary and junior high schools, with the exception o f students at Collins High
School. The tracking system often resulted in racially identifiable classrooms and was
abandoned in 1979-80 as a result of an investigation by the Office of Civil Rights.
[**2] In 1976, the Tattnall County School Board adopted a diploma policy requiring that,
in addition to successful completion of a certain number of credit hours and sufficient
school attendance, each graduating student perform at the ninth grade level (a score of
9.0) on the mathematics and reading portions of the California Achievement Test
("CAT"). As part of the testing requirement, the District instituted remedial courses for
those who failed to achieve the requisite score and delayed the imposition of the diploma
sanction until Spring, 1978.REMEDIATION In 1978, 30 out of a class of 219 students
did not obtain the required 9.0 score and, as a result, received certificates of attendance
instead of diplomas; seventeen of those who only received certificates were black. [*646]
O f the 192 members of the graduating class of 1979, 10 out of the 12 students who did
not get a diploma because they failed the CAT were black. In 1980, 6 students out of 192
received certificates of attendance; all six were black. EQUAL PROTECTION
This action was filed in October, 1979, by appellant Kathy Norris Johnson on behalf of
herself and other black students in Tattnall County, Georgia, who have completed, will
complete, [**3] or are eligible to complete all requirements for high school graduation
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and receipt of a high school diploma other than achieving a particular score on the CAT.
Named as defendants were the Tattnall County School District, the Tattnall County
School Board, and Ben F. Sikes, the Superintendent of Schools for Tattnall County. The
complaint alleged that the exit examination: discriminates against the plaintiffs because
of their race, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment;EQUAL PROTECTION is fundamentally unfair and therefore violates the
plaintiffs' rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment; due
process violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 EQUAL PROTECTION, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d; and violates 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703,1706. 1 The case was consolidated with
a similar case, Walls v. Banks, and the district court certified the following classes:
Class 1. All black children who attended, are attending, or will attend public schools in
Tattnall County, Georgia, and who have completed, will complete, or are eligible to
complete all valid and legal requirements for receipt of a high school diploma established
by Defendant Board or the Georgia State Board of Education, [**4] but who did not or
will not achieve a particular score on the California Achievement Test, and who, as a
result of having failed to achieve a certain score on said tests, have been or will be denied
a high school diploma by Defendants.
Class 1.a. All black children who have attended, are attending, or will attend public
schools in Tattnall County, Georgia, and who have completed, or will complete all
requirements for receipt of a high school diploma established by Defendant Board or the
Georgia State Board of Education, other than achieving a particular score on the
California Achievement Test, and who, solely as a result of having failed to achieve a
certain score on said test, have been or will be denied a high school diploma by
Defendants.
1 The plaintiff was permitted to amend her complaint to add another named
plaintiff, to change the class definition, and to add a claim. The new claim, under
the fourteenth amendment and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794, alleged that the defendants were not administering the exit exam to students
classified as Educable Mentally Retarded. Issues concerning the relief afforded to
those classified as Educable Mentally Retarded are not raised in this appeal.
[**5] After trial on the consolidated cases, the district court entered its order of June 17,
1981. See Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.Ga.1981). The court held that the
plaintiffs prevailed on their equal protection claims and ordered the defendants not to
impose the diploma sanction until the graduation of the class of 1983 since that would be
the first group of graduating students who began their education after the abolition o f the
segregated school system. After analyzing the standards set forth in McNeal v. Tate
County School District, 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975), the district court further held that
the District could reinstate the diploma sanction in 1983 if it could then show that the
increased educational opportunities of the CAT outweigh any lingering causal connection
between the discriminatory tracking system and the imposition of the diploma sanction.
EQUAL PROTECTION
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The district court also examined the plaintiffs' due process claims in light of Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981), and held that the school authorities had not
demonstrated that the CAT was a fair test of the material actually taught in Tattnall
County public schools. The defendants [**6] filed a motion for reconsideration of the due
process portion of the order, arguing that the Debra P. decision [*647] was announced
after trial and that the decision created a new standard of proof and a shifting of the
burden of proof. The court agreed that Debra P. changed the applicable law and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing to permit the defendants to present additional evidence
concerning the match between the CAT and what was actually taught in the classrooms.
A second order was issued on June 16, 1982, see Anderson v. Banks, 540 F. Supp. 761
(S.D.Ga.1982), holding that the defendants had made a sufficient showing that the CAT
is a fair test of the material taught in Tattnall County. A judgment was entered on June
17,1982, stating that plaintiffs did not prevail on their substantive due process claims.
DUE PROCESS/CURRICULAR VALIDITY
On appeal, plaintiffs-appellants contend that the district court erred in its ruling of June
17, 1981, on plaintiffs' equal protection claims, and in its order of June 16,1982, on
plaintiffs' due process claims. They argue that the court misinterpreted McNeal v. Tate
County School District in holding that the school authorities could reestablish the [**7]
competency test in 1983 if they could then show that the increased educational
opportunities of the CAT policy outweigh any lingering causal connection between the
discriminatory tracking system and the imposition o f the diploma sanction. According to
appellants, the District can only reinstate the exam policy if it can show that steps taken
to bring disadvantaged students to peer status have ended the educational disadvantages
caused by the tracking system EQUAL PROTECTION. Appellants also maintain that
the court erred in holding that the exit exam covered material taught in Tattnall County
public schools CURRICULAR VALIDITY. They assert that the district court misapplied
the test set forth in Debra P. v. Turlington for determining whether an exit exam
comports with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. DUE PROCESS
DISCUSSION
In effect, the appellants ask us to announce whether the appellees can reinstate the exit
exam at some uncertain future date if the appellees choose to reinstitute the test and i f the
appellees are able to demonstrate to the district court that the educational benefits of the
testing program outweigh any lingering causal connection between the diploma sanction
and the tracking [**8] system EQUAL PROTECTION. Before considering the issues
raised by appellants, we must first determine whether these issues are properly before this
court. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 679-680,46 L. Ed. 2d 659
(1976). Prior to oral argument, we requested the parties to brief the issue of the finality
and appealability of the district court's orders. Both parties concede that there are still
matters to be decided by the district court but contend that the court's rulings constitute a
final order as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, an appealable
interlocutory denial of an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).2
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2 Because we hold that this case is not ripe for review, we need not and do not
express any view on whether this court would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 or 1292(a).
Neither party, however, has addressed whether we should defer decision on the
constitutional issues raised by the appellants because the controversy is not ripe for
review in light of the [**9] absence o f a ruling by the district court that the school district
may reinstate the exit exam policy. The question of ripeness affects our subject matter
jurisdiction, see International Tape Manufacturers Ass'n v. Gerstein, 494 F.2d 25, 27 (5th
Cir.1974); Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 176 U.S. App. D.C. 218, 539 F.2d 220, 221 n.
2 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S. Ct. 737, 50 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1977),
and may be raised sua sponte at any time, Duke City Lumber Co., 539 F.2d at 221 n. 2; In
re Grand Jury, April, 1979, 604 F.2d 69, 72 (10th Cir.1979). Although at oral argument
the parties encourages us to render a decision in this case, "because issues of ripeness
involve, at least in part, the existence of a live 'Case or Controversy,' we cannot rely upon
concessions of the parties and must determine whether the issues are ripe for decision in
the 'Case and Controversy' sense. Further, to the extent that questions of ripeness involve
the exercise [*648] of judicial restraint from unnecessary decision of constitutional
issues, the Court must determine whether to exercise that restraint and cannot be bound
by the wishes of the parties." Regional [**10] Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102,138, 95 S. Ct. 335, 356,42 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
The ripeness doctrine involves both jurisdictional limitations imposed by Article Hi's
requirement of a case of controversy and prudential considerations arising from problems
of prematurity and abstractness that may present insurmountable obstacles to the exercise
of the court's jurisdiction, even though jurisdiction is technically present. See id.;
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588, 92 S. Ct. 1716, 1719, 32 L. Ed. 2d
317 (1972); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532,
at 237-38 (1975). The basic rationale is "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. .. . The
problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S. Ct. 1507,
1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967). Moreover, "since ripeness is peculiarly a question of
timing, it is the situation [**11] now rather than the situation at the time of the District
Court's decision that must govern." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at
140,95 S. Ct. at 357.
We are convinced that it is preferable for us to defer a decision on the due process and
equal protection issues raised in this appeal until the district court enters an order and
final judgment permitting the school authorities to reinstitute the test. All students who
were denied a diploma because of the exit exam policy have since been awarded a
diploma by the Tattnall County School District. Therefore, it is only those fixture
students who may be given the CAT that would be affected by a review of the district
court's rulings. While the parties may feel that it is convenient or desirable for this court
to determine in advance if the CAT is a fair test of the materials taught in Tattnall County
or if the school district need only show that the exit exam will remedy the results of the
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tracking system through better educational opportunities, any future harm to the
appellants is contingent on uncertain events.
3 The parties entered into a stipulation in June, 1982, in which the defendants
agreed to award diplomas to all students who would have received diplomas in
1978, 1979, 1980,1981, and 1982, except for their failure to attain a score of at
least 9.0 on the CAT.
[**12] For example, the Tattnall County School District may decide not to reinstate the
CAT policy. The District voluntarily chose not to attempt to reinstate the exit exam in
1983. Counsel for appellees stated at oral argument that the school system has no
intention of proving that its test will remedy the results of past segregation unless it
knows that the district court's announcement of that standard was correct. Appellants
have informed us that the Georgia Department of Education is in the process of imposing
a similar testing policy across the state; apparently, this statewide testing would supplant
the exit exams given by local school districts.
Additionally, even if the District decides to reimpose the CAT, the appellees may be
unable to show that the test remedies the results of the tracking system through better
educational opportunities. The district court may find that the school system has not
sustained their burden of proof and, accordingly, may prevent the appellees from
reinstating the diploma sanction.
It is also possible that by the time the appellees decide to reinstitute the CAT they may be
able to prove that the school system has completely eliminated all the [**13] educational
disadvantages caused by the tracking system. In that case, appellees' proof would meet
even the more stringent evidentiary burden argued by the appellants.
These examples indicate that the appellants' present claims are based merely on assumed,
potential invasions of their constitutional [*649] rights. However, the hypothetical and
contingent nature of the questions raised in this appeal counsel against issuing an opinion
premised on uncertain and contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or
may not occur at all. See Federal Election Commission v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132, 1138
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 453 U.S. 917,101 S. Ct. 3151, 69 L. Ed. 2d 999 (1981).
The record in this case does not indicate any injury currently being suffered by the
appellants, and the future effect of the district court's rulings is speculative. See Socialist
Labor Party, 406 U.S. at 589, 92 S. Ct. at 1720. Our decision not to render an opinion
advising what the law would be on an assumed set of facts is also consistent with the
well-established rule that a court is never to "anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of [**14] deciding it." Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288, 346, 56
S. Ct. 466,483, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y.
& P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S. Ct. 352, 28 L. Ed. 899
(1885)). 4
4 By holding that this appeal is not ripe for review, we do not mean to suggest that
it was unwise for the district court to postpone a finding on the remedial benefits of
the CAT policy until such time as the school authorities seek to reimpose the test.
To the contrary, it appears to us that the district judge's action was wise judicial
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administration. Indeed, the plaintiff suggested that the district court was in no
position in 1981 to assess what the educational situation would be in Tattnall
County in 1983. The court's proposed order on the plaintiffs' equal protection
claims allowed the reimplementation o f the testing program in 1983. The proposed
order was sent to the parties for comment. The plaintiffs responded in February,
1981, that it would be premature to determine that by 1983 the defendants will
have remedied the educational disadvantages caused by the tracking system.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Proposed Order. Instead, plaintiffs advised
the court to establish objective standards against which the school system's efforts
to remedy the results of post segregation could be measured when the defendants
propose to reinstitute the CAT. Id. Thus, the course chosen by the district court, to
announce the burden that the school system must meet if it seeks to reimpose the
diploma sanction but to delay a decision on whether the defendants have meet their
burden until such time as the defendants propose to begin using the CAT again, is
the course suggested by the plaintiffs. See Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. at 503.
[**15] Our dismissal of this appeal does not render impossible any review of the district
court's orders of June 17,1981, and June 16, 1982. If and when the district court is called
upon to determine if the CAT may be reinstated and issues a final judgment, then the
appropriate party will have an opportunity to have all of the court's rulings reviewed. At
that point, unlike now, the school authorities' clear intention to proceed with the CAT, the
district court's permission to reinstitute the diploma sanction, and the evidence that black
students in Tattnall County are more likely to fail the test and be denied diplomas would
indicate that "injury is certainly impending." See Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. at 142, 95 S. Ct. at 358 (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
553, 595,43 S. Ct. 658, 664, 67 L. Ed. 1117 (1923)). Accordingly, because we find that
we will be in a "better position later than we are now" to confront any constitutional
questions raised by this case, see Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at
145, 95 S. Ct. at 359, we hold that this case is not ripe for appellate review. [**16] The
appeal is
DISMISSED.
CASE WAS DISMISSED AND EDUCATIONAL AGENCY CAN DENY DIPLOMAS
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of Florida.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, a class of high school seniors, sought review
of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
which upheld the validity of a state-wide competency examination in appellants' action
against appellees, commissioner of education and state, challenging the examination
based on an alleged disproportionate impact on black students.
OVERVIEW: Appellants, a class of high school seniors who failed a state competency
examination, challenged appellee state's use of the test for diploma denials, arguing that
there was an unconstitutionally disproportionate impact on blacks. The district court
found that the examination was a fair test of what was taught in Florida's classrooms, that
the test's racially discriminatory impact was not due to the present effects of past
intentional discrimination, and that the test's use as a diploma sanction remedied any
remaining vestiges of past discrimination. The court affirmed, finding that evidence of
remedial efforts, student surveys, and recent pass rates supported the finding of
instructional validity. The study results were properly admitted under Fed. R. Evid.
803(24) because the study possessed guarantees of trustworthiness. The district court's
finding of no causal link between black student performance and effects of past
discrimination was supported by expert testimony that other factors more directly related
to performance. There was also sufficient evidence that the diploma sanction remedied
any present effects of past discrimination by encouraging student performance.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the district court's judgment that found that the students
were actually taught test skills, that vestiges of past intentional segregation did not cause
the test's disproportionate impact on blacks, and that use of the test as a diploma sanction
helped remedy the vestiges of past segregation. Therefore, the state was allowed to begin
denying diplomas to students who had not yet passed the examination.
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OPINION BY: ANDERSON, HI
OPINION
[*1406] R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, Circuit Judge:
A class consisting of Florida high school seniors who have failed a state-wide
competency examination appeal findings entered by the district court on remand from
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B). We affirm the decision of
the district court.
FACTS
In 1978 the Florida legislature approved an amendment [**2] to the Educational
Accountability Act of 1976, Fla.Stat. § 229.55 et seq., requiring Florida public school
students to pass a functional literacy examination, the SSAT-II, in order to receive a state
high school diploma. Fla.Stat. § 232.246(1 )(b) (1978). Shortly thereafter, present and
future twelth grade students who had failed or would fail the test filed suit, challenging
the constitutionality of using the test for diploma denials under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also challenged this use of the
SSAT-II under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
(1976), and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act ("EEOA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1703
(1976). 1Central to their challenge was the argument that the diploma sanction had an
unconstitutionally disproportionate impact on blacks. At the time of the 1979 hearing,
after three test administrations, the failure rate of black students was approximately 10
times greater than that of white students, equal protection 2
1 For a fuller discussion of this litigation, see Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d
397,400-02 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B).
[**3]
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2 After three test administrations, 20.049% of the black students in the Class of
1979 had not passed the test, compared with 1.9% of the white students in that
class. 644 F.2d at 401.
As noted later in this opinion, the pass rate of all students had improved
dramatically by the time of the 1983 hearings on remand.
[*1407] The district court held that use of the SSAT-II for diploma denials violated the
due process and equal protection clauses, Title VI, and the EEOA. Debra P. v.
Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D.Fla.1979). The court enjoined the test's use as a
diploma sanction until the 1982-83 school year, but allowed the state to use the test in the
interim for remediation, which the court found violated neither the Constitution nor
statutes. The district court found that the SSAT-ITs content was valid, id. at 261, which
would allow the state to use it as a diploma sanction after 1982.
The district court issued the four-year injunction for two reasons. First, the court found
that the examination violated the equal protection clause, Title VI, and the EEOA by
perpetuating [**4] past discrimination against black students who had attended
segregated schools for the first four years of their education. 474 F. Supp. at 25057.EQUAL PROTECTION. The students in the high school class of 1983 would be the
first to have attended physically integrated schools for all 12 years of their educational
careers; thus, they would be the first students against whom the diploma sanction could
be applied. Second, the court held that the test's implementation schedule provided
insufficient notice, in violation of the due process clause. Id. at 267. The court determined
that because instruction of the skills necessary to complete the SSAT-II is a cumulative
and time consuming process, id. at 264, four to six years should intervene between
announcement of the test and implementation of the diploma sanction. Id. at 267. The
class of 1983 would be the first with six years notice o f the sanction and adequate
instruction to take the test. DUE PROCESS
On appeal, the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
injunction, but remanded for further findings on two issues that would affect use of the
SSAT-n as a diploma sanction in 1983 and thereafter. First, the circuit court [**5]
required the state to demonstrate on remand that the competency exam was "a fair test of
that which is taught in [Florida's] classrooms." Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397,408
(5th Cir.1981) (Unit B). The circuit court declared clearly erroneous the district court's
holding that the test's content was valid; the record was "simply insufficient in proof that
the test administered measures what was actually taught in the schools of Florida." Id. at
405. Without such proof, use of the test as a diploma sanction would violate the due
process and equal protection clauses. Id. at 404,406. Second, the circuit court held that if
the state was able to prove that the test tested what was "actually taught CURRICULAR
VALDIITY," the state would then have to demonstrate either that the test's racially
discriminatory impact was not due to the present effects of past intentional
discrimination, or that the test's use as a diploma sanction would remedy those effects. Id.
at 407-08. EQUAL PROTECTION
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On remand, the district court tried the two issues separately. After trial on the first issue,
the district court concluded that the state had met its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the [**6] competency examination is "instructionally
valid," i.e., a fair test of that which is taught in Florida's schools. Debra P. v. Turlington,
564 F. Supp. 177, 186 (M.D.Fla.1983) CURRICULAR VALIDITY. After an evidentiary
hearing on the second issue, the court found that although vestiges of past segregation
still exist to some extent, and although the test still has a racially discriminatory impact,
there is no causal link between the disproportionate failure rate of black students and
those present effects of past segregation. Id. at 188. The court found, moreover, that even
if there were a causal connection, the defendants had carried their burden of showing that
the diploma sanction would remedy those effects. Id. The propriety of these findings
forms the basis for this appeal. Our opinion will refer more particularly to facts adduced
at the hearings in the district court on remand. EQUAL PROTECTION
I. INSTRUCTIONAL VALIDITY
Following remand, the Florida Department of Education commissioned IOX Assessment
Associates, a private consulting [*1408] firm, to design a study to determine whether
Florida's school districts teach the skills tested by the competency examination. IOX
designed a four-part [**7] study. The first part of the study consisted of a teacher survey,
which was distributed to all of Florida's 65,000 teachers. Forty-seven thousand teachers
responded to the survey. The survey asked whether the teacher had provided instruction
during 1981-82 relating to the skills tested on the SSAT-II and if so, whether that
instruction had been sufficient for a student to master the skills.
The second part of the study was a district survey completed by all of Florida's 67 school
districts and 4 university laboratory schools. The survey requested the districts (1) to
estimate in which of grades 2-12 students were taught the test skills and in which grade a
majority of students would have mastered the skills, (2) to describe any major variations
in instruction among schools in the district, (3) to describe any remedial programs
specifically related to mastery o f test skills, (4) to describe staff development activities
related to teaching test skills, (5) to list instructional materials specifically to teach test
skills, and (6) to identify any program designed specifically to help students pass the test.
The district survey instructed respondents to consider only the 1981-82 [**8] school year.
The third part of the study was a series of site visits to verify the accuracy of the district
reports. Each district was visited by at least one visitation team. The visitation teams were
composed of one program auditor from the Department of Education and two
administrators from school districts other than the one visited. After two days of
interviewing teachers and reviewing instructional materials, a team would prepare a
report of findings and impressions about the accuracy of the district report.
The fourth portion of the study consisted of surveys given in a randomly selected school
within each school district to students in an English or Social Studies class selected at
random within the school by the visitation team. The survey asked the students whether
they had been taught the skills tested by the competency exam at any point during their
educational careers. In all, thirty-two hundred students completed this survey.
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At trial, the state introduced the study results, over the objection of the appellants that the
results constituted inadmissible hearsay. The state also presented three expert witnesses
who concluded on the basis of the data from the [**9] IOX study that Florida was
teaching what it was testing. One expert was Dr. Popham, designer of the study, who
relied in large part on a "Mastery Exposure Index" prepared by the Department of
Education. The Index is a distillation of the survey data and purportedly demonstrates
that each student is given an average of 2.7 opportunities over the length of his
educational career to master test skills. Dr. Popham testified that one such opportunity
would be enough to make the competency exam "instructionally valid" —a fair test of
that which is taught.
All three experts for the state testified that their conclusions o f instructional validity were
bolstered by the state's extensive remedial efforts to help students who initially fail the
test pass it before graduation.3
3 As discussed infra slip op. p. 1410, p. 1411, students first take the SSAT-II in
10th grade and have four more opportunities to pass the test before graduation.
Two experts testified on behalf of the appellants that the IOX study [**10] did not prove
instructional validity. One expert opined that the survey was not a reliable indication of
what had been taught to the Class of 1983 because it focused only on the 1981-82 school
year, rather than the twelth graders' entire school careers. The other expert testified that
the survey demonstrated that in school districts with high rates of SSAT-II failure,
students were not taught test skills.
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, particularly the evidence of remedial
[*1409] programs and efforts, the district court concluded that the competency exam is
instructionally valid because "students are afforded an adequate opportunity to learn the
skills tested on the SSAT-II before it is used as a diploma sanction." 564 F. Supp. at 186.
Appellants raise three objections to the district court's finding that the SSAT-II is
instructionally valid.
A. Legal Standard
First, the appellants argue that the district court applied an improper legal standard in
determining the validity of the test's content. They claim that the Fifth Circuit opinion
required direct evidence that students were "actually taught" the subjects tested. In
essence, they argue [**11] that the district court erred by considering circumstantial
evidence. 4
4 Parts of what the appellants attack as an "improper legal standard" are properly
characterized as the inferences the district court drew from circumstantial evidence.
For example, the appellants argue that the district court employed an "improper
legal standard" by inferring that test skills were "actually taught" on the basis of
evidence that test skills are included in the curriculum and that a majority of
teachers realize they should teach the test skills. This is an attack on the district
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court's finding of fact, not on the legal standard it employed. We address the court's
finding of fact in the next section.
We think that appellants read the prior opinion of this court too restrictively. The opinion
gives no indication that in requiring that the state prove "that the test covered things
actually taught in the classroom," 644 F.2d at 405, the panel meant to limit the proof to
direct evidence of classroom activities.5 [**12] In the absence of such an indication, the
normal rule that evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, may be considered if
relevant, see Fed.R.Evid. 402, should apply.
5 In fact, a passage in the opinion stating that the test would be invalid if "it tests
matters outside the curriculum," 644 F.2d at 406, indicates just the opposite, i.e.,
that proof of the contents of the curriculum would be important and that proof need
not be limited to direct proof of classroom activities.
Contrary to appellants' contentions, the district clearly understood the question posed to it
by the panel opinion: "Put simply, the task assigned to this Court by the Court of Appeals
was to find out if Florida is teaching what it is testing." 564 F. Supp. at 180.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
B. Factual Findings
Appellants challenge on several grounds the district court's factual finding that students
are afforded an adequate opportunity to leam the SSAT-II skills. In examining these
contentions, we bear in mind that the district court's findings [**13] of fact and
inferences drawn therefrom are clearly erroneous only when "the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.
Ed. 746 (1948).
1. The Focus on the 1981-82 School Year
The appellants object that the IOX study, relied on by the state's experts and the district
court, is invalid because it evaluated only the 1981-82 school year. They argue that the
most the study can show is that in 1981-82 Florida was providing instruction in grades 212 that, considered cumulatively, would prepare a student for the SSAT-II. Thus, they
maintain that the study proves that the Class of 1983 was taught the SSAT-II skills only if
one assumes that what was taught in Florida schools in 1981 -82 has been taught in
Florida schools since 1971. Appellants argue that such an assumption is contradicted by
the district court's own 1979 findings that "there is evidence that certain skills were not
taught in Florida public schools," that instruction prior to 1977 "was neutral and devoid
of the present objectives," and that results of the 1977 test [**14] "reflect the obvious
inadequacy of the prior instruction in the standard objectives." 474 F. Supp. at 263,264.
It was partially on the basis of these findings that the court in 1979 issued its [*1410]
four-year injunction against use of the test as a diploma sanction. Id. at 267.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
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The testimony of Dr. Popham, the designer of the IOX study and expert witness for the
state, seems to support the appellants' argument that the study proves instructional
validity as to the Class of 1983 only if one assumes that the same instruction was offered
since 1971. He testified that "definitive, conclusive evidence" as to what the twelfth
graders in the Class of 1983 had been taught could have been obtained only by tracking
them back to second grade, 40 R. 73, but that this would have required prohibitively
"elaborate and expensive mechanisms." 41 R. 222. Therefore, he devised a "crosssectional" study of grades 2-12 from which "we could draw reasonable inferences
regarding what had transpired at the earlier grade levels." 40 R. 73. Popham concluded
that such inferences would be reasonable because there had not been "dramatic
modifications in instruction, certainly [not] after the [**15] introduction of this
legislation." 40 R. 74. Popham had no evidence to support this conclusion, other than his
own judgment that "most o f the basic reading skills and mathematic skills have probably
always been emphasized in Florida schools in most grades." 42 R. 286 (emphasis added).
Another of Florida's expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Gagne, also based his opinion that then
current twelfth graders had been taught SSAT-II skills on the assumption that the skills
taught in 1981-82 had been taught "over a period of years." 46 R. 707. In addition,
however, he relied on the extensive remedial programs Florida offers to students who
initially fail the SSAT-II. Id.
One of appellants' experts, Dr. Robert Linn, challenged the assumption that instruction
had been the same throughout the twelfth graders' careers as it was in 1981 -82. He
testified that institution of the SSAT-II in 1976 would have created a change in the
emphasis the Florida teachers placed on test skills. 45 R. 533.
The district court did not directly address the charge that the study was invalid because it
demonstrated only what was taught in grades 2-12 in 1981-82. However, the court, by
emphasizing evidence [**16] of Florida's remedial efforts, indicated its view that the
evidence of such efforts compensated for any such deficiency in the IOX study.
To the extent that the IOX study relies on an inference that what was taught in 1981-82
was taught as far back as 1971, we acknowledge some concern, given the district court's
1979 findings and the abysmal results of the first SSAT-II administration in the fall of
1977. 6 Even Dr. Popham's testimony indicated his belief that enactment of the 1976
Educational Accountability Act prompted a dramatic modification in instruction. 40 R.
74.
6 Seventy-eight percent of the black students and twenty-five percent of the white
students taking the test in 1977 failed one or more sections of the test. 644 F.2d at
401.
On the other hand, there was a clearly reasonable inference that the instruction revealed
in the 1981-82 survey was substantially the same as the post-Act instruction, i.e.,
beginning in 1977. Our question about the pre-1977 instruction undermines to some
extent [**17] our confidence in portions of the IOX study, such as the teacher survey and
the Master Exposure Index relied on by Dr. Popham. However, we are not convinced that
our doubts concerning the pre-1977 inference would seriously affect our conclusion.
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There was evidence that "the bulk of the [SSAT-II] instruction occurs in the latter years"
of a child's educational career, which in this case would be the years since 1977. 41 R.
211 (testimony of Dr. Popham). Moreover, other portions of the study do not rely on the
questionable inference at all. For instance, the evidence of high school remedial programs
as they relate to the Class of 1983 and subsequent classes, and the results of the student
survey are not dependent on any inference of what transpired before 1977.
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
Florida's remedial efforts are extensive. The state provides funds to each school district to
be used solely for providing remedial [*1411] instruction to students who need additional
assistance in mastering basic skills. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 236.088 (West Supp.1983). Students
have five chances to pass the SSAT-II between 10th and 12th grades, and if they fail,
they are offered remedial help. Students may also elect [**18] to remain in school for an
additional year on a full-time or part-time basis to receive, at the state's expense, "special
instruction designed to remedy [their] identified deficiencies." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 232.246(4)
(West Supp. 1983).7 If they then pass the SSAT-II, they are awarded their diplomas.
7 Students who have obtained a certificate of completion, awarded to students who
have satisfied all requirements for graduation except passing the SSAT-II, may also
take adult education classes aimed at remediating SSAT-II skill. Fla.Stat.Ann. §
228.072 (West Supp. 1983). They may then retake the SSAT-II and receive
diplomas if they pass. A student who has received a certificate of completion may
also take the SSAT-II after leaving school even if he or she is not enrolled in adult
education classes. 564 F. Supp. at 185 n. 16.
The state's experts testified at length about the breadth and effectiveness of the state's
remedial efforts.8 All agreed that the efforts were substantial and bolstered a finding of
[**19] instructional validity. Dr. Robert Gagne testified "that with suitable instructional
programs, and I see a good deal of evidence that those exist, that the skills which may be
initially failed on the test, let's say, in 10th grade . . . could readily be learned by the next
administration of the test or some next administration of the test in any case." 46 R. 675.
8 41 R. 206-07 (testimony of Dr. Popham); 44 R. 454-77 (testimony of Dr.
Henderson); 46 R. 663-64; 674-80; 707-08 (testimony of Dr. Gagne).
Significantly, appellants' experts, Dr. Linn and Dr. Calfee, did not examine in any detail
the district reports that described the remedial programs. 45 R. 573 (testimony of Dr.
Linn); 48 R. 895-97 (testimony of Dr. Calfee).9 Dr. Linn did not examine responses from
remedial teachers because they were not available to him. He conceded that such
responses "would be very desirable information to have for this instructional validity
question." 45 R. 603. 10
9 Dr. Calfee thought the district reports were "too indirect" to prove instructional
validity. 48 R. 897.
[** 20 ]
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10 Appellants argue that the existence of remedial instruction has no significance
because the state produced no specific evidence about what was taught in the
remedial classes. It is true that the district surveys did not contain questions about
what skills were taught in remedial programs. However, Dr. Gagne testified that
lists of remedial materials contained in the district reports demonstrated that the
remedial programs concentrated on SSAT-II skills. 46 R. 677. Moreover, Dr.
Popham thought it was clear that SSAT-II skills would be taught in remedial
classes specifically designed to help students pass the SSAT-II. 42 R. 263. We
cannot disagree with the district court's significant reliance on the remedial
programs. REMEDIATION
The results of the student survey are also impressive. Ninety to ninety-nine percent o f the
students surveyed statewide said they had been taught the test skills. 41 R. 186. Dr.
Popham found this "very powerful evidence" of instructional validity. Id. 11
CURRICULAR VALIDITY
11 Appellants' expert Dr. Linn questioned the results of the student survey because
it was not strictly random. 45 R. 545. Schools to be visited by survey teams were
selected by a random sampling technique and the teams were instructed to choose a
class in the school at random and administer the survey to it. Dr. Linn was
concerned that the second step, because it depended on the discretion of the survey
team, would not produce random results. However, he had no evidence that this
skewed the results of the survey. 45 R. 591. We find the survey results persuasive.

[**21] The remedial efforts and the student survey, in addition to the evidence that most
instruction is provided in the later school years persuade us that there was adequate
evidence to support the district court's finding of instruction validity, notwithstanding our
reservations about the inference concerning the pre-1977 instruction. We are also
persuaded in this regard by the SSAT-II pass rate in the Class of 1983. After four o f five
test administrations, 99.84 percent of the class had passed the communications portion of
the test and 97.23 percent had passed the math portion. 564 F. Supp. at 180. Appellants'
[*1412] expert Dr. Calfee in fact conceded the instructional validity of the
communication section of the test, 49 R. 1011, as did appellants' counsel at oral argument
before this court. CURRICULAR VALIDITY
2. Dr. Calfee's Correllation
Dr. Robert Calfee, an expert witness for the appellants, testified that the results of the
IOX teacher survey when compared with pass rates in the different school districts
demonstrate a correlation between the amount of instruction reported by teachers and
performance on the test. Calfee found that students failed the test in greatest numbers in
districts [**22] where teachers reported teaching the fewest test skills. 47 R. 811. Dr.
Calfee concluded that the SSAT-II is not instructionally valid as to some districts.
The state's experts testified on the basis of the results of the same teacher survey that
students in all of Florida's districts were given an opportunity to learn the SSAT-II skills
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before the end of 12th grade. The district court chose to credit the state's experts over Dr.
Calfee.
"It is settled law that the weight to be accorded expert opinion is solely within the
discretion of the judge sitting without a jury. . . . In the ultimate analysis, the trier of fact
is the final arbiter as between experts whose opinions may differ...." Pittman v.
Gilmore, 556 F.2d 1259, 1261 (5th Cir.1977). Accord Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber
and Chemical Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir.1981). We think that the district court
was within its discretion in crediting the state's experts over Dr. Calfee. 12
12 The district court itself elicited from Dr. Calfee that his study did not look at
which skills teachers from a district reported teaching but only how many. 48 R.
845. Thus, if two teachers each reported teaching eight of thirteen skills, Calfee's
analysis assumed that they each taught the same eight skills, whereas they might
have taught all thirteen between the two of them. Moreover, Dr. Calfee testified
that in the case of six or seven school districts his correlation between teacher
responses and pass rates completely broke down. 48 R. 851. Dr. Calfee attributed
this to "noise in the data," id. at 850, although he also said he did not understand
why this happened: "Here, I scratched my head." Id. at 853. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
[**23] 3. Failure to Focus on Students Who Failed
The appellants object that the state offered no direct and specific evidence that students
who never passed the SSAT-II were taught test skills. Appellants assert that these
students should have been the focus of the inquiry into instructional validity.
None of the experts at trial suggested that an instructional validity study must focus on
students who have failed the test. The experts conceded that there are no accepted
educational standards for determining whether a test is instructionally valid. Under these
circumstances, we reject the unsupported assertion that the state study does not prove that
the SSAT-II is a fair test of that which is taught because it did not focus specifically on
students who had failed the test.
4. Inferences Drawn by the Trial Court
The appellants argue that the district court was clearly erroneous in inferring that skills
were actually taught from circumstantial evidence presented at trial. Such evidence
included evidence of inclusion of the skills in the curriculum, inclusion of the skills by
individual teachers in their course of instruction, the existence of remedial efforts, and
evidence [**24] from the student survey that students remembered receiving instruction
in the skills. We cannot say that this inference is clearly erroneous. As our discussion
above makes clear, we believe the evidence at trial was such that the district court could
reasonably infer that the students were actually taught what was necessary to pass the
exam. CURRICULAR VALIDTY
C. Admissibility o f the Study Results
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The appellants argue that the trial judge improperly admitted the IOX study results into
evidence.
[*1413] "The trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of admission or exclusion of
evidence and will not be overturned absent an abuse of this discretion." ADP-Financial
Computer Services v. First National Bank, 703 F.2d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir.1983) (citing
Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S. Ct. 1119, 8 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1962)).
The district court ruled that the study results, although hearsay, were admissible under
Fed.R.Evid. 803(24),13 which provides in part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions [**25] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of the material facts; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.. ..
13 Alternatively, the district court admitted the study results under Fed.R.Evid.
703. Because we hold here that the study results were admissible under Rule
803(24), we need not evaluate this alternative ground.
Appellants maintain that the study results do not satisfy two conditions of 803(24). First,
they argue that the results were not more probative on die point for which they were
offered than any other evidence that the proponent could procure through reasonable
efforts. The appellants assert that their experts' testimony demonstrated [**26] that there
were less expensive methods of obtaining information about instructional validity that
would have more directly demonstrated that Florida is teaching what it is testing. Dr.
Popham testified, however, that he had considered and rejected these methods as either
impractical, prohibitively expensive, or less reliable. See, e.g., 40 R. 53, 81-82; 41 R.
229-30. Given this expert testimony, the district court was within its discretion in
determining that the results were more probative than other available evidence.
Second, the appellants claim that the results did not possess sufficient circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. They claim that the trustworthiness of the results is
questionable because the study respondents were aware of the purpose of the survey, the
study was conducted by the state itself, and instructions to respondents placed pressure on
them to give answers favorable to the state.
It is true that study respondents were aware of the study's purpose and that the state
conducted this study. However, the study did possess guarantees of trustworthiness. For
instance, site visitors verified the accuracy of the district reports, and site visitors [**27]
were told that other visiting teams might audit their reports. 41 R. 163. Dr. Popham
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testified that steps were taken to remove pressure from teachers to respond positively to
the teacher survey: responses were anonymous, teachers were encouraged to answer
honestly, and all teachers, not just math and language arts teachers, were surveyed to
remove even the perception that the state was seeking only positive responses. 40 R. 73;
41 R. 100. The district court relied on steps taken to safeguard trustworthiness in
determining that the study was trustworthy. 564 F. Supp. at 182 n. 7. The district court
also noted that appellants' expert Dr. Calfee "had no problem with the study procedures."
Id. Under these circumstances, the district court was within its discretion in determining
that this study was sufficiently trustworthy to qualify for admission under 803(24).
We therefore find no error in the admission of the IOX study results. See also Jellibeans,
Inc. v. Skating Clubs o f Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844-45 (11th Cir.1983) (consumer
survey admissible in trade name case; "alleged technical deficiencies affect the survey's
weight and not its admissibility"); C.A. May [**28] Marine Supply /*1414] Co. v.
Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1055 n. 10 (5th Cir.1981) (consumer survey in
wrongful dealership termination case inadmissible only because irrelevant; "if the
inadequacies in the survey had been technical, such as the format of the question or the
manner in which it was the survey [sic] was taken, those shortcomings would have bome
on the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility"); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out,
481 F.2d 445,447 (5th Cir.1973) (consumer survey admissible in trade name case;
"format of the questions and the manner of conducting the survey" go to weight of
evidence). CURRICULAR VALIDITY
II. "VESTIGES" OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
The prior Fifth Circuit opinion in this case held that if, upon remand, the state
demonstrated that the SSAT-II is a fair test of that which is taught, the trial court should
examine the relationship between continuing "vestiges" of past intentional segregation
and the test's racially discriminatory impact. Use of the test as a diploma sanction would
be permissible only if the state satisfied the test set forth in McNeal v. Tate County
School District, 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.1975), by demonstrating either [**29] (1) that the
disproportionate failure of blacks was not caused by the present effects of past intentional
segregation, or (2) that the use of the test as a diploma sanction would remedy those
effects. 644 F.2d at 4 0 7 .14 EQUAL PROTECTION
14 McNeal v. Tate County School District held that ability grouping that has a
racially discriminatory impact "may nevertheless be permitted in an otherwise
unitary system if the school district can demonstrate that its assignment method is
not based on the present results of past segregation or will remedy such results
through better educational opportunities." 508 F.2d at 1020.
Appellants contend that McNeal requires in all cases as a threshold matter that a
school system be "unitary" in the sense that its operation has eliminated all vestiges
of discrimination. We disagree. An absolute requirement that there be no present
effects of past discrimination would be incompatible with both prongs of McNeal.
Proof that the present effects of past discrimination did not cause the disparate
impact, i.e., the first McNeal prong, and proof that the test or procedure at issue
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would remedy such vestiges of past discrimination, i.e., the second prong, both
assume the continued presence of vestiges of past discrimination.
In McNeal, the school district, simultaneous with its court-ordered transition from a
dual or segregated to a unitary system, employed an ability grouping plan that
resulted in substantial classroom segregation. The language of the McNeal opinion
on which plaintiffs rely barred the use o f ability grouping until the school "district
can show that steps to bring disadvantaged students to peer status have ended the
educational disadvantages caused by prior segregation." 508 F.2d at 1021. In the
instant appeal, however, Florida dismantled its dual system in 1971, and the
diploma sanction at issue will not be implemented until the students taking the test
shall have attended all 12 of their school years after 1971. Although the district
court acknowledged the continued existence of some vestiges of past
discrimination in its 1979 decision, and that such vestiges continued "to some
extent" at the time of the 1983 hearing, the court found that such vestiges "did not
significantly affect the educational opportunities of black students who started
school after 1971." 7 R. 1542; 564 F. Supp. at 187; 474 F. Supp. at 252, 256.
Accord Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d at 407 (approving the application of the
two-prong McNeal test in the instant case). EQUAL PROTECTION
[**30] Following the trial of this issue on remand, the district court concluded that
vestiges of past purposeful segregation still exist to some extent in Florida schools. The
district court found that some individual teachers have racial biases that impair their
teaching abilities. 564 F. Supp. at 187. The court also noted the plaintiffs' evidence "that
black students are still being suspended more often than white students, that several
counties still do not have black administrators, that racial stereotypes still persist, and that
blacks are being assigned to EMR [educable mentally retarded] classes more readily than
whites." Id.
The court also noted the undisputed fact that the SSAT-II failure rate among black
students is still disproportionately high. Fifty-seven percent of the students in the Class of
1983 who have failed the test are black, even though blacks constitute only 20% of the
class. 564 F. Supp. at 186; 50 R. 20-21.
However, the court found on the basis of the evidence at trial that there is no causal
[*1415] link between the present effects of past school segregation and the
disproportionate failure rate. 564 F. Supp. at 188. The district court found, [**31]
moreover, that even if there were a causal connection, the state had proven that the test
will help remedy those effects. Id. The appellants challenge these last two factual
findings as clearly erroneous. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The Finding o f No Causal Link
The district court based its finding that there is no causal link between effects of past
discrimination and the SSAT-II's disproportionate impact partly on the testimony of Dr.
Barbara Lemer, an expert witness for the state. The court credited her testimony that the
existing vestiges of school segregation do not affect performance on the SSAT-II. Dr.
Lemer testified that other factors, such as the educational background of a student's
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parents, class size, attendance, and amounts of homework, more directly relate to student
performance.
The district court also based its finding on evidence that black students in counties where
there are black administrators have not performed appreciably better on the SSAT-II than
black students in counties where there are no black authority figures, and that more than
90% of black students have passed the test. Finally, the court credited testimony of
appellants' expert Dr. Na'im Akbar that many [**32] of the impediments to learning
faced by black students arise outside the classroom.
We think that this was sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that whatever
vestiges of discrimination remain do not cause the disproportionate failure rate among
black students. We are particularly impressed by the very high percentages of blacks who
in fact have passed the test. Ninety-nine and one-half percent of the black members of the
Class of 1983 passed the communications portion o f the test, and ninety-one percent
passed the mathematics portion. According to appellants' experts, vestiges of past
intentional segregation operate statewide and therefore presumably touch all black
students. The fact that ninety-one to ninety-nine percent of the black students nonetheless
pass the SSAT-II is strong evidence that the vestiges do not cause blacks to fail the te st.15
equal protection EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
15 We also think that Florida's remedial efforts play a role in severing any possible
link between vestiges and poor performance by black students. Even assuming that
discriminatory vestiges contributed to a student's initial failure to pass the SSAT-II,
it seems that the state's extensive remedial programs would enable the student to
pass the test before graduation despite the effects of discrimination. It seems
unlikely that remedial programs designed specifically to help students who have
failed die SSAT-II would be infected by the same vestiges that exist to some extent
in other parts of the school system. REMEDIATION
[**33] The appellants vigorously argue that their evidence demonstrates that racial
stereotypes, which the district court found still persist to some extent in Florida schools,
cause teachers to have lower expectations of black students, which negatively affects the
performance of those students. Dr. Lemer's testimony disparaged this lower expectation
theory. Dr. Lemer did not suggest that lower teacher expectations do not result in lower
performance. However, she testified that numerous studies demonstrate that teachers very
quickly correct initial expectations in light of their actual experience with students. 52 R.
232. Appellants contend that the studies relied on by Dr. Lemer were done outside the
context of desegregation. Dr. Lemer testified, however, that actual experience will
correct initial expectations based on race, except in the case of profoundly bigoted
persons. 53 R. 275. Although Dr. Lemer's experience with the problems of desegregation
in Florida may have been less than desirable, the district court was entitled to credit her
testimony, which was also corroborated by the high pass rate among black students
indicating that any lower expectations among Florida teachers [**34] did not have a
significant effect.
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Although the evidence before the district court was far from conclusive, after a careful
review of the record, we are convinced [*1416] that the inferences and conclusions drawn
by the district court are reasonable and supported by the evidence. We conclude that the
district court's findings on causation were not clearly erroneous. 16
16 The appellants also argue that the district court employed the wrong legal
standard in determining that there was no causal link between present effects of
past intentional segregation and the SSAT-ITs disproportionate impact. We do not
understand the basis for this claim. The district court was instructed to determine
on remand whether present effects caused the disproportionate impact. This is
precisely the question the district court examined and answered. There was no legal
error. EQUAL PROTECTION
B. The Finding that the Diploma Sanction Remedies Vestiges
The district court also found that, even assuming there was a causal link between [**35]
vestiges and disparate impact, the state had satisfied the second prong of the McNeal test
by demonstrating that use of the SSAT-II as a diploma sanction would remedy the
vestiges of past intentional segregation. The district court relied, again, on Dr. Lemer's
testimony. Dr. Lemer testified that the best way to encourage student performance is by
setting objective standards and creating a "climate o f order" to motivate students. Dr.
Lemer cited studies showing that such a climate is responsible for greater student
achievement in Catholic schools. Dr. Lemer concluded that the use of the SSAT-II as a
diploma sanction will "necessarily remedy" vestiges of past segregation by contributing
to objective standards and a "climate of order" that motivates students. 52 R. 243.
This evidence supports the district court's finding that the diploma sanction is needed to
remedy the present effects of past segregation in Florida's schools. The district court
finding is also supported by another fact alluded to by the district court, and of which we
take judicial notice, namely, that the diploma sanction will motivate teachers and
administrators, as well as students. Although the sanction [**36] is to deny the student
the diploma, diploma denial reflects adversely on the teachers and administrators o f the
school system responsible for the student's education. We think it is clear that teachers
and administrators will work to avoid this stigma, thus tending to remedy any lingering
lower expectations on the part of teachers.
The remarkable improvement in the SSAT-II pass rate among black students over the last
six years demonstrates that use of the SSAT-II as a diploma sanction will be effective in
overcoming the effects of past segregation. Appellants argue that the improvement has
nothing to do with diploma sanctions because the test has not yet been used to deny
diplomas. However, we think it likely that the threat of diploma sanction that existed
throughout the course of this litigation contributed to the improved pass rate, and that
actual use of the test as a diploma sanction will be equally, if not more, effective helping
black students overcome discriminatory vestiges and pass the SSAT-II.
Thus, we affirm the finding that use of the SSAT-II as a diploma sanction will help
remedy vestiges of past discrimination. We acknowledge a heavy sense of discomfort
over [**37] the unfairness if discriminatory vestiges (albeit much attenuated) have in fact
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caused a student to fail the SSAT-II. 17 However, that apparent unfairness would be
outweighed by the demonstrated effect of the diploma sanction in remedying the greater
unfairness of functional illiteracy.
17 For purposes of analysis under the second prong of McNeal, we have assumed
arguendo that there may be a causal link between vestiges and SSAT-II failure by
black students. Of course, we have already found in Section HA, supra, that the
state demonstrated that there is no such link. EQUAL PROTECTION:
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court's findings (1) that students were actually taught test skills, (2)
that vestiges of past intentional segregation do not cause the SSAT-ITs disproportionate
impact on blacks, and (3) that use of the SSAT-II as a diploma sanction [*1417] will help
remedy the vestiges of past segregation. Therefore, the State of Florida may deny
diplomas to students (beginning with the Class of [**38] 1983) who have not yet passed
the SSAT-n.
AFFIRMED. EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
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Renita LOVE, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ralph D. TURLINGTON, as
Commissioner of Education; Florida State Board of
Education, Governor Robert Graham, Etc., Et Al.,
Defendants-Appellees
No. 82-3142
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
733 F.2d 1562; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21678; 39 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 358
June 11,1984
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff appealed from the order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which denied class certification in an
action challenging the constitutionality o f a basic skills test administered to eleventh
graders throughout the state of Florida.
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff sought class certification for an action challenging the
constitutionality of a basic skills test administered to eleventh graders in Florida. The test
was designed to identify students who had not mastered minimum performance standards
defined in regulations promulgated pursuant to statute. Students who failed the test were
targeted for remedial assistance, and a disproportionately large number of those students
were black. Plaintiff contended that the state's use of the test to create a pool of students
at risk of not receiving a diploma carried forward prior racial discrimination suffered by
black students who attended inferior schools in the dual school system, and that
inadequate notice was given regarding the test and its objectives. The district court denied
class status, and the court affirmed. The court noted that the test at issue simply identified
students that were substandard in certain areas in the eleventh grade for the purposes of
remediation. Because each school district was responsible for its own remedial program,
and thus each student's situation differed, commonality and typicality of plaintiffs
required for class status was not present.
OUTCOME: The judgment of the district court denying class certification was affirmed.
Because each school district was responsible for the remedial measures to be taken as a
result of the test at issue, commonality and typicality of plaintiffs required for class
certification did not exist.
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CORE TERMS: class certification, diploma, certification, individual claim,
commonality, typicality, settlement, remedial, class action, personal stake, judicial
resolution, mootness, moot
COUNSEL: Stephen F. Hanlon, Tampa, Florida, Robert Shapiro, Tampa, Florida,
Morris W. Milton, St. Petersburg, Florida, Diana Pullin, Center for Law & Educ.,
Gutman Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Robert Pressman, Ronald B. Halpem, Gulf
Coast Legal Services, Six South Ft. Harrison, Clearwater, Florida, Cynthis Metzler,
Florida Rural Legal Services, Bartow, Florida, Stephen Cotton, Center for Law &
Education, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, for Appellant.
(For: State Board of Education), James D. Little, Gen., Cnsl. State Bd. of Education,
Tallahassee, Florida, Judith A. Brechner, Deputy Gen. Cnsl., State Bd. of Education,
Tallahassee, Florida, (For: School Bd. of Pinellas County), B. Edwin Johnson,
Clearwater, Florida.
JUDGES: Godbold, Chief Judge, Roney and Kravitch, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: RONEY
OPINION
[*1563] RONEY, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Renita Love appeals the district court's denial of class certification in this action
challenging the constitutionality of the SSAT-I (State Student Assessment Test), a basic
skills test administered to eleventh graders throughout the state [**2] of Florida. The
SSAT-I is designed to identify students who have not mastered one or more of the
minimum performance standards defined in regulations promulgated pursuant to statute.
See Fla.Stat. § 232.-246(1 )(a); Fla.Admin.Code Rule 6A-A.-942(l)(d). Students who fail
the test are targeted for remedial assistance. A disproportionately large number of these
students are black.
Plaintiff contends that the state's use of the SSAT-I to create a pool of students "at risk"
of not receiving a diploma carries forward prior racial discrimination suffered by black
students who attended inferior [*1564] schools in the dual school system, and that
inadequate notice was given regarding the test and its objectives.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification on
grounds that the commonality and typicality required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2) and (3)
are absent in this case. The district judge had before him the uncontested affidavits
presented by the defendant which specified that (1) passage o f the SSAT-I is not a
requirement for receipt of a high school diploma in Florida, and (2) determinations of
remedial assistance to be given [**3] those students who fail the SSAT-I are made on a
district-by-district basis, and the findings of diploma eligibility are made for each student
individually.
While it is true that a trial court may not properly reach the merits of a claim when
determining whether class certification is warranted, Miller v. Mackey International, Inc.,
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452 F.2d 424,428 (5th Cir.1971), this principle should not be talismanically invoked to
artificially limit a trial court's examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned
determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of establishing each of the Rule
23 class action requirements. In H uff v. N.D. Cass Company o f Alabama, 485 F.2d 710,
713 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc), the Court refused to "accept the idea that to avoid
infringing the plaintiffs and the class's right to jury trial district judges must be barred
from making any evidentiary inquiry," and further "rejected . . . the argument that the
judge is inextricably bound by the face of the pleadings." (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiffs attempt to analogize this case to Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th
Cir.1981), in which class certification was granted, is unsuccessful [**4] because of the
disparity between the uses and effects of the tests at issue in the two cases. Debra P.
concerned the so-called SSAT-II or "functional literacy test," which determined whether
or not high school students throughout Florida would receive diplomas, regardless of
their academic records. Commonality and typicality were clearly present. In contrast, the
SSAT-I simply identifies, for purposes of remediation, those students who are
substandard in certain areas in the eleventh grade year. Each district is responsible for its
own remedial program for such students REMEDIATION. The determinations of
whether students failing the SSAT-I are ultimately eligible for a diploma are made by
individual teachers on the basis of students' individual achievements. Each student's
situation differs, and the diploma is denied each student for reasons which are unique to
his situation, and which do not necessarily correspond to his performance on the SSAT-I.
A settlement reached subsequent to the district court's denial of certification resolved
plaintiffs individual claim. At oral argument, this Court raised the issue of whether or not
an appeal from a denial of class certification by a plaintiff [**5] who has settled her
individual claim is moot, and requested that counsel submit supplemental briefs on the
question. It appeared that as a condition of the settlement of Love's individual claim, the
defendants agreed not to contest the appealability of the certification order. It is an
established principle of law that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created or waived
by agreement of the parties, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Association, 625 F.2d 38, 41 (5th Cir.1980), and that lack
of jurisdiction may be raised at any point in a proceeding by either party, or by the court
itself upon its own motion. Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102
(5th Cir.1981).
The jurisdictional issue in question was explicitly left open by the Supreme Court in
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,404 n. 10, 100 S. Ct. 1202,
1212 n. 10, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1980), which held that a plaintiff whose claim had expired
could still appeal a denial of class certification. Our review of the briefs and relevant
legal precedent persuades us that this plaintiffs appeal of the denial of class certification
[**6] is not moot.
[*1565] Mootness occurs when the issues in a case are no longer "live," or when the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486,496, 89 S. Ct. 1944,1950, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969). The fact that another student
affected by the SSAT-I has moved to intervene in this action is sufficient to demonstrate
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that this controversy remains a "live" one. At issue, then, is the second aspect of
mootness, that is, the parties' interest in the litigation, often referred to as the "personal
stake" requirement. See, e.g., Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bankv. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334 n.
6, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 n. 6, 63 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1980); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171,
172-73, 97 S. Ct. 1739, 1740, 52 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1977); Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755, 96 S. Ct. 1251, 1259, 47 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1976).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a class action plaintiff presents two separate
issues for judicial resolution: the claim on the merits, and the claim that he is entitled to
represent a class. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402, 100 S. Ct. at 1211. Application of the
personal-stake requirement [**7] to a procedural claim such as the right to represent a
class is different from application of the requirement to substantive claims. The interest in
having a class certified is "more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to
the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy the 'personal stake' requirement,"
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403, 100 S. Ct. at 1212. Finding no meaningful distinction between
the settlement of the claim here at issue and the expiration of the claim in Geraghty for
purposes of the ability of the named plaintiff to pursue an appeal of the denial of
certification, we hold that a dispute capable of judicial resolution continues to exist with
regard to the class certification issue in this case.
While affirming the district court's denial of class certification because of the plaintiffs
failure to satisfy the requirements of commonality and typicality, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2)
and (3), we make no comment upon the merits of the individual actions potentially
available to members of the groups for which certification was unsuccessfully sought.
AFFIRMED.
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THOMAS CRUMP, ET AL v. GILM ER INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT
6:92 CV. 315
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, TYLER DIVISION
797 F. Supp. 552; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17346
May 29,1992, Decided
May 29,1992, Filed and Entered
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff students filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. §
1983 against defendant school district for allegedly denying the students the right to
participate in their high school graduation ceremony. The student sought a temporary
restraining order mandating that the school district allow them to participate in the
graduation ceremony.
OVERVIEW: Three students failed to complete successfully the Texas Assessment of
Academic Skills Examination (TAAS), a statewide competency examination designed to
measure student performance in mathematics and writing, administered by the school
district. Except for the TAAS examination, two of the three students had successfully
completed all other requirements for a high school diploma. The students filed a § 1983
action against the school district alleging that they were unconstitutionally denied the
opportunity to participate in a graduation ceremony. The school district contended that
successful completion of the TAAS was required for a high school diploma. The court
granted two of the students' requests for a temporary restraining order mandating the
school district allow the student to participate in the ceremony. The court found that (1)
the students would suffer irreparable harm if they were denied the opportunity to
participate in their graduation ceremony; (2) the school district and the public would
suffer no harm by allowing the student to participate; and (3) there was a substantial
likelihood that the implementation period for the TAAS test was constitutionally
deficient.
OUTCOME: The court granted two of the students a temporary restraining order against
the school district pending a hearing on the students' motion for a preliminary injunction.
CORE TERMS: graduation, taught, ceremony, high school diploma, curriculum, school
district, high school, restraining order, temporary, diploma, notice, successfully
completed, competency, pupil, satisfactorily, competency examination, tested, exit,
opportunity to participate, injunction, statewide, testing, skills, secondary, preliminary
injunction, public interest, essential elements, prerequisite, irreparable, mathematics
JUDGES: [**1] Justice
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OPINION BY: WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE
OPINION
[*552] ORDER
Plaintiffs, Carlos Crump, Sharon Jeffrey, and Wintress Finch, instituted this civil action,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Gilmer Independent School District, alleging
that they are being unconstitutionally denied a high school diploma and the [*553] right
to participate in their high school graduation ceremony. Plaintiffs seek a temporary
restraining order mandating that the high school allow them to participate in the
graduation ceremony, which is scheduled to begin at 8:00 p.m. this evening. An in
chambers hearing on the plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order was held
on Thursday, May 28, 1992, at 2:00 p.m., at which the court heard the arguments of
counsel and the statements of school officials and the plaintiffs. For the reasons stated
below, the requested relief will be granted as to plaintiffs Crump and Jeffrey, and denied
as to plaintiff Finch.
I. Facts
Most of the relevant facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs are high school seniors at Gilmer
High School in Gilmer, Texas, who failed to complete successfully the recently
implemented Texas Assessment of Academic Skills Examination [**2] (TAAS).
Plaintiffs took the examination on April 2,1992, and received the results on May 11,
1992. 1 Plaintiffs Crump and Jeffrey each failed the examination by two points, while
plaintiff Finch failed it by one point.
1 The plaintiffs have apparently taken the test on three prior occasions as well,
beginning in the fall of 1990.
The TAAS examination is a statewide competency examination designed to measure
student performance in mathematics and writing. Texas has required all high school
students to pass an examination in order to receive a diploma since 1985. However,
successful completion of the TAAS test was only made a requirement for graduation in
the fall of 1991. The TAAS examination is substantially more difficult than the test that
was previously given to high school students.
Under Texas law, plaintiffs cannot receive a high school diploma until they have
successfully completed the TAAS examination.2 2 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.553
(Vernon 1987). The next test is scheduled to be given on July 13,1992. [**3] All three
plaintiffs have submitted sworn affidavits stating that they intend to take the test in July
1992, and that they will continue to take any required test until they pass
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN: MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES . Except for the TAAS
examination, plaintiffs Cmmp and Jeffrey have successfully completed all other
requirements for a high school diploma.
2 Section 21.553 provides:
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(a) A pupil who has not performed satisfactorily on all sections of the secondary
exit level assessment instrument by the time the pupil has successfully completed
the 12th grade level shall not receive a high school diploma until the pupil has
performed satisfactorily on all sections of the secondary exit level assessment
instrument.
(b) Each time the assessment instrument is administered, a pupil who has not been
given a high school diploma because of a failure to perform satisfactorily on all
sections o f the secondary exit level assessment instrument may retake those
sections o f the assessment instrument on which the pupil has not performed
satisfactorily OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN.MUTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES
(c) A pupil who has been denied a high school diploma under the provisions of
Subsections (a) and (b) above, and who subsequently performs satisfactorily on all
sections o f the secondary exit level assessment instrument shall be issued a high
school diploma.
[**4] II. Standard fo r Granting A Temporary Restraining Order
In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury
outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) that granting the preliminary
injunction will not disserve the public interest. Justin Industries v. Choctaw Securities,
L.P., 920 F.2d 262, 268 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991); Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas
Pipe Line, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985); Canal Authority o f State o f Florida v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). A temporary restraining order is an
extraordinary remedy; it should be granted only if the plaintiff clearly carries the burden
of persuasion as to all four factors. Mississippi Power & Light, 760 F.2d at 621.
III. Balancing o f Harms
The last three factors all weigh heavily in favor of the plaintiffs. If it [*554] should
eventuate that the plaintiffs [**5] were wrongly denied their diploma, then they would
have forever lost the opportunity to participate in graduation ceremonies with their high
school class. It hardly needs emphasizing that high school graduation ceremonies are an
occasion to celebrate profound personal achievement and hope for the future. A student's
high school graduation is the source of fond memories and treasured mementos and
photographs that cannot be replaced. Unquestionably, plaintiffs will suffer irreparable
harm if they are denied the opportunity to participate in their graduation ceremony.
Dubey v. Niles Township High Schools District 219, No. 91- C3523, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7739, at *4 (N.D. 111. June 7, 1991). Cf. also Albright v. Board, ofEduc. o f
Granite School Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 686 (D. Utah 1991).
By contrast, defendant will suffer no harm if the students are allowed to participate in the
graduation ceremony. The students will not be able to obtain a diploma unless and until
they pass the TAAS test or the test is declared invalid. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have no
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objection to Gilmer high school announcing in the program or by other [**6] means that
the plaintiffs have not yet successfully completed the TAAS test.
Defendants assert that the purpose of the graduation ceremony is to reward those students
who have completed all their graduation requirements, and that allowing the plaintiffs to
participate will cheapen the ceremony for the remaining students. Toward this end,
defendants claim that it has always been the practice at Gilmer High School not to allow
students to participate in the graduation ceremonies unless they have completed all
prerequisites for graduation. Unquestionably, the high school has a strong interest in
instilling pride in accomplishment by giving students a strong incentive to complete high
school successfully. Plaintiffs do not challenge Gilmer High School's prerogative to
require completion of all other graduation requirements, except passing the TAAS test, as
a condition to participating in graduation. Nonetheless, plaintiffs Crump and Jeffrey have
studied for four years and have completed all other academic requirements. The only
element separating plaintiffs Crump and Jeffrey from the other 137 students who will
graduate this evening is that they have failed to pass a test which may not [**7] be legally
valid. Whatever marginal benefits GISD may gamer by denying plaintiffs the opportunity
to participate in this once in a lifetime experience are outweighed by the tremendous
potential for irreparable harm to them.
Nor will allowing plaintiffs to participate in the graduation ceremony cause any harm to
the public. The public interest would be ill served if students were wrongly denied an
opportunity to reap a benefit to which they were justly entitled. Furthermore, the Texas
legislature has determined that the public interest will be adequately served by denying a
diploma to students who do not pass the test. See 2 Tex. Codes Ann. § 21.553(a) & (c)
(Vernon 1987). No statewide law or regulation mandates the additional sanction of
denying the student an opportunity to participate in the graduation ceremony.
IV. Likelihood o f Success on the Merits
The propriety of granting the requested relief therefore turns entirely on whether the
plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits. The leading case on competency testing of
students is Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981), in which
the court held unconstitutional [**8] a Florida law requiring that students pass a
statewide competency examination in order to receive a diploma.3 In that case, the court
held that the state's compulsory attendance law and statewide education program gave
students a constitutionally protected expectation that they would receive a diploma if they
satisfactorily completed high school. 644 F.2d at 404. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565,574 (1975). Because [*555] the students had a protected property interest, the court
held, the state was prohibited from imposing new criteria absent adequate notice due
process and a sufficient nexus between the test and the school curriculum. Id. BOARD
AUTHORITY NEXUS TO STATE GOALS
3 For a thorough analysis of potential constitutional problems underlying the
establishment of student competency examinations in Texas, see Ellen Smith
Pryor, Student Competency Testing in Texas 16 St. Mary's L. J. 903, 908-921
(1985).
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A. Notice
With regard to notice, the Debra P. court [**9J held that due process requires that
students be given adequate notice that passing the test is a prerequisite to obtaining a
diploma. Id. Accord Brookhartv. Illinois State Bd. o f Education, 697 F.2d 179, 186 (7th
Cir. 1983). Such notice is necessary so that students will have an adequate opportunity to
prepare for the test, the school district will have an adequate time to prepare a remedial
program, and there will be sufficient time to correct deficiencies in the test and set an
appropriate passing score. See Debra P., 644 F.2d at 404; Brookhart, 697 F.2d at 186.
See also Ellen Smith Pryor, Student Competency Testing in Texas 16 St. Mary's L. J. 903,
918-919(1985).
In this case, the students were first exposed to the TAAS test in the fall of 1990, but the
test was not made a requirement for graduation until the fall of 1991 DUE PROCESS.
Remedial programs tailored to helping students pass the test did not begin until slightly
over one year ago, in the spring of 1991 REMEDIATION. Although the notice that must
be provided varies according to the circumstance of each case, comparable [**10]
implementation periods have been declared unconstitutional. Debra P., 644 F.2d at 404
(thirteen month period between implementation of test and denial of diploma violated due
process); Brookhart, 697 F.2d at 179 (eighteen month period for implementation of
competency tests as diploma requirement for handicapped students violated due
process).DUE PROCESS In fact, in Debra P., the district court enjoined the state from
denying students a diploma for failure to pass the competency examination for four years.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 267, 269 (M. D. Fla. 1979) a ffd in part,
vacated in part, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). The court relied on expert testimony that,
in order to meet constitutional standards, at least four to six years was required to
implement a new testing requirement. Id. Accordingly, it is found that there is a
substantial likelihood that the implementation period for the TAAS test will prove to be
constitutionally deficient. DUE PROCESS
B. Nexus Between Curriculum and Examination
The Debra P. court also held that in order for a competency [**11] test to be valid, the
state must prove that the competency test fairly assessed what was actually taught in the
schools. 4 644 F.2d at 405.
Fundamental fairness requires that the state be put to test on the issue of whether the
students were tested on material they were or were not taught.
Just as a teacher in a particular class gives the final exam on what he or she has taught, so
should the state give its final exam on what has been taught in its classrooms.
644 F.2d at 406. Significantly, the court refused to accept the state's assurance that the
test's content was based on the minimum student performance standards that were
required in Florida schools. Id. Rather, the court demanded concrete proof that the
content of the tests was actually being taught. The court noted that the state had made no
effort to ascertain whether or not the minimum student performance standards were
actually being taught in Florida public schools. Nor had there been formal studies
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conducted to determine whether the skills measured on the test were actually being taught
in the schools. 644 F.2d at 405. The court [**12] concluded:
We believe that the state administered a test that was, at least on the record [*556] before
us, fundamentally unfair in that it may have covered matters not taught in the schools of
the state.
644 F.2d at 404 (emphasis in original). Because of the lack o f this proof, the court
remanded the case to the district court for a determination o f whether the examination
was "a fair test of that which was taught." 644 F.2d at 406.
4 This requirement is termed "curricular validity." Debra P., 644 F.2d at 405.
Curricular validity has two components. First, the test items must adequately
correspond to the required curriculum in which the students should have been
instructed by the time that they take the test. Second, the test must correspond to
the material that was actually taught in the relevant schools, regardless of what
should have been taught. E. S. Pryor, supra p. 7,16 St. Mary's L. J. at 915.
[**13] Hence, Debra P. indicates that school districts cannot refuse to issue diplomas for
failure to pass a state competency examination absent proof that the matters tested are
actually taught in the relevant schools. Even at this preliminary stage, there is
considerable doubt that the defendant will be able to make this showing. Defendant
maintains that the TAAS test is based on the essential elements of English language arts
and mathematics, for which each school district is required to provide instruction. 5
However, since defendant's administrators and teachers are not allowed to view the
contents of these tests, there is no way of knowing for certain that the TAAS examination
is actually based on these elements. There is no statutory requirement, for example, that
the test be based solely on these elements. 6 More importantly, even if TAAS is based on
the essential elements established by the Board, the effect o f this restriction on TAAS
would depend entirely on how specific those elements are. The more vague and broad the
elements are, the less likely it is that the examination questions will specifically
correspond to the school curriculum. Because the district has not given [**14] the court
any examples of the required elements, the court cannot assess whether those guidelines
provide any assurance that TAAS is adequately linked to the school curriculum. Finally,
even if the required Texas curriculum theoretically covers the materials tested by TAAS,
GISD still must prove that the material is actually taught in its schools. See Debra P., 644
F.2d at 405; E. S. Pryor, supra p. 7,16 St. Mary's L. J. at 915.
5 Section 21.101 of the Education Code requires school districts to offer "a well
balanced curriculum" that includes various subjects including English language arts
and mathematics. 2 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.101(a) (West 1987). The Code
further requires the State Board of Education to designate the essential elements of
these subjects that must be taught by each school district. 2 Tex. Educ. Code Ann.
§ 21.101(c) (West 1987).
6 See § 21.551(b) (effective Aug. 28, 1989 (requiring Central Education Agency to
adopt exit level assessments based on "competencies for pupils at the 12th grade
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level"); § 21.5512(a) (effective Aug. 26,1991) (requiring State Board of Education
to develop performance based examinations based on broad educational goals).
[**15] In sum, the school district must eventually make a substantial showing to
demonstrate the validity of the TAAS examination, and there is little assurance that the
district will be able to make this showing. On the other hand, there is already some
indication that the TAAS examination tests matters outside the curriculum. One of the
plaintiffs stated that, based on his experience, TAAS tested areas not covered in the
remedial programs or in the regular school curriculum. In addition, school district
representatives admitted that they never seen a TAAS examination and were not
permitted to view them. Without an opportunity to compare TAAS with its curriculum, it
seems likely that there will be at least some divergence between the skills tested by
TAAS and the GISD curriculum. Under these circumstances, the court has no choice but
to conclude that the plaintiffs have made a substantial showing of a likelihood of success
on the merits. STUDENT PREVAILED
V. Bond Requirement
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (b), no security is required if there is no risk of a monetary loss
to the defendant if an injunction is granted. Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, 569
F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1978); [**16] International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d
1334, 1356 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). It is found that there is no threat
of an injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted; therefore, security is not
required.
[*557] VI. Conclusion
It is found that plaintiffs Carlos Crump and Sharon Jeffrey have made the requisite
showing for a temporary restraining order, and that they have no adequate remedy at law.
It is further found that plaintiff Wintress Finch has not made the requisite showing for a
temporary restraining order, in that she has not demonstrated that she has completed
successfully completed all prerequisites to graduation except for completion of the TAAS
exam. It is further found that the posting of security is not required.
Accordingly, the defendant, Gilmer Independent School District, its officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of this temporary restraining order by personal
service or otherwise, shall be, and they are hereby, TEMPORARILY RESTRAINED
AND ENJOINED, pending hearing [**17] on plaintiffs motion for preliminary
injunction, below ordered, from failing to comply with the following order and
injunction:
Defendant, its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this temporary
restraining order by personal service or otherwise, shall be, and they are hereby,
ORDERED and ENJOINED to permit plaintiffs Carlos Crump and Sharon Jeffrey to
participate fully, except as herein provided, in the graduation exercises of the Gilmer
High School, scheduled at 8:00 o'clock p.m. on this 29th day of May, 1992;
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PROVIDED, however, that defendant may have it announced at ceremonies, if its
officials so desire, that such plaintiffs have not yet successfully completed the Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) Examination; and PROVIDED, further, that
defendant shall not be required to issue a diploma to either of such plaintiffs until each,
respectively, has successfully completed the state mandated TAAS Examination.
It is further ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction shall be, and it
is hereby, set down for hearing on the 9th day [**18] of June, 1992, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.,
before the undersigned judge, in Room 306, United States Courthouse Annex, 211 West
Ferguson Street, Tyler, Texas.
It is further ORDERED that no bond or other security shall be required of plaintiff to
effectuate this order.
SIGNED this 29th day of May, 1992, at 11:42 a.m., in Tyler, Texas.
William Wayne Justice
United States District Judge
Eastern District of Texas
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LAURITZ A. W ILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. AUSTIN
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant
CIVIL NO. A-92-CA-346
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT O F TEXAS, AUSTIN DIVISION
796 F. Supp. 251; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8261
June 9,1992, Decided
June 9,1992, Filed
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff father filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order, requesting the Court to require defendant school district to allow his son to
participate in a high school graduation ceremony.
OVERVIEW: The son had failed to pass the mathematics portion of a test required for
graduation. The father argued that if the son was not allowed to graduate with his fellow
classmates, he would be unconstitutionally denied a high school diploma and the right to
participate in the ceremony. To prevail, the father had to show substantial likelihood o f
success on the merits, substantial threat that the son would suffer irreparable injury, that
the threatened injury outweighed harm to the school district, and that the injunction
would not disserve the public interest. The court found that it was unlikely that the father
would prevail on the merits. The son had sufficient notice that the test would be required
and he was provided with the courses he needed to pass the test. He suffered no
irreparable injury because he had further opportunity to take and pass the test, and
thereby earn his degree. Finally, the court believed the public interest was better served
by the court not interfering with the decisions of the school district, the Texas
Legislature, the State Board of Education, and the Texas Education Agency.
OUTCOME: The court declined to enter a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction.
CORE TERMS: high school diploma, graduation, diploma, ceremony, graduate, high
school, school districts, public interest, notice, math, literacy test, injunction, functional,
elected, taught, school students, high school senior, level o f education, injunctive relief,
irreparable injury, public education, process violation, property interest, educational,
prevail, restraining order, prepare, temporary, right to participate, preliminary injunction
COUNSEL: [**1] Attorney for Plaintiff: LAURITZ A. WILLIAMS, SR., PRO SE.
Attorney for Defendant: JAMES R. RAUP, McGINNIS, LOCHRIDGE & KILGORE.
JUDGES: SPARKS
OPINION BY: SAM SPARKS
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OPINION
[*252] MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Lauritz A. Williams ("Williams") filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order on June 2,1992, requesting this Court to require the Austin Independent School
District ("AISD") to allow his son, Lauritz A. Williams, Jr., ("Williams, Jr.") to
participate in the McCallum High School Graduation Ceremony on June 3,1992.
Because Williams, Jr. would not be allowed to graduate with his fellow classmates,
Williams claims he is being "unconstitutionally denied a high school diploma and the
right to participate in the McCallum High School Graduation Ceremony." On June 2,
1992, the Court held an evidentiary hearing in which the parties appeared in person
and/or by and through counsel of record. After listening to the testimony of witnesses and
arguments of counsel, the Court orally denied the temporary restraining order.
Facts
Williams' son, Williams, Jr., is a high school senior at McCallum High School in Austin,
Texas who failed to complete successfully the recently implemented Texas Assessment
of Academic Skills [**2] Examination ("TAAS"). Williams, Jr. failed the math portion of
the April, 1991, TAAS test by one point. He was re-tested in April, 1992, and again
failed. Williams, Jr. received his latest results in May, 1992. (Opportunity to learn:
multiple attempts to pass the test)When Williams attempted to file a formal appeal with
the Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas, he was informed that "the
appropriate remedy lies with the judiciary." May 26, 1992, letter to Lauritz A Williams,
from Joan Howard Allen of the Texas Education Agency.
The TAAS examination is a statewide competency examination designed to measure
student performance in mathematics and English language arts. High school students in
Texas must pass all sections of the TAAS before he or she may receive a high school
diploma. Tex. Educ. Code § 21.553(a). Students may retake the sections he or she
previously failed until he or she performs satisfactorily on all sections of the test, at
which time he or she "shall be issued a high school diploma." Id. § 21.553(b), (c).
Students have been required to perform satisfactorily on all sections of a "secondary exit
level assessment instrument" in order to graduate since Sept. 1,1984. See id. However,
Williams is correct [**3] that successful completion o f the TAAS in particular was only
made a requirement [*253] for graduation in the fall of 1991, although the TAAS was
first administered in October, 1990. According to Williams, who has never seen nor taken
the TAAS, the TAAS is substantially more difficult than the test previously required for
graduation by high school students in Texas. 1
1 Williams told the Court he decided to file this lawsuit after reading in the
newspaper that Federal Judge William Wayne Justice had ordered the Gilmer
Independent School District to allow two students, who had failed the TAAS but
completed their other graduation requirements, to participate in the Gilmer High
School Graduation Ceremony. Williams' opinion on the difficulty of the TAAS
presumably came at least partially from that newspaper article and his son.
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Preliminary Injunctive Relief
A. Standard
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Williams must demonstrate: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat [**4] that Williams, Jr. will
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury
outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) that granting the injunction will
not disserve the public interest. Crump v. Gilmer Indep. School Dist., No. 6:92-CV-315,
slip op. at 3 (E.D. Tex. May 29, 1992); Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe
Line, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, which should only be granted if the plaintiff clearly carries the burden of
persuasion on each factor. Id.
B. Analysis
1. Likelihood o f Success on the Merits
Whether a high school student should be allowed to graduate from a Texas high school is
a question more properly answered by the Texas legislature or the Texas Board of
Education. Education is not a fundamental right. Absent allegations of equal protection
violations, decisions regarding educational requirements are not generally subject to
federal court scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE See
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16
(1972).
With that in mind, it [**5] becomes apparent that Williams has a heavy burden. Williams
claims his son was unconstitutionally denied a high school diploma and the right to
participate in the June 3,1992, McCallum High School Graduation Ceremony.
Construing his complaint liberally,2 the basis for William's claims are that his son was
given inadequate notice that he would have to pass the TAAS due process and that the
courses he took at McCallum High School inadequately prepared him to pass the TAAS,
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN violating his son's right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In his complaint, Williams does not make an equal protection
violation claim, and during the hearing he confirmed that he was not challenging the
TAAS as being racially biased.
2 Williams is representing his son pro se.
The Court recognizes that in enacting systems of free public education with mandatory
attendance, States create "legitimate entitlements to a public education as a property
interest which may be protected by the due process Clause." See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 574, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736,42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); [**6] Debra P. v. Turlington, 644
F.2d 397,403 (5th Cir. 1981). However, that is not the issue here. Williams is not arguing
that the Austin Independent School District is depriving him of an education. Indeed, the
very test Williams complains of was designed to ensure that Texas students actually
receive a minimum level of education before they are allowed to graduate. NEXUS TO
STATE GOALS
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The Court also recognizes that the Fifth Circuit in Debra P. v. Turlington found that
students have a legitimate expectation they will receive diplomas if they attend school for
the requisite number of years and take and pass required courses. Debra P., 644 F.2d at
404. In that case, the Court found students had been given inadequate notice that they
must pass a [*254] functional literacy test before they could graduate. Id. The students in
Debra P. v. Turlington had thirteen months notice between the administration of the first
functional literacy test and the administration of the third functional literacy test, which
would be the last test given to that year's high school seniors in order to graduate at the
normally expected time. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979),
[**7] a jfd 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981).
In this case, students in Texas have known for seven years that they must pass a
comprehensive examination before receiving their diplomas. According to the testimony
of Penny Miller, the principal of McCallum High School, students upon entering
McCallum High School are given a high school guide, which discusses the TAAS 3 and
the fact that all students must pass the test to graduate. She also testified that teachers
frequently discuss the TAAS with their students in class. Williams offered no evidence to
contradict her testimony.
3 In the case of students entering high school beginning in 1984, but before the
TAAS replaced earlier versions of the examination, the guide would presumably
have discussed the earlier version of the mandatory examination. In either case,
however, students would have been made aware that passage of some final
comprehensive examination was a prerequisite to graduation from McCallum High
School.
That some students who may have [**8] passed last year's test will fail this year's
allegedly more difficult test does not render the test unconstitutional. Taking the holding
of Debra P. v. Turlington and stretching it to mean that not only must students be given
time to generally prepare for a comprehensive test like the functional literacy test
administered in Florida, but they must be given time to specifically prepare for the same,
but more difficult, kind of test does not further the purpose of that holding. Students
should be given a fair opportunity to pass the test, not a guarantee that they will pass the
test. DUE PROCESS
From the evidence presented to the Court, it appears that Williams, Jr. was given
adequate notice that he must pass the TAAS to graduate and is unlikely to prevail on the
merits based on inadequate notice, due process EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED
Williams is also unlikely to prevail on the merits of his second asserted due process
violation, that his son was not taught all the material tested on the TAAS. See Debra P.,
644 F.2d at 404-06. In Debra P. v. Turlington the Court found that a test required for
graduation could be "fundamentally unfair" and constitute a due process violation if the
test did not measure [**9] what was actually taught in school. Id. at 404-05. In that case
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sent that issue back to the district court on remand
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because the State of Florida had "merely assumed" the materials covered on the test were
being taught, but offered no real proof that they actually were. Id. at 405.
In this case, however, AISD presented substantial evidence that McCallum High School
provided, and Williams took, courses which adequately prepared him to take and pass the
TAAS. Elton Shillup, Math Coordinator for AISD, testified that the math portion 4 of the
TAAS primarily covers algebra and geometry. He and Penny Miller testified that
Williams, Jr. took pre-algebra, geometry, algebra, and two tutorial courses designed to
help students who had failed the math portion of the TAAS. Mr. Shillup further testified
that, although the TAAS is a "closed test",5 the Texas Education Agency provides the
school with a book describing the thirteen objectives of the TAAS, with 138
subcomponents, and giving other general information about what the TAAS covers. From
this information, course curricula are designed specifically to include the [**10] material
described in the objectives to prepare students to take the TAAS. Thus, unlike the State
of Florida in Debra P. v. Turlington the AISD has not "merely assumed" that the subject
[*255] matter tested on the TAAS is taught in Texas high schools. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
4 Recall Williams, Jr. failed only the math portion of the TAAS.
5 A "closed test" means teachers and AISD officials are not allowed to view the
contents of the test or students' answers.
Again, Williams put on no evidence to contradict the testimony of AISD witnesses,
which the Court found both credible and persuasive. Williams is not likely to prevail on
the merits of either due process violation claim, due process EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED
2. Irreparable Injury
Williams suffered no irreparable injury by not being allowed to participate in McCallum
High School's June 3, 1992, Graduation Ceremony. While the Court recognizes that high
school graduation is an important and memorable occasion in a young person's life,
"walking across the stage" certainly does not rise to the level of a constitutionally [**11]
protected property interest any more than attending one's high school prom, which most
young people also expect to do after completing twelve years of public school. It is the
actual high school diploma which is the property interest described in Debra P. v.
Turlington. Debra P. 644 F.2d at 404. There is no accompanying constitutional right to
receive that diploma at a specific graduation ceremony, and while this Court certainly has
no objection to the Austin Independent School District ("AISD") allowing Williams to
participate in McCallum's June 3 Graduation Ceremony tomorrow, it will not order the
AISD to do so. Furthermore, the evidence is undisputed that if Williams takes and passes
the TAAS in July, or at a later date, he can participate in the August graduation ceremony
or in a later graduation ceremony.
Assuming Williams also wanted this Court to issue an injunction requiring AISD to grant
Williams, Jr. his high school diploma at the June 3 ceremony, the Court also finds
Williams, Jr. is not irreparably injured by not receiving his diploma immediately. Not
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only has Texas altered the property right described in Debra P. v. Turlington so that
students [**12] in Texas since 1985 only have a legitimate expectation of receiving a
diploma after attending school for the requisite number of years, successfully completing
required courses, and passing a comprehensive exit examination, but Williams will still
receive a high school diploma when he passes the TAAS.
3. Threatened Injury
The injury to both Williams, Jr. and the AISD is comparable and does not affect the result
in this case. Williams, Jr. will suffer to the extent that participating in one's high school
graduation ceremony with his or her peers is important to many students. Nonetheless,
Williams, Jr. will still have the opportunity to participate in a graduation ceremony at a
later time. As for the AISD, while the Court does not believe the AISD would be greatly
injured by allowing Williams, Jr. to participate without receiving a real high school
diploma, the Court respects the principals' decision to not allow participation by students
who failed the TAAS in order to send a message to students that passing the TAAS really
is necessary in order to graduate and to properly recognize those students who have
completed all the requirements for graduation. 6
6 Penny Miller, McCallum High School Principal, testified that principals from all
the high schools in the Austin Independent School District held a meeting
approximately two weeks ago to decide whether students who had failed the TAAS
should be allowed to participate in this spring's graduation ceremonies.
[**13] 4. Public Interest
The Court believes the public interest is better served by this Court not interfering with
the decisions of the AISD, the Texas Legislature, the State Board of Education, and the
Texas Education Agency ("TEA"). The Texas Constitution vests the duty of establishing
"an efficient system of public free schools" and a State Board of Education in the Texas
Legislature. Tex. Const., art. VII, §§ 1,8. The Texas Legislature, in turn, states that
trustees, elected to serve in independent school districts, "shall have the exclusive power
to manage and govern the public free schools of the district." Tex. Educ. Code §
23.26(b); see also § 23.01; § 23.08; § 23.13. There is no question that the education of
Texas [*256] children and determination of educational policies in Texas are state
matters, with which this Court should interfere only when constitutional rights are clearly
being violated. See Debra P., 644 F.2d at 402-03 (citing Cumming v. Bd. o f Educ., 175
U.S. 528, 545, 20 S. Ct. 197,201, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899); Brown v. Bd. o f Educ., 341 U.S.
483,493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691,98 L. Ed. 873 (1954); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95
S. Ct. 729, 736,42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975)). [**14]
The citizens of Texas are disserved when federal judges substitute their notions of
fairness in place of officials elected to make these kinds of policy decisions and judgment
calls. Whether or not Williams, Jr. is allowed to participate in the June 3 McCallum High
School Graduation Ceremony, the Court does not believe the public interest is
substantially effected. Granting Williams, Jr., or any other student who has failed the
TAAS, a diploma, however, may disserve the public interest. If, as adjudged by the Texas
Legislature, the elected State Board of Education, and the TEA, the ability to pass the

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

537

TAAS does indicate that a student has received an acceptable level of education and is
prepared to enter the work force or proceed on with higher education, then allowing
students who have not passed the TAAS to receive a diploma harms the public. The
citizens of Texas have a right to expect that a high school graduate is educated and that a
diploma is not a meaningless piece of paper.
Conclusion
The Court declines to enter a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.
Williams has not shown this Court that he is likely to succeed on the merits or that his
son will [**15] be irreparably harmed if a preliminary injunction is not issued. The
decisions to not grant Williams' son a diploma or allow him to participate in the June 3,
1992, McCallum High School Graduation Ceremony are decisions belonging to the
AISD, the Texas Education Agency, and the Texas Legislature. There being no clear
showing of a constitutional injury absent the granting of preliminary injunctive relief, this
Court will not interfere with those decisions at this time.
Furthermore, the Court has reviewed Judge William Wayne Justice's opinion of May 29,
1992, in Crump v. Gilmer Indep. School Dist., No. 6:92-CV-315, which was both the
catalyst and basis of the filing of this lawsuit by Williams. While the contentions and
supporting evidence of these cases are obviously dissimilar, this Court is also in basic
disagreement with Judge Justice. The right of a free public education in Texas is a Texas
constitutional right, and the level of education and academic achievement necessary to
obtain a diploma from a Texas high school is appropriately a judgment call for the
persons elected for that state responsibility and those experienced persons responsible for
educating and preparing students [**16] to achieve the established level of competence.
Any interference in this process is simply destructive to the attempts by the state to
salvage its educational system, and this includes interference by the federal judiciary.
JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE
SIGNED this 9 day of June, 1992.
SAM SPARKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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TARCHIA RANKINS, CHAD YANCY, SONOVIA HICKS,
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LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION
No. 93 CA 1879
COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, FIRST CIRCUIT
93 1879 (La.App. 1 Cir. 03/17/94); 637 So. 2d 548; 1994 La.
App. LEXIS 1444
M arch 17,1994, Rendered
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Released for Publication May 5, 1994.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in and for the
Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Trial Court No. 394,923, Honorable Joseph
Keogh, Judge
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant state board of education sought review of an
order of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, East Baton Rouge Parish (Louisiana),
which issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the board of education from
withholding plaintiff students' high school diplomas despite their graduation exit
examination (GEE) failure.
OVERVIEW: The students sought the award of their high school diplomas and a
declaration as to the invalidity of the board of education's GEE policy. The trial court
held that the GEE had been unconstitutionally administered in violation of the equal
protection clause of the federal and state constitutions. The court held that the board of
education had authority to establish the GEE as a requirement for obtaining a state
diploma and that the trial court erred in holding that the GEE was being administered in
violation of the equal protection clause. Under constitutional proscriptions, the board of
education could not dictate the curriculum or set exit exam requirements in non-public
schools; to do so would be an "excessive entanglement" violative of U.S. Const, amend.
I. The state could impose an exit exam requirement on students without violating equal
protection provided the exam was specifically tied to the curriculum. The court held that
the GEE did not violate the equal protection clause because its administration was
rationally related to the state's legitimate interest of insuring minimum competency
among persons obtaining a state diploma.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the portion of the district court's judgment which stated
that the GEE violated the equal protection clause and vacated the preliminary injunction
issued with respect to the students' diplomas.
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CORE TERMS: non-public, exam, exit, graduation, curriculum, school students, high
school diploma, elementary, grade, diploma, taught, equal protection, administered,
public schools, supervision and control, home study, vocational-technical, classification,
competency, secondary schools, rational relationship, referenced, religious, criterion,
insuring, public education, secondary education, special schools, general powers,
standards of review
COUNSEL: Ernest Johnson and Ronald Johnson, Baton Rouge, LA, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Tarchia Rankins, et al.
Roy A. Mongrue, Jr. and Margo Fleet, Baton Rouge, LA, Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.
Thomas A. Rayer, Denechaud and Denechaud, New Orleans, LA, Attorney for La.
Federation, Citizens for Educational Freedom, Amicus Curiae.
JUDGES: BEFORE: LOTTINGER, C.J., CARTER, CRAIN, LEBLANC, AND
WHIPPLE, JJ.
OPINION BY: LOTTINGER
OPINION
[*550] BEFORE: LOTTINGER, CHIEF JUDGE.
The subject of this litigation is Louisiana's graduation exit examination (GEE) which has
been a requirement for obtaining a state high school diploma since 1989. The five
plaintiffs in this case, all Louisiana public school students, failed to pass the GEE before
the end of their senior year in high school. They have all accumulated the required 23
Carnegie units 1 necessary for graduation but, because of their failure to pass the GEE,
[**2] they have not received their respective diplomas. SOLE CRITERION. Plaintiffs
filed this suit seeking the award of their high school diplomas and a declaration as to the
invalidity of the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education's (BESE) GEE policy.
1 Prior to implementation of the GEE, the only academic requirement for high
school graduation was the successful completion of 23 Carnegie units. The
required units presently consist of 4 units of English, 3 units of mathematics, 3
units of science, 3 units of social studies, 2 units of health and physical education,
1/2 unit of computer literacy, and 7 1/2 units of electives. Louisiana Department of
Education, Louisiana Handbook for School Administrators (revised November
1992). SOLE CRITERION
Following a hearing, the trial judge issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting BESE
[*551] from withholding the plaintiffs' state high school diplomas despite their failure of
the GEE. In his written reasons for judgment, the judge stated that the GEE has been
unconstitutionally administered in violation of [**3] the equal protection clause of the
United States and Louisiana Constitutions. From this judgment, BESE appeals.
The central issues raised by this appeal are:
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(1) whether BESE has authority to establish the GEE as a graduation requirement; and
(2) whether the GEE is being administered in violation of the equal protection clause.
BESE'S AUTHORITY
Plaintiffs assert that BESE exceeded the scope of its authority in adopting the GEE
because the legislature did not specifically authorize a graduation exit exam. For the
reasons assigned below, we conclude that BESE has authority to establish the GEE as a
requirement for obtaining a state diploma.
Article VIII Section 3(A) of the Louisiana Constitution provides that:
The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education is created as a body
corporate. It shall supervise and control the public elementary and secondary
schools, vocational-technical training and special schools under its
jurisdiction and shall have budgetary responsibility for all funds appropriated
or allocated by the state for those schools, all as provided by law. The board
shall have other powers, duties, and responsibilities as provided by this
constitution [**4] or by law, but shall have no control over the business
affairs of a parish or city school board or the selection or removal of its
officers and employees.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 708 (La. 1983),
concluded that this constitutional provision is not self-executing. Thus, BESE's
supervision and control of public elementary and secondary education is not unfettered,
but is subject to the laws passed by the legislature.2 Id. We therefore look to legislative
enactments in search of BESE's authority to establish the GEE.
2 In answering a certified question from the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Aguillard court discussed the meaning of the phrase "as provided by
law" contained in La. Const, art. VIII § 3(A). The court concluded that according
to this phrase, "the Board shall supervise and control the public elementary and
secondary schools as provided 'by the legislature' or 'by statute.'" Id. at 708, see
also Board o f Elementary and Secondary Education v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147, (La.
1977) (The Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted La. Const, art. V m § 3(A) to
mean that although the legislature shall provide by law for the supervision, control,
and budgetary power of the board, the legislature cannot regulate and limit BESE's
constitutional grant of power to supervise, control, and budget education.)
[**5] The legislature set forth the general powers o f BESE in La. R.S. 17:6. This statute
contains numerous grants of specific powers as well as the following general provision:
A. In the exercise o f its supervision and control over the public elementary
and secondary schools, vocational-technical and postsecondary vocationaltechnical schools and programs except in colleges and universities, and
special schools under its jurisdiction, and in the exercise of its budgetary
responsibility for all funds appropriated or allocated by the state for public
elementary and secondary schools, vocational-technical and postsecondary
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vocational-technical programs and schools except colleges and universities,
and special schools placed under its jurisdiction, the board shall have
authority to:
(15) Perform such other functions as are necessary to the supervision and
control of those phases of education under its supervision and control.
Under this grant of general power and in the absence of specific legislation regarding the
development o f a graduation exit exam, BESE retains the authority to establish the GEE.
In brief, plaintiffs assert that BESE exceeded its [**6] authority because "the legislature
did not express the intent in [La. R.S. 17: 24.4] that the eleventh grade criterionreferenced [*552] test was to be administered as a graduation exit exam." The pertinent
parts of this statute provide:
A. (2) "The Louisiana Educational Assessment Program" means a process of
measuring pupil performance in relation to grade appropriate skills, state
curriculum standards, and national indices.
F. The Department of Education shall begin implementation of a Louisiana
Educational Assessment Program, with the approval of the State Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education.. . . A grade eleven criterionreferenced test shall be piloted no later than the 1987-1988 school year with
implementation no later than 1988-1989.
La. R.S. 17:24.4.
While plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the statute is devoid of legislative intent
regarding graduation exit exams, this silence does not imply that BESE exceeded the
scope of its authority. Under La. R.S. 17:6(A)(15), BESE has broad powers to perform
such functions as are necessary for the supervision and control of public education.
Because the legislature has not expressed [**7] a contrary intent, BESE retains the
power under this statute to implement the GEE as a graduation requirement. BOARD
AUTHORITY
3 House Concurrent Resolution 204 of 1989 provides some evidence of the
legislature's intent regarding the GEE. In April of 1989, BESE adopted a resolution
requiring all Louisiana students, public and non-public, to pass the GEE before
obtaining a state high school diploma. In response to this resolution, the legislature
adopted House Concurrent Resolution 204 which expresses the legislature's intent
to limit the applicability of the GEE to public school students. Following this
action by the legislature, BESE adopted a new policy which stated that the GEE
would be mandatory for public students and optional for non-public students.
This resolution is significant in that the legislature did not disapprove of BESE's
plans to make the GEE a requirement for Louisiana's public school students.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that BESE has authority to establish the GEE as a
requirement for obtaining [**8] a state high school diploma. Having reached this
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conclusion, we now consider whether BESE's administration of the GEE violates the
equal protection clause. BOARD AUTHORITY: EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED
EQUAL PROTECTION
In challenging BESE's GEE policy, plaintiffs note that students attending state approved
non-public schools, home study students, and persons obtaining a General Educational
Development Diploma (GED), are not required to take the GEE prior to receiving a state
diploma. On the other hand, public school students must successfully complete the 23
Carnegie units and pass the GEE before obtaining a state diploma. Based on this uneven
administration of the GEE, the trial judge concluded "that the Graduate Exit Exam (GEE)
has been unconstitutionally administered in violation of the equal protection Laws o f the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions."
After a careful review of the applicable constitutional provisions and jurisprudence, we
conclude that the trial judge erred in holding that the GEE is being administered in
violation of the equal protection clause. EQUAL PROTECTION: EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED
A. BESE’s Authority Over Non-public Schools
We first consider the scope of BESE's authority over non-public schools. La. Const.
[**9] art. V m § 4 gives BESE the limited power to approve "a private elementary,
secondary, or proprietary school with a sustained curriculum or specialized course of
study of quality at least equal to that prescribed for similar public schools. . . . "
According to the testimony of Louisiana State Superintendent of Education, Raymond G.
Arveson, the key factor in approving a non-public school is whether the school offers the
23 Carnegie units. In granting or withholding approval, BESE may only compare the
quality of the curriculum of the non-public school with the mandated curriculum of the
public schools. This limited constitutional authority to approve non-public schools does
not empower BESE to mandate the contents of the courses taught or to require that the
students pass the GEE prior to graduation.
[*553] BESE's authority over non-public schools is further constrained by the United
States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has held that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state from intruding into family decisions in the
areas of religious freedom and parental control over the rearing of children.
The right of parents to choose the means and methods whereby [**10] their children may
be educated free from unreasonable or excessive government interference is a liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Pierce v. Society o f Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45
S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925), the Court set forth the following:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625, 67
L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore
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pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
[**11] to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
The Court reaffirmed the constitutional right o f parental choice in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972). Therein the Court acknowledged
that the state may "impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education." Id. at 213. However, the Court limited this power by observing that
reasonable regulations must "yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent
education in a privately operated system." Id. The Court then concluded:
thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is
not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the
words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional [**12] obligations."
Id. at 214.
Under these constitutional proscriptions, BESE cannot dictate the curriculum or set exit
exam requirements in non-public schools without infringing upon the rights of parents
who choose to send their children to non-public schools or who choose religious over
public education
B. The Holdings of Debra P.
The seminal case in the area of exit exams arose under similar circumstances in Florida.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). In Debra P. a group of Florida high
school students challenged the validity of the Florida State Student Assessment Test
which was a condition for receipt of a high school diploma. 4 The Fifth Circuit held that
there was no equal protection violation merely because the exit exam was applied only to
public school students. Id. at 406. Citing Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 77, 99 S. Ct.
1589,1595, n .8 ,60 L. Ed. 2d 49, 57 (1979), the court stated, "the state need not correct
all the problems of education in one fell [**13] swoop and it has a stronger interest in
those for which it pays the cost." 644 F.2d at 406-07.
4 Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Debra P. case from the present case by
noting that "the Louisiana State Legislature has expressed no interest in the
implementation of a graduation exit exam which is different from the State of
Florida." In light of our conclusions in the first portion of this opinion, this
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distinction does not affect the application of the Debra P. holdings to the facts of
this case.
A second holding in the Debra P. case is that an exit exam cannot be made a requirement
for graduation unless it is specifically [*554] tied to the curriculum taught in the schools.
5 644 F.2d at 406. This is known as a criterion-referenced examination. The requirement
that exit exams be criterion referenced is necessary to avoid equal protection problems
which may arise if the test attempts to gauge general knowledge and is consequently
biased because of social and noneducational factors.
5 The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to hear evidence on whether Florida's exit
exam tested materials actually taught in Florida's public schools and to determine
whether the exam had a racially discriminatory impact. 644 F.2d at 408. Following
the district court's decision on remand, the case was appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's findings that the Florida students
were taught tested skills, that the exam did not discriminate, and that the exam
would help remedy the vestiges of past segregation. 730 F.2d at 1416-17.
[**14] According to Debra P., the state may impose an exit exam requirement on
students without violating equal protection, provided the exam is specifically tied to the
curriculum. The GEE is a five part, criterion referenced exam which tests skills from
Louisiana's mandated public school curriculum. The English Language Arts, Written
Composition, and Mathematics portions of the GEE are first administered in the 10th
grade CURRICULAR VALIDITY. Students who fail any of these portions may retake
them in the 11th and 12th grades. The Science and Social Studies portions are first given
in the 11th grade and may be retaken in the 12th grade.6 Remediation is offered for
students who have failed any section of the GEE. Remediation and testing remain
available to students after completion of their high school curriculum. REMEDIATION
6 Students are afforded four opportunities to take and pass the Science and Social
Studies portions of the exam and they have six opportunities to take and pass the
other sections. OPPORUNITY TO LEARN: MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES
The GEE requirement applies to public [**15] high school students with exceptions for
home study students,7 persons who obtain a G E D ,8 and non-public school students. 9
These limited exceptions are not arbitrary, but rather are mandated by the holding of
Debra P. which prohibits the state from requiring passage of an exit exam unless the
exam tests the content of subjects actually taught in the schools. CURRICULAR
VALIDITY
7 Home study students who return to the public school system in the eleventh grade
are not required to take three of the five parts of the GEE and students returning in
the twelfth grade are not required to take any part of the exam.
8 Persons obtaining a GED are not required to take any part of the GEE.
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9 BESE maintains a policy of optional participation for approved non-public
schools.
As discussed above, the Louisiana and U.S. Constitutions prohibit BESE from dictating
the contents of the curriculum in non-public schools and in home study programs. Thus,
requiring these students to pass a test covering materials that were not necessarily [**16]
taught, clearly violates the rule of Debra P. Additionally, because Debra P. mandates
that exit exams be criterion referenced, persons who obtain a GED cannot be required to
pass the GEE which is based on the curriculum taught in Louisiana's public schools.
In sum, because BESE cannot mandate the content o f the curriculum taught in non-public
schools or in home study programs and because Debra P. requires that exit exams be
criterion referenced, BESE cannot require that non-public students, home study students,
or persons obtaining a GED pass the GEE prior to receiving a state diploma. BOARD
AUTHORITY: EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
C. The Rational Relationship Standard
In analyzing equal protection claims, the courts have established three standards of
review. Sibley v. Board o f Supervisors o f Louisiana State University, A ll So. 2d 1094,
1107 (La. 1985) (on rehearing). When legislative enactments classify persons by race or
religious beliefs, the strict scrutiny standard is applied. For classifications based on birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, an intermediate
standard of review is appropriate. All other classifications are analyzed [**17] under the
rational relationship standard.
In the present case, the classification of public versus non-public school students 10
[*555] does not involve any of the suspect or intermediate classifications recognized
under the equal protection analysis. Thus, the rational relationship standard is the proper
standard of review. Under this standard the challenger must establish that the legislative
classification at issue is not rationally related to any legitimate state purpose. Pierre v.
Administrator, Louisiana Office o f Employment Security, 553 So. 2d 442, 447 (La. 1989).
10 There is no evidence in the record which attempts to set forth the number of
non-parochial schools in Louisiana vis a vis parochial schools. Therefore, under the
equal protection analysis, the students are classified as public versus non-public.
In applying the rational relationship standard in Debra P., the court held that the exit
exam bears a rational relation to Florida's valid interest of insuring the functional [**18]
literacy of its graduating students. Debra P., 644 F.2d at 406. In the present case, the state
of Louisiana has a valid interest of insuring the minimum competency of persons
obtaining a state diploma. The GEE bears a rational relationship to this goal by insuring
that students who obtain a state diploma have reached die required level of competency.
We also note that BESE's policies regarding remediation and retesting further the state's
interest by providing failing students an opportunity to achieve the required level of
competency.
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Plaintiffs suggest that because approved non-public schools receive state funding, the
state also has an interest in the quality of education in those non-public schools. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that limited financial assistance to non
public school students is permissible provided it does not create an excessive government
entanglement with the non-public schools. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct.
2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971). Limited funding to non-public school students does not
authorize the state to impose curriculum or graduation requirements on [**19] non-public
school students. Any attempt to establish the GEE requirement in a non-public school
would be an "excessive entanglement" and thus, violate the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. EQUAL PROTECTION
Although the state provides certain funds for services which directly assist students in
non-public schools, we join the Debra P. court in acknowledging that the state has a
stronger interest in the public education for which it pays the costs. We conclude that the
GEE does not violate the equal protection clause because it's administration is rationally
related to the state's legitimate interest of insuring minimum competency among persons
obtaining a state diploma.BOARD AUTHORITY: LEGITIMATE INTEREST:
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that BESE has the authority to establish the GEE
as a requirement for obtaining a state high school diploma and that BESE's administration
of the GEE does not violate the equal protection clause. Accordingly, we reverse that
portion of the trial court's judgment which states that the GEE violates the equal
protection clause and we vacate the preliminary injunction issued with respect to the
plaintiffs diplomas. Costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiffs.
[**20] REVERSED AND RENDERED.
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TARCHIA RANKINS, ET AL v. LOUISIANA STATE
BOARD OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION
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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
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JUDGES: Catherine D. Kimball, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Walter F. Marcus, Jr., Jack
Crozier Watson, Harry T. Lemmon, Pike Hall, Revius O. Ortique
OPINION
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CHAD TRIPLETT; TRACEY TRIPLETT; PHILLIP
TRIPLETT; AND GWEN TRIPLETT, APPELLANTS v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY BOARD O F EDUCATION; LEE
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AND TOM COUNTS, APPELLEES AND LIVINGSTON
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; LEE JONES; MIKE
JOINER; TONY LASHER; DARRELL STAFFORD;
PHILLIP THRELKELD; TIM PORTER; AND TOM
COUNTS, APPELLANTS v. CHAD TRIPLETT; TRACEY
TRIPLETT; PH ILLIP TRIPLETT; AND GWEN
TRIPLETT, APPELLEES
NO. 96-CA-1046-MR, NO. 96-CA-1371-MR
COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY
967 S.W.2d 25; 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 74
August 15,1997, RENDERED
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Petition for Rehearing Denied October 10, 1997.
Released for Publication June 19,1998. Certiorari Denied January 19, 1999, Reported at:
1999 U.S. LEXIS 599.
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT.
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE. ACTION NO. 94-CI-62.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, parents and students, sought review of the
judgment from the Livingston Circuit Court (Kentucky), which declared that the
Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) assessment exam and the
requirement to take said exam was not in violation o f appellants' constitutional rights, nor
in violation of certain federal laws. Appellee school district cross-appealed the ruling
mandating the exam was open for public review.
OVERVIEW: Appellant parents contended that the Kentucky Instructional Results
Information System (ORIS) assessment exam, which assessed student skills in reading,
mathematics, writing, science, and social studies, asked questions that violated 20
U.S.C.S. § 1232h(b). The court disagreed. The court also held, contrary to appellant's
contention, that the content of the KIRIS exam questions did not advance or inhibit
religion, nor did it foster any government entanglement with religion. The court held that
the state's interest in the improvement of the educational system through the use of an
assessment program such as the O R IS exam was sufficiently compelling to require all
students to take the KIRIS exam. Because o f the importance of the KIRIS exam as a tool
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for measuring the efficiency and improvement of Kentucky schools, and its potential for
abuse, the court held that the KIRIS exam should not be open for general public viewing
without a special showing of necessity beyond simple curiosity as to its content.
OUTCOME: The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in part, and reversed and
remanded in part. It was not violative of appellant parent or students' rights or federal law
to require Kentucky students to take an assessment exam.
CORE TERMS: exam, religion, religious, religious beliefs, educational, graduation,
statewide, exercise of religion, school board, summary judgment, achievement, Hatch
Amendment, school year, school districts, strict scrutiny, instructional, inspection,
testing, privacy, viewing, rewards, grade, score, novice, matter of law, constitutional
rights, public education, public school, public inspection, board of education
COUNSEL: BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS (IN 96-CA1046)/APPELLEES (IN 96-CA-1371): James F. Dinwiddie, Leitchfield, Kentucky.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES (IN 96-CA-1046/APPELLANTS
(IN 96-CA-1371): David L. Yewell, Owensboro, Kentucky.
JUDGES: BEFORE: COMBS, DYCHE, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES. ALL CONCUR.
OPINION BY: SCHRODER
OPINION
[*27] OPINION
AFFIRM ING IN PART
A N D R E VERSING A ND REMANDING I N PAR T
SCHRODER, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a judgment declaring that the Kentucky
Instructional Results Information System ("KIRIS") assessment exam and the
requirement to take said exam are not in violation of parents' or students' constitutional
rights, nor in violation of certain federal laws. This is also an appeal by the school from a
ruling mandating that the KIRIS assessment exam shall be open for public review. We
affirm the court's decision regarding the constitutionality of the exam and the requirement
to take the exam, [**2] reverse the open records order, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
In response to the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc., Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989), the Kentucky General Assembly enacted
the Kentucky Education Reform Act ("KERA"), effective July 13, 1990, which mandated
that the Kentucky Board of Education ("KBE") develop a system of public education
whereby state government, local committees, parents, students and school employees
would share the responsibility of improving public education in Kentucky. Part o f KERA
mandates that the KBE create and implement "a statewide, primarily performance-based
assessment program to ensure school accountability for student achievement of the goals
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set forth in KRS 158.645." KRS 158.6453 BOARD AUTHORITY. The goals in KRS
158.645, which codified those set forth in Rose, supra at 212 are:
(1) Communication skills necessary to function in a complex and changing
civilization;
(2) Knowledge to make economic, social, and political choices;
(3) Understanding of governmental processes as they affect the community,
the state, and the nation;
(4) [**3] Sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his mental and
physical wellness;
(5) Sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or
her cultural and historical heritage;
(6) Sufficient preparation to choose and pursue his life's work intelligently;
and
(7) Skills to enable him to compete favorably with other students in other
states.
KRS 158.6453 required that an interim assessment test be given to students in grades 4, 8
and 12 by the 1991-1992 school year and that the permanent assessment program be
implemented no later than the 1995-1996 school year.
In establishing the assessment program, KERA provided for the KBE to contract with
authorities in the field of performance-based assessment. The KBE contracted with such
authority in New Hampshire and ultimately created the Kentucky Instructional Results
Information System ("KIRIS") assessment exam which assesses student skills in reading,
mathematics, writing, science and social studies.
The primary purpose of the KIRIS test is not for evaluating individual student
performance, but for evaluating the progress of the school systems under KERA.
Performance levels [**4] of Novice (being the lowest), Apprentice, Proficient and
Distinguished were established in evaluating the KIRIS exam results. Each o f these
performance levels was given a rating from 0 points for the Novice, to 140 points for the
Distinguished. Through a fairly complicated formula, the grades of the [*28] individuals
tested are computed into an overall school rating. The testing provides both cognitive
(academic) and non-cognitive (dropout rates, attendance, retention rates, etc.) data which
come together first to form a baseline score. Once the scores are established, thresholds,
or goals, are established for each school to meet. If the school exceeds the threshold by
one point and moves ten percent or more of its students out of the "Novice" level, it is
considered successful and qualifies for rewards. Schools that improved, but did not meet
their goals must develop improvement plans and work to raise their levels of
achievement. For those schools in crisis whose scores drop below their baseline,
assistance is made available.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

551

Simply put, those school districts where students do well on the KIRIS test are rewarded,
and those school districts where students do poorly are penalized. The [**5] law provides
for sanctions to be imposed upon those in crisis (staff placed on probation), and financial
rewards are given to those districts that are successful. KRS 158.6455. Therefore, each
school district in this state has a financial interest in the outcome of the test scores of
KIRIS examinations given within its district.
Early in 1994, prior to the KIRIS assessment tests' being administered in the spring, the
parents of Chad Triplett, a senior, and Tracey Triplett, an eighth-grader (hereinafter "the
Tripletts") informed the Livingston County School System (hereinafter "the school") that
they did not want their children to take the KIRIS assessment test. When the 1993-1994
school year commenced, the Livingston County schools had no policy requiring students
to take the KIRIS tests. Thus, at first, the Tripletts were told by the school that their
children would not be required to take the KIRIS test. Subsequently, however, the KBE
informed the Livingston County school system that it would hold all schools accountable
for the performance of all students and, in the absence of KIRIS assessment information
about the performance of a child, the school would be assigned a novice [**6] level
performance for that child. Consequently, on February 14,1994, the Livingston County
Board of Education passed the following policy:
Students shall complete all parts of KIRIS assessment before advancing to
the next grade or graduating, including math and writing portfolios.
Prior to the tests' being given, Mrs. Triplett requested to review the tests, and on February
16 and February 18,1994, she was allowed to examine them. There is some question as
to how much of the actual tests she was allowed to examine and how long she was given
to review the tests. She was not allowed to take any notes or make copies.
Based primarily on religious objections to the tests, the Tripletts refused to let Chad and
Tracey take the KIRIS assessment test in 1994. FREE EXERCISE As a result of their
not taking the test, the Livingston County School Board refused to allow Chad to
graduate and Tracey to be promoted to the ninth grade, although Chad and Tracey had
completed all other necessary requirements for graduation and promotion, respectively.
On May 25,1994, the Tripletts filed the action herein against the Livingston County
Board of Education, seeking a permanent injunction to prevent [**7j the school board
from excluding Chad from graduation and a declaratory judgment establishing that Chad
and Tracey had fulfilled all requirements for graduation and promotion, respectively. The
petition for declaratory judgment also requested that the court rule regarding the Tripletts'
claims of violation of privacy, infringement of their exercise of religion, interference with
their parental rights, denial of their due process rights and their rights under certain
federal laws.
Both parties filed various affidavits in support of their positions, including some from
educational experts giving their opinions regarding the merits or lack thereof of the
KIRIS assessment test. Additionally, the Tripletts filed a request for production of the
KIRIS assessment test for review in preparation for trial. The court ordered that the test
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be delivered by the school to a Special Commissioner who would monitor the review by
the Tripletts and their counsel.
[*29] Subsequently, the school made a motion for summary judgment. On February 22,
1996, the circuit court granted the school's motion and dismissed the Tripletts' petition.
The court noted that since the petition was for declaratory judgment [**8] seeking a
permanent injunction, it was an equitable action in which the court must decide both
issues of law and fact.
In the court's 21-page opinion and order, the court reviewed the KIRIS exam questions in
the record in light of the specific objections raised by the Tripletts, and found that the
Tripletts' claims had no merit:
The Court finds nothing in the examination questions which either interferes
with the parental rights or the control in the upbringing of the children,
infringes upon the free exercise of religion nor the establishment thereof, nor
violates any of the rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act, nor their right to privacy. While the KIRIS assessment procedure as
well as KERA itself may be subject to political debate, the implementation
of that law has already been held to be legitimate and is not an exercise of
arbitrary power in violation of Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution.
(See Chapman v. Gorman, 839 S.W.2d 232 (1992)).
The court went on to conclude that it was not unconstitutional to require all students to
take the KIRIS exam. The court did, however, agree with the Tripletts' argument as to
their right to review [**9] the KIRIS exam questions. The court ruled that the KIRIS
exam should be made open for review by the public. In a subsequent order the court
expanded its earlier ruling to allow the KIRIS exam to be viewed by the public at the
Livingston County Circuit Clerk's office PUBLIC REVIEW. From the February 22, 1996
judgment, the Tripletts now appeal the ruling regarding the constitutionality o f the KIRIS
exam and the requirement to take the KIRIS exam, while the school appeals from the
rulings allowing the KIRIS exam to be made open for public viewing.
We first address the Tripletts' argument that summary judgment was premature in this
case because material questions of fact existed. They specifically point to the affidavits of
the various experts in the record containing opposing views on the KIRIS assessment
exam. The Tripletts also maintain that they will present other evidence discrediting the
KIRIS exam if the action is allowed to proceed.
Summary judgment should be used to terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it
appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at trial
warranting judgment in his favor and against the movant. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service [**10] Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991). The function of a motion for
summary judgment is to secure final judgment as a matter of law when there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Conley v. Hall, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 575 (1965). We would
agree with the lower court that the issues in the present case are matters of law, not fact.
While the determination of the constitutionality of the KIRIS exam may involve factual
matters, the ultimate decision is one of law. In a similar case challenging a Louisiana act
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requiring the teaching of creationism, the United States Supreme Court found that
summary judgment was proper, even in the face of uncontroverted affidavits submitted
by the respondent. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 96 L. Ed. 2d 510
(1987). We believe the present case was proper for summary judgment since the record
contained everything necessary for the court to decide the issues of law, which we shall
now address.
The Tripletts argue that when the Livingston County Board of Education passed the
policy requiring that all students take the KIRIS exam mid-year in the school year
(February), it failed to provide them with adequate notice o f the requirement [**11] and,
thus, operated as an ex post facto law. We believe this argument is without merit. The
passage of the KIRIS exam requirement did not punish any action that had already been
taken by the Tripletts and did not serve to prejudice the Tripletts in any way. The KIRIS
exam requires no advance preparation beyond the student's normal academic program;
hence, further notice would have served no purpose, due process EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED
[*30] The Tripletts also argue that the local school board did not have legal authority to
require that all students take the KIRIS exam. Although there is nothing in KRS 158.6453
(the statute mandating that the Kentucky Board of Education create and implement an
assessment program) specifically requiring that all students must take the assessment
exam, we believe statutory authority exists for the local board of education to establish
such a policy. KRS 156.160(1 )(c) allows the KBE to promulgate regulations regarding
the minimum requirements for high school graduation and requires that the KBE review
the graduation requirements in light of the expected outcomes for students and schools
set forth in KRS 158.6451. 704 KAR 3:305 § 3(1) & (2) provides:
(1) Each student who satisfactorily completes [**12] the requirements of this
administrative regulation and such credits and additional requirements as
may be imposed by a local board of education shall be awarded a graduation
diploma.
(2) Local boards of education may grant different diplomas to those students
who complete credits above the minimum number of credits as established
by the State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education.
The above regulation permits local boards to establish additional graduation requirements
above the minimum requirements set forth by the KBE. Indeed, the concept of
decentralization of schools is a large part of KERA. The individual schools are
responsible for their own performance on the KIRIS assessment exams and there is much
at stake for the individual schools in terms of rewards and penalties. See KRS 158.6455.
Therefore, each school district should have the authority to set policy which relates to the
assessment process so long as it does not conflict with KERA or the responsibilities
delegated solely to the KBE by KERA. BOARD AUTHORITY EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED
We next move on to the Tripletts' primary claim that requiring the Triplett children to
take the KIRIS assessment exam violates: their constitutional right [**13] to free exercise
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of religion; their constitutional right as parents to direct the education and upbringing of
their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1972); and the Hatch Amendment to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20
USC A § 1232 (Hatch Amendment). The thrust of the Tripletts' claim is that the content
of the KIRIS exam questions offends their religious beliefs because the test: establishes a
religious or moral code; invades the students' religious and moral beliefs; discriminates
on the basis of religion; and compels the students to speak against their beliefs by
selecting morally objectionable responses.
We shall first address the Tripletts' allegation that the KIRIS exam violates 20 USCA §
1232h(b) of the Hatch Amendment which provides as follows:
No student shall be required, as part of any applicable program, to submit to
a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information concerning (1) political affiliations;
(2) mental and psychological problems potentially embarrassing to the
student or his family;
(3) sex behavior and attitudes;
(4) illegal, anti-social, [**14] self- incriminating and demeaning behavior;
(5) critical appraisals of other individuals with whom respondents have close
family relationships;
(6) legally recognized privileged or analogous relationships, such as those of
lawyers, physicians, and ministers; or
(7) income (other than that required by law to determine eligibility for
participation in a program or for receiving financial assistance under such
program), without the prior consent o f the student (if the student is an adult or
emancipated minor), or in the case of an unemancipated minor, without the
prior written consent of the parent.
We find there is nothing in the exam which compels a student to reveal any type of
information listed in 20 USCA § 1232h(b). A portion of the exam does include a
multiple-choice student questionnaire in which the student is asked to give certain factual
information [*31] about himself or herself, such as how much time he or she spends on
homework each day and whether he or she attended kindergarten, but the questionnaire is
prefaced by the caveat that if he or she does not feel comfortable answering any question,
he or she may leave it blank. Also, [**15] certain essay questions ask that the child view
a situation from his or her own perspective in responding to the question or statement.
However, the child is not required to give any specific personal information proscribed
by the above Act. FREE EXERCISE: EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
We now turn to the Tripletts' constitutional claims. The Establishment clause of the
United States Constitution and its counterpart of the Kentucky Constitution guarantee
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that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes state religious faith or tends to do
so. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct. 2649,120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992); U.S.C.A.
Const. Amends. §§ 1,14; Ky. Const. §§ 1,5. The Free Exercise clause of both
constitutions prevents the government from regulating one's religious beliefs. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. §§ 1,14; Ky. Const. §§ 1, 5. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.
Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971), the United States Supreme Court applied the
following three-part test in deciding whether the Establishment clause had been violated:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary [**16] effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243, 88 S. Ct. 1923,
1926, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion." [Walz v. Tax
Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1411,
25 L. Ed. 2d 697(1970)].
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-613.
In reviewing the KIRIS exam in light of KERA, we see that the exam has the secular
legislative purpose provided for in KRS 158.6453(1), "to ensure school accountability for
student achievement of the goals set forth in KRS 158.645. "BOARD AUTHORITY
NEXUS TO STATE GOALS. In reviewing the content of the KIRIS exam questions in
the record, we do not see that the exam advances or inhibits religion, nor that it fosters
any government entanglement with religion. While some questions contain pop culture
references, humorous elements, or touch on current and/or controversial events or issues,
we fail to see how they could be interpreted as attempting to promote or influence
religious beliefs or send any message regarding religious belief. ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILS
In adjudging that the content of the KIRIS exam itself does not violate the [**17]
Establishment Clause, we must do so from our own concept of religion, and we do not
presume to question the genuineness of the Tripletts' claims that the KIRIS exam offends
their religious and moral sensibilities. Nevertheless not every state action implicating
religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find such an action offensive. Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577,112 S. Ct. 2649,120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). So long as the state action does
not, by any realistic measure, create any of the dangers which the First Amendment was
designed to protect and does not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious
exercises or in the favoring of a religion as to have a meaningful and practical impact,
there is no First Amendment violation. Lee v. Weisman, supra.
In Smith v. Board o f School Commissioners o f Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1987), plaintiffs objected to the school's use of certain home economics, history and
social studies textbooks on grounds that they advanced certain religious beliefs and, thus,
violated the Establishment Clause. The Court upheld the use of the books and held that
the government action must amount to an endorsement of religion [**18] in order for the
government's conduct to have the primary effect of advancing religion in violation o f the
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Establishment Clause. The Court further stated that it is not sufficient that the
government action merely accommodates religion or confers an indirect, remote, or
incidental benefit on a particular religion or happens to harmonize with the tenets o f a
religion. Similarly, in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board o f Education, 827 F.2d 1058
[*32] (6th Cir. 1987) cert, denied, Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 484 U.S.
1066, 108 S. Ct. 1029, 98 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1988), parents objected to a school's
requirement that children read from a particular textbook they found offensive to their
religious beliefs. The Court held that absent any proof that a student was ever called upon
to say or do anything that required the student to affirm or deny a religious belief or to
engage or refrain from engaging in any act required or forbidden by the student's religion,
there was no violation of their right to free exercise of religion. Even assuming that some
KIRIS exam questions do conflict with certain religious beliefs held by the Tripletts, the
exam clearly does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, nor do the questions
[**19] require the students to affirm or deny any religious belief.
In Rawlings v. Butler, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956), an action was brought against a
public school because nuns who were teaching at the school were allowed to dress in
religious habit and wear symbols of their religion. The Court held there was no First
Amendment violation because the nuns did not inject religion or the dogma of their
church into what they taught. Paraphrasing from a concurring opinion of Justice Jackson
of the United States Supreme Court in People o f State o f III. ex rel McCollum v. Board o f
Education o f School Dist. No. 71., 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948), the
Court stated:
He further states there are 256 separate and substantial religious bodies in
this country and if we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any
of these warring sects, or that which is inconsistent with their doctrines, "we
will leave public education in shreds." [McCollum, 333 U.S. at 203, 68 S. Ct.
at 477.]
Rawlings v. Butler, Ky., 290 S.W.2d at 805.
Even if the governmental action substantially burdens a religious practice, if it is justified
by a compelling state interest, it survives [**20] a free exercise of religion challenge.
Sherbert v. Vemer, 314 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). The First
Amendment does not prevent the government from regulating behavior associated with
religious beliefs. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,102 S. Ct. 1051, 71 L. Ed. 2d 127
(1982).
In Employment Division, Dept, o f Human Resources o f Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
879,110 S. Ct. 1595,1600, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990), the Court held the "right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." Quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. at 263. In Smith, supra, a showing of a compelling state interest was not required
because die law was valid and neutral and of general applicability. As to whether a strict

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

557

scrutiny analysis is required in the instant case, we turn to the case o f Vandiver v. Hardin
County Board o f Education, 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991) for guidance.
In Vandiver, supra, a student in Kentucky who had been in a home study program sought
[**21] to transfer to a public school, and the public school required the transferee to pass
an equivalency exam in order to gain credit for the school work performed in the home
study program, pursuant to 704 KAR 3:307 § 2. The student objected to the testing
requirement on rather tenuous religious grounds (studying for the test required more work
than God would want him to bear). Nevertheless, the Court considered his claim, as it did
not question the sincerity of his religious convictions. Relying heavily on Smith, supra,
the Court found that the regulation at issue was generally applicable and religion-neutral
such that a strict scrutiny analysis was unnecessary. However, in dicta, the Court went on
to further interpret Smith, supra, and stated that if the statute not only affects the free
exercise of religion, but also burdens other constitutionally protected rights such as that
of a parent to direct the education and upbringing o f his children, the claim remains
subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, although we deem the KIRIS testing requirement in the
instant case to be generally applicable and religion-neutral, we shall nevertheless proceed
with a strict scrutiny analysis [**22] since the Tripletts additionally [*33] claim that their
parental rights have been violated.
The basis of the Court's ruling in Rose v. Council For Better Education, Inc., Ky., 790
S.W.2d 186 (1989) is that education is a fundamental right in Kentucky and that the
government must provide an efficient system of common schools that would be
substantially uniform throughout the state and afford equal educational opportunities to
every child within the state. If a constitutionally efficient educational system is one that is
uniform and provides equal opportunities, there must be a way to measure whether all
students are receiving equal opportunities beyond simply the resources that are being
provided. The performance-based assessment process mandated by KERA is such a
measuring device. Our Supreme Court has recognized the importance of statewide
assessment of all schools in Board ofEduc. o f Boone County v. Bushee, Ky., 889 S.W.2d
809 (1994), wherein the Court attempted to clarify the responsibilities of the State Board,
the local school boards and school councils under KERA. The Court stated:
Other responsibilities of the State Board are directed in KRS 158.6453.
These directives [**23] primarily focus on the need for statewide assessment
of the achievements of each local institution in terms of the stated statewide
objectives. These reflect the need for statewide accountability for
achievement of outlined objectives.
These responsibilities clearly reflect that area of education that most
effectively rests at the statewide level. In order to assess the overall success
of the educational reforms, the legislature recognized that it is imperative
that a body representing statewide interests be held accountable for
establishing a system whereby these objectives can best be achieved. Further,
the statute recognizes that each individual school will be held accountable to
the State Board for its performance. Also reflective of this structural
approach are the mandates of KRS 158.6455 which require the State Board
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to "establish a system of determining successful schools and dispensing
appropriate rewards."
Id. at 813. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
It appears that there is no higher priority in Kentucky at the present time than education.
Therefore, the state's interest in the improvement o f our educational system through the
use of an assessment program such as the [**24] KIRIS exam is sufficiently compelling
to require all students to take the KIRIS exam. We do not see how an assessment process
can measure performance in terms of educational equality and progress unless all
students are required to take the exam. BOARD AUTHORITY NEXUS TO STATE
GOALS EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
We now move on to the Tripletts' claims regarding the KIRIS assessment process. They
maintain that the KIRIS exam is subjective and arbitrary and, therefore, lacks reliability
in that it does not measure either the child's or the school's performance accurately. One
complaint in particular is that the exam should be completely multiple choice. (The exam
contains multiple choice, open-response and essay questions.) Both sides have submitted
affidavits of experts stating their positions on the KIRIS exam. While the KIRIS
assessment exam may not be perfect (doubtless, no testing process is), we are not being
called upon, and indeed it is not our place, to pass on the relative merits and flaws of the
exam. Rather, it is our responsibility only to adjudge whether its requirement rises to the
level of a constitutional or statutory violation. We hold that it does not. VALIDIDTY
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
The final issue before us is the school's appeal of the court's rulings that [**25] the KIRIS
exam must be open for public inspection. The Tripletts contend that the public should be
allowed unfettered examination of such exams.
KRS 61.878(l)(g) provides the following exemption from the Kentucky Open Records
Act (KRS 61.870-61.884):
(1) The following public records are excluded from the application of KRS
61.870 to 61.884 and shall be subject to inspection only upon order of a court
of competent jurisdiction, except that no court shall authorize the inspection
by any party of any [*34] materials pertaining to civil litigation beyond that
which is provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure governing pretrial
discovery.
(g) Test questions, scoring keys, and other examination data used to
administer a licensing examination, examination for employment, or
academic examination before the exam is given or if it is to be given again.
Assuming the KIRIS exam about which the Tripletts complain will be administered again
in the future, the KIRIS exam clearly falls within the above-stated exemption even in
view of the strict construction requirement in KRS 61.871.1 However, the lower court
bypassed the statute and, instead, applied [**26] a balancing test, finding that "any
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prejudice the Defendants may incur because of this public disclosure is far outweighed by
the public's need to know."
1 Once the test is given and if it will not be administered again, KRS 61.878(1 )(a)
does not apply.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with the same issue in Gabrilson v.
Flynn, 554 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1996), when a local school board member sought to make
public a high school assessment test. The Court declined to apply a balancing test,
reasoning that there was no indication that the legislature intended such a balancing of
interests since they specifically excepted examinations from the open records law. Hence,
the Court ruled that the assessment exam was not covered by the open records law and
could not lawfully be disclosed.
The Tripletts argue that KRS 61.878(1) authorizes the court to order that the KIRIS exam
be made open for public inspection. The language o f the statute does allow a court of
competent jurisdiction the authority [**27] to order an exempted record to be open for
inspection. However, a court does not have unbridled discretion in exercising that
authority, and we believe the lower court abused its discretion in the present case when it
ordered the KIRIS exam open for public viewing. Given the importance of the KIRIS
exam as a tool for measuring the efficiency and improvement of our schools as we have
previously discussed in this opinion, and its potential for abuse, we believe the KIRIS
exam should not be open for general public viewing without a special showing of
necessity beyond simple curiosity as to its content. In our view, permitting the exam to be
indiscriminately viewed by the public would interfere with the accomplishment of the
objectives for which it was devised. It would certainly jeopardize the integrity and
reliability of the exam. However, where, as here, there are specific allegations about the
exam that are the subject of a lawsuit, the court could properly order the exam open for
limited viewing for purposes o f the litigation. Accordingly, the court's orders requiring
the KIRIS exam to be open for public inspection are reversed and the cause remanded for
an order sealing the portions [**28] of the record containing the KIRIS exam questions.
PUBLIC VIEWING OF TEST: EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
The Tripletts also argue that they, as parents, have a right to view the KIRIS exam under
the following provision of 20 USCA § 1232h(a) of the Hatch Amendment:
All instructional materials, including teacher's manuals, films, tapes, or other
supplementary material which will be used in connection with any survey,
analysis, or evaluation as part of any applicable program shall be available
for inspection by the parents or guardians of the children.
In reading the above provision, we do not believe that an assessment exam such as the
KIRIS exam falls within its purview. Although the KIRIS exam is a requirement for
promotion and graduation, it is not a part of the student's regular curriculum and has no
instructional purpose.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Livingston Circuit Court is affirmed in
part, and reversed and remanded in part for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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HUBBARD BY HUBBARD v. BUFFALO INDEP. SCH. DIST.
20 F.Supp.2d 1012 (1998)
Sarah HUBBARD, a Minor, by and through her Parents and Next Friends, John
and Linda HUBBARD, and John and Linda Hubbard in their Individual
Capacities, Plaintiffs,
v.
BUFFALO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
Civil No. W-98-CA-156.
United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Waco Division.
September 1,1998.
Gina G. Parker, Waco, David C. Gibbs, Barbara J. Weller, Gibbs & Craza, P.A.,
Seminole, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Joe B. Hairston, Mark C. Goulet, Walsh, Anderson, Brown, Schulze & Aldridge, Austin,
TX, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WALTER S. SMITH, Jr., District Judge.
Before the Court are the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. The
undisputed facts are these:
Sarah Hubbard, a sixteen year old, attended Buffalo Independent School District
("BISD") from Kindergarten through the seventh grade, and then transferred to the Upper
Room Christian Academy ("Upper Room"). Upper Room is a non-accredited private
religious institution. It differs from BISD in that 1) it is not accredited by the State of
Texas; 2) it does not require its teachers to be certified or have college degrees; 3) it uses
a system of student "self-directed" learning for granting both credit and grades in most
courses; and 4) it sometimes awards students credit for courses without requiring any
testing.
After completing one-half of the eleventh grade year at Upper Room, Sarah transferred to
BISD. The BISD policy applied to "Students Entering from Non-accredited Private or
Home Schools" was as follows:
Students who have taken courses through any source other than a public or private
school which is fully accredited by the State of Texas or the Department of
Education of the state in which the school is located, must be tested for
proficiency in the course before graduation credit will be awarded for the course.
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(This testing requirement applies to students who have been "home schooled" and
to students who have attended a private school that is not fiilly state accredited.)
An exam must be taken for each semester credit desired. Students must score a
minimum of 70 percent on the exam to receive credit toward high school
graduation. Exams will be obtained through Texas Tech University. The full fee
for each exam will be paid by the student and/or the student's parent/guardian.
Credits earned through testing for proficiency will not be included in calculations
for grade point average or class ranking.
Under this policy, Sarah was required, for each of the course-credits she wished to
transfer, to take and pay for a test that would demonstrate her proficiency in the subject
matter. Her other options were to take correspondence courses in the various courses or
spend an extra year in high school and graduate a year later. Sarah declined all of these
options and this litigation followed.
The issue is this: When a student transfers into a Texas public school from a nonaccredited private school, can the student be required to pass a test, thereby proving
proficiency as to each course for which the student desires credit?
Plaintiffs call the Court's attention to two state statutes adopted by the last session of the
Texas legislature, asserting that these statutes create a state "fundamental right and duty
of a parent to direct the upbringing of the parents' child." Plaintiffs' application of these
statutes to this case is misplaced.
Section 81.002(b) of the Labor Code of the State of Texas was amended to read:
Section 3 (a) This Act takes effect September 1,1997.
b) No state agency may adopt rules or policies or take any action which violates
the fund
amental right and duty of a parent to direct the upbringing of the parent's
child.
Subsection (b), Section 40.002, Human Resources Code was amended to read as follows:
(b) The department [Department of Protective and Regulatory Services] is the
state agency with primary responsibility for:
(j)* * *

(2) providing family support and family preservation services which respect the
fundamental right of parents to control the education and upbringing of their
children;...
Simply put, BISD is neither an agency of the State of Texas nor the Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services, and these statutes do not control and are not even
related to this litigation.
That parents have the primary right and obligation to control the education and
upbringing o f their children cannot be argued; but that right must have limits —
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otherwise a truant's parent could plausibly proclaim that he or she was exercising his or
her rights while "home-schooling" a child to be a safecracker or a prostitute. Actually the
example fails, because absent limits there could be no compulsory public education laws
at all.
Policy decisions made by local school boards must be examined by courts with great
deference and care. "We have previously cautioned that courts lack the 'specialized
knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy.'" Board of Education v. Rowley,458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034,3052,
73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). "Judicial interposition of the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint... By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of the state and local authorities."
JUDICIAL RELUCATANCEpperson v. Arkansas.393 U.S. 97. 89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21
L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).
The "Free Exercise o f Religion" Cause o f Action
Plaintiffs contend that BISD's refusal to transfer Sarah's credits without testing violated
her rights under the Free Exercise clause of the United States Constitution. The Court
finds that Plaintiffs' claim fails for several reasons. As a result, BISD is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' free exercise claim. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how BISD's policy has burdened their right to the
free exercise of religion. By Plaintiffs' own admission they have no religious objections
to the school district's testing policy. See Sarah Hubbard Dep. at pp. 31, 33, 36-37,53;
Linda Hubbard Dep. at pp. 32-33; John Hubbard Dep. at pp. 22,77. Defendants correctly
point out that Plaintiffs' objections to BISD's policy are based on purely non-religious
grounds. Defendant's Brief at 3. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that taking the tests
would necessitate some study and sacrifice on Sarah's part. However, making time to
study for the BISD's testing is not the same as a genuine free exercise claim.
Even if the Court could construe Plaintiffs' objections to the testing policy as religious
objections, the policy would still be a valid, religion-neutral policy of general
applicability. Laws that are religion-neutral and are of general applicability are valid even
when a compelling governmental interest cannot be found. City o f Boeme v. Flores. 521
U.S. 5 0 7 .117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) citing Employment Division,
Dep't o f Human Resources v. Smith.494 U.S. 872. 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876
(1990). It is not disputed that BISD's policy applies "across the board." That is, the policy
applies to all students without regard to the nature of their prior education. The Court
finds that a plain reading of the policy demonstrates that it is religion-neutral and applies
to all students who wish to transfer outside credits for the purpose of graduation from
BISD. FREE EXERCISE
Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to show that any other rights are implicated in this case. As
a matter of law and constitutional history, ",..[t]he only instances where a neutral,
generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted,
were cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake." City o f Boeme, 521
U.S. a t
, 117 S.Ct. at 2161. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder.406 U.S. 205. 92 S.Ct. 1526,
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32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The Court finds that no other constitutional protections are
implicated in this case. "No special constitutional protections have been recognized for
those who feel burdened by testing ... In the absence of a special constitutionally
recognized interest to abstain from test-taking, the court may not entertain a free exercise
challenge to the statute in question." Vandiver v. Hardin County Board o f Ed.. 925 F.2d
927 (6th Cir.1991). Plaintiffs' claim that Sarah must be exempted from BISD's policy as a
matter of right. After considering Plaintiffs' arguments carefully, the Court finds no such
right. FREE EXERCISE EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
In sum, Plaintiffs' free exercise claim fails because Plaintiffs' objections to the policy are
not religious in nature. Further, the policy is a valid, religion-neutral policy of general
applicability, and the policy implicates no other constitutional protections. Therefore, the
Court finds that BISD is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' free exercise claim.
Equal Protection Cause o f Action Under the U.S. and Texas Constitutions
Plaintiffs claim that BISD's testing policy violates their equal protection rights under both
the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution. The equal protection analysis
under the Texas Constitution is identical to that found in the United States Constitution.
Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamps.695 S.W.2d 556. 559 (Tex. 1985). In the
present case, the school district's policy "neither infringes upon fundamental rights nor
burdens an inherently suspect class; equal protection analysis requires that the
classification be rationally related to the legitimate state interest." Id. After reviewing
Plaintiffs' arguments, the Court finds that BISD's policy is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Therefore, BISD is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
equal protection claim.
BISD's policy concerning "Students Entering from Non-accredited Private or Home
Schools" does not treat one group of individuals differently from any other group. Any
student coming to BISD from a non-accredited school is subject to the testing policy.
Under no circumstances, apparent to the Court, is enforcement of the policy contingent
on the nature of the transferring student's previous education. Plaintiffs seek to convince
the Court that other BISD policies do treat other groups of students differently. Plaintiffs
direct the Court's attention to BISD's policies concerning "Foreign Exchange Students"
and "Correspondence Courses." These two policies are easily distinguished from the
testing policy.
First, BISD's treatment of foreign exchange students is consistent with its treatment of
transferring students. According to BISD's policy, foreign exchange students are not
seeking to transfer outside credits into BISD for the purpose of graduation. As a result,
they are not subject to the BISD testing policy. However, if a foreign exchange student
would seek transfer of outside credits into BISD, such a student would be subject to
BISD's testing policy. Jackson Dep. at pp. 115-118. This is the precise treatment that
students in Sarah's position receive.
Second, BISD's policy concerning "Correspondence Courses" provides that any such
courses be obtained through Texas Tech University, thus assuring the validity of the
course work. Likewise, students in Sarah's position must pass tests obtained through
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Texas Tech University when they seek to transfer credits from a non-accredited school.
Clearly, BISD requires both groups of students to obtain their tests and course work
through the same state university to assure the quality and consistency o f the materials
provided. Jackson Affidavit, Exhibit A; Jackson Dep. at pp. 118-22. Furthermore, a
correspondence course provided through a state university would result in credits
obtained through an accredited institution. This is not the case with credits obtained
through a non-accredited home school, for example. As a result, BISD is entitled to treat
these two kinds of credits differently.
Finally, Plaintiffs cannot show that BISD's policy infringes upon a fundamental right or
burdens a suspect class. A public education is not a fundamental right and every variation
in which education is provided need not be justified by a compelling necessity. San
Antonio ISD v. RodrieuezA U U.S. 1. 35, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1298, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
People who choose to educate their children outside the public school system are "not
members of a suspect class for equal protection purposes." Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 931.
After reviewing BISD's policy, the Court finds that it is rationally related to BISD's
legitimate interest in setting uniform public school advancement and graduation
requirements. EQUAL PROTECTION; EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
Due Process Claims
Plaintiffs, at least in oral argument, have abandoned their procedural due process claim.
They admit they had notice of the policy of testing to acquire credits and the opportunity
to appear before the BISD board. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all
of Plaintiffs' claims, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is in all things
DENIED, due process CLAIMS W ERE WITHDRAWN: EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED.
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CHAD TRIPLETT, ET AL. v. LIVINGSTON
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
98-760
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
525 U.S. 1104; 119 S. Ct. 870; 142 L. Ed. 2d 771; 1999 U.S.
LEXIS 599; 67 U.S.L.W. 3457
January 19,1999, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Reported below: 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 74.
JUDGES: Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer.
OPINION
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky denied.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

567

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
ALEXANDER NOON, a minor, by his guardian ad litem TRACY BARBEE, et aL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALASKA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT;
ROGER SAMPSON, Commissioner of Education & Early Development, sued in his
official capacity; ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT; RICHARD SMILEY,
Administrator, Standards and Assessment, Alaska Department of Education &
Early Development, sued in his official capacity, Defendants.
Case No. A04-0057 CV. (JKS)
CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Before The Hon. James K. Singleton
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RECITALS
1. Defendants are the Alaska State Board of Education and Early Development; Roger
Sampson, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of Education & Early
Development; Richard Smiley, in his official capacity, the Alaska Department of
Education & Early Development (collectively, “the Department”); and the Anchorage
School District.
2. On or about March 16,2004, Named Plaintiffs Alexander Noon, Kendall Leibach,
Douglas Mate, Tiana Lupie, Irene Takak, and Learning Disabilities Association of Alaska
commenced a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska,
Case No. A04-0057 CV. (JKS) (“Lawsuit”), against Defendants, alleging discrimination
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”),
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”), Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. (“Section 504”), AS
14.03.075 and AS 18.80.200 et seq. (“state statutes”), and the federal and Alaska
Constitutions regarding access to the Alaska High School Graduation Qualifying Exam
(“HSGQE”) for students with disabilities in Alaska public schools.
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3. On or about April 7, 2004, the Court in the Lawsuit entered an Order granting the
Parties’ stipulated limited interim relief, which (a) excused from the HSGQE graduation
requirement those students with disabilities in the Class o f 2004 who were otherwise
qualified to receive a diploma and (b) included a certification of a Plaintiff Class under
FRCP 23.
4. Defendants deny any and all liabilities to the Named Plaintiffs and to Class Members
and deny that they have violated any laws pertaining to access to the HSGQE for students
with disabilities or that they have discriminated against students with disabilities.
5. The Lawsuit has been vigorously prosecuted and defended.
6. The Parties now desire to resolve their differences and disputes by settling the suit in
such a manner as to:
a. Improve access to the HSGQE for students with disabilities;
b. Assure that neither the Named Plaintiffs nor the Class nor any Class Member will
attempt to enforce, and Defendants will not thereby be subject to, conflicting standards
regarding compliance with the ADA, IDEA, Section 504, state law, and state and federal
constitutional law concerning access to and implementation o f the HSGQE for students
with disabilities.
I. DEFINITIONS
As used in this Agreement, the following terms shall have the meaning ascribed to them
in this Section. All other terms shall be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary
meaning.
A. Accommodations
An “Accommodation” is a change made in the administration of the HSGQE to ensure
that the information obtained from a test is an accurate reflection of what the test is
intended to measure rather than a measure of the student’s disability. Accommodations
are permitted on the regular HSGQE.
B. Board
“Board” means the Alaska State Board o f Education.
C. Class or Class Members
“Class” or “Class Members” means and refers to all persons who meet the definition of
the Class as entered by the Court in its Order dated April 7,2004.
D. Class Counsel
“Class Counsel” means and refers to Disability Rights Advocates, the Disability Law
Center of Alaska, and Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, including the attorneys therein.
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E. Compliance Period
“Compliance Period” means the period from the date of Final Approval of this Settlement
Agreement until 30 months from Final Approval. The duration of the Compliance Period
can be modified by the Court upon on a showing of good cause.
F. Commissioner
“Commissioner” means the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Education and
Early Development.
G. Defendants
“Defendants” means each of the named Defendants.
H. Department
"Department” means the Alaska Department of Education and Early Development.
I. School District
“District” means an Alaska school district as defined in AS 14.17.990.
J. Fairness Hearing
“Fairness Hearing” means the hearing described in Section n.D and required pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(C).
K. Final Approval
“Final Approval” means the date when the Court issues an order granting final approval
of this Settlement Agreement in Case No. A04-0057 CV. (JKS).
L. Modification
A “Modification” is a change made in the administration of the HSGQE which distorts
the measurement of the skills targeted by a test or compromises the validity of the testing
results. Modifications are only allowed on the Modified HSGQE.
M. Named Plaintiffs
“Named Plaintiffs” means and refers to Plaintiffs Alexander Noon, by his guardian ad
litem Tracy Barbee; Kendall Leibach, by her guardian ad litem Jacqueline Leibach;
Douglas Mate; Tiana Lupie, by her guardian ad litem, Evelyn Lupie; Irene Takak; and
Learning Disabilities Association of Alaska.
N. Parties
“Parties” means the Defendants and Named Plaintiffs.
O. Preliminary Approval
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Preliminary Approval” means the preliminary approval by the Court in Case No. A040057 CV. (JKS) of the terms of this Settlement Agreement which shall occur prior to any
notice being provided in accordance with Section HE.
P. Released Claims
“Released Claims” means those claims described in Section IX.
Q. Released Parties
“Released Parties” means those parties described in Section IX.
R. Settlement Agreement
“Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement” means this document.
S. Subtest
“Subtest” or “Subtests” means any one or all of the three subtests which make up the
HSGQE: the Writing, Reading, and Mathematics subtests.
n. APPROVAL
A. Joint Approval Action
The parties shall jointly move the Court for an order granting Preliminary Approval of
this Settlement Agreement within 15 days of this settlement, directing notice to the
settlement class as described in Section HE, below, and setting a hearing for Final
Approval allowing for notice as directed by the Court.
B. Objections
Any Class Member may object to the proposed Settlement Agreement by filing with the
Clerk of the Court a written objection (“Objection”) filed or postmarked no later than a
date set by the Court after Preliminary Approval of the Settlement Agreement.
C. Equitable Provisions Binding
Upon Final Approval of this Settlement Agreement, all Class Members shall be bound by
all equitable provisions of this Settlement Agreement and orders issued pursuant thereto,
notwithstanding any objection filed by a class member under HB of this Agreement and
subject to Release provisions under IX. A of this Agreement. In the event that the Board
does not ultimately adopt the substantive terms of this Agreement in whole as
recommended by the Commissioner, this Agreement is null and void.
D. Fairness Hearing
The Court shall hold a hearing under FRCP 23(e)(1)(C) to establish the fairness of the
final settlement of the claims of the Class against Defendants and to decide whether there
will be Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement. This hearing shall take place at a
date allowing for a period of reasonable notice to the Class as the Court may direct. At
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this hearing, the Parties shall jointly move for Final Approval of this Settlement
Agreement and entry of the Stipulated Injunctive Order. The Parties specifically intend
that some sections of the Settlement Agreement shall be implemented prior to formal
Court approval of the Settlement in accordance with the timelines set forth herein.
E. Notice to the Class Regarding the Proposed Settlement
The Department will provide at its sole expense notice regarding the terms of the
proposed Settlement Agreement. The Parties will prepare a notice plan for submission to
the Court at the Fairness Hearing.
ffl. EQUITABLE PROVISIONS
The Parties agree that, conditioned upon entry of Final Approval, Defendants shall do the
following in order to ensure an appropriate opportunity to fulfill the HSGQE graduation
requirement for students with disabilities:
A. Accommodations
1. The Commissioner will recommend regulations to the Board that will clarify and
revise the information regarding the HSGQE in the “Participation Guidelines for Alaska
Students in State Assessments” (“Participation Guidelines”) with respect to options for
participation by students with disabilities. The information will include descriptions of
the options for participation in the HSGQE by students with disabilities, the implication
of each of the options, and the appeals process. The Department shall further clarify in
the Participation Guidelines (and in any other publications or websites designed to
provide information about accommodations on the HSGQE) that:
a. the guideline concerning the use o f a proposed HSGQE accommodation for
three months prior to test in the classroom is a recommendation only and is not a
requirement;
b. any list (regulatory or otherwise) of approved accommodations published by
the Department as a guide for school Districts shall not be deemed exclusive by
the Department. With respect to any potential accommodation that is not on the
“approved” list, the Department will provide IEP and 504 Plan teams with a
checklist and/or guidelines with criteria to be used in determining if an
accommodation is appropriate.
2. The Department shall work with Districts to ensure test security while allowing
students with disabilities the opportunity to:
a. take the HSGQE over the course of more than one day if necessary to
accurately demonstrate proficiency on the HSGQE; and
b. take the HSGQE at home, provided that, due to a disability, the student’s
primary instruction location is the student’s own home.
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3. IEP and 504 Plan teams shall meet in accordance with the timeline set forth herein.
Plans for all students with disabilities shall be reviewed in their next annual IEP or 504
Plan review (and then at least annually thereafter) for the presence and appropriateness of
accommodations to be used in the HSGQE.
4. In addition to other trainings described below in Section V.3, the Commissioner will
recommend regulations to the Board that will require Districts to plan and make available
training for parents of special education students in the ninth grade (freshman) regarding
the HSGQE and the range of participation options for students with disabilities. The
trainings shall occur in preparation for the student’s first HSGQE experience the spring
of the student’s sophomore year.
5. The Department will broaden the current list of appropriate accommodations for
students with disabilities and shall at least annually consider the appropriateness of other
proposed accommodations that may arise. Districts retain the right to deny a requested
accommodation on a case-by-case basis and provide the reasons or basis for the denial.
6. A student’s IEP or 504 Plan Team will initially determine whether a particular
proposed modification for use on the Modified HSGQE will be helpful to a student on the
Subtest(s) of the HSGQE which the student has not passed. The IEP or 504 Plan team
will then apply to the Department for approval of the proposed modification. The
Department will determine whether the benefit of the modification outweighs its
potentially adverse effect on the validity of the test. In balancing the benefits against the
potential drawbacks, the Department shall consider the effect of the proposed
modification on an entire Subtest, not just on a single construct of that Subtest.
B. Sequence of Testing
1. The Commissioner shall promptly recommend to the Board appropriate regulations
concerning the alternative assessment program under the provisions of Alaska Statutes §
14.03.075(c) to implement the following procedure for accessing the HSGQE:
a. If an eligible student fails to pass any subtests of the HSGQE, the student’s IEP
or 504 Plan team shall determine whether the student should:
i. retake those subtests of the HSGQE with other accommodations; or
ii. take the Modified HSGQE for those subtests with appropriate
accommodations and any of the modifications approved by the
Department, including, but not limited to:
1. asking a test proctor for clarification of a test question,
2. sign language interpretation of test questions for a deaf student,
3. spell-checker on a word processor,
4. grammar checker on a word processor,
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5. oral presentation (read-aloud) o f test question (including recorded
oral presentation),
6. graphing calculator,
7. dictionary or thesaurus,
8. math or writing resource guides,
9. voice recognition software and word processor,
10. asking test proctor for synonym of unknown word; or
iii. take a non-standardized assessment instrument designed to measure
competency in skills tested by HSGQE for whichever subtest(s) the student
failed if the DEP or 504 Plan team certifies that the student meets the
applicable qualifications (see Section m .C .l below).
C. Non-standardized Assessment Format that Leads to a Standard Diploma
1. The non-standardized assessment is reserved only for those diploma-track students
who:
a. are working at or near grade level;
b. have a documented history o f being unable to demonstrate proficiency on a
standardized assessment because of one or more of the following conditions:
(i) the student has a severe emotional or behavioral impairment or a
pervasive developmental or other disability that causes the student to be
unable to maintain sufficient concentration to participate in standard
testing, even with accommodations or appropriate modifications;
(ii) the student cannot cope with the demands of a prolonged test
administration because of multiple physical disabilities, severe healthrelated disabilities, or a neurological disorder;
(iii) the student has a significant motor, learning, or communication
disability that causes the student to need more time than is reasonable or
available for testing, even with the allowance of extended time.
2. The Department shall make available an appropriate non-standardized assessment
using formats or a format that fairly assesses a disabled student’s mastery of state content
standards and eligibility for a standard high school diploma. This non-standardized
format:
a. May be, but is not required to be, a student work portfolio that incorporates a
review of a student’s work and/or classroom performance and/or grades over a
period of time which demonstrates mastery o f state content standards.
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b. May be, but is not required to be, a system of individualized assessment
whereby a student’s IEP or 504 Plan team develops (with the oversight and
approval of the Board or Department of Education) a system of assessment for
that particular student that measures the student’s qualifications to obtain a high
school diploma without directly assessing the student’s disability.
3.The Department will provide appropriate and thorough guidance and information to
Districts, which will provide training to IEP teams, 504 teams, other instructional
planning teams, parents, and students concerning this non-standardized assessment option
leading to a standard high school diploma for students who qualify under this provision.
D. Appeals of Accommodation and Modification Decisions
1. Parents of students with IEPs and 504 Plans may request that a District consult with
the Department before a District rejects an accommodation or modification on the
grounds that the accommodation or modification would make a test invalid. In response
to such a request, the Department will provide to the District and parents a non-binding
written statement regarding the accommodation or modification. The parent of a student
with an IEP or 504 Plan may request mediation, a due process hearing, or a state
complaint, consistent with state and federal law and regulations. In this type of an
appeal, the procedure will be consistent with 4 AAC 52.550(g) and applicable federal
law. The Parties also agree that the Department will issue a directive to all hearing
officers that in these appeals, the hearing officers will make every reasonable effort to
issue a decision as soon as possible but not later than 25 days. The Parties do not intend
that the state shall have to adopt new regulations to implement this provision.
IV. PHASE-IN PROVISIONS FOR CLASS OF 2005
1. For school year 2004-05 only, a District shall grant a waiver to a student with a
disability who has an IEP or 504 Plan, is a senior, and has met all other requirements of
graduation, and the student’s IEP or 504 Plan team does not meet on or before September
24, 2004, and because of the failure to meet,
a. the student does not have two opportunities during the 2004-2005 school year
to use an allowable modification that an IEP or 504 Plan team determines the
student needs to demonstrate proficiency on the state assessment; or
V. IMPLEMENTATION & REPORTING
1. Defendants shall take all necessary steps to implement the terms of this Agreement.
The parties understand that implementation of this Agreement will require adoption of
regulations by the Board, and that the Board will exercise its independent judgment in the
best interests of the State when adopting regulations. The parties further understand that
this Agreement does not purport to bind the Alaska State Legislature, and that a change in
state or federal law may moot or otherwise obviate this Agreement.
2. The Department shall designate a State employee or official as the Facilitator
responsible for collecting information concerning compliance with this Agreement, and
producing the semi-annual reports referenced in Paragraph V.7 below. In addition to
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other duties, this or another qualified employee shall be assigned the duty to use
independent judgment to monitor the defendants’ compliance with this Agreement.
3. The Department will provide notice and statewide trainings regarding the revisions to
the HSGQE system under this Agreement for Districts. Specific notice of the terms o f
this Agreement will be sent to all Districts, with direction that the Districts provide notice
to special education teachers, IEP and 504 Plan team members, special education
directors, and parents of class members within 30 days of Final Approval that a copy o f
the Agreement is available for review or may be obtained upon request.
4. The Department shall develop appropriate forms for implementation of the terms of
this Agreement.
5. The implementation of the terms of this Agreement shall proceed according to the
following timeline:
Issue
Implementation Complete
Accommodations
Clarification/new edition of Participation Guidelines
September 30,2004
IEP/504 Plan team meetings to review accommodations/modifications for classes of
2005-06 for October 2004 administration.
September 24, 2004, annually thereafter for subsequent classes
IEP/504 Plan team meetings to review accommodations/modifications for class of 2007,
and for class of 2006 if they have not already met in the current school year, for April
2005 administration
January 1,2005, annually thereafter for subsequent classes
First wave of trainings for parents of students in ninth grade (Class of 2008)
June 1,2005
Review of accommodation validity research
Ongoing
Regulatory changes necessary to implement new accommodations procedure for October
2004 administration
September 30, 2004
Non-Standardized Assessment Program
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Deadline for IEP/504 Plan teams to identify and certify students for non-standardized
assessment program for March 2005 administration
September 24, 2004, annually thereafter
Development and availability of application and scoring guidelines for Non-standardized
assessment program for assessing proficiency in HSGQE skills
September 1,2004
Appeals Process
Appeals process established
September 15, 2004
Other Implementation
Designation of state implementation Facilitator
Within 30 days of Final Approval
Notice regarding terms of Settlement Agreement to all Districts.
Within 30 days of Final Approval
6. This timeline assumes that Defendants are able to develop and implement the equitable
provisions of this Agreement in a timely fashion. If any deadline involving
implementation of the equitable provisions for the April 2005 testing date is not met
before February 15,2005, the Parties agree to meet and confer to determine (1) whether
students will still have a fair opportunity to access the HSGQE in April 2005 and (2)
whether this Agreement should be amended.
7. For a period of 30 months after Final Approval of this Agreement, the Department
shall provide written reports on a semi-annual basis to Class Counsel regarding work
performed to implement this Agreement. The reports shall detail (a) what steps the State
has taken to comply with the Agreement since the last report, (b) whether the State has
met the deadlines for implementation set forth in this Agreement, and if not, the extent to
which such work has been completed and an explanation for any gaps, (c) what problems
if any the State has encountered in complying with the Agreement, (d) what if anything
the State plans to do to remedy these problems, and (e) any complaints and any responses
to such complaints the State has received regarding the HSGQE with respect to students
with disabilities. The first such report shall be due 180 days after the Final Approval of
this Agreement.
8. Class Counsel shall receive the semi-annual reports required by this Agreement for
purposes of monitoring the State’s compliance. Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek
monitoring fees under any legal basis available under applicable law, and Defendants
reserve the right to oppose Plaintiffs’ request for monitoring fees. To the extent that
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Defendants are liable for fees under this paragraph, those fees shall not exceed $ 10,000
per year.
9. In the event that Class Counsel concludes that there has been a significant pattern of
violation of the terms of this Agreement, Class Counsel is not precluded from seeking
fees and costs for increased monitoring by motion to the Court.
10. Monitoring of the implementation of this Agreement by Class Counsel shall continue
for 30 months following the Final Approval. This Compliance Period may be extended
by the Court only upon a showing of good cause. The Compliance Period may be either
shortened or lengthened by agreement of the Parties or by order of the Court.
VI. MEDIA
The Parties agree to hold a joint press conference.
VII. TERM OF THE AGREEMENT
The term of this Agreement shall consist of the Compliance Period, as set forth in
Paragraph I.E above. In addition, Defendants shall be required to submit a Final Report
to Class Counsel within 60 days of completion of the 30 month Compliance Period. The
complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice when all efforts referenced in Sections HI,
IV, and V. are complete and the Final Report has been submitted.
Vm. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1. The Parties will attempt to resolve any claim of material violation of this Agreement
through negotiation. An attempt at informal resolution, as described below, will be a
prerequisite to any Party’s request for relief from the Court for an alleged violation o f this
Agreement.
2. The Court will retain jurisdiction solely for the purposes of enforcing compliance with
this Agreement and adjudicating fees and costs if the Parties are unable to reach
agreement.
3. Before relief is sought from the Court, the following process will be used by the
Parties: Any Party claiming that a violation has occurred under this Agreement will give
notice of the claim in writing to the other Parties and will propose a resolution of the
issue to the other Parties.
4. The responding Parties will have twenty (20) days following receipt of the written
claim to respond in writing, unless the period is enlarged by agreement of the Parties.
5. If the Party asserting the claim is dissatisfied with another Party’s response, or if no
response is received, the Party asserting the violation may, after providing ten days
written notice to the other Parties, submit the matter to mediation for a non-binding
determination. If any Party is dissatisfied with the mediator’s determination, that Party
may request relief from this Court. The mediator’s determination will be considered a
recommendation to the Court.
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6. In any dispute resolution procedure, attorneys’ fees and costs may be claimed under
any legal basis available under applicable law.
IX. RELEASES
A. Releases By The Class
In return for the consideration provided for in this Settlement Agreement, on the date of
Final Approval, all Class Members, both individually and as a Class, shall release
Defendants and their officers, directors, employees, attorneys, agents, and insurers
(“Released Parties”) from any and all claims, liabilities, obligations, demands, and
actions under the ADA, Section 504, IDEA, AS 14.03.075, AS 18.80.200 et seq., 4 AAC
06.775, or any other state or federal statutes or regulations, or the federal and Alaska
constitutions, that were brought or could have been brought against the Released Parties
for injunctive or declaratory relief relating to access to the HSGQE and implementation
of AS 14.03.075 for students with disabilities. Notwithstanding any other term of this
Agreement, this Release does not apply to (1) the validity of the HSGQE as a high stakes
high school exit exam or (2) any and all issues of instructional validity, curricular
validity, and opportunity to leam material tested by the HSGQE. Notwithstanding any
other term of this Agreement, Plaintiffs do not release any claims related to the
requirement, found in AS 14.03.075(c)(1), of failing the HSGQE once before accessing
the Modified HSGQE and/or the non-standardized assessment. Plaintiffs reserve the
right to challenge this requirement in judicial forums or though special education due
process procedures available under federal law.
B. Releases By Named Plaintiffs
Named Plaintiffs Alexander Noon, Kendall Leibach, Douglas Mate, Tiana Lupie, Irene
Takak, and Learning Disabilities Association of Alaska, in return for the consideration set
forth in this Agreement, and except for the terms of this Agreement and subject to the
exceptions in die foregoing paragraph, hereby release Released Parties from any and all
claims, liabilities, obligations, demands, actions, and claims that were brought or could
have been brought under the ADA, Section 504, IDEA, AS 14.03.075, AS 18.80.200,4
AAC 06.775 or any other state or federal statutes or regulations, or the federal and Alaska
constitutions against the Released Parties relating to access to the HSGQE and
implementation of AS 14.03.075 for students with disabilities.
X. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
The Parties have not reached an agreement regarding attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs
expressly retain the right to seek reasonable attorneys’ fees under any legal basis
available under applicable law and will make an appropriate application to the Court
within 45 days of Final Approval. Defendants reserve the right to object to all or any part
of Plaintiffs’ request to recover attorneys’ fees and costs on any other basis, including,
but not limited to, the reasonableness of rates and time spent. Failure of the Parties to
resolve this issue does not invalidate any of the other provisions of the Settlement
Agreement.
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XI. ORDERS AND DISMISSAL
A. Continuing Jurisdiction
The Court shall maintain jurisdiction over this lawsuit, including jurisdiction to enforce
the terms of this Agreement for the duration of the Compliance Period and to resolve
disputes over attorneys’ fees and costs. The Parties agree that the Court may delegate the
determination o f attorney’s fees and costs to a Magistrate Judge.
B. Dismissal
Within thirty business days after the submission of Defendants’ Final Report pursuant to
Paragraph VII, Class Counsel shall provide to counsel for Defendants a signed form of
Request for Dismissal with Prejudice.
Xn. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Entire Agreement
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Parties. No modifications or
limits will be binding on the Parties unless expressly provided for in this Agreement or
made by writing signed by all Parties. This Agreement expresses the complete and final
understanding with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement. The Parties hereto
understand and agree that the terms of this Agreement supersede any prior discussions,
understandings, or agreements between them related to the subject matter hereof.
B. Counterparts
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be considered an
original, but all of which, when taken together, will constitute one and the same
instrument.
C. Interpretation
The language of this Agreement shall be construed as a whole according to its fair
meaning, and not strictly for or against any of the Parties. The headings in this
Agreement are solely for convenience and will not be considered in its interpretation.
Where required by context, the plural includes the singular and the singular includes the
plural. This Agreement is the product of negotiation and joint drafting so that any
ambiguity shall not be construed against any Party.
D. Additional Documents
To the extent any documents are required to be executed by any of the Parties to
effectuate this Agreement, each party hereto agrees to execute and deliver such and
further documents as may be required to carry out the terms of this Agreement.
E. Authority to Bind

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

581

Roger Sampson, Commissioner of Education and Early Development, represents and
warrants that he is authorized to sign on behalf of, and to bind, the State Defendants to
this Settlement Agreement, which include himself, the Alaska State Board of Education
and Early Development, and Richard Smiley, in his official capacity as an employee o f
the Alaska Department of Education & Early Development. Carol Comeau, the
Superintendent of the Anchorage School District, represents and warrants that she is
authorized to sign on behalf of, and to bind, the Anchorage School District to this
Settlement Agreement.
FOR PLAINTIFFS:
Approved as to Form:DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
By:______________________________________
Sid Wolinsky Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
By: Joan Wilson Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DISABILITY LAW CENTER OF ALASKA
By: David Fleurant
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
FOR DEFENDANTS:
Approved as to Form By:Roger Sampson
Commissioner of Education and Early
Development
By:
Carol Comeau
Superintendent of the Anchorage School District
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA
B y:_______________________________
Gregg Renkes
Attorneys for Defendants
Noon v. Alaska State Bd. of Educ. & Early Dev., Case No. A04-0057 CV. (JKS)
Settlement Agreement
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GI FORUM, IMAGE DE TEJAS, RHONDA BOOZER, MELISSA MARIE CRUZ,
MICHELLE MARIE CRUZ, LETICIA ANN FAZ, ELIZABETH GARZA, MARK
GARZA, ALFRED LEE HICKS, BRAND YE R. JOHNSON, JOCQULYN RUS
SELL, Plaintiffs, VS. TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, DR. MIKE MOSES,
MEMBERS, AND THE TEXAS STATE BOARD O F EDUCATION, in their
official capacities, Defendants.
Civil Action No. SA-97-CA-1278-EP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE W ESTERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS,
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
87 F. Supp. 2d 667; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153
January 7,2000, Decided
January 7,2000, Filed
DISPOSITION: [**1] Judgment GRANTED in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiffs. Pending motions be STRICKEN from docket as moot, and this case
DISMISSED.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs challenged use of Texas Assessment of
Academic Skills (TAAS) examination because it unfairly discriminated against minority
students or violated their right to due process and asked for an injunction preventing
Texas Education Agency from using failure of the exit-level TAAS test as a basis for
denying high school diplomas.
OVERVIEW: The articulated goals of the implementation o f Texas Assessment of
Academic Skills (TAAS) requirement were to hold schools, students, and teachers
accountable for education and to ensure that all Texas students receive the same,
adequate learning opportunities. The goals were within the legitimate exercise of state's
power over public education. While the TAAS test did adversely affect minority students,
Texas Education Agency (TEA) demonstrated an educational necessity for the test, and
plaintiffs failed to identify equally effective alternatives. TAAS test violated neither the
procedural nor the substantive due process rights of plaintiffs. TEA provided adequate
notice of the consequences of the exam and ensured that the exam was strongly correlated
to material actually taught in the classroom. The test was valid and in keeping with
current educational norms. The test did not perpetuate prior educational discrimination or
unfairly hold minority students accountable for the failures o f the state's educational
system.
COUNSEL: For GI FORUM, Image De Tejas, RHONDA BOOZER, MELISSA
MARIE CRUZ, MICHELLE MARIE CRUZ, LETICIA ANN FAZ, ELIZABETH
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GARZA, MARK GARZA, ALFRED LEE HICKS, BRAND YE R. JOHNSON,
JOCQULYN RUSSELL, plaintiffs: Albert H. Kauffinan, MALDEF, San Antonio, TX.
For PLAINTIFFS: Albert H. Kauffinan, MALDEF, San Antonio, TX. Nina Perales,
Mexican American Legal Defense, et al, San Antonio, TX.
For TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, MIKE MOSES, DR., THE TEXAS STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, defendants: Geoffrey Amsel, Office of the Attorney
General, Austin, TX.
JUDGES: EDWARD C. PRADO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: EDWARD C. PRADO
OPINION
[*668] ORDER
The issue before the Court is whether the use of the Texas Assessment of Academic
Skills (TAAS) examination as a requirement for high school graduation unfairly
discriminates against Texas minority students or violates their right to due process. The
Plaintiffs challenge the use of the TAAS test under the due process clause of the United
States Constitution and 34 C.F.R. § 100.3, an implementing regulation to Title VI o f the
[**2] Civil Rights Act of 1964, asking this Court to issue an injunction preventing the
Texas Education Agency (TEA) from using failure of the exit-level TAAS test as a basis
for denying high school diplomas. 1 The Court has considered the testimony and
evidence presented during five weeks of trial before the bench, as well as the relevant
case law. After such consideration, and much reflection, the Court has determined that
the use of the TAAS examination does not have an impermissible adverse impact on
Texas's minority students equal protection EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
and does not violate their right to the due process of law. due process EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED.
The bases for the Courts determination are outlined more fully in its findings of facts and
conclusions of law, below. The Court writes separately only to make a few general
observations about the legal issues underpinning this case.
1 This suit is also brought individually by nine Texas students who did not pass
the TAAS exit-level examination prior to their scheduled graduation dates. Those
students who actually testified request that their respective school districts issue their
diplomas. Consistent with this Order, that request is denied. Those students who did not
appear to testify; Melissa Marie Cruz, Michelle Marie Cruz, and Jocqulyn Russell are
dismissed from the case for failure to prosecute.
[**3] In deciding the issues presented, both at the summary judgment stage and at trial,
the Court has been required to apply a body of law that has not always provided clear
guidance. [*669] This case requires the application of law from a number of diverse
areas—employment law, desegregation law, and testing law in areas such as bar
examinations or teacher certification examinations. Only one case cited by any party or
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this [**4] Court is both controlling and directly on point—Debra P. v. Turlington, 644
F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). In Debra P., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found that a state could overstep its bounds in implementing standardized tests as
graduation requirements. Specifically, the court found that a test that did not measure
what students were actually learning could be fundamentally unfair. The court also found
that a test that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination was unconstitutional. This
Court finds these ideas to be in step with the United States Supreme Court's suggestion in
Regents o f University o f Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 88 L. Ed. 2d 523, 106 S.
Ct. 507 (1985), that a state could violate the constitution if it implemented policies that
violated accepted educational norms
In addition, this Court has allowed the Plaintiffs to bring a claim pursuant to a
regulation adopted in conjunction with Title VI. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3. While [**5] the
Court acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has limited Title VI itself to
constitutional parameters (i.e., has required a showing of an intent to discriminate in
order to prove a violation), see United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 722 n.7, 120 L.
Ed. 2d 575,112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992), the Court does not find that this limitation has been
clearly and unambiguously extended to its implementing regulations. The Court is not
alone in reaching this conclusion. See Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 198
F.3d 107, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33441,1999 WL 1241077, at *5 (3d Cir. 1999); Elston
v. Talladega Co. Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993); Harper v. Board o f
Regents o f III. State Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (C.D. 111. 1999); Valeria G. v.
Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Graham v. Tennessee Secondary
Athletic Ass'n, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3211, No. 1:05- CV-044,1995 WL 115890, at *12
(E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20,1995). Nor is the Court alone in concluding that a private right of
action exists under this regulation. See, e.g., Harper, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; [**6]
Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023; Graham, No. 1:05- CV-044,1995 WL 115890, at
*12. The Court believes that it has followed the law as it presently exists in allowing
these claims to go forward.
In reviewing the diverse cases that underpin this decision, the Court has had to
acknowledge what the Defendants have argued throughout trial this case is, in some
important ways, different from those cases relied upon by the Plaintiffs. In the first place,
this case asks the Court to consider a standardized test that measures knowledge rather
than one that predicts performance. The Court has had to consider whether guidelines
established in the employment context are adequate for determining whether an adverse
impact exits in this context. In addition, the Court has been required to determine the
deference to be given to a State in deciding how much a student should be required to
learn—the cut-score issue STATE AUTHORITY. Finally, the Court has had to weigh
what appears to be a significant discrepancy in pass scores on the TAAS test with the
overwhelming evidence that the discrepancy is rapidly improving and that the lot of
Texas minority students, at least as demonstrated [**7] by academic achievement, while
far from perfect, is better than that o f minority students in other parts of the country and
appears to be getting better EQUAL PROTECTION.
2 The Court read and heard with interest the conclusions of Plaintiff s expert Amilcar
Shabazz on this subject. See Report o f Dr. Amilcar Shabazz, Plaintiffs expert, at 11-12.
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Shabazz rejects the argument that offering focused remedial efforts to students who do
not pass the TAAS helps eradicate the effects of past discrimination. A student who fails
the test does not graduate. A student who has been remediated and finally passes the test
has only passed a test, not necessarily received an adequate education. The Court notes in
response that its authority to determine what constitutes an "adequate" education is
extremely limited.
[*670] This case is also remarkable for what it does not present for the Court's
consideration. In spite of the diverse and contentious opinions surrounding the use of the
TAAS test, this Court has not been asked to and indeed [** 8 ] could not role on the
wisdom of standardized examinations. This Court has no authority to tell the State of
Texas what a well-educated high school graduate should demonstrably know at the end
of twelve years of education. Nor may this Court determine the relative merits of teacher
evaluation and "objective" testing. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE
This case is also not directly about the history of minority education in the State. While
that history has had some bearing on some of the due process concerns raised by the
Plaintiffs, what is really at issue here is whether the TAAS ex-it-level test is fair. As the
Court notes below, the test cannot be fair if it is used to punish minorities who have been
victimized by state-funded unequal educations. Thus, the Court has carefully considered
the claims that Texas schools still offer widely diverse educational opportunities and that,
too often, those opportunities depend on the color of a student's skin or the financial
resources of the student's school district. 3 To some degree, as discussed below, the Court
must accept these claims. But that finding, alone, is an insufficient basis for invalidating
this examination. There must be some link between the TAAS test [**9] and these
disparities. In other words, the Plaintiffs were required to prove, by a pre-ponderance of
the evidence, that the TAAS test was implemented in spite of the disparities or that the
TAAS test has perpetuated the disparities, and that requiring passage of the test for
graduation is therefore fundamentally unfair. The Court believes that this has not been
proven. Instead, the evidence suggests that the State of Texas was aware of probable
disparities and that it designed the TAAS accountability system to reflect an insistence on
standards and educational policies that are uniform from school to school. It is true that
these standards reflect no more than what the State of Texas has determined are essential
skills and knowledge. It is undeniable that there is more to be learned. However, the
Court cannot pass on the States determination of what, or how much, knowledge must be
acquired prior to high school graduation.
3 Of course, these are generalizations. The Court recognizes that students in districts with
relatively greater resources have failed the TAAS examination.
[**10] This case presented widely differing views of how an educational system should
work. One set of witnesses believed that the integrity of objective measurement was
paramount; the other believed that this consideration should be tempered with more
flexible notions of fairness and justice. Thus, the relative quality of experts in this case is
not so simple a matter as either party would make it. On the issue of internal test fairness
and soundness, clearly the TEA pre-sented better experts—their experts wrote the test and
have written other tests. Their experts are invested in the profession and practice o f test-
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writing and tire committed to standardized tests as useful exercises for various kinds of
educational measurement. However, TEA's experts were not so qualified, the Court finds,
to speak on the wisdom of the use of standardized tests as they apply to ethnic minorities
in a state educational system that has had its difficulties providing an equal education to
those minorities. In that regard, the expert testimony failed to match up. TEA's experts,
for example, are not especially qualified to speak on the psychological, social, or
economic effects of failing to pass a test used [**11] as a requirement for graduation. At
least one of those experts testified [*671] that whether a given test item disadvantages
minority students is a factor that an item reviewer may ultimately reject in determining
whether an otherwise valid item should be placed on the test. This is so because, as
TEA's experts overwhelmingly testified, what is fundamentally important to these
psychometricians is that the test objectively measure the material that it purports to
measure and that it measure content that students have been exposed to. 4 See Report o f
Dr. Susan Phillips, Defendants' expert, at 16 (a plausible explanation for differential
performance is difference in achievement level). On the question, then, of whether it is
wise to use standardized tests in making high stakes decisions, taking into account all the
contextual factors, the Court finds the expert testimony was not fairly joined. Plaintiffs
experts had clearly considered this question more fully and given it more weight. The
question is-how relevant to this Court's decision is the wisdom of the TAAS test and, to
the extent that Plaintiffs experts were able to prove that the test is not wise, have they
been [**12] able to show that it actually crosses the line and is impermissible by some
legal standard?
4 The Court does not suggest that the psychometricians who testified on behalf of the
TEA reject the notion that a test's effects should be fair. Rather, they view the system in
place, which provides wholly objective assessment, as the best way to ensure fairness. In
addition, De-fendants' expert Dr. Susan Phillips noted that careful scrutiny is given to test
items that arc identified as having large differences between the performances of minority
and majority students. See Report o f Dr. Susan Phillips, Defendants' expert, at 3.
Ultimately, resolution of this ease turns not on the relative validity of the parties' views
on education but on the State's right to pursue educational policies that it legitimately
believes are in the best interests of Texas students. The Plaintiffs were able to show that
the policies are debated and debatable among learned people. The Plaintiffs demonstrated
that the policies have had [**13] an initial and substantial adverse impact on minority
students. The Plaintiffs demonstrated that the policies are not perfect. However, the
Plaintiffs failed to prove that the policies are unconstitutional, that the adverse impact is
avoidable or more significant than the concomitant positive impact, or that other
approaches would meet the State's articulated legitimate goals. In the absence of such
proof, the State must be allowed to design an educational system that it believes best
meets the need of its citizens.
FINDINGS OF PACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINDINGS OF FACT
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5 Any finding of fact more appropriately characterized as a conclusion of law may be
considered as such.
THE TEST
Test Construction
In 1984, the Texas legislature passed the Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA),
designed to impose an "accountability" system on Texas public school administrators,
teachers, and students. The following year, in response to that legislation, the Texas State
Board of Education [**14] adopted a curriculum of Essential Elements. 6 In addition, the
Board moved forward with its plans to implement an objective standardized test that
would measure mastery of the state-mandated curriculum. In 1987, Texas instituted the
TEAMS high school graduation exit test, given to eleventh-graders.
6 In 1998-1999, the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS) replaced the Essential
Elements.
In 1990, Texas replaced the TEAMS test with the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
(TAAS) test, the subject of this lawsuit. Like the TEAMS test, the TAAS test is designed
to measure mastery of the state-mandated curriculum. How-ever, the TAAS test seeks to
assess higher-order thinking and higher problem-solving skills than did the TEAMS test.
The TAAS test is developed and constructed by [*672] National Computer Systems
(NCS), a private corporation. NCS, in turn, subcontracts development of TAAS items to
Harcourt Brace Educational Measurement (HBEM) and Measurement Incorporated.
HBEM contracts with individuals to write items [**15] for the TAAS test. In addition to
the extensive input from these professional test-designers, many of whom are not in the
State of Texas, there is a great deal of input from state educators in the design of the
TAAS test. Decisions as to which portions o f the state-mandated curriculum should be
measured by the TAAS test are made by Texas teachers and educational professionals.
The Texas Education Agency has ensured that the educators comprise an ethnically
diverse group of individuals from across the state. In addition, proposed TAAS questions
are reviewed by subject-matter content experts, review committees of teachers and
educators, test-construction experts, and measurement experts.
In reviewing test items, educators are instructed to consider the following issues;
relevancy of the item, difficulty range, clarity of the item, correctness of the keyed
answer choice, and the plausibility of distractors. Reviewers are also asked to consider
the more global issues of passage appropriateness, passage difficulty, and interactions
between items within and between passages as well as work, graphs, or figures.
Reviewers are asked to assess whether or not each item on the TAAS exam covers [**16]
information that was sufficiently taught in the classroom by the time of the test
administration.
After this initial review, a second review is conducted by staff members of the Student
Assessment and Curriculum divisions of the TEA and by developmental and scoring
contractors.
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Selected questions are then field tested. The results of those field tests are reviewed by a
Data Review Committee. Committee members are permitted to remove items they
consider to be questionable, including questions that a dispro-portionate number of
minority students fail to answer correctly. Reviewing members are given "great
deference" in this process and are not required to eliminate a question that reflects that
any ethnic group bad particular difficulty with the question. See Report o f Dr. Susan
Phillips, Defendants' expert, at 17. If the reviewer finds that an item with a predicted
adverse effect on minorities is a "fair measure of its corresponding state objectives fo r all
students, and is free of offensive language or concepts that may differentially
disadvantage minority students," the item may be retained, even if a significantly larger
number of minority students do not answer it correctly. [**17] Id. (emphasis in original).
Test Validity
Several concepts are key to understanding the arguments raised by the parties regarding
the validity of the TAAS examination. The "validity" of a given standardized test refers
to the "weight of the accumulated evidence supporting the particular use of the test
scores." Report o f Dr. Susan Phillips, Defendants' expert, at 3. "Content validity"
measures the degree to which the test measures the knowledge and skills sought to be
measured, in this case the legislatively man-dated minimum essentials. Id. "Curricular
validity" refers to the issue of whether students have an adequate opportunity to leam the
material covered on a given standardized test. Id. at 10. "Test reliability" is "an indicator
of the consistency of measurement" Id. at 4. Reliability may be tested by repeat testing or
by various measures based on a single-test measurement. Id.
Each form of a standardized test must be valid and reliable. Validity and reliability across
different forms of the test are ensured by "equating" test forms, or adjusting for any
minor variations in difficulty between the forms. Id. at 7. The TAAS test is "equated"
[**18] under what is called the Rasch Model. Id. This model focuses narrowly on itemdifficulty parameters and does not provide for "item weighing," as do more complex
equating models. Id. In other words, part of equating test forms involves using a fairly
simple formula, the [*673] Rasch Model, to determine how well a student's response on a
given question predicts that student's success on the exam as a whole. "Point biserials"
measure the degree to which persons who answer an item correctly tend to also have high
total test scores and vice ver-sa. Id. at 21.
Test Administration
Texas public school students begin taking the TAAS test in the third grade. In the tenth
grade, Texas public school students are given what is called the "exit-level" TAAS exam,
or the examination they must pass in order to graduate. Students must pass each of three
portions of the TAAS test—a reading, mathematics, and writing portion—in order to
graduate. Texas public school students who do not pass the test on their first attempt are
then given at least seven additional opportunities to take and pass the TAAS exam before
their scheduled graduation date.
THE PASSING STANDARD
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The initial passing [**19] standard, or cut score, on the TAAS test was set at 60 percent,
and a 70-percent passing standard was phased in after the first year. In setting the passing
standard, the State Board of Education looked at the passing standard for the TEAMS
test, which was also 70 percent, and also considered input from educator committees. In
addition, the selection of the score reflected a general sense that 70 percent of the
required essential elements was sufficient "mastery" for the purposes of graduation. See
TEA Board o f Education Minutes, June 1990.
The TEA understood the consequences of setting the cut score at 70 percent. When it
implemented the TAAS test, the TEA projected that, with a 70-percent cut score, at least
73 percent of African Americans and 67 percent of Hispanics would fail the math portion
of the test; at least 55 percent of African Americans and 54 percent of Hispanics would
fail the reading section; and at least 62 percent of African Americans and 45 percent o f
Hispanics would fail the writing section. The predictions for white students were 50
percent, 29 percent, and 36 percent, respectively. However, TEA representatives had
reason to believe that those projections [**20] were inflated, Experts informed TEA
representatives that there is a measurable difference in the motivation between students
taking a field examination and students taking a test with actual consequences. While the
passing numbers were somewhat better than projected, they were non-etheless alarming.
On the October 1991 administration of the exam to tenth graders, 67 percent of African
Americans and 59 percent of Hispanics failed to meet the passing cut score. For whites,
the number was 31 percent.
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OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENT
In spite of projected disparities in passing rates, the TEA determined that objective
measures of mastery should be imposed in order to eliminate what it perceived to be
inconsistent and possibly subjective teacher evaluations of students. The TEA offered
evidence at trial that such inconsistency exists. The TEA also presented testimony that
subjectivity can work to disadvantage minority students by allowing inflated grades to
mask gaps in learning.
REMEDIATION
Failure to master any portion of the exam results in state-mandated remediation in the
specific subject area where the student encountered difficulty. There is no state-mandated
approach to remediation, [**21] however. Consequently, remedial efforts vary from
district to district. The evidence at trial reflected varying degrees of success resulting
from remedial efforts. The Court finds that, on balance, remedial efforts are largely
successful. TEA's expert Dr. Susan Phillips estimates that 44,515 minority students in
1997 were successfully remediated after having failed their first attempt at the TAAS test
in 1995. Report o f Dr. Susan Phillips, Defendants' expert, at 14. The Court finds this
evidence credible.
[*674] ACCOUNTABILITY
Administrators, schools, and teachers are held accountable, in varying degrees, for TAAS
performance. The accountability system does not ignore the presence of ethnic minorities
in the system or the difficulties minorities may have in passing the examination. Passing
and failing scores are dis-aggregated, or broken down into subgroups, so that schools and
districts are aware of the degree of success or failure of African American, Hispanic, and
white students. If one subgroup fails to meet minimum performance standards, a school
or district will receive a low accountability rating.
HISTORY OF TESTING/DISCRIMINATION IN TEXAS
It is beyond dispute [**22] that standardized tests have been used in educational contexts
to disadvantage minorities. See Report o f Dr. Uri Treisman. Defendants' expert, at 3.
However, the Plaintiffs have presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
TAAS test, as developed, implemented, and used in Texas, is designed to or does
impermissibly disadvantage minorities. While it is true that a number of minority
students fail to pass the TAAS test and earn a diploma, there is no evidence that this was
the design of the State in initiating the test. On the contrary, there is evidence that one of
the goals of the test is to help identify and eradicate educational disparities. The receipt of
an education that does not meet some minimal standards is an adverse impact just as
surely as failure to receive a diploma.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that sufficient evidence, including evidence cited in
other state and federal case law, exists to support the Plaintiffs' claim that Texas minority
students have been, and to some extent continue to be, the victims of educational
inequality, See Report o f Dr. Uri Triesman. Defendants' Expert, at 7; see also, e.g.,
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United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972), [**23] and its
progeny; United States v. Texas, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1971). Witnesses in this
case were questioned by counsel and by the Court about the reasons for this inequa-lity.
The evidence was disturbing, but inconclusive. Socio-economics, family support, unequal
finding, quality of teaching and educational materials, individual effort, and the residual
effects of prior discriminatory practices were all implicated. The Court finds that each of
these factors, to some degree, is to be blamed.
However, the Plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that minority
students do not have a reasonable opportunity to learn the material covered on the TAAS
examination, whether because of unequal education in the past or the current residual
effects of an unequal system. The Plaintiffs presented evidence to show that, in a more
general sense, minorities are not provided equal educational opportunities. In particular,
Plaintiffs demonstrated that minorities are underrepresented in advanced placement
courses and in gifted-and-talented programs. Minority students are also
disproportionately taught by non-certified teachers. However, because of the rigid, [**24]
state-mandated correlation between the Texas Essentials o f Knowledge and Skills and the
TAAS test, the Court finds that all Texas students have an equal opportunity to leam the
items presented on the TAAS test, which is the issue before the court. In fact, the
evidence showed that die immediate effect of poor performance on the TAAS
examination is more concentrated, targeted educational opportunities, in the form of
remediation. Moreover, the TEA's evidence that the implementation of the TAAS test,
together with school accountability and mandated remedial follow-up, helps address the
effects of any prior discrimination and remaining inequities in the system is both credible
and persuasive. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS **
Current prevailing standards for the proper use of educational testing recommend that
highstakes decisions, such as whether or not to promote or graduate a student, should not
be made on the basis [*675] of a single test score. See Supplemental Report o f Dr. Walter
Haney, Plaintiffs expert, at 42 (citing Standards fo r Educational and Psychological
Testing (1985)). There was little dispute at trial over whether this standard exists and
applies to the TAAS exit-level [**25] examination. What was disputed was whether the
TAAS test is actually the sole criterion for graduation. As the TEA points out, [HN6] in
addition to passing the TAAS test, Texas students must also pass each required course by
70 percent. See TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 74.26(c). Graduation in Texas, in fact, hinges
on three separate and independent criteria: the two objective criteria of attendance and
success on the TAAS examination, and the arguably objec-tive/subjective criterion of
course success. However, as the Plaintiffs note, these factors are not weighed with and
against each other; rather, failure to meet any single criterion results in failure to
graduate. Thus, the failure to pass the exit-level exam does serve as a bar to graduation,
and the exam is properly called a "high stakes" test. SOLE CRITERION
On the other hand, students are given at least eight opportunities to pass the examination
prior to their scheduled graduation date. In this regard, a single TAAS score does not
serve as the sole criterion for graduation. The TEA presented persuasive evidence that the
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number of testing opportunities severely limits the possibility of "false negative" results
and actually increases the possibility [**26] of "false positives," a fact that arguably
advantages all students whose scores hover near the borderline between passing and
failing. OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN
DISPARATE IMPACT
The Court finds as an inescapable conclusion that in every administration of the TAAS
test since October 1990, His-panic and African American students have performed
significantly worse on all three sections of the exit exam than majority students.
However, the Court also finds that it is highly significant that minority students have
continued to narrow the passing rate gap at a rapid rate. In addition, minority students
have made gains on other measures of academic progress, such as the National
Assessment of Educational Progress test. The number of minority students taking college
entrance examinations has also increased.
In determining whether a legally significant statistical disparity exists, the Court has had
to consider two difficult issues. The first is whether to apply the EEOC's Four-Fifths Rule
or some other recognized test for identifying statistical disparity, as the Plaintiffs have
argued the Court must do. The second is whether to consider cumulative pass rates or
pass rates on a single administration of the [**27] examination at the tenth-grade level.
The Court's resolution of these is-sues is discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law,
below.
Plaintiffs statistical expert, Mark Fassold, presented evidence that TAAS exit-level exam
failure rates have a racially discriminatory effect under the Four-Fifths Rule 7 and the
Shoben formula. 8 The TEA contends that Fassold's study is flawed in significant ways
and must be rejected. The Court acknowledges that Fassold's data include students who
did not sit for the exam in the category of students who "passed" the exam. However, the
Court has considered this flaw in its proper context. As the Plaintiffs point out, Fassold's
methodology almost certainly artificially inflates the minority pass rate by coding those
who fail to take the examination as passing. Report o f Mark Fassold, Plaintiffs expert, at
13 n. 10. Because minorities fail to take the test at a higher rate than majority students,
the minority pass rate is inflated at a higher rate than that of the majority pass rate. [*676]
Id. Thus, the Court is inclined to agree with Plaintiffs that they have likely over-estimated
the minority pass rate. In this context, then, the Court [**28] finds there is sufficient
evidence that, on first-time administration of the exit-level teat, a legally significant
adverse impact exists. While an examination of cumulative pass scores in more recent
years does not evince adverse impact under the Four-Fifths Rule, the disparity there, too,
is sufficient to give rise to legitimate concern. See Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic
As-soc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("no rigid mathematical threshold of
disproportionality...must be met to demonstrate a sufficiently adverse impact"), rev'don
other grounds, 198 F.3d 107, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33441, 1999 WL 1241077 (3d Cir.
1999). Moreover, as discussed below, there are significant statistical disparities in
cumulative pass rates.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

594

7 [HN7] The Four-Fifths Rule finds an adverse impact where the passing rate for the
minority group is less than 80 percent of the passing rate for the majority group. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.
8 [HN8] The Shoben formula seeks to assess the statistical significance of observed
numerical disparities by determining differences be-tween independent proportions. See
Frazier v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 271 U.S. App. D.C. 220, 851 F.2d 1447, 1450 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
[**29] In addition to evaluating the statistical impact of the examination, the Court has, at
the behest of both parties, considered the "practical consequences" or "practical impact"
of the high failure rates of minorities. That consideration involves careful examination of
the immediate and long-term effects of the statistically disparate failure rates. The TEA
argues that, because of the presence of largeLy successful remediation, the practical
significance benefits minorities. The Plaintiffs note that failure to graduate has serious
economic, social, and emotional effects on students. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Court finds that failure of the exit-level TAAS examination during the first seven
administrations results in immediate remedial efforts. At the last administration, of
course, failure of the exit-level TAAS examination results in a failure to receive a
diploma. However, the Court finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the
effect of remediation, which is usually eventual success in passing the examination and
thus receipt of a high school diploma, is more profound than the steadily decreasing
minority failure rate. MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES/REMEDIATION
DROP-OUT/RETENTION RATES
Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence [**30] to support a finding that Texas students,
particularly minority students, dropout of school in significant numbers and are retained
at their current grade level in numbers that give cause for concern. Moreover, the
Plaintiffs presented evidence supporting their contention that drop-out and retention rates
for minorities are peculiarly high at the ninth grade, just before the first administration of
the exit-level TAAS. See Supple-mental Report o f Dr. Walter Haney, Plaintiffs expert, at
21-29- The evidence presented by Plaintiffs also shows that in the year 1991, as the
present TAAS test was being phased in, there was a drop in the ratio of high school
graduates to grade nine students three years before, and that this drop was most notable
for minority students. See Id. at 25-26 How-ever, Plaintiffs have failed to make a causal
connection between the implementation of the TAAS test and these phenomena, beyond
mere conjecture. In other words, Plaintiffs were only able to point to the problem and ask
the Court to draw an inference that the problem exists because of the implementation of
the TAAS test. That inference is not, in light of the evidence, inevitable. The Defendants
hypothesize, [**31] just as plausibly, for example, that the ninth grade increase in drop
outs is due to the cessation of automatic grade promotion at the beginning of high school
in Texas. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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9 Any conclusion of law more appropriately characterized as a finding of fact may be
considered as such.
This lawsuit is properly brought under two causes o f action: the implementing regulations
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
TITLE VI REGULATIONS
[HN9] Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a statute enacted "with the [*677]
'intent' to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional enforcement power." Lesage
v. State o f Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 1998), cert, filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3469 (Jan.
11, 1999). [HN10] The TEA, as a state agency that administers and monitors compliance
with educational programs required by state and federal laws and as the recipient of
federal funds, is governed [**32] by Title VI and its regulations. 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.;
Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). The Plaintiffs have
brought this suit, in pall, pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 100.3, a regulation promulgated by the
Department of Education to implement Title VI. [HN11] That regulation prohibits
activity in federally funded programs that has the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3; Powell
v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 396 (3d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 8029, 120 S.
Ct. 579,1999 WL 783927 (1999); Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406. [HN12] The language of the
regulation clearly suggests that a disparate impact analysis is appropriate under this
regulation, and courts have applied it in that manner. 10 See Quarles v. Oxford Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989); City o f Chicago v. Lindley, 66
F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (gathering cases).
Similarly, courts have held that plaintiffs bringing lawsuits pursuant to 34 [**33] C.F.R.
§ 100.3 have a private right of action. Powell, 189 F.3d at 398; Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at
689. This Court concurs in that conclusion.
10 As noted elsewhere, the TEA has suggested that this regulation has been limited to its
constitutional dimensions (i.e., to a requirement that a plaintiff show discriminatory
intent) by the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,
120 L. Ed. 2d 575, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). The Court acknowledges the dicta to which
the TEA refers. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 732. However, the Court notes that other courts
have not held that the disparate impact analysis under 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 has been
abrogated. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (collecting cases); Graham v. Tennessee
Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3211, No. l:95-cv-044, 1995 WL
115890, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1995) (joining other courts in maintaining disparate
impact claim after Fordice). It is this Court's duty to apply the law, as near as it is able,
and only to predict what the law will be when absolutely necessary. See Charles J.
Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent & Principal in Constitutional Adjudication, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 401 at n.6 (1988).
[**34] A disparate impact theory of racial discrimination permits a court to overturn
facially neutral acts and policies that have "significant adverse effects on protected
groups ... without proof that the [actor] adopted those practices with a discriminatory
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intent." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827,
108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). To delineate a standard for evaluating this disparate impact
claim, the Court has looked to employment law un-der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which allows a disparate impact cause of action. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 104 L. Ed. 2d 733, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Watson, 487
U.S. 977, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827, 108 S. Ct. 2777; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
28 L. Ed. 2d 158, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
Thus, in determining whether a prima facie case of disparate impact has been established,
this Court will apply the burden-shifting analysis established in Title VII cases. Under
that analysis, the plaintiff must initially demonstrate that the application of a facially
neutral practice has caused a disproportionate [**35] adverse effect. Wards Cove, 490
U.S. at 656-57. If a plaintiff makes such a showing, a burden of production shifts to the
defendant. Under that burden, the defendant must produce evidence that the practice is
justified by an educational necessity. Id. The plaintiff may then ultimately prevail by
demonstrating that an equally effective alternative practice could result in less racial
disproportionality while still serving the articulated need. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
I. Disparate Impact
In determining whether an adverse impact exists in this case, the Court has [*678]
considered and applied the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Four-Fifths
Rule. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d). The Court disagrees with the TEA's argument that this
test is not suited for identifying the presence of adverse impact in this context. See
Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (applying Four-Fifths Rule). In addition, the Court notes
that the TEA did not offer in its briefing or at trial a satisfactory substitute for
determining a statistical disparity, choosing instead to rely on its arguments that a
disparate impact theory should not be applied [**36] in a Title VI case or, alternatively,
that the Court should consider only the practical effect of remediation.
In addition to the Four-Fifths Rule, the Court has considered the statistical significance of
the observed differences in pass rates. The methodology for such consideration, referred
to by these parties as the Shoben formula, is to find a "z-score," or a number representing
the differences between independent proportions—here the pass rates of minority students
and the pass rates of majority students. See Report o f Mark Fassold, Plaintiffs expert, at
4-6; Preliminary Re-port o f Dr. Walter Haney, Plaintiffs expert, at 13.
The evidence regarding whether Plaintiffs have established the existence of a significant
adverse impact on minority students is mixed. Plaintiffs' statistical analysis, while
somewhat flawed, demonstrates a significant impact on first-time administration of the
exam. This impact, which clearly satisfies the Four-Fifths Rule, is conceded by at least
one TEA expert. See Report o f Dr. Susan Phillips, Defendants' expert, at 13. However,
cumulative pass rates do not demonstrate so severe an impact and, at least for the classes
of 1996, 1997, [**37] and 1998, are not statistically significant under the EEOC's FourFifths Rule. See id. at 14.
In considering how to handle the dilemma of choosing between cumulative and singletest administration, the Court has taken into account the immediate impact of initial and
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subsequent in-school failure of the exam—largely successful educational remediation. In
addition, the Court has considered the evidence that minority scores have shown dramatic
improvement. These facts would seem to support the TEA's position that cumulative pass
rates are the relevant consid-eration here.
The Plaintiffs argue that successful remediation and pass-rate improvement should not be
considered in determining whether an adverse impact exists. To support their argument,
the Plaintiffs point to case law holding that a "bottom line" defense is insufficient to
combat a showing of adverse impact. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455, 73 L.
Ed. 2d 130, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982). The Court is not convinced that this argument is
applicable to the case before it.
In Connecticut v. Teal, the United States Supreme Court held that an employer charged
with a Title VII violation could [**38] not justify discrimination against one individual
by pointing to its favorable treatment of other members of the same racial group. Id. at
454. According to the Court, Title VII requires an employer to provide "an equal
opportunity for each applicant regardless of race." Id. In that case, however, the employer
was trying to compensate for a discriminatory selection test by arguing that subsequent
affirmative action practices allowed the employer to reach a non-discriminatory "bottomline." Id. at 452-53. As another court has stated, Teal stands for the proposition that "the
disparate exclusion of minority candidates at the first stage o f the selection process was
not ameliorated by the favorable end result because excluded candidates were deprived
individually of the opportunity for promotion." Lindley, 66 F.3d at 829.
The Court will assume that Teal’s analysis applies in Title VI cases. Id. However, the
Court is not sure that Teal is relevant here. Failure to pass the first administration of the
TAAS test does not deny an individual a competitive opportunity. It is only after at least
eight tries that there [**39] is a real negative impact. This is not a case [*679] where
there are several distinct steps through a selection system. See Newark Branch, NAACP v.
Town o f Harrison, N.J., 940 F.2d 792, 801 (3d Cir. 1991). Nor is it the TEA's argument
that the test is legal because, while some individuals fail and do not receive diplomas,
others do and so the disparate effect is ameliorated. Rather, the TEA is arguing that each
individual student is given at least eight tries to pass the exam and that many students
who fail on the first attempt eventually succeed. The Court believes that these facts
distinguish this case from Teal, and the Court will reject the Teal analysis. Thus, the
Court has considered, and found relevant, the distinction between pass rates after a single
administration and pass rates after eight attempts.
Having said all that, however, the Court finds that, whether one looks at cumulative or
single-administration results, the disparity between minority and majority pass rates on
the TAAS test must give pause to anyone looking at the numbers. The variances are not
only large and disconcerting, they also apparently cut across such factors as
socioeconomics. [**40] Further, the data presented by the Plaintiffs regarding the
statistical significance of the disparities buttress the view that legally meaningful
differences do exist between the pass rates of minority and majority students. Disparate
impact is suspected if the statistical significance test yields a result, or z-score, of more
than two or three standard deviations. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17, 97
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S. Ct. 1272, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). In all cases here, on single and cumulative
administrations, there are significant statistical differences under this standard. Given the
sober-ing differences in pass rates and their demonstrated statistical significance, the
Court finds that the Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of significant adverse
impact. See Supplemental Report o f Dr. Walter Haney, Plaintiffs Expert, at 4-5
(discussing practical adverse impact); Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 697 ("no [HN15] rigid
mathematical threshold of disproportionality ... must be met to demonstrate a sufficiently
adverse impact").
II. Educational Necessity
Having found that the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie showing of significant
adverse impact, the Court must consider [**41] whether the TEA has met its burden of
production on the question of whether the TAAS test is an educational "necessity." The
word "necessity," as an initial matter, is somewhat misleading; the law does not place so
stringent a burden on the defendant as that word's common usage might suggest. Instead,
an educational ne-cessity exists where the challenged practice serves the legitimate
educational goals of the institution. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. In other words, the
TEA must merely produce evidence that there is a manifest relationship between the
TAAS test and a legitimate educational goal. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446. The Court finds that
the TEA has met its burden.
The articulated goals of the implementation of the TAAS requirement are to hold schools,
students, and teachers ac-countable for education and to ensure that all Texas students
receive the same, adequate learning opportunities. These goals are certainly within the
legitimate exercise of the State's power over public education. To determine whether the
TAAS test hears a manifest relationship to these legitimate goals, the Court has
considered carefully each of the test's alleged deficiencies-the [**42] overall
effectiveness of the test, the cut score of the test, the use of the test as a requirement for
graduation, the Plaintiffs' allegation that the test has resulted in inferior educational
opportunities for minorities, and the alleged relationship between the test and student
drop out scores. NEXUS TO STATE GOALS
A. Effectiveness
The Court finds that the TAAS test effectively measures students' mastery of the skills
and knowledge the State of Tex-as [*680] has deemed graduating high school seniors
must possess. The Plaintiffs provided evidence that, in many cases, success or failure in
relevant subject-matter classes does not predict success or failure in that same area on the
TAAS test. See Supplemental Report o f Dr. Walter Haney, Plaintiffs expert, at 29-32. In
other words, a student may Page 14 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, *; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153,
** perform reasonably well in a ninth-grade English class, for example, and still fail the
English portion of the exit-level TAAS exam.VALIDITY The evidence suggests that the
disparities are sharper for ethnic minorities. Id. at 33. However, the TEA has argued that
a student's classroom grade cannot be equated to TAAS performance, as grades can
measure a variety of factors, ranging from effort and improvement to [**43] objective
mastery. The TAAS test is a solely objective mea-surement of mastery. The Court finds
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that, based on the evidence presented at trial, the test accomplishes what it sets out to
accomplish, which is to provide an objective assessment of whether students have
mastered a discrete set of skills and knowledge.
B. Cut Score
The Court has paid close attention to testimony in this ease regarding the setting of the
70-percent passing standard for the TAAS test. In addition, the Court has carefully
considered the scope of its own authority to address that issue. Ultimately, the Court
concludes that the passing standard does bear a manifest relation to a legitimate goal.
NEXUS TO STATE GOAL
Whether the use of a given cut score, or any cut score, is proper depends on whether the
use of the score is justified. In Cureton, a case relied upon heavily by the Plaintiffs in this
case, the court found that the use of an SAT cut score as a selection practice fo r the
NCAA must be justified by some independent basis for choosing the cut score. Cu-reton,
37 F. Supp. 2d at 708. In addition, the court noted that the NCAA had not validated the
use of the SAT as a predictor for graduation [**44] rates. Id.
Here, the test use being challenged is the assessment o f legislatively established
minimum skills as a requisite for graduation. This is a conceptually different exercise
from that of predicting graduation rates or success in employment or college. In addition,
the Court finds that it is an exercise well within the State's power and authority. The State
of Texas has determined that, to graduate, a senior must have mastered 70 percent of the
tested minimal essentials.
In Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit noted two criteria for determining whether a standardized test is
rationally supportable. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1101. The relevant criterion here is whether the
cut score is related to the quality the test purports to measure. Id. The court noted that a
70-percent cut score for bar passage "has no significance standing alone" but that it
"represents the examiners' considered judgments as to minimal competence required to
practice law." Id. The Court finds that the 70-percent cut score for the TAAS test reflects
similar judgments. See Report o f the State Board [**45] o f Education Committee o f Edu
cation Committee o f the Whole, Work Session Minutes, July 12,1990. The Court does not
mean to suggest that a state could arrive at any cut score without running afoul of the law.
However, Texas relied on field test data and input from educators to determine where to
set its cut score. It set initial cut scores 10 percentage points lower, and phased in the 70percent score. See State Board o f Education Minutes, July 14, 1990. While field test
results suggested that a large number of students would not pass at the 70-percent cut
score, officials had reason to believe that those numbers were inflated. See Work Session
Minutes, July 12,1990. Officials contemplated the possible consequences and determined
that the risk should be taken. The Court cannot say, based on the record, that die States
chosen cut score was arbitrary or unjustified. Moreover, the Court finds [*681] that the
score bears a manifest relationship to the State's legitimate goals.
C. Use as a Graduation Requirement
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The Court finds that the TEA has shown that the high stakes use of the TAAS test as a
graduation requirement guarantees that students will be motivated to learn [**46] the
curriculum tested. While there was testimony that the test would be useful even if it were
not offered as a requisite to graduation, the Court finds that there was no, or insufficient,
evidence to refute the TEA's assertion that the use as a graduation requirement boosted
student motivation and encour-aged learning. In addition, the evidence was unrefuted that
the State had an interest in setting standards as a basis for the awarding of diplomas. The
use of a standardized test to determine whether those standards are met and as a basis for
the awarding of a diploma has a manifest relationship to that goal. NEXUS TO STATE
GOALS
D. Inferior Educational Opportunities
The Plaintiffs introduced evidence that, in attempting to ensure that minority students
passed the TAAS test, the TEA was limiting their education to the barest elements. The
Court finds that the question of whether the education of minority students is being
limited by TAAS-directed instruction is not a proper subject for its review. 11 The State
of Texas has determined that a set of knowledge and skills must be taught end learned in
State schools. The State mandates no more than these "essential" items. Test-driven
instruction [**47] undeniably helps to accomplish this goal. It is not within the Court's
power to alter or broaden the curricular decisions made by the State.
11 Of course, upon a showing of intentional discrimination, such a claim would implicate
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court has
already held that Plaintiffs have offered no proof of intent in this case. EQUAL
PROTECTION
E. Drop-Out and Retention Rates
As discussed above, the Plaintiffs have presented credible evidence that the drop-out and
retention rates among minority students in Texas give cause for concern. However, there
is no credible evidence linking State drop-out and retention rates to the administration of
the exit-level TAAS test. Expert Walter Haney's hypothesis that schools are retaining stu
dents in the ninth grade in order to inflate tenth-grade TAAS results was not supported
with legally sufficient evidence demonstrating the link between retention and TAAS.
III. Equally Effective Alternatives
In considering [**48] whether the Plaintiffs have shown that there are equally effective
alternatives to the current use of the TAAS test, the Court must begin with the State's
articulated, legitimate goals in instituting the examination, Those goals are to hold
students, teachers, and schools accountable for learning and for teaching, to ensure that
all students have the opportunity to leam minimal skills and knowledge, and to make the
Texas high school diploma uniformly meaningful. Further, as discussed more fully
above, the State has set a standard for mastery of 70 percent o f the items tested, and the
Court has held that this standard is legitimate.
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Plaintiffs did offer evidence that different approaches would aid the State in measuring
the acquisition of essential skills. Among these approaches was a sliding-scale system
that would allow educators to compensate a student's low test performance with high
academic grades or to compensate lower grades with outstanding test scores. However,
Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that this, or other, alternatives could sufficiently
motivate students to perform to their highest ability. In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, the present use of the TAAS [**49] test motivates schools and teachers to
provide an adequate and fair education, at least of the minimum skills required by the
State, to all students. See Debra P. II, 730 F.2d 1405 at 1416. [*682] The Plaintiffs
produced no alternative that adequately addressed the goal o f systemic accountability.
ALTERNATIVE TO TEST
DUE PROCESS
In order for a court to find a due process violation, it must first find that a plaintiff has a
protected interest—either property or liberty—in what the State seeks to limit or deny. See
MichaelH. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110, 121,105 L. Ed. 2d 91, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)
(substantive due process, liberty interest); Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222 (substantive due
process, property interest); Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229 (procedural due process, property
interest). The Court has previously found, and reiterates here, that [HN19] the State of
Texas has created a protected interest in the receipt of a high school diploma. See TEX.
EDUC. CODE § 25.085(b); Id. at § 4.002; id. at § 28.025(a)(1); Debra P., 644 F.2d at
403-404.
The due process clause has two aspects—procedural and substantive. Ewing, 474 U.S. at
229. [**50] [HN20] On the procedural side, the law demands that a state provide, at a
minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard before it deprives citizens of certain
state-created protected interests. Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1529 (5th Cir.
1993). [HN21] On the substantive side, the law holds that some rights are so profoundly
inherent in the American sys-tem of justice that they cannot be limited or deprived
arbitrarily, even if the procedures afforded an individual are fair. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229;
Robertson v. Plano City, 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1995). [HN22] The use of a
standardized test as a graduation requirement can implicate both procedural due process
concerns and substantive due process concerns. Debra P., 644 F.2d at 404.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that [HN23] a state
cannot impose a standardized test as a graduation requirement without giving its students
the procedural protection of adequate notice that such will be the use of the test. (PAN) Id.
at 404. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has suggested [HN24] a substantive component to a
student's rights where a state attempts [**51] to condition a diploma on standardized test
scores: a state may not im-pose an examination where such imposition is arbitrary and
capricious(S) or frustrates a legitimate state interest (SG) or is fundamentally unfair, in
that it encroaches upon concepts of justice lying at the basis o f our civil and political
institutions. (FF)./<7. [HN25] The United States Supreme Court has suggested that a
state's educational determinations may be invalid under a substantive due process
analysis where they reflect a "substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
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professional judgment." Ew-ing, 474 U.S. at 225. The Court has evaluated the use of the
TAAS examination under each of these formulations and finds that it does not violate the
due process rights of Texas students, minority or majority.
A test that covers matters not taught in the schools is fundamentally unfair. Debra P., 644
F.2d at 404. The Court finds, however, that the TAAS exit-level test meets currently
accepted standards for curricular validity. In other words, the test measures what it
purports to measure, and it does so with [**52] a sufficient degree of reliability. In
addition, all students in Texas have had a reasonable opportunity to learn the subject
matters covered by the exam. The State's efforts at remediation and the fact that students
are given eight opportunities to pass the examination before leaving school support this
conclusion, Debra P. II, 730 F.2d at 1411.
The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the TAAS test is a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms or is based on a failure to exercise
professional judgment. Certainly, there was conflicting evidence at trial regarding
whether the test, as used, is appropriate. However, there was no testimony demonstrating
that Texas has rejected current academic standards [*683] in designing its educational
system. Educators and test-designers testified that the design and the use of the test was
within accepted norms.
The Court, in reaching this conclusion, has considered carefully the testimony of
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Martin Shapiro, demonstrating that the item-selection system
chosen by TEA often results in the favoring of items on which minorities will perform
poorly, while disfavoring items where [**53] discrepancies are less wide. The Court
cannot quarrel with this evidence. However, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not
been able to demonstrate that the test, as validated and equated, does not best serve the
State's goals of identifying and remediating educational problems. Because one of the
goals of the TAAS test is to identify and remedy problems in the State's educational
system, no matter their source, then it would be reasonable for the State to validate and
equate test items on some basis other than their disparate impact on certain groups. In
addition, the State need not equate its test on the basis of standards it rejects, such as
subjective teacher evaluations.
In short, the Court finds, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, that the disparities
in test scores do not result from flaws in the test or in the way it is administered. Instead,
as the Plaintiffs themselves have argued, some minority students have, for a myriad of
reasons, failed to keep up (or catch up) with their majority counterparts. It may be, as the
TEA argues, that the TAAS test is one weapon in the fight to remedy this problem. At any
rate, the State is within its power to choose [**54] this remedy.
As the Court has stated in prior orders, it would be fundamentally unfair to punish
minority students for receiving an unequal, state-funded education. 12 In other words, it
would violate due process if the TAAS test were used as a vehicle for holding students
accountable for an educational system that failed them. The Court concludes, however,
that the TAAS test is not used in such a manner, due process EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED
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12 In Debra P. II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated this
concern in equal protection terms, reiterating the proposition that an educational system
still suffering from the effects of prior discrimination cannot classify students based on
race unless that classification can be shown either not be a result of prior discrimination
or that it will remedy such discrimination. See Debra P. II, 730 F.2d at 1411. This Court
has dismissed the Plaintiffs equal protection claim. Nonetheless, the Court has stated,
and emphasizes again here, that it would be a due process violation to impose standards
on minority students whose failure to meet those standards is directly attributable to state
action.
[**55] The Court has considered this question carefully. Texas's difficulties in providing
an equal education to all its students are well-documented. It is only in the recent past
that efforts have been made to provide equal funding to Texas public schools. Several
schools in the state remain under desegregation orders. These facts cannot be ignored.
Court finds, however, after listening to the evidence at trial, that the TEA would agree
with the proposition that unequal education is a matter of great concern and must be
eradicated. The Court has determined that the use and implementation of the TAAS test
does identify educational inequalities and attempts to address them. See Debra P. II, 730
F.2d at 1415 (remedial efforts help dispel link between past discrimination and poor
performance on standardized test). While lack of effort and creativity at the local level
sometimes frustrate those attempts, local policy is not an issue before the Court. The
results of the TAAS test are used, in many cases quite effectively, to motivate not only
students but schools and teachers to raise and meet educational standards.
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds that [**56] the TAAS exit-level examination does not
violate regulations enacted pursuant to Title [*684] VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
While the TAAS test does adversely affect minority students in significant numbers, the
TEA has demonstrated an educational necessity for the test, and the Plaintiffs have failed
to identify equally effective alternatives equal protection EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED. In addition, the Court concludes that the TAAS test violates neither the
procedural nor the substantive due process rights of the Plaintiffs. The TEA has provided
adequate notice of the conse-quences of the exam and has ensured that the exam is
strongly correlated to material actually taught in the classroom. In addition, the test is
valid and in keeping with current educational norms, due process EDUCATIONAL
AGENCY PREVAILED. Finally, the test does not perpetuate prior educational
discrimination or unfairly hold Texas minority students accountable for the failures o f the
State's educational system. Instead, the test seeks to identify inequities and to address
them. It is not for this Court to determine whether Texas has chosen the best of all
possible means for achieving these goals. The system is not perfect, hut the Court can-not
say that it is unconstitutional. Judgment is GRANTED [**57] in favor of the Defendants,
and this case is DIS-MISSED.
SIGNED and ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2000.
EDWARD C. PRADO
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this same date, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, and DECREED that judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and
against the Plaintiffs. All costs are to be borne by the parties incur-ring them. It is further
ORDERED that all pending motions be STRICKEN from the docket as moot and that
this case is DISMISSED.
SIGNED and ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2000
EDWARD C. PRADO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

605

RENE EX REL. RENE v. REED
751 N.E.2d 736 (2001)
Meghan RENE, by her parents and next Friends, Michael and Robin RENE, et al.,
Appellants-PIaintiffs,
v.
Dr. Suellen REED, in her official capacity As Indiana State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, e t al., Appellees-Defendants.
No. 49A02-0007-CV-433.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
June 20,2001.
Kenneth J. Falk, Jacquelyn E. Bowie, E. Paige Freitag, Indiana Civil Liberties Union,
Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Beth H. Henkel, Frances H.
Barrow, Linda S. Leonard, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for
Appellee.
OPINION
MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge.
Meghan Rene and certain other students with disabilities ("the Students") who were or
are required to pass the Indiana graduation qualifying examination ("the GQE")1 brought
a class action
against Dr. Suellen Reed as Indiana Superintendent o f Public Instruction ("the State").
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the State violated their due process
rights by imposing the GQE as a condition of high school graduation because the State
had not previously required disabled students to meet the standards the State had
implemented to prepare students for the GQE. Therefore, the Students say, it did not
necessarily expose them to some of the material tested on the GQE. The Students also
assert the State violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) because
they were denied certain test-taking adaptations and modifications required for them
pursuant to the IDEA. The trial court entered judgment2 for the State, and we affirm.FACTS
We summarized the evolution of this case in Rene ex rel. Rene v. Reed.126 N.E.2d 808.
812-15 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), (hereinafter Reed I) where we reversed the trial court's order
denying certification to one of the classes and redefining the other:
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On May 21, 1998, the Students filed their class action Complaint seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief. The Complaint, filed by their parents on the Students' behalf, set forth
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1401 ("IDEA"). The Students, as defined by proposed Class A, claim that the
Appellee/Defendant, Dr. Suellen Reed (Dr. Reed), in her official capacity as Indiana
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, violated their due process rights under the
United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution by requiring them to take and
pass the Graduation Qualifying Examination ("GQE") when they had previously been
exempted from standardized testing and/or had not been taught the subject matter on the
tests. The Students, as defined by proposed Class B, claim that Dr. Reed violated their
rights under the IDEA by requiring them to take the GQE without the testing
accommodations and adaptations required by the Students' case conferences and
individualized education programs.
In Indiana, students participate in the Indiana Statewide Testing for Educational Progress
(ISTEP) testing program in the third, sixth, eighth and tenth grades. Ind.Code § 20-10.116-8. This test measures achievement in mathematics and language arts. Ind. Code § 2010.1-16-7. The GQE is a portion of the tenth grade ISTEP examination. Subject to two
exceptions, all Indiana high school students who wish to receive a high school diploma
must take and pass the GQE. Ind.Code § 20-10.1-16-13. This includes students with
disabilities. Id.
The Students are four Indiana high-school students, who were in the 10th grade at the
time the Complaint was filed. The Students belong to first class of Indiana students, the
class of 1999-2000, who are required to pass the GQE as a prerequisite to receiving a
high school diploma.As a condition of the State receiving federal financial assistance, the IDEA requires that
students with disabilities must receive a public education which is free and appropriate
given their specific needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). Indiana receives
money under the IDEA and is therefore bound by the federal requirements. Ind.Code §
20-1-6-1. The federal requirement that a student receive a free and appropriate education
is ensured by means of an individualized education program ("IEP") which is prepared at
least annually in a case conference which is attended by the students with disabilities'
regular education teachers, special education teachers, parents and others who have
knowledge and special expertise. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); Ind.Code § 20-1-6-1(5). The IEP
contains the outline of the student's education, including the services to be provided and
modifications to the general education program, including modifications to any statewide
assessments to be given to special education students. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
Prior to the change in the state statute requiring that students pass the GQE, case
conference could indicate that a student with disabilities was excused from taking the
GQE or other standardized testing, while still on the diploma track. The case conference
could also determine that the tests for these diploma bound students would be taken
diagnostically, which meant that they were not given under normal testing conditions,
and if the student failed, there would be no adverse consequences such as remediation or
retention. Prior to the GQE, students with disabilities on the diploma track received a
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high school diploma if they satisfied the requirements of their IEPs and the general state
curriculum requirements, regardless o f whether they took the standardized tests.
Furthermore, prior to the GQE, there was not a requirement that in order to graduate, a
student master the skills that are now tested by the GQE examination. The Students
allege that as a result, many students with disabilities who were on a diploma track were
not taught the information now tested on the GQE. Indeed, the State has acknowledged
that there was no requirement that, prior to the GQE, students with disabilities be taught
the skills which are now tested on the graduation examination.
[Meghan Rene] attends Ben Davis High School in Indianapolis, Indiana, and has received
special education since the first grade. Prior to the GQE requirement, Meghan had always
been excused from standardized testing. Meghan's IEP provided that she was in the
diploma program and if she completed all her course work and complied with her IEP,
she would receive a diploma. Meghan's IEP further provided that she be excused from
standardized testing and also indicated that all tests were to be read to her. Meghan was
first informed that she had to take the GQE in the fall of 1997. Meghan first took the
exam in the fall of 1997 and the examination was not read to her. Also, Meghan's IEP
provided that she be allowed to use a calculator during testing. This accommodation was
also disallowed when she took the GQE. Meghan failed the exam, and as of February
1999, had yet to pass the GQE.
None of the representative plaintiffs are in the Core 40 curriculum program which would
exempt them from the GQE. Further, all of the Students allege that they were not given
sufficient notice that they would be required to pass the GQE and were not given the
opportunity to adjust their curriculum in order to take courses that would specifically
prepare them for the GQE. Additionally, the Students assert that they would not qualify
under the waiver provision of Ind.Code § 20-10.1-16-13(e) because they have not
obtained the necessary proficiencies in the tested areas to allow their teachers to so
certify, (footnote two supplied; record citations omitted).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the trial court, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, entered final judgment
on the basis of the findings and conclusions it entered sua sponte in its order denying
injunctive relief, we will consider the findings to be made voluntarily and will treat the
decision as a general judgment with respect to issues not covered by the findings. Under
that standard, the specific findings control only with respect to the issues they cover, and
the general judgment controls as to the issues upon which the court has not found.
Catellier v. Depco, Inc..696 N.E.2d 75. 77 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). We may not reverse the
trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The general judgment will be
affirmed if it can be sustained upon any legal theory by the evidence introduced at trial.
Id. In our review, we will consider only the evidence that is most favorable to the trial
court's judgment and will not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
DUE PROCESS
The trial court properly found, and the State does not explicitly disagree, that the Students
have a property interest protected by due process in the award of a diploma if all
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graduation requirements are met. If the state chooses to provide a public education
system, it "is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public
education as a property interest which may be protected by the due process Clause."
Debra P. v. Turlington.644 F.2d 397.403 (5th Cir. 1981), quoting Goss v. Lopez,419 U.S565. 574,95 S.Ct. 729,42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). In Debra P., students challenged a
standardized test required by the State of Florida as a condition for receipt of a high
school diploma. The court there noted that the exam might have covered matters not
taught through the curriculum and it held the state could not constitutionally deprive its
public school students of a diploma on that basis. 644 F.2d at 404.
While the State implicitly concedes there are due process implications in the case before
us, it does assert as a threshold matter that there was no due process violation because
"[t]he Students wrongly claim they had a legitimate expectation to receive a regular high
school diploma because their case conference committees checked a box on their IEPs
indicating that they were on a 'diploma track'" (Br. of Defendant-Appellant at 24)
(hereinafter "State's Br.").The Students do not argue a property interest had arisen because someone "checked a box
on their IEPs;" rather, they rely on Debra P., where the Seventh Circuit found a property
right arising from the establishment of a system of free public education and from
mandatory attendance laws:
From the students' point of view, the expectation is that if a student attends school during
those required years, and indeed more, and if he takes and passes the required courses, he
will receive a diploma. This is a property interest as that term is used constitutionally....
This expectation can be viewed as a state-created "understanding" that secures certain
benefits and that supports claims of entitlement to those benefits.
644 F.2d at 404.
Although the trial court acknowledged that due process was implicated by the GQE
requirement, it found the imposition of the GQE as a condition to the grant of a diploma
did not violate the Students' due process rights because the three years' notice the
Students were given of the GQE requirement was adequate and because the Students'
remedy for the schools' alleged failure to teach the subjects required by the GQE was
"continued education and remediation and not the award of a high school diploma." (R. at
1382.)
1. The Nature o f the due process Implications o f the GQE Requirement
We recognized in Reed I that due process is violated when a "graduation exam is
'fundamentally unfair in that it may have covered matters not taught in the schools o f the
state,"' 726 N.E.2d at 822 n. 8, quoting Debra P., 644 F.2d at 404. We further noted "due
process protections require that handicapped students be given sufficient notice of a
minimal competency exam in order for them to prepare adequately to satisfy the new
requirement." 7#., citing Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. ofEduc.,691 F.2d 179. 186-87
(7th Cir. 1983).
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2. The Asserted due process Violations
The Students allege the implementation of the GQE denied them due process because 1)
the Students were not exposed during their schooling to some of the material tested on
the GQE, and 2) they had inadequate notice of the requirement and inadequate time to
prepare for the GQE.- They further assert that additional remediation is not an adequate
remedy for the due process violation. Rather, they contend that the State should be
enjoined from enforcing the GQE requirement until the GQE represents a fair test of what
disabled students have been taught.
A. Notice o f the GQE Requirement
In Brookhart, handicapped students challenged a school district decision in the spring of
1978 to require that all students eligible to graduate in the spring of 1980 pass a "m inim al
competency test" ("M.C.T") as a condition of the receipt o f a diploma. The district
publicized the new requirement with announcements in the mass media, distribution of
circulars in schools, and individual mailings to some parents. In Brookhart, as here, the
students did not "contest the factual basis underlying the loss of a liberty interest; in fact,
they admit that they did not pass the M.C.T. Rather, they demanded procedures that
would provide sufficient notice of the M.C.T. to enable them to prepare adequately to
satisfy the new requirement." 697 F.2d at 185.
The Brookhart court determined the notice was inadequate despite the absence of
evidence any student was unaware of the requirement. Id. at 182. There was evidence
before the district court that the disabled students' IEPs did not expose them to up to 90
per cent of the material tested on the M.C.T., and the students had only one to one-andone-half years to prepare for the test:
[t]he plaintiffs' programs of instruction were not developed to meet the goal of passing
the M.C.T., but were instead geared to address individual educational needs. Since
plaintiffs and their parents knew of the M.C.T. requirements only one to one and a half
years prior to the students' anticipated graduation, the M.C.T. objectives could not have
been specifically incorporated into the IEPs over a period of years. If they were
incorporated at all, it could only have been during the most recent year and a half. As the
Superintendent found, "in an educational system that assumes special education students
learn at a slower pace than regular division students," a year and a half to prepare for the
M.C.T is insufficient. Thus the length of notice, rather than a deliberate decision not to
instruct plaintiffs because of their incapacity to master the material, explains the
overwhelming lack of exposure to M.C.T. goals and objectives.
Id. at 187.
The Brookhart court declined to define "adequate notice" in terms of a specific number of
years, but it noted the requirement would be satisfied if the school district 1) ensured that
the students were sufficiently exposed to most of the material that appears on the test, or
2) produced evidence of "a reasonable and well-informed decision by the parents and
teachers involved that a particular high school student will be better off concentrating on
educational objectives other than preparation for the M.C.T." Id. at 187-88.
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There was evidence in the case before us to support the trial court's determination that the
students had adequate notice of the GQE requirement. The State notes the school districts
had at least five years' notice of the GQE requirement, and the Students and their parents
had at least three. The State cites Board ofEduc. ofNorthport-EastNorthport Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Ambach.90 A.D.2d 227. 458 N.Y.S.2d 680, 688 (1982), a ifdbO N.Y.2d 758.
469 N.Y.S.2d 669,457 N.E.2d 775 (1983) as authority for its premise that three years'
notice is sufficient. In a portion of its decision the Ambach court addressed "remedially,"
rather than "functionally" handicapped children. It held "the three-school-year notice ...
was not of such a brief duration as to prevent school districts from programming the IEPs
of [remedially handicapped children] to enable them to pass the basic competency tests
required for diploma graduation."
Debra P. said Anderson v. Banks. 520 F.Supp. 472 (S.D.Ga.1981) also support the
proposition that three years is sufficient notice.2 In Anderson, two years' notice of a
requirement that graduating students would need to demonstrate performance at a ninthgrade level was adequate where, as here, the test could be retaken and remediation was
provided. In Debra P., one year of notice was found insufficient where the state had not
submitted evidence that the test covered material required to be taught in the classroom.
On remand, the injunction was lifted after the state provided such evidence. 564 F.Supp.
177 (M.D.Fla.1983), a ffdTi0 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984). We cannot say the trial court
erred to the extent it determined the State provided adequate notice that the Students
would be subject to the GQE requirement.
B. Exposure to the Curriculum
The Students assert non-disabled students had ten years to prepare for the GQE
requirement while the disabled students, who do not leam at a normal rate, had only
three. They note that the ISTEP program, without the GQE requirement, was added in
1987, and the State Board of Education was at that time directed to begin adopting
educational proficiencies and achievement standards for grades one through eight.
However, disabled students whose IEPs did not include regular instruction in
mathematics and language arts were exempted from the proficiency standards in that such
decisions regarding disabled students were to be made not pursuant to ISTEP but rather
pursuant to the disabled students' case conferences and IEPs.
In 1990, the ISTEP statute was amended to apply to high school students, and the
disabled students were again exempted. As a result, they assert, the curriculum for non
disabled students has been adjusted and aligned to the material tested on the ISTEP since
1987. The GQE requirement was added by legislation in 1995, with the testing
requirement imposed for the first time on the class o f 2000. Disabled students are not
exempted from the GQE, regardless of any contrary indications in the case conferences or
IEPs.- The Students point to record evidence that it was not until 1997 that the State's
Special Education Director notified school administrators the GQE requirement would
apply to disabled students, and that parents of the disabled students did not find out about
the requirement until just before the first test was given in 1997.
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The trial court found the Students had been exposed to the curriculum tested on the GQE,
and we cannot characterize that finding as clearly erroneous. In its findings of fact, the
court noted that state law requires remedial assistance be provided to all students who do
not meet the academic standards required to pass the GQE, and stated "Given the
multiple remediation opportunities mandated by state law for students who take but do
not pass the GQE, the Court finds it implausible that the Plaintiff class was not exposed
throughout their high school career to the subjects tested on the GQE." (R. at 1375.)
REMEDIATION
The Students correctly note there was evidence presented that in order to learn the
material tested on the GQE, students must have the appropriate base knowledge from
earlier courses and from building blocks that were in place in elementary school. They
note that disabled students, by definition, learn at a slower pace than other students. But,
they assert, there was evidence that even after the imposition of the GQE requirement, the
curriculum for a significant number of disabled students had not been "realigned to the
proficiencies tested on the examination." (Br. of Appellants at 32) (hereinafter "Students'
Br.").
While the State notes the school systems were required by statute and regulation to align
their curriculum with the state standards, at least as of 1996, it does not directly argue the
disabled students' curriculum addressed the GQE requirements in advance of the
imposition of the GQE requirement on the Students. Rather, it asserts, the Students did
not submit any evidence the GQE is not aligned with "the curriculum required by state
law to be offered at their schools and made available to them through state mandate,
given the multiple opportunities provided them to take the exam and the targeted
remediation the State has made available at no cost to them." (State's Br. at 23)
(emphasis supplied). Though the record suggests the Students would have benefited from
earlier adjustment of their curriculum in order to prepare them for the GQE requirement,
we cannot characterize as clearly erroneous the trial court's determination that the
Students were exposed during their high school careers to the subjects tested on the GQE.
equal protection OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN
C. Adequacy o f Remediation Remedy
The trial court found that if the school systems had failed to teach the Students the
subjects tested on the GQE despite the Students' ability to meet the GQE standards, "the
remedy is not that the State be required to hand these Plaintiffs a diploma." (R. at 1381.)
Rather, it concluded, citing Brookhart, that the remedy is to offer the students additional
remediation and opportunities to acquire the necessary skills.
The Brookhart court did state that "in theory, the proper remedy for a violation of this
kind is to require [the school district] to provide free, remedial special education classes
to ensure exposure to the material tested...." 697 F.2d at 188.2
The Students note that the Brookhart case involved only 14 plaintiffs, and they point to
Anderson, 520 F.Supp. at 512 as authority for their argument that where there is a
"systematic failure of due process" (Students' Br. at 35) involving a large number of
students, the proper remedy is to enjoin the State from requiring the GQE until such time
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as it "is no longer irrational to impose the requirement on the class." (Students' Br. at 35.)
They argue that until the GQE requirement has been in effect for the entire educational
career of a student, the case conferences should be responsible for making the
determination whether it is appropriate for a disabled student to take the GQE in order to
graduate.
In Anderson, the court ordered the schools to award diplomas to all students who would
have received them but for the graduation test policy. It went on to hold that "[n]o exit
exam policy may be utilized until it is demonstrated that the test used is a fair test of what
is taught." 520 F.Supp. at 512. Similarly, in Debra P., the court held the state could not
deprive its high school seniors of the benefits of a high school diploma until it
demonstrated its version of the GQE was a fair test of what was taught in its classrooms.
644 F.2d at 408. There, the exam had had a disproportionate impact on black students due
to unequal educational opportunities several years before the test was administered.
In light of the evidence before the trial court that the Students had between three and five
years' notice they would be subject to the GQE requirement, we cannot say the trial court
erred to the extent it determined the remediation offered by the State was an adequate
remedy for any due process violation arising from the test requirement. DUE
PROCESS/ADEQUATE NOTICE EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVALED
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT The trial court made no findings of fact with regard to the students in Class B, who
alleged a violation of the IDEA in the form of the State's failure to honor certain
modifications and accommodations in the test-taking process. As its only conclusion of
law on that issue, the trial court stated the Students had failed to "cite supporting law for
their position that the State's policies violate IDEA," (R. at 1382), and therefore they had
not established a prima facie case on that issue.
We note initially that the IDEA does not require specific results, but instead it mandates
only that disabled students have access to specialized and individualized educational
services. Therefore, denial of a diploma to handicapped children who cannot achieve the
educational level necessary to pass a standardized graduation exam is not a denial o f the
"free appropriate public education" the IDEA requires. Brookhart, 697 F.2d at 183
(addressing the IDEA predecessor statute). Further, the imposition of such a standardized
exam does not violate the IDEA where, as in the case before us, the exam is not the sole
criterion for graduation. Id. "Congress' desire to provide specialized educational services
... cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon the
states." Board o f Educ. o f Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. Westchester County v.
RowlevA5S U.S. 176.200, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).
The IDEA requires participating states to offer special education and related services in
conformity with the individualized education program (IEP) provided for in 20 U.S.C.
1414(d). The IEPs of the members of Class B state that the class members are on the
diploma track but are to be excused from standardized testing or are to have certain
accommodations during testing. While the definition of "free appropriate public
education" mandated by the IDEA includes special education that meets the standards of
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the State educational agency, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (8)(B), Rowley notes that it "must also
comport with the child's IEP." 458 U.S. at 203,102 S.Ct. 3034; 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (8)(D).
Because the State is requiring all the members of Class B to take and pass the GQE
without certain adaptations or accommodations, the Students assert the IDEA is violated.
"[S]tate procedures which more stringently protect the rights of the handicapped and their
parents are consistent with the [IDEA'S predecessor statute] and thus enforceable."
Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach.838 F.2d 635. 641 (2d Cir. 1988). However, "those
[procedures] that merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act
are not enforceable." Id. The State, the Students say, accordingly cannot choose to honor
some, but not other, of the modifications and adaptations called for in the IEP and cannot
require a disabled student to take the GQE if he or she is properly exempted by the case
conference.
We cannot say the trial court erred to the extent it determined the State need not honor
certain accommodations called for in the Students' IEPs where those accommodations
would affect the validity of the test results. The court had evidence before it that the State
does permit a number of accommodations typically called for in IEPs. However, the State
does not permit accommodations for "cognitive disabilities" that can "significantly affect
the meaning and interpretation of the test score." (State's Br. at 44.)
For example, the State permits accommodations such as oral or sign language responses
to test questions questions in Braille, special lighting or furniture, enlarged answer sheets,
and individual or small group testing. By contrast, it prohibits accommodations in the
form of reading to the student test questions that are meant to measure reading
comprehension, allowing unlimited time to complete test sections, allowing the student to
respond to questions in a language other than English, and using language in the
directions or in certain test questions that is reduced in complexity.
Neither the Students nor the State have directed us to decisions that directly address
whether the IDEA is violated by prohibiting on a standardized graduation exam
accommodations for "cognitive disabilities" that are provided for in a student's IEP.
However, a number of administrative decisions have addressed one such
accommodation—that of providing the services of a reader for a reading comprehension
test. In those decisions, Office of Civil Rights hearing officers have found that states
could properly require students to take a reading comprehension test without providing
the services of a reader. For example, in Mobile County Bd. o f Educ. 26 IDELR 695
(1997), the hearing officer decided the State could properly deny an accommodation in
the form of a reader on the Alabama "exit exam."—
The IEP represents "an educational plan developed specifically for the child [that] sets
out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term
objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed
instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Board o f
Educ. o f Oak Park & River Forest High School Dist. No. 200 v. Illinois State Bd. o f
Educ.. 10 F.Supp.2d 971. 975-76 (N.D.H1.1998). The GQE, by contrast, is an assessment
of the outcome of that educational plan. We therefore decline to hold that an
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accommodation for cognitive disabilities provided for in a student's IEP must necessarily
be observed during the GQE, or that the prohibition of such an accommodation during
the GQE is necessarily inconsistent with the IEP. We cannot say the trial court erred
when it determined the prohibition of certain accommodations did not violate the IDEA.
CONCLUSION
While the Students have an interest protected by due process in fair implementation o f
the GQE requirement, we cannot say the trial court erred when it found the Students were
exposed during their schooling to the subjects tested on the GQE, that they had adequate
notice of that graduation requirement, and that the remediation and additional
opportunities to take the GQE were an adequate remedy if due process was violated. The
trial court further did not err to the extent it found the State's refusal to allow certain testtaking accommodations did not violate the IDEA. Accordingly, we affirm.
SHARPNACK, C.J., and BAILEY, J., concur, due process EDUCATIONAL AGENCY
PREVAILED
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A.S.K. V. OREGON
As a result of a lawsuit filed by Disability Rights Advocates (DRA), Oregon will take
extensive steps to modify its current high stakes testing system to ensure that the tests do
not discriminate against students with learning disabilities. The settlement is based on the
findings of an expert panel that was convened by the parties to examine the impact of
Oregon's high stakes testing on students with learning disabilities. Both the expert report
and the settlement are first of its kind and have national implications. Under the
settlement, Oregon will take extensive steps to modify its current testing system so that
students with learning disabilities will not be tested on their disabilities and instead will
be able to demonstrate their abilities. These steps include: SPECIAL EDUCATION
1. broadening the list of accommodations available to students with learning
disabilities,
2. providing an alternative to the standard assessment for those learning disabled
students who are disadvantaged by the regular assessment,
3. instituting an appeals process,
4. conducting further research to ensure the validity o f the tests with respect to
students with disabilities, and
5. providing greater training and information about the assessment to students,
teachers, and parents.
The neutral panel of experts was appointed to study Oregon's assessment. The panel
consisted of four prominent educators and researchers from across the country and a
retired Oregon Supreme Court justice who acted as the facilitator. The panel was charged
with reviewing Oregon's testing system as it relates to students with learning disabilities,
and to make recommendations on policies and procedures needed to ensure that learning
disabled students have an equal opportunity to participate in the assessment system. The
panel received extensive amounts of information from the State and the plaintiffs and
studied the assessment system for approximately one year before issuing their
recommendations. This is the first time an expert panel has been convened to analyze a
testing system specifically with regard to the impact on students with learning
disabilities. The panel's work will be invaluable resource not only in Oregon but across
the country as well for its outline for all states to follow to ensure that assessment systems
are fair to learning disabled students.EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
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Meghan Rene, etal v. Dr. Suellen Reed etal
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
774 N.E.2d 506; 2002 Ind. LEXIS 101
January 31,2002, Decided
NOTICE: [*1] DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
PRIOR HISTORY: 49A02-0007-CV-433. Original Opinion of June 20, 2001, Reported
at: 2001 Ind. App. LEXIS 1078.
Rene v. Reed, 751 N.E.2d 736,2001 Ind. App. LEXIS 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
OPINION
Transfer Denied.
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JULEUS CHAPMAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. CA DEPT OF EDUCATION et al.,
Defendants.
No. C 01-01780 CRB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
229 F. Supp. 2d 981; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21879
February 21, 2002, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reversed in part and remanded, Smiley v. Cal. Dep't of
Educ., 45 Fed. Appx. 780, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18466 (9th Cir. Cal. Sept. 4, 2002).
DISPOSITION: Limited temporary injunction granted.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff learning disabled students brought a class action
suit against defendants, including the California D epartm ent of Education, seeking to
halt the administration of the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE), which
California law required students to pass in order to receive a diploma. The students
moved for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, to make the CAHSEE voluntary
rather than mandatory for all
students.
OVERVIEW: The class consisted of students who were eligible for either an
individualized education program (IEP)pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) or a § 504 education plan pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. The court found that the named students did not have to take and fail the CAHSEE
in order to have standing, that ongoing development of the CAHSEE did not render the
suit unripe, and that a private right of action existed under the IDEA with respect to
participation in state-wide assessments. As the case involved a challenge to defendants'
general policies, exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary. A preliminary
injunction was warranted because (1) students who were unable to meaningfully access
the CAHSEE regardless of accommodations and/or modifications offered were entitled to
an alternate assessment and (2) the IDEA required the state to permit accommodations
necessary for a student to access the CAHSEE. However, the court limited relief to
students who already had either an IEP or a § 504 plan and found that the scope of relief
requested by the students would impose significant hardship on defendants.
OUTCOME: The court ordered, inter alia, that students were to be allowed to take the
CAHSEE with accommodations, modifications, or alternate assessments provided by
their IEPs or § 504 plans for the CAHSEE, general standardized testing, or classroom
testing.
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CORE TERMS: accommodation, alternate, modification, testing, disability, diploma,
learning, disabled, exam, state-wide, standardized, score, high school, right of action,
achievement, educational, team, irreparable injury, public education, administrative
remedies, administered, hardship, test scores, preliminary injunction, specifically
provides, district-wide, exit, school district, invalidate, classroom
COUNSEL: [**1] For Ryan Smiley, Jennifer Lyons, Learning Disabilities Association
of California, Juleus Chapman, Plaintiffs: Alison M. Aubrejuan, Disability Rights
Advocates, Oakland, CA. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, San Francisco, CA. Eve H. Cervantez, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
San Francisco, CA. Mary Bondy Reiten, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, San
Francisco, CA. Melissa W. Kasnitz, Disability Rights Advocates, Oakland, CA. Morris
A. Ratner, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, CA. Rhoda
Benedetti, Disability Rights Advocates, Oakland, CA. Sid Wolinsky, Disability Rights
Advocates, Oakland, CA.
For California Department of Education, Delaine Eastin, Defendants: Amy Bisson
Holloway, California Department of Education, Sacramento, CA. Douglas M. Press,
CA Attorney General's Office, San Francisco, CA. Michael Hersher, California
Department of Education, Sacramento, CA. Suzanne B. Giorgi, CA Attorney General's
Office, Sacramento, CA. Teresa L. Stinson, CA Attorney General's Office, San
Francisco, CA.
For Fremont Unified School District, Defendant: James R. Hawley, Hoge Fenton Jones &
Appel, San Jose, CA.
For [**2] California State Board of Education, Defendant: Amy Bisson Holloway,
California Department of Education, Sacramento, CA. Douglas M. Press, CA
Attorney General's Office, San Francisco, CA. Suzanne B. Giorgi, CA Attorney
General's Office, Sacramento, CA.
JUDGES: CHARLES R. BREYER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: CHARLES R. BREYER
OPINION
[*983] CLASS ACTION
ORDER RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to halt the administration of the California High
School Exit Exam ("CAHSEE") currently scheduled for March 5, 6, and 7,2002. As an
alternative, plaintiffs propose making the CAHSEE voluntary for all students. As set
forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have shown that preliminary relief is
warranted. Absent a court order, the March administration o f the CAHSEE is likely to
violate rights guaranteed to learning disabled students under federal law. However, the
scope of relief prayed for is not warranted. The Court has crafted an injunction that
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protects the rights of learning disabled students without derailing the State of
California's efforts to improve education in the State.
BACKGROUND
The CAHSEE was administered to freshmen in the [**3] class of 2004 on a voluntary
basis in March 2001. On March 5, 6, and 7 of this year, the CAHSEE will be
administered on a mandatory basis to all members of the class o f2004 (sophomores) who
have not already passed the exam. Under current California law, members of the class of
2004 are required to pass the CAHSEE to receive a diploma. Cal. Ed. Code § 60851(a).
The plaintiff class consists of learning disabled students eligible for either an
Individualized Education Program ("IEP") pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"), or a Section 504 Education Plan ("504 Plan") pursuant to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. These plans, created by a team consisting of the student
(where appropriate), parents, educators, and other professionals, are the blueprints of a
learning disabled child's education. They assess the current performance of a child, set
annual goals, and specify special education and related services a child is to receive.
Federal regulations require the IEP to specifically address state-wide assessments such as
the CAHSEE. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(5)(i) (The IEP must include a "statement of
any individual modifications [**4] in the administration of State or district-wide
assessments of student achievement that are needed in order for the child to participate in
the assessment."). Where the IEP team determines that a child cannot participate in a
particular state-wide assessment, even with modifications, the IEP must include a
statement of why the state-wide assessment is not appropriate and how the child will be
assessed. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(5)(ii). [*984] The evidence before the Court,
however, suggests that, with regard to the CAHSEE, most IEP teams have not had time to
comply with these provisions, equal protection SPECIAL EDUCATION
IEPs in California do address other testing situations. For example, pursuant to their
IEPs, the named plaintiffs take classroom tests with certain accommodations. Chapman
uses a laptop computer. Smiley uses a calculator and a laptop computer and has his tests
presented orally. Lyons is permitted to use a spell checker, a calculator, a computer, a
scanner, and a tape recorder. Among other matters, this order addresses the extent to
which similar accommodations are appropriate for the CAHSEE.ACCOMMODATIONS
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs claim that a preliminary injunction is warranted on [**5] five independent
grounds: 1) there is no alternate assessment to the CAHSEE, 2) required accommodations
are not provided to learning disabled students taking the CAHSEE, 3) the test violates
due process because it covers materials that students have had no opportunity to learn, 4)
the test is invalid, and 5) the CAHSEE fails to conform to nationally recognized
standards.
As set forth below, the Court concludes that a limited preliminary injunction is warranted
based on the first and second of these grounds.
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I. Legal Standard
Traditionally, a preliminary injunction will issue where the plaintiff shows: 1) a
likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury, 3) a balance of
hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 4) that preliminary relief is in the public interest.
Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999). This test has evolved into the
modem test that the plaintiff must "demonstrate either (1) a combination of probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted, or
(2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships
tips sharply [**6] in its favor." First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378,
1381 (9th Cir. 1987). While this test is phrased in the disjunctive, many courts view it as
essentially a single test. Viewed as a single test, the greater the showing of likely success
the lighter the burden in terms of the relative hardship, and vice versa. See Regents of
Univ. of Calif, v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1984).
II. Education Policy Generally
The Court notes at the outset that the State of California is afforded broad latitude in
crafting public education policy and setting standards for students and educators. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S.
Ct. 1278 (1973); Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983);
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). Respecting the state's role in
education policy under our system o f federalism, this Court "will interfere with
educational policy decisions only when necessary to protect individual statutory or
constitutional rights." Brookhart, 697 F.2d at 182. [**7] Accordingly any relief must be
"narrowly tailored to enforce federal constitutional and statutory law only." Clark v.
Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1995). JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE
III. Likelihood of Success
A. Standing and Ripeness
Defendants claim that plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not yet ripe for
adjudication. Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing because they are unable to
show particularized or imminent [*985] injury. In particular, defendants point to the fact
that no student has taken a mandatory CAHSEE. Furthermore, no student can show that
failure on the CAHSEE will result in denial of a diploma.
"In order to assert claims on behalf of a class, a named plaintiff must have personally
sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
challenged statute or official conduct." Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th Cir.
2001) (internal citation omitted). However, in a class action, as alleged here, the Court
may consider injuries alleged by name plaintiffs "in the context of the harm asserted by
the class as a whole, to determine whether a credible threat" of injury to the named
plaintiffs [**8] exists. Id. Based on this framework, the Court concludes that die named
plaintiffs have standing.
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Plaintiffs do not have to take and fail a defective exam to have standing. Furthermore,
under the IDEA, plaintiffs have a statutory right to meaningful inclusion in a state-wide
assessment, such as the CAHSEE, whether they pass or not. That right is violated, and
harm is suffered, at the time the exam in administered. The presence of harm is not
dependent upon how the results are used. MEANINGFUL INCLUSION
Defendants make a related ripeness argument. This argument centers around the fact that
development of the CAHSEE is a highly dynamic process. Defendants argue that they
need the data of several CAHSEE administrations to finalize policies. They argue that the
pass rate is likely to be significantly higher in the future. Defendants also point to a
provision in the law permitting the Board to delay the date upon which the CAHSEE
becomes a graduation prerequisite. Cal. Ed. Code § 60859.
The Court accepts all of this as true. However, the CAHSEE has already been
administered once and will be administered again in March. While the Board may delay
the effective date at which the CAHSEE becomes a graduation [**9] requirement, the
fact remains that under current law the class of 2004 must either pass the CAHSEE or be
granted a waiver to receive a diploma. The mere possibility that intervening action might
rectify allegedly illegal behavior does not render this lawsuit unripe.
Even more fundamentally, as stated above, plaintiffs have a right to be meaningfully
included in the March CAHSEE, regardless of how the test results are used. This suit is
ripe.
B. Private Right of Action
Defendants claim that there is no private right of action to enforce the IDEA'S provisions
regarding accommodations and alternate assessments. No case cited by either party
specifically addresses a private right of action under these provisions.
The IDEA specifically provides a private right of action, after exhaustion of
administrative remedies, for claims "relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education
to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). Defendants claim that the inclusion of these
specific rights of action evinces a Congressional intent to preclude a private right of
action for other matters.
[**10] However, as recognized by the Third Circuit in Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll,
87 F.3d 80 (3rd Cir. 1996), the statute does not just provide a private right to ensure
provision of a free appropriate public education. It provides a private right of action for
"any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free and appropriate public education." 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). On the basis of this language, the Beth V. court
[*986] permitted a private action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Pennsylvania Department of Education
for allegedly failing to comply with federal regulations governing the handling of
complaints. See id.
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Therefore, because meaningful participation in state-wide assessments such as the
CAHSEE is an important aspect of public education, it is protected by a private right of
action under the IDEA.
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The IDEA requires that administrative remedies be exhausted before filing a civil action
in some cases. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). As stated by the Ninth Circuit, the IDEA'S
"exhaustion requirement. . . recognizes [**11] the traditionally strong state and local
interest in education, as reflected in the statute's emphasis on state and local
responsibility." Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.
1992). However, a party is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where such
efforts would be futile or administrative remedies are inadequate. See id. at 1303-04. Nor
is plaintiff required to exhaust administrative remedies where they challenge a policy or
practice of general applicability. See id.
In this case the plaintiffs are challenging the general policies of the defendants in
administering the CAHSEE exam. Accordingly, the Court finds that the exhaustion
requirement is unlikely to bar this action.
D. Alternate Assessment
Plaintiffs claim that some members of the class are entitled to an "alternate assessment"
to the CAHSEE, under the IDEA. The IDEA "provides federal funds to assist state and
local agencies in educating children with disabilities, but conditions such funding on
compliance with certain goals and procedures." Ojai Unified School Dist. v. Jackson, 4
F.3d 1467,1469 (9th Cir. 1993). With [**12] regard to an alternate assessment, the IDEA
requires the following:
Children with disabilities are included in general State and district-wide
assessment programs, with appropriate accommodations, where necessary. As
appropriate, the State or local educational agency—
(i) develops guidelines for the participation of children with disabilities in
alternate assessments for those children who cannot participate in State
and district-wide assessment programs; and
(ii) develops and, beginning not later than July 1,2000, conducts those
alternate assessments.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(17)(A).
Unfortunately there is no case law defining an "alternate assessment" in the context o f the
IDEA to guide the Court in this case. As defined in the academic literature, an alternate
assessment could include an interview and/or oral presentation, teacher observations,
checklists and inventories, or a review of a portfolio of the student's work over an
academic period. Despite this ambiguity, it is clear that no alternate assessments were
offered for the 2001 administration of the CAHSEE.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

623

There is evidence before the Court that some students are unable [**13] to meaningfully
access the CAHSEE regardless of the accommodations and/or modifications offered. See
Declaration of Dr. Susan Vogel; Declaration of Dr. Kay Runyan. For these students, the
CAHSEE will not be a valid measure of their academic achievement. Some of these
students are performing at a high school level and have mastered the CAHSEE subject
matter. See Vogel Decl. PI 1; Runyan Decl. PI 0-14. Some of these students are unable to
[*987] master a high school level curriculum. See Vogel Decl. PI 1; Runyan Decl. P1520. As is clear from the language of the IDEA, both sets of students are entitled to an
alternate assessment. The fact that some of these students are incapable of mastering the
content of the CAHSEE is of no importance; they are still entitled to a valid assessment
of their capabilities.
Defendants argue that the waiver policy satisfies the IDEA'S requirement for an alternate
assessment. 1 The waiver policy is evolving. But in its present form, the Court concludes
that the waiver policy is unlikely to satisfy the IDEA requirement for an alternate
assessment because: 1) the school district not the individual applies for the waiver, 2) the
school district has discretion [**14] in determining whether to apply for the waiver, and
3) the State Board of Education retains discretion in determining whether to grant a
waiver. See California State Board of Education Policy 01 -07 at 1. By contrast the IDEA
creates an entitlement on the part of individual students.
1 Defendants had previously argued that the IDEA does not apply to the
CAHSEE because the CAHSEE is not a "state-wide assessment," but rather a tool
for measuring individual achievement. It is not clear whether defendants still
make this argument. Regardless, by both the terms of the IDEA and the California
implementing statute, the Court is convinced that the IDEA applies to the
CAHSEE.
The State has proposed regulations that would require the school district to apply for a
waiver. See California State Board of Education document dated January 2002. However,
even under the proposed regulations the State Board of Education retains discretion in
determining whether to grant a waiver.
But a further, more fundamental, problem [**15] exists under any even speculative
version of the waiver policy. The waiver policy does not address that group of students
unable to access the CAHSEE regardless of the accommodations and/or modifications
provided. As discussed above, the evidence before the Court shows that there are
individuals for whom the CAHSEE, even with modification, will not be an accurate
measure of academic achievement. For these individuals, the State's waiver policy is
meaningless, and therefore cannot satisfy the IDEA requirement for an alternate
assessment. For these individuals the waiver policy is meaningless because the possibility
of a waiver is only triggered when a student achieves the equivalent of a passing score on
the CAHSEE—a test that they are unable to access. Even if the State can ultimately deny
a high school diploma to these students, a question which the Court does not reach
today,the State cannot deny these students a meaningful assessment of their academic
achievement when such an assessment is available to all other students. ALTERNATE
ASSESSMENT
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E. Accommodation
The question of accommodation on the CAHSEE is substantially confused by the
tendency to conflate two separate and distinct issues. [**16] The first issue is what
accommodations and/or modifications are students entitled to when actually taking the
CAHSEE. The second distinct issue is whether federal law requires the State to treat
scores achieved with certain accommodations and/or modifications the same way it treats
scores achieved by students without accommodation and/or modification. With the
CAHSEE only days away, the Court must address the first issue now. No similar urgency
requires an answer to the second issue. Any benefit to an immediate answer to the
question of what the State must do with the test scores is outweighed by the benefit of
extra time to brief and deliberate the issue fully.
[*988] With the understanding that the Court is focused on the issue o f what
accommodations must be permitted in actually taking the test, the starting point is again
the language of the IDEA which provides:
Children with disabilities are included in general State and district-wide
assessment programs, with appropriate accommodations, where necessary. As
appropriate, the State or local educational agency20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(17)(A). The regulations contain similar language:
[Children [**17] with disabilities are included in general State and district-wide
assessment programs, with appropriate accommodations and modifications in
administration, if necessary
34 C.F.R. § 300.138.
In defining "appropriate accommodations" under the IDEA the most logical place to look
would be to a student's IEP or 504 plan. However, the IDEA does not explicitly
incorporate this definition, and there is some limited authority suggesting that the
definitions are not identical.
For example, in Alabama Dept, o f Educ., 29 EDELR 249 (1998), the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) in the U.S. Department of Education, concluded that a state could deny
the use of a reading device for a graduation exam, even though the student's IEP
permitted it. However, the OCR, by the terms of this decision and others cited by
defendants, is charged with interpreting and enforcing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, not the IDEA. The specific reference to an
IEP plan, which is provided for by the IDEA, is somewhat incongruous in this context,
but the decision by its terms does not express an opinion as to the permissibility of the
state [**18] policy under the IDEA.
Defendants also cite to an Indiana Court of Appeals decision. In that case, the court found
that the state did not have to permit test taking accommodations prescribed by the IEP to
students taking an high school exit exam. See Rene ex rel. Rene v. Reed, 751 N.E.2d 736,
746-47. However, that case reached its conclusion with little analysis. To the extent it
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holds that students are not entitled to accommodations during test taking this Court
disagrees.
The Court finds a U.S. Department of Education memorandum, from the Office of
Special Education Programs, entitled "Guidance on Including Students with Disabilities
in Assessment Programs," more persuasive in construing the accommodations
requirement of the IDEA. In discussing design of IEP plans, the memorandum states:
IDEA gives the IEP team the authority to determine what, if any,
accommodations or modifications are needed in order for a child with a disability
to participate in an assessment. However, state and local school agencies have the
authority to determine how test scores are reported and used, and the may limit
the use of test scores if certain accommodations or modifications [**19] are
involved.
Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education
Programs, to State Directors of Special Education et al., # 1 0 (January 17, 2001),
available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSERS/OSEP/Products/omip.html. As this memo
suggests, an "appropriate accommodation" under the IDEA is one necessary to access the
test. Id. at # 6. In the context of the CAHSEE therefore, an "appropriate accommodation"
is any accommodation necessary to render a student's score on the CAHSEE a
meaningful measure of that student's academic achievement. The determination of what
specific accommodations are appropriate for any specific student is ultimately best left to
the IEP and Section 504 process.
[*989] The Court's preliminary judgment is that the Department of Education
memorandum best reconciles a state's wide discretion to set and implement education
policy with the IDEA'S basic mandate that all students be accorded meaningful
participation in any state-wide assessment programs. The state must permit
accommodations necessary for a student to access a state-wide assessment such as the
CAHSEE. This way a student's score provides a meaningful measure of achievement.
[**20] This type of feedback when measured against clearly articulated standards helps
hold educators accountable for teaching all students—a key goal of the IDEA. The
feedback is also valuable to students and parents.
At the same time, a state may set specific standards and require any student seeking a
diploma to satisfy them. O f course, federal law places some limits on a state's discretion
to set educational standards. Those limits are not set today. By requiring all appropriate
accommodations, the IDEA does not interfere with the state's prerogative to set these
standards; it merely ensures that the state is held to account for its efforts in helping all
students meet them. ACCOMMODATIONS
F. Other Substantive Arguments
The plaintiffs have not made a showing of likely success on the merits in their other
substantive claims. Plaintiffs have cited limited case law supporting the proposition that it
is a violation of due process to test students on material they have not had an adequate
opportunity to leam. However, the present state of the evidence does not reveal an
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asymmetry between what students are taught and the material tested on the CAHSEE
implicating due process concerns. Plaintiffs' [**21] arguments regarding test validity boil
down to a battle of experts. At this point the Court cannot credit one expert over another.
DUE PROCESS
G. Conclusion
The Court concludes that plaintiffs have shown they are likely to prevail on two separate
IDEA claims. First, it appears that the IDEA requires school districts to permit students to
take the CAHSEE with appropriate accommodations. Second, under the IDEA it appears
that the State must provide an alternate assessment to the CAHSEE to students who are
unable to access the test due to a learning disability.
Normally the State would be required to permit accommodations or offer an alternate
assessment only to the extent they were prescribed by a student's IEP or Section 504 plan.
However, in this instance, the Court concludes that IEP and Section 504 teams have not
had sufficient time or notice to address the CAHSEE. Therefore students and parents
should not be penalized if a plan fails to address the CAHSEE specifically.
IV. Possibility of Irreparable Injury
As stated above, administration of the CAHSEE threatens to violate specific statutory
rights of learning disabled students. Regardless of how the CAHSEE scores are used,
[**22] the plaintiffs have a right to participate meaningfully in the assessment provided
by the CAHSEE. As stated above, it appears that administration of the CAHSEE will
violate this right. Furthermore, because the receipt of a diploma is conditioned upon
passage of the CAHSEE, administration of the CAHSEE without protections plaintiffs
may be entitled to under federal law could effectively deny plaintiffs an opportunity to
receive a diploma. EQUAL PROTECTION
Both of these injuries, one probable and the other possible, implicate a dignity interest in
full participation in the educational process. Harm to a student's dignity and educational
prospects constitutes irreparable [*990] injury. See Cupolo v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, 5
F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084 (stating that "injuries to individual dignity and deprivations of
civil rights constitute irreparable injury" with regard to the ADA); see also Chalk v.
United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 710 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that reassignment to
different job constitutes irreparable injury, even though pay was equivalent, due to
psychological harm).
V. Balance of Hardships/Scope of Relief
Because plaintiffs have shown a [**23] likelihood of success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable harm, preliminary relief is warranted. Having made this
showing, however, the scope of relief remains to be determined. Only a small portion of
students scheduled to take the CAHSEE in March are members of the plaintiff class.
As stated above, see section 13 supra, the State is afforded wide discretion in crafting
education policy and setting standards. The Court will not second guess the judgment of
the State of California that the CAHSEE is a vital component of a standards-based
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reform effort. Indeed, California is not alone in this judgment. Twenty-seven states have
high school exit exams. See American Federation of Teachers, Making Standards Matter
2001 at 5, 29 available at http://www.sft.org/edissues/standards/MSM2001/Index.htm.
Indeed the IDEA itself expresses the opinion that learning disabled students can benefit
from higher expectations and standards. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) ("Over 20 years of
research and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities
can be made more effective by . .. having high expectations for such [**24] children and
ensuring their access in the general curriculum to the maximum extent possible.").
Accepting the State's judgment that the CAHSEE is a vital component of an effort to
improve public education, the Court has no trouble concluding that granting plaintiffs the
relief they seek, either enjoining the March administration of the CAHSEE altogether or
making it voluntary for all students, would impose significant hardship on the State.
Indeed, in determining the appropriate scope of preliminary relief, this Court must
consider the general public interest served by permitting the March CAHSEE to go
forward. See Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668,674 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("The district court must consider the public interest as a factor in balancing
the hardships when the public interest may be affected.")
Because education is a core state function, relief from this Court must be "narrowly
tailored" and constrain a state's actions only where necessary to protect the individual
rights of the class members. See Clark v. Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) Students [**25] shall be permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations or
modifications 2 their IEP or Section 504 plan specifically provides for the CAHSEE. If a
student's IEP or Section 504 plan does not address the CAHSEE specifically, the student
shall be permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations or modifications their
IEP or Section 504 [*991] plan provides for standardized testing. If a student's IEP or
Section 504 plan does not address either the CAHSEE specifically or standardized testing
generally, the student shall be permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations
or modifications their IEP or Section 504 plan provides for general classroom testing. 3
(2) A student may choose to forego any accommodation or modification to which he or
she is entitled under this Order. STUDENT PREVAILED
(3) At its December 5,2001 meeting, the State Board of Education adopted policy
number 01-07, "California High School Exit Examination: Waiver of Test Passage for
Specific Special Education Students." Pending further order of this Court, defendants
may grant, but may not deny, a waiver under this policy.
(4) If a student's IEP or Section 504 plan specifically provides for an alternate assessment
in lieu [**26] of the CAHSEE, an alternate assessment shall be provided. If a student's
IEP or Section 504 plan does not specifically address the CAHSEE but provides for an
alternate assessment in lieu of general standardized testing, an alternate assessment to the
CAHSEE shall be provided. If a student's IEP or Section 504 plan does not specifically
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address the CAHSEE or standardized testing but provides for an alternate assessment in
lieu of general classroom testing, an alternate assessment to the CAHSEE shall be
provided. STUDENT PREVAILED
(5) The State is directed to develop an alternate assessment to the CAHSEE forthwith.
Students identified as entitled to an alternate assessment in (4) above shall not be required
to take the CAHSEE, but may do so if they choose. The State shall provide an alternate
assessment to the CAHSEE to these students as soon as practicable.
(6) In order for a student covered by this Order to avail himself or herself of any rights
under this Order, no additional IEP or Section 504 team meeting shall be necessary.
(7) Nothing in this Order shall be interpreted to prevent the State from continuing to
develop its regulations and policies regarding the CAHSEE.
(8) The State shall direct [**27] all school districts to provide a copy of Appendix A to
all parents and guardians of children with a IEP or Section 504 plan.
(9) As stated above, the Court reserves for future consideration the issues of whether, and
to what extent, the State may treat students taking the CAHSEE with an unapproved
modification or given an alternate assessment differently from other students with respect
to the granting of a diploma.
(10) The parties are ordered to appear at 10 a.m. on June 7, 2002 in Courtroom 8 to
advise the Court on the status of the matters discussed herein.
(11) This Order shall remain in effect until further order of the Court.
2 California has defined an "accommodation" as a change in the CAHSEE (in
format, student response, timing, or other attribute) that does not invalidate the
score achieved. California has defined a "modification" as a change in the
CAHSEE that invalidates the test score because it fundamentally alters what the
test measures.
3 The plaintiff class consists of all students eligible for an IEP or Section 504
plan. This order, however, provides relief only to students with such a plan. The
Court finds the practical difficulties of providing relief to the entire class
insurmountable. Furthermore, states are already under an affirmative obligation to
identify students needing special education and related services. Of course, the
Court expects those efforts to continue.
[**28] IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: February 21,2002
CHARLES R. BREYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Appendix A
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NOTICE TO ALL PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF CHILDREN WITH AN
INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM (IEP) OR A SECTION 504 PLAN
The case Juleus Chapman, et al. v. California Department of Education, et al., [*992]
No. C 01-1780 CRB is currently pending in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. Plaintiffs in the case, a group of learning disabled
students, claim that the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE), to be given to
tenth graders on March 5, 6, and 7, 2002, violates rights guaranteed to learning disabled
students under federal law. The Court has issued an Order that requires the March
CAHSEE to be administered in accordance with the following procedures:
(1) Students shall be permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations or
modifications 4 their IEP or Section 504 plan specifically provides for the CAHSEE. If a
student's IEP or Section 504 plan does not address the CAHSEE specifically, the student
shall be permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations or modifications their
IEP or Section 504 plan provides [**29] for standardized testing. If a student's IEP or
Section 504 plan does not address either the CAHSEE specifically or standardized testing
generally, the student shall be permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations
or modifications their IEP or Section 504 plan provides for general classroom testing.
(2) Some of the accommodations and modifications to which students are entitled under
this Order, pursuant to (1) above, have already been approved by the State. With regard
to others, the State has determined that they will "invalidate" the test score and a waiver
will be required before a diploma is granted. While this Order requires that students be
permitted to take the CAHSEE with any accommodations or modifications defined in (1)
above, the Court has not yet decided how taking the CAHSEE with a modification not
approved by the State will affect the receipt of a diploma. A student may choose to
forego any accommodation or modification to which he or she is entitled under this
Order.
(3) If a student's IEP or Section 504 plan specifically provides for an alternate assessment
in lieu of the CAHSEE, an alternate assessment shall be provided. If a student's IEP or
Section 504 [**30] plan does not specifically address the CAHSEE but provides for an
alternate assessment in lieu of general standardized testing, an alternate assessment to the
CAHSEE shall be provided. If a student's IEP or Section 504 plan does not specifically
address the CAHSEE or standardized testing but provides for an alternate assessment in
lieu of general classroom testing, an alternate assessment to the CAHSEE shall be
provided. Students entitled to an alternate assessment shall not be required to take the
CAHSEE, but may do so if they chose.
(4) While this Order requires that an alternate assessment be provided to certain students,
the Court has not yet decided how an alternate assessment will affect the receipt of a
diploma.
(5) In order for a student covered by this Order to avail himself or herself of any rights
under this Order, no additional IEP or Section 504 team meeting shall be necessary.
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4 California has defined an "accommodation" as a change in the CAHSEE (in
format, student response, timing, or other attribute) that does not invalidate the
score achieved. California has defined a "modification" as a change in the
CAHSEE that invalidates the test score because it fundamentally alters what the
test measures.
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In the M atter of New York Performance Standards Consortium et al., Appellants, v.
New York State Education D epartm ent et al., Respondents.
90820
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD
DEPARTMENT
293 A.D.2d 113; 741 N.Y.S.2d 349; 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4790
May 9,2002, Decided
May 9,2002, Entered
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Anthony T.
Kane, J.), entered November 8, 2001 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners'
application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of
respondent Commissioner of Education revoking a variance permitting member schools
of petitioner New York Performance Standards Consortium to substitute their own
performance-based assessments for the State Regents examinations.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed, without costs.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, a consortium of 28 public schools, requested a
variance from respondent New York State Education Department to permit them to
substitute their own performance-based assessments for the state regents examinations.
After the department denied a variance, the consortium filed suit under N.Y.C.P.L.R. art.
78 to review the department's ruling. The trial court dismissed the consortium's
application, and the consortium appealed.
OVERVIEW: The consortium advocated the use o f performance-based assessments in
lieu of state regents examinations for its students. It received a variance from the
department permitting its schools to utilize these assessments. After the variance expired,
the department adopted a new set of comprehensive learning standards. It denied the
consortium's variance request because it found that the consortium did not meet the
applicable regulatory requirements. In so doing, the department discussed the precise
manner in which the consortium's members had failed to demonstrate compliance with
each of the requisite criteria. On appeal, the consortium contended that the department's
failure to conduct the periodic reviews outlined in the earlier variance precluded it from
denying an extension. The appellate court held that this was an incorrect interpretation of
the terms of the variance; the department's failure to conduct such reviews was not a basis
for affording relief. As the consortium did not meet the applicable regulatory
requirements for obtaining a variance, the department's denial of a variance was not
arbitrary or capricious.
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.
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CORE TERMS: variance, arbitrary and capricious, review process, performance-based,
error of law, failed to demonstrate, record reflects, participating, disapproving,
conditional, recommended, requisite, annual, case law, come forward, inter alia,
indefinitely, prematurely, educational, irrational, commencing, graduation, terminate,
affording, learning, rigorous, annulled, revised, annul, petitioners contend
COUNSEL: Weil, Gotshal & Manges L.L.P., New York City {Richard J. Davis of
counsel), for appellants. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany {Denise A. Hartman of
counsel), for respondents.
JUDGES: Before: Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ. Mercure, J.P.,
Peters, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.
OPINION BY: Crew
OPINION
[*114] [**350] Crew m , J.
Petitioner New York Performance Standards Consortium (hereinafter the Consortium) is
comprised of 28 public high schools that advocate the use of performance-based
assessments in lieu of State Regents examinations. Specifically, these schools require
students to successfully [***2] complete five performance-based tasks in the core
academic disciplines in order to graduate—a research paper, a literary essay, a scientific
experiment, a mathematics project and an oral portfolio presentation/defense. SOLE
CRITERION In May 1995, the Consortium received a variance from respondent
Education Department permitting its members to utilize the foregoing assessments in lieu
of the otherwise required Regents examinations. The variance was effective for a fiveyear period commencing with the 1995-1996 academic year and was subject to a number
of conditions including, inter alia, periodic reviews conducted by the Department.
ALTERNATE ASSESSMENT
Thereafter, beginning in 1996, the Department adopted a new set of comprehensive
learning standards resulting in, inter alia, an increase in the number of credits required for
graduation and the administration of more stringent Regents examinations {see, 8
NYCRR part 100). In conjunction therewith, the procedure for reviewing and approving
alternative assessments also was modified {see, 8 NYCRR 100.5 [a] [5]). Under the new
regulations, respondent Commissioner of Education established the [***3] State
Assessment Panel (hereinafter SAP), which was charged with reviewing any proposed
alternative assessments and advising the Commissioner as to whether such assessments
[**351] were aligned with the revised state learning standards and were as rigorous and
reliable as the corresponding Regents examinations. Thus, under such regulations, the
[*115] only permissible substitute for the upgraded Regents examinations was an
alternative assessment recommended by SAP and approved for statewide use by the
Commissioner {see, 8 NYCRR 100.2 [f]).
Throughout 1998 and 1999, the Department notified all public high schools, including the
Consortium's members, of the revised educational standards and the criteria/procedure for
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the approval of proposed alternative assessments. Indeed, the record reflects that by letter
dated June 21, 1999, petitioner Ann Cook, a member of the Consortium's Executive
Committee, was expressly notified of the new criteria and of the need for the
Consortium's members to satisfy these new requirements for any future variances. Cook
also was advised at this time that the new review process was "a rigorous one which
[would] [***4] require[] extensive time and effort by the entity submitting a proposed
alternative assessment." Thereafter, in November 1999, the Consortium applied to SAP
for a continuation of the 1995 variance. Upon reviewing such application, and after citing
the need for the Consortium to provide it with additional information and data
demonstrating the Consortium's compliance with the applicable regulatory criteria, SAP
recommended granting a narrow, conditional variance for only those schools included in
the original variance and for only those students in the graduating classes of 2000 and
2001 who entered such schools in September 1996 or September 1997. The conditional
approval was set to expire in February 2001.
In January 2000, the Commissioner declined to approve the proposed alternative
assessment submitted by the Consortium, finding that the Consortium either failed to
address certain of the regulatory criteria in its application or failed to submit sufficient
information to demonstrate its compliance therewith. As to the requested extension o f the
then-existing variance, the Commissioner again found insufficient information to render
an informed decision on this point. The [***5] Commissioner, however, permitted the
variance to remain in effect for the 2000-2001 academic year and created the Blue
Ribbon Panel (hereinafter the Panel), consisting of nationally recognized testing experts,
to evaluate whether the Consortium's proposed alternative assessments satisfied the
criteria established by the Department.
In May 2000, the Commissioner and various Department staff members met with the
principals and other representatives of the Consortium's member schools to discuss the
Panel's evaluation process and to outline the type of data that would [*116] be required in
order to demonstrate that the proposed alternative assessments complied with the
underlying regulatory criteria. Although the Panel initially was scheduled to complete
this evaluation by December 2000, the Consortium's member schools apparently were not
forthcoming with the requested information and, therefore, the Panel requested and
received a three-month extension in order to gather additional data. In March 2001, the
Panel issued its report, concluding that the "dearth of evidence" available to it precluded a
finding that the proposed alternative assessment program advocated by the Consortium
[***6] satisfied the regulatory criteria. Instead, the Panel recommended that the
Commissioner issue an interim, nonrenewable three-year variance, thereby affording the
Consortium and the Department an opportunity to collect and evaluate the information
necessary to render a final decision in this regard.
[**352] By determination dated April 19,2001, the Commissioner found that the
proposed alternative assessments submitted by the Consortium did not meet the
applicable regulatory requirements and, therefore, approval of such assessments and
extension of the requested variance was denied. In so doing, the Commissioner discussed
the precise manner in which the Consortium's member schools had failed to demonstrate
compliance with each of the requisite criteria. As to the Panel's recommendation that the
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Consortium be granted a further opportunity to compile and submit additional
information, the Commissioner noted that "the Consortium schools have had more than
five years to gather data. I am not convinced that additional time will produce better
results." Accordingly, the Commissioner established a Regents examination schedule for
the Consortium's member schools, noting that the Consortium [***7] had the option in
the future of developing additional evidence and again applying for a variance from the
Regents examination requirements.
Petitioners thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to
annul the Commissioner's determination. Supreme Court dismissed petitioners'
application, finding that the Commissioner's determination was neither irrational,
arbitrary and capricious nor affected by an error of law. This appeal by petitioners
ensued. ALTERNATE ASSESSMENT
We affirm. Petitioners initially contend that the Department's apparent failure to conduct
the periodic reviews outlined in the 1995 variance precluded the Department from
denying the requested extension. The 1995 variance was granted subject to a number of
conditions, including an annual review of the [*117] participating schools' alternative
assessment programs. Such review, in turn, consisted of three parts including, insofar as
is relevant to this appeal, a "formative" review by the Department during the first four
years of the variance and a "summative" review in the fifth year. The variance further
provided that "if for any reason the [Department] does not conduct a review or reviews,
the [***8] waiver shall nonetheless continue in effect." Seizing upon this final clause of
the variance, petitioners argue that the Department's failure to comply with the review
procedures entitled the Consortium to an extension o f the variance in perpetuity. We
cannot agree.
The 1995 variance plainly and unequivocally states that it "shall be effective for a period
of five years commencing with the 1995-96 school year" provided the conditions set forth
therein are met. In addition to the aforementioned review process, the variance required
participating schools to submit an assessment plan on an annual basis and to ensure that
the "alternative assessments] employed ... measure curriculum content and student
performance standards that meet or exceed the standards reflected by Regents
examinations or Regents Competency Tests, as appropriate." Adopting the construction
urged by petitioners would, in our view, render the remaining conditions set forth in the
variance meaningless. Affording the words employed in the variance their plain and
ordinary meaning (see, Estate o f Hatch v. NYCO Mins., 245 AD2d 746, 747), * we
conclude that the contested clause simply means that the [***9] Department could not
prematurely terminate the variance by failing to conduct one or more of the required
reviews and not, [**353] as petitioners assert, that the five-year variance continues
indefinitely until such time as the Department completes the required review. Thus, the
Department's apparent failure to conduct such reviews does not afford petitioners a basis
for relief.
* As we do not perceive any ambiguity in this regard, we need not consider the
extrinsic evidence relied upon by petitioners.
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Nor are we persuaded that the Commissioner's determination disapproving the
Consortium's proposed alternative assessment program and denying the requested
variance must be annulled. Statutory and case law make clear that the Commissioner is
vested with the authority to enforce the educational policies of this state (see, Education
Law § 305 [1]; see also, Matter o f New York City School Bds. Assn. v. Board o f Educ. o f
City School Dist. o f City ofN. Y, 39 NY2d 111, 116), [***101 including the power to
promulgate rules and regulations governing [*118] graduation requirements (see, Matter
o f Board o f Educ. o f Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist. v. Ambach, 90
AD2d 227, 231-232, affd 60 NY2d 758, cert denied 465 US 1101) and the approval of
alternative assessment programs (see, 8 NYCRR 100.2 [f]). The case law makes equally
clear that in reviewing the Commissioner's determination, our inquiry is limited to
whether such determination was arbitrary and capricious, lacked a rational basis or was
affected by an error of law (see, Matter o f Board o f Educ. o f Monticello Cent. School
Dist. v. Commissioner o f Educ., 91 NY2d 133, 139).+
Applying these principles to the matter before us, we are unable to discern a basis upon
which to annul the Commissioner's determination. In disapproving the proposed
alternative assessments and denying the requested variance, the Commissioner addressed
each of the regulatory criteria and specified the manner in which the Consortium and its
member schools failed to demonstrate compliance therewith. To the extent that [***H]
petitioners contend that the Commissioner's findings contravene those made by the Panel,
we need note only that the Panel played a purely advisory role in this regard and,
ultimately, it was the Commissioner's task to determine whether the proposed alternative
assessments and variance should be granted. ALTERNATE ASSESSMENTS
Equally unpersuasive is petitioners' assertion that the Department's failure to conduct the
required review process somehow precluded them from coming forward with sufficient
proof to demonstrate their compliance with the applicable regulatory criteria. The record
reflects that the Consortium and its member schools had ample and repeated
opportunities to provide SAP and the Panel with the information necessary to permit a
finding that the proposed alternative assessments should be approved, and their failure to
come forward with the requisite proof does not provide a basis upon which the
underlying determination may be annulled.
As a final matter, petitioners contend that it has not been demonstrated that the Regents
examinations meet the regulatory criteria used to evaluate proposed alternative
assessments and, therefore, the denial of petitioners' assessments and the requested
[***12] variance was arbitrary and capricious. Again, we cannot agree. The worthiness
of the Regents examinations is not at issue on this appeal. Moreover, even assuming that
some shortcoming in evaluating the efficacy of the Regents program and examinations
may exist (and there certainly is no evidence of that here), any such deficiency
nonetheless does not excuse [*119] petitioners from demonstrating their compliance with
the regulatory provisions governing proposed alternative assessments. [**354]
Petitioners' remaining contentions, including their assertion that the Commissioner's
determination violates their due process rights, have been examined and found to be
lacking in merit, due process STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION PREVAILED
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Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
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RYAN SMILEY, by his guardian ad litem Krista Smiley; JENNIFER LYONS, by
her guardian ad litem Susan Lyons, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated; LEARNING DISABILITIES ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA;
JULEUS CHAPMAN, by his guardian ad litem Monique Chapman, PlaintiffsAppeUees, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; DELAINE
EASTIN, Superintendent of Public Education; CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, Defendants-Appellants, and FREMONT UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; SHARON JONES, Superintendent of Fremont Unified School District,
Defendants. RYAN SMILEY, by his guardian ad litem Krista Smiley; JENNIFER
LYONS, by her guardian ad litem Susan Lyons, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; LEARNING DISABILITIES
ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA; JULEUS CHAPMAN, by his guardian ad
litem Monique Chapman, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION; DELAINE EASTIN, Superintendent of Public Education;
CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants-Appellants, and
FREMONT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SHARON JONES, Superintendent of
Fremont Unified School District, Defendants.
No. 02-15552, No. 02-15553
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
45 Fed. Appx. 780; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18466
August 14,2002, Argued and Submitted, San Francisco, California
September 4,2002, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] RULES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY
LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE
RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. D.C. No.CV-01-01780-CRB, D.C. No. CV-01-01780-CRB.
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding.
DISPOSITION: Judgment of the district court reversed and remanded.
COUNSEL: For RYAN SMILEY, JENNIFER LYONS, Learning Disabilities
Association of California, JULEUS CHAPMAN, Plaintiffs-Appellees (02-15552,0215553): Sidney M. Wolinsky, Esq., Melissa W. Kasnitz, Esq., DISABILITY RIGHTS
ADVOCATES, Oakland, CA.
For RYAN SMILEY, Plaintiff-Appellee (02-15552,02-15553): Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Esq., LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIM ANN AND BERSTEIN LLP, Eve H. Cervantez, Esq.,
LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN AND BERNSTEIN, LLP, San Francisco, CA.
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For JENNIFER LYONS, Learning Disabilities Association o f California, JULEUS
CHAPMAN, Plaintiffs-Appellees (02-15552, 02-15553): Elizabeth Joan Cabraser, Esq.,
Eve H. Cervantez, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, San Francisco,
CA.
For California Department of Education, DELAINE EASTIN, California State Board
of Education, Defendants-Appellants [**2] (02-15552, 02-15553): Michael E. Hersher,
Esq., CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Sacramento, CA.
For California Department of Education, DELAINE EASTIN, California State Board
of Education, Defendants-Appellants (02-15552,02-15553): Douglas M. Press, Esq., San
Francisco, CA.
For California Department of Education, DELAINE EASTIN, California State Board
of Education, Defendants-Appellants (02-15552, 02-15553): Teresa L. Stinson, Esq.,
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, San Francisco, CA.
For Fremont Unified School District, Defendant (02-15552, 02-15553): James R.
Hawley, Esq., HOGE FENTON JONES AND APPEL, San Jose, CA.
SHARON JONES, Defendant (02-15552,02-15553): No Appearance.
JUDGES: Before: HALL, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
[*780] MEMORANDUM *
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by
the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: HALL, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
With respect [**3] to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the district court's preliminary injunction
order dated February 21, 2002,the State Defendants claim that those provisions, which
permit all members of the plaintiff class to take the California High School Exit
Examination ("CAHSEE") with the necessary accommodations and modifications, are
already ineffect. To avoid any ambiguity on this point, we therefore decline to modify
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the district court's order.
The challenge to the waiver provisions of the CAHSEE is not currently ripe for
adjudication as to claims relating to potential [*781] future harms caused by the possible
denial of a waiver. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300,140 L. Ed. 2d 406,118
S. Ct. 1257 (1998) (noting that the ripeness doctrine is triggered when the claims at issue
relate to "contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The challenge is ripe as to the claim that the uncertainty of the waiver process burdens
students' rights to participate in the examination by forcing them to choose between
forgoing the use of modifications or risking the denial of a waiver. [**4] Because they
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have alleged a real and immediate injury to all learning disabled students whose IEPs
indicate the use of modifications, the plaintiffs have standing to raise this claim. See City
o f Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
However, though the right to participate in statewide testing requires that participation
must be meaningful, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(17)(A); H.R. Rep. 105-95,1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98-99, it does not require us to prohibit the state from exercising its
traditional authority to set diploma requirements. Consequently, the plaintiffs have not
met their burden to demonstrate probable success on the merits or a sufficiently serious
question going to the merits to make the issue a fair ground for litigation. See Baby Tam
& Co. v. City o f Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998).
The challenge to the putative failure to establish an alternate assessment process is also
insufficiently ripe for adjudication at the present time. See Texas v. United States, 523
U.S. at 300.
Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's order with respect [**5] to paragraphs 3-5
and 8 of the preliminary injunction and REMAND with directions to dissolve those
portions of the preliminary injunction. REVERSED in part and REMANDED. Each party
is to bear its own costs on appeal.
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STUDENT NO. 9 1 & others 2 vs. BOARD OF EDUCATION & others.
3
1 A minor, by her mother and next friend, "EV."
2 Five public school students in the high school class of 2003, on behalf of themselves
and on behalf of other students similarly situated. Eight other public school
students, named in the original and in the first amended complaint, have since been
dismissed from the case.
3 The Department of Education (department), the chairman of the Board of
Education, and the Commissioner of Education (commissioner).
SJC-09046
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
440 Mass. 752; 802 N.E.2d 105; 2004 Mass. LEXIS 28
November 6, 2003, Argued
January 27,2004, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Suffolk. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court
Department on January 7, 2003. An emergency motion for a preliminary injunction was
heard by Margot Botsford, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The court granted direct review to an appeal by plaintiff
high school students from an order of the Superior Court Department, Suffolk
(Massachusetts), denying their emergency motion for preliminary injunctive relief against
the application of Mass. Regs. Code tit. 630, § 30.03 (2000), a regulation promulgated by
defendant Massachusetts Board of Education pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69.
OVERVIEW: In response to a Massachusetts constitutional mandate, the legislature
enacted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, which obliged the board to set competency standards in
at least five subjects and to adopt regulations prescribing appropriate assessment tools
that students would be required to pass before graduating from high school. When the
range of student deficiencies became apparent, the Board adopted an approach that began
by requiring students only to pass tests in reading and mathematical skills. Students who
had not passed the proficiency tests and faced possible ineligibility for assessment
alternatives argued that the Board had exceeded its powers in testing on only two
subjects. The high court held that the students had failed to make the required showing
for injunctive relief of probable success of their facial invalidity challenge.
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The powers bestowed upon the board by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, § IB were very broad,
and the legislature's subsequent funding of the abbreviated proficiency testing program
indicated its approval of the approach taken.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the order denying preliminary injunctive relief.
CORE TERMS: competency, exam, mathematics, graduation, grade, school districts,
curriculum, high school, language arts, science and technology, score, skills, preliminary
injunction, academic standards, disability, scaled, public schools, social science, graders,
budget, tested, prerequisite, portfolio, educated, school students, foreign languages, line
items, accountability, accountable, graduating
COUNSEL: Thomas C. Frongillo (David S. Godkin with him), for the plaintiffs.
Pierce O. Cray, Assistant Attorney General (John R. Hitt, Assistant Attorney General,
Rhoda Schneider & Lucy Wall with him), for the defendants.
David M. Mandel, for Massachusetts Association of Vocational Administrators, amicus
curiae, was present but did not argue.
The following submitted briefs, for amici curiae:
Joel Z. Eigerman & Sumner Z. Kaplan, for Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action &
others.
Sarah R. Wunsch, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts.
Thomas J. Dougherty, Kurt Wm. Hemr, Alisha Quintana, & Stephen J. Finnegan, for
Massachusetts Association of School Committees.
John H. Walsh, for Michael Colin Walsh & others.
Henry C. Dinger & Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, for Massachusetts Business Alliance for
Education & others.
Mark Alan Perkins, for Massachusetts Coalition, for Authentic Reform in Education
[***2] & others.
David Lee Turner, Town Counsel, for town of Brookline.
JUDGES: Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, & Cordy, JJ.
IRELAND, J. (concurring).
OPINION BY: GREANEY
OPINION
[**107] [*753] GREANEY, J. The plaintiffs, public school students in the high school
class of 2003, challenge the facial validity o f 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.03 (2000), a
regulation adopted by the Board of Education (board), which required them to pass the
tenth grade English language arts and mathematics sections o f the Massachusetts
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Comprehensive Assessment System examination (MCAS exam) in order to graduate
from high school. 4 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendants from enforcing the regulation and from requiring [*754] students in the high
school class of 2003 to pass the tenth grade English language arts and mathematics
sections of the MCAS exam as a prerequisite to the award of a high school diploma. A
judge of the Superior Court denied the preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed.
We granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review and now affirm the
judge's order.
[***3] 1. The background of the case is as follows. In McDuffy v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 617-619, [**108] 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993), this
court held that the Massachusetts Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on the
Commonwealth to ensure that all children in its public schools receive an education that
is to include certain specific training. 5 Virtually simultaneously with the June 15 release
of the McDuffy decision, the Legislature by emergency preamble, on June 18, 1993,
enacted the Education Reform Act of 1993 (Act), St. 1993, c. 71. Section 27 of the Act,
which rewrote G. L. c. 69, § 1, sets forth its intent and purpose in the following terms:
"It is hereby declared to be a paramount goal of the Commonwealth to provide a public
education system of sufficient quality to extend to all children 6 the opportunity to reach
their full potential and to lead lives as participants [*755] in the political and social life of
the Commonwealth and as contributors to its economy. It is therefore the intent of this
title to ensure: (1) that each public school classroom provides the conditions for all pupils
to engage fully in learning as [***4] an inherently meaningful and enjoyable activity
without threats to their sense of security or self-esteem, (2) a consistent commitment of
resources sufficient to provide a high quality public education to every child, (3) a
deliberate process for establishing and achieving specific educational performance goals
for every child, and (4) an effective mechanism for monitoring progress toward those
goals and for holding educators accountable for their achievement."
St. 1993, c. 71, § 27. NEXUS TO STATE GOASL
Of relevance are three sections of G. L. c. 69, namely, §§ ID, IE, and II, which were
inserted by St. 1993, c. 71, § 29. These provisions imposed various obligations on the
commissioner and the board, in furtherance o f education reform, including obligations to
develop "academic standards" and "curriculum frameworks" in certain "core subjects."
See G. L. c. 69, § ID, IE. First, the board, through the commissioner, was required "to
institute a process to develop academic standards for the core subjects of mathematics,
science and technology, history and social science, English, foreign languages and the
arts." 7 Id. at § ID, [**109] second par. Second, the board [***6] was required to direct
the commissioner "to institute a process for drawing up curriculum frameworks for the
core subjects covered by the academic standards provided in [§ ID]." Id. At § IE, first
par. [*756] The curriculum frameworks "shall present broad pedagogical approaches and
strategies for assisting students in the development of the skills, competencies and
knowledge called for by these standards... .They shall provide sufficient detail to guide
the promulgation of student assessment instruments." Id.
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[***7] The Act imposed on the board an obligation to create objective "assessments" to
measure both school and student performance. See G. L. c. 69, § 11, first, second, and
third pars., inserted by St. 1993, c. 71, § 29. 8 The first three paragraphs of § II, provide,
in pertinent part:
"The board shall adopt a system for evaluating on an annual basis the performance of
both public school districts and individual public schools. With respect to individual
schools, the system shall include instruments designed to assess the extent to which
schools and districts succeed in improving or fail to improve student performance, as
defined by student acquisition of the skills,
competencies and knowledge called for by the academic standards and embodied in the
curriculum frameworks established by the board pursuant to [§§ ID and IE] in the areas
of mathematics, science and technology, history and social science, English, foreign
languages and the arts, as well as by other gauges of student learning judged by the board
to be relevant and meaningful to students, parents, teachers, administrators, and
taxpayers.
"The system shall be designed both to measure [***8] outcomes and results regarding
student performance, and to improve the effectiveness of curriculum and instruction. In
its design and application, the system shall strike a balance among considerations of
accuracy, fairness, expense and administration. The system shall employ a variety of
assessment instruments on either a comprehensive or statistically valid sampling basis.
Such instruments shall be criterion referenced, assessing whether students are meeting the
academic standards described in this chapter. As much as is practicable, especially in the
case of students whose performance is difficult to assess using [*757] conventional
methods, such instruments shall include consideration of work samples, projects and
portfolios, and shall facilitate authentic and direct gauges of student performance. Such
instruments shall provide the means to compare student performance among the various
school systems and communities in the Commonwealth, and between students in other
States and in other nations, especially those nations which compete with the
Commonwealth for employment and economic opportunities. . . .
"In addition, comprehensive diagnostic assessment o f individual students [***9] shall be
conducted at least in the fourth, eighth and tenth grades. Said diagnostic assessments
shall identify academic achievement levels of all students [**110] in order to inform
teachers, parents, administrators and the students themselves, as to individual academic
performance. The board shall develop procedures for updating, improving or refining the
assessment system."(Emphases added.)
The Act also amended G. L. c. 69 to impose a graduation requirement called the
"competency determination." G. L. c. 69, § ID, inserted by St. 1993, c. 71, § 29. The
provision reads, in pertinent part:
"The 'competency determination' shall be based on the academic standards and
curriculum frameworks for tenth graders in the areas of mathematics, science and
technology, history and social science, and English, 9 and shall represent a determination
that a [***10] particular student has demonstrated mastery o f a common core of skills,
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competencies and knowledge in these areas, as measured by the assessment instruments
described in [§ 1]. Satisfaction of the requirements of the competency determination shall
be a condition for high school graduation. If the particular student's assessment results for
the tenth grade do not demonstrate the required level of competency, the student shall
have the right to participate in the assessment program for the following year or years.
Students who fail to satisfy the requirements of the competency determination [*758]
may be eligible to receive an educational assistance plan designed within the confines of
the foundation budget to impart the skills, competencies and knowledge required to attain
the required level of mastery. .. ." (Emphasis added.) Id. at § ID, fourth par., (i). 10
All high school students attending public schools, including vocational high schools and
charter schools, and all students educated with State funds, are subject to the competency
determination.
The Act granted extensive authority to the board:
"The board shall establish such other policies as it deems necessary
to fulfill the
purposes of this chapter . . . . In accordance with the provisions of [G. L. c. 30A], the
board may promulgate regulations as necessary to fulfill said purposes. Said regulations
shall be promulgated so as to encourage innovation, flexibility and accountability in
schools and school districts."
G. L. c. 69, § IB, twenty-fourth par., inserted by St. 1993, c. 71, § 29.
The board undertook its mandate to implement the Act, and, over time, established
curriculum frameworks for all core subjects and formulated the MCAS exam. The exam
is a customized test, designed by a national testing company specifically for
Massachusetts to be closely [***12] aligned with the curriculum frameworks. The MCAS
exam contains multiple-choice questions; short answer questions requiring responses
ranging from a number or a few words to several sentences; open response questions,
requiring students to write a detailed or descriptive answer up to one-half page long, or a
chart or graph; and writing prompts, requiring students to write a composition that
develops an idea coherently and uses proper punctuation, spelling, and grammar. There
are four levels of "performance levels," or scores, for the MCAS exam. A scaled
score of 200-219 [**111] corresponds to "failing," a scaled score of 220-238 corresponds
to "needs improvement," a scaled score of 240-258 [*759] corresponds to "proficient,"
and a scaled score of 260-280 corresponds to "advanced." VALIDITY
The MCAS exam was administered for the first time in May, 1998, and initially covered
the core subjects of English language arts, mathematics, and science and technology. On
May 1,1998, the department publicly announced that the MCAS exam in four subjects —
English, mathematics, science, and social studies - would be used as the high school
competency determination, or graduation requirement, called for in G. L. c. 69, § ID
[***13], to begin with students enrolled in the tenth grade in 2001, who would be
graduating in 2003.
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In 1998, forty-two per cent of eighth graders taking the MCAS exam failed the
mathematics section, fourteen per cent failed the English section, and forty-one per cent
failed the science and technology section. The same year, fifty-two per cent of tenth
graders failed the mathematics section, twenty-eight per cent failed the English section,
and thirty-six per cent failed the science and technology section. In 1999, forty per cent
of eighth graders taking the MCAS exam failed the mathematics section, thirteen per cent
failed the English section, forty-five per cent failed the science and technology section,
and forty-nine per cent failed a newly added history section. That same year, fifty-three
per cent of tenth graders failed the mathematics section, thirty-two per cent failed the
English section, and thirty-eight per cent failed the science and technology section. Tenth
grade students were not tested in history. Board minutes indicated that, at least in part
because of those results, the board, in 1999, began to discuss the possibility of phasing
various core subjects into the MCAS [***14] exam graduation requirement. The board
adopted the challenged regulation, 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.03, on January 25,2000,
and the regulation became effective on February 18, 2000. The regulation provides:
"Students in the graduating class of 2003 shall meet or exceed the Needs Improvement
threshold scaled score of 220 on both the English Language Arts and the Mathematics
MCAS grade 10 tests in order to satisfy the requirements of the Competency
Determination. The Board [*760] intends to raise the threshold scaled score required for
the Competency Determination in future years." 11
[***15] The board also adopted a regulation, 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.05,that creates
an alternate way for students to satisfy the graduation requirement. The regulation
establishes a "performance appeals" process which allows a student to satisfy the MCAS
grade ten exam requirement despite a nonpassing score. 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.05
(1), (10). The regulation contains several waivable eligibility requirements, including
scoring at least a score of 216 on a prior MCAS exam. Id. at § 30.05 (3) (b), (4). No
performance appeal can be brought for a student whose knowledge in English language
arts and mathematics does not at least meet "a performance level equivalent to 220 on the
MCAS [**112] grade 10 test [*761] required for the competency determination." 12 Id.
at § 30.05(1).
[***16] Approximately six months after the board promulgated the regulation, the
Legislature, by St. 2000, c. 159, § 137, amended § II of G. L. c. 69 to require certain
school districts to prepare "MCAS success plans." Section 11 provides that:
" Each school district in which more than [twenty] per cent of the students score below
level two [i.e., needs improvement] on the [MCAS] exam . .. shall submit an MCAS
success plan to the department. The plan shall describe the school district's strategies for
helping each student to master the skills, competencies and knowledge required for the
competency determination described in [§ ID, fourth par., (i)]."
The Legislature has also specifically made reference to the MCAS exam in numerous
budget line items. The Legislature appropriated funds in the fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget
for intensive education programs to assist students in passing the MCAS exam.
REMEDIATION See St. 2002, c. 184, § 2, line item 7061-9404. Additional funds were
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appropriated in the FY 2004 budget, some directed toward helping students "in the
graduating classes of 2003, 2004, and 2005 who have not obtained a competency
determination on either the tenth grade English [***17] or math MCAS exams." See St.
2003, c. 26, § 2, line item 7061-9404. Both branches of the Legislature also rejected
amendments to the FY 2004 budget that would have eliminated the MCAS graduation
requirement for students in the classes of 2003 and 2004. See 2003 House J. 261; 2003
Senate J. 242-243.
By March, 2003, approximately ninety per cent of the members of the high school
graduation class of 2003 had passed the tenth grade English and math MCAS exams,
making them eligible for high school graduation, compared to only sixty-eight per cent
when the class first took the exam in 2001. High school juniors and seniors who, as of
March, 2003, had not yet passed were given an opportunity to participate in intensive
English and mathematics remedial programs, and were permitted to take the MCAS exam
again in May, 2003, in time for graduation in June. Students who failed the May, 2003,
MCAS exam were given the opportunity to attend free remediation classes during the
summer and to take the exam again in August, 2003. Also, the board and the department
worked to develop remedial education programs in community colleges and workplace
settings for students who satisfied local graduation [***18] requirements but had not yet
obtained the competency determination. These students have been permitted, at no cost,
to take further MCAS exams as many times as they choose. The board has established a
"certificate of attainment" which school committees may award to students who meet
local high school graduation requirements, but who do not qualify for a diploma because
they have not passed the English language arts or mathematics sections of the MCAS
exam. REMEDIATION/ MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES
[*762] The plaintiffs are members of the high school class o f 2003. With one exception,
the plaintiffs are public school students. One plaintiff, who is blind, is enrolled at public
expense at the Perkins State School for the Blind. Some o f the plaintiffs have one or more
disabilities and [**113] have received special education services. One student has limited
English proficiency. All of the plaintiffs have satisfied local graduation requirements, and
would have graduated but for their failure to pass either or both the English language arts
and mathematics sections of the MCAS exam. Several of the plaintiffs have failed
multiple administrations of the mathematics section of the MCAS exam. One plaintiff, on
four occasions, has failed both [***19] the English language arts and mathematics
sections of the MCAS exam, despite his participation in remediation programs. This
plaintiff was told that his cohort (class size) was too small to permit a performance
appeal.
2. The judge applied the established test in assessing the plaintiffs' application for a
preliminary injunction, see Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Board of Health, 433 Mass. 217, 219, 741
N.E.2d 37 (2001), and she kept in mind the additional requirement that, when a party
seeks to enjoin governmental action, the judge must also consider whether the grant of an
injunction would adversely affect the public interest. See Landry v. Attorney Gen., 429
Mass. 336, 343,709 N.E.2d 1085 (1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 663,
120 S. Ct. 785 (2000). The judge also correctly recognized that the significant remedy of
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a preliminary injunction should not be granted unless the plaintiffs had made a clear
showing of entitlement thereto. Id.
The plaintiffs argue essentially that the regulation is facially invalid because it operates
ultra vires in conflict with several provisions of the Act. In challenging the regulation, the
plaintiffs have the burden, a formidable [***20] one, of demonstrating its illegality. See
Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 771, 767 N.E.2d 549
(2002); Greenleaf Fin. Co. v. Small Loans Regulatory Bd., 377 Mass. 282,293, 385
N.E.2d 1364 (1979). An administrative agency, like the board, has considerable leeway
in interpreting a statute it is charged with enforcing, and regulations adopted by the
agency stand on the same footing as statutes, with reasonable presumptions to be made in
favor of [*763] their validity. See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
supra; Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Bd., 421 Mass. 196,
210-211, 656 N.E.2d 563 (1995); Quincy v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 421
Mass. 463,468, 658 N.E.2d 145 (1995). A court will not declare a regulation void unless
its provisions cannot, in any appropriate way, be interpreted in harmony with the
legislative mandate. See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., supra, and
cases cited.
The plaintiffs' central contention is that the regulation's limitation of the competency
determination, or graduation requirement, to the English language [***21] arts and
mathematics sections of the MCAS exam conflicts with G. L. c. 69, § ID, fourth par., (i),
which states that the '"competency determination' shall be based on the academic
standards and curriculum frameworks for tenth graders in the areas of mathematics,
science and technology, history and social science, foreign languages, and English" and
must indicate that "a particular student has demonstrated mastery of a common core of
skills, competencies and knowledge in these areas . . . " (emphases added). Thus, the
plaintiffs conclude, the regulation's use of the MCAS exam is unlawful because the
competency determination does not take into account the other core subjects mentioned
in the statute.
The language of § ID, fourth par., (i), and the use of the word "shall," has to be read to
effectuate the Legislature's purpose in passing the Act, with attention to [**114] the fact
that the Legislature has entrusted the board with the Act's implementation. The
requirement that the competency determination "shall" be based on multiple subject areas
cannot be construed as permissive in the sense that the board can omit entirely and
permanently any core subject [***22] it chooses. We agree with the judge that, in view of
the purpose of § ID to establish a certain level of knowledge and skills as a prerequisite
to graduation, the statute reasonably should be interpreted to direct the board to create a
competency determination including multiple subject areas while permitting the board, in
its discretion, to phase in those subjects in a reasonable manner and on a reasonable
timetable.
The language in § ID quoted by the plaintiffs does not address [*764] the timing or
sequence of the implementation of the graduation requirement (except that it could not
occur prior to 1998). There is no express prohibition in the statute concerning the
phasing-in of core subjects over time and as curriculum frameworks become revised and
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finalized. Construing the statute to require the board to delay implementation of the
competency determination until it made competence in every core subject a graduation
requirement would only delay education reform and frustrate significantly the
accomplishment of the Legislature's purpose in enacting § ID, fourth par., (i), an
undesirable result that is to be avoided if reasonably possible. See North Shore Realty
Trust v. Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 109, 112, 747 N.E.2d 107 (2001); [***23] Watros v.
Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, Inc., 421 Mass. 106, 113, 653 N.E.2d
589 (1995). "Where the focus of a statutory enactment is reform, the administrative
agency charged with its implementation should construe it broadly so as to further the
goals of such reform." Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., supra at 774.
The board, therefore, could permissibly exercise its discretion by the form of pragmatic
gradualism it undertook, particularly because the fundamental subjects of English
language arts and mathematics can be considered the basic foundational requirements
with which other core subjects can be studied and mastered. Put more colloquially, the
board could properly conclude that a student should have competence in "reading,
writing, and arithmetic" before being tested on competence in science, history, and other
areas.
We reject the plaintiffs' contention that our construction conflicts with the Act's purpose
of holding educators accountable. Rather, the implementation of the regulation is a large
stride in accomplishing that goal. Educators have established the required academic
standards and curriculum frameworks, [***24] and have implemented the competency
determination in the subjects of English language arts and mathematics. To be sure, the
defendants have not been, and are in no way, excused from requiring a demonstration of
competence in the other core subjects as a graduation requirement, and the defendants
[*765] acknowledge as much. 13 There is no record support for, and no substance to, the
plaintiffs' argument that because the graduation requirement has not yet been based on
the other core subjects, the students educated in this [**115] State with public funds are
not being provided with a "comprehensive education. "Nothing in the McDuffy decision
requires a graduation requirement, let alone a graduation requirement based on an
assessment of multiple subjects. Simply put, enjoining the regulation, and enjoining the
defendants from requiring the plaintiffs to pass the tenth grade English language arts and
mathematics sections of die MCAS exam as a prerequisite to receiving a high school
diploma, would undermine educator accountability and hinder education reform. NEXUS
TO STATE GOALS EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
[***25] Our interpretation of the regulation finds additional strong support in two other
sources. The first source arises out of other provisions of the Act that give broad
discretion to the board to carry out its responsibilities. See St. 1993, c. 71, § 29. 14 The
[*766] second source, which is much more direct and compelling in its emphasis, is the
Legislature's approval of the board's use of the MCAS exam, as presently structured, to
implement the Act. The approvals primarily are manifested in budget line items passed
by the Legislature over the years, most particularly in FY 2003 and FY 2004,
appropriating substantial sums for intensive remediation programs for those who need
them in order to pass the MCAS exam. 15 As the judge correctly noted, it makes no sense
for the Legislature to provide for targeted, remedial programs, if the Legislature did not
both recognize and confirm the board's determination that passage of the English
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language arts and mathematics sections of the MCAS exam was to serve as the
competency determination that under the Act is a prerequisite for graduation from high
school. In this manner the Legislature has expressed its acceptance of the board's
phasing-in [***26] approach. See Director of the Civil Defense Agency & Office of
Emergency [*767] Preparedness v. Civil Serv. [**116] Comm'n, 373 Mass. 401,409,
367 N.E.2d 1168 (1977); Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 607-608,282 N.E.2d 87
(1972); Director of the Civil Defense Agency & Office of Emergency Preparedness v.
Leger, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 740, 404 N.E.2d 679 (1980). See also Boston Water &
Sewer Comm'n v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 408 Mass. 572, 578, 562 N.E.2d 470
(1990); Assessors of Melrose v. Driscoll, 370 Mass. 443,447, 348 N.E.2d 783 (1976).
3. What has been said above turns aside the additional arguments made by the plaintiffs
and others 16 in seeking a preliminary injunction, including the contention that the Act
requires that the competency of a student be measured by a variety of assessment
instruments such as those mentioned in G. L. c. 69, § I I , second par., including review of
an individual student's portfolio work. Because the judge correctly determined that the
plaintiffs have not shown that there is a likelihood of success on die facial challenge
made, there is no need to consider the judge's determination that the plaintiffs have not
shown irreparable harm in the degree needed to obtain a preliminary injunction.
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
[***28] 4. The order denying the application for a preliminary injunction is affirmed.
So ordered.
CONCUR BY: IRELAND
CONCUR
IRELAND, J. (concurring). I do not disagree that our result is compelled by the
procedural posture of this case and the record before the motion judge. Nonetheless, I
write separately to [*768] voice my concern regarding the lack of progress in providing a
sufficient education to all children educated with public funds in the ten years since this
court decided McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545,
615 N.E.2d 516 (1993). In other contexts, I have expressed concern for the well-being of
our children. See, e.g., Barnett v. Lynn, 433 Mass. 662, 667-668,745 N.E.2d 344 (2001)
(Ireland, J., concurring) (city officials should be expected to take reasonable measures to
protect children when they have advance notice of danger); Brum v. Dartmouth, 428
Mass. 684, 708-710, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (1999) (Ireland, J., concurring, with whom
Abrams and Marshall, JJs., joined) (school officials should take steps to protect children
from harm where they have advance notice of danger).
The education of our children is no less a compelling issue than their [***29] physical
safety. "Local schools lie at the heart of our communities. Each morning, parents across
the Commonwealth send their children off to school. They entrust the schools with
nothing less than the safety and well-being of those most dear to them—their own
children. No arm of government touches more closely the core of our families and our
children than our schools." Brum v. Dartmouth, supra at 709 (Ireland, J., concurring).
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[**117] As the court recalled, ante at & n.5, the McDuffy court held that it was the
constitutional "duty" of the legislative and executive branches to provide sufficient
education in multiple areas "for all [the Commonwealth's] children, rich and poor, in
every city and town." McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., supra at
606, 617-619. The McDuffy court left it to the Legislature (and executive branch) "to
define the precise nature of the task which they face in fulfilling their constitutional duty
to educate our children today, and in the future." Id. at 620.
Declaring that providing a "public education system of sufficient quality to all children
[is] a paramount [***30] goal," the Education Reform Act of 1993 (Act), St. 1993, c. 71,
amending G. L. c. 69, § 1, gave specificity to the McDuffy requirements. Ante a t . The
Act required, inter alia, curriculum frameworks, objective assessments of both students
and schools, and academic standards in core subjects (mathematics, English, science and
technology, history and social science, foreign languages and [*769] the arts). G. L. c. 69,
§§ ID, IE, and II. Ante at . Annual assessment of the performance of both school
districts and individual public schools in improving or failing to improve, inter alia,
student competencies in the core subjects is required. G. L. c. 69, § II. Ante at.
In this case, there are many claims asserted by the plaintiffs that have yet to be tested at
trial. On the record before us today, we know that: (1) the current use of the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) examination means that
some core subjects have been omitted from the requisite competency determination; 17
(2) "the record is devoid of evidence [***31] about when the board plans fully to
implement the Act's curriculum provisions by incorporating the remaining core subjects
into the competency determination"; 18 (3) "alternative routes to a high school diploma,
theoretically available through a 'performance appeal' or an 'alternate assessment,' as a
practical matter are closed to almost all students, particularly those with significant
learning disabilities"; 19 (4) there is a "considerable" disparity in pass rates for different
subgroups within the Commonwealth, [**118] as well as between urban and [*770]
suburban schools, and between different types o f schools; 20 and (5) there is no system in
place to assess the performance of the schools in core subjects not tested by the MCAS
examination. 21
[***33] The education of our children is of "crucial importance." Brum v. Dartmouth
supra at 709 (Ireland, J., concurring), quoting Care & Protection of Charles, 399 Mass.
324, 334-335, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987). "The framers' decision to place the provisions
concerning education in 'The Frame of Government' —rather than in the 'Declaration of
Rights' —demonstrates that the framers conceived o f education as fundamentally related
to the very existence o f government. . . [because] education . . . is the means of diffusing
wisdom, knowledge, and virtue, [and], therefore a prerequisite for the existence and
survival of the Commonwealth." McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ.,
supra at 565-566.
I am concerned that in the ten years since the McDuffy case [*771] was decided and the
Legislature declared education of our children to be a "paramount goal," St. 1993, c. 71, §
27, progress toward providing education in all core subjects to all the Commonwealth's
students educated with public funds, disabled and nondisabled, rich and poor, and of
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every race and ethnicity, has not advanced more. Schools are not being assessed on their
performance [***341 in teaching core subjects beyond English and mathematics. In the
best of circumstances, it will be 2009 before four of the five core subjects will become
part of the assessment, sixteen years after the 1993 McDuffy decision and the 1993 Act.
22 See note 2, supra. The availability of the competency determinations as an assessment
instrument is only the first step in remedying [**119] poor school performance. How
long it will take poorly performing schools or school districts to then be identified,
reviewed, and measures taken to make them accountable for the education of their
students is unknown. 23 These delays do not seem to be in keeping with McDuffy
mandates or the Act, both of which addressed a "state of emergency" in the
Massachusetts education system identified in 1991 by the board itself. McDuffy v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., supra at 552.
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JULIE HANCOCK & others 1 vs. COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION & others. 2
1 Public school students in certain cities and towns of the Commonwealth, including
Brockton, Springfield, and Winchendon.
2 The chair, vice-chair, and nonstudent members of the board of education.
SJC-09267
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
443 Mass. 428; 822 N.E.2d 1134; 2005 Mass. LEXIS 78
October 4, 2004, Argued
February 15,2005, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Corrected March 11, 2005.
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Suffolk. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Suffolk on March 27,1990, and a motion for further relief was
filed in the county court on December 22,1999. The case was reported by Greaney, J.
Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118 (Mass. Super. Ct., Apr. 26,2004)
DISPOSITION: Plaintiffs' motion for further relief is denied, and the single justice's
ongoing jurisdiction is terminated.
CORE TERMS: public education, educational, public schools, budget, teacher, funding,
score, school districts, curriculum, grade, mathematics, capabilities, spending, educate,
school student, progress, special education, fiscal, formula, executive branches,
accountability, Reform Act, constitutional duty, language arts, underperforming, elected,
concurring opinion, stare decisis, enforceable, proficiency.
COUNSEL: Deirdre Roney, Assistant Attorney General (Juliana deHaan Rice & Jane L.
Willoughby, Assistant Attorneys General, with her) for the defendants.
Michael D. Weisman (Rebecca P. McIntyre, Emiliano Mazlen, Peter E. Montgomery,
&Alan Jay Rom with him) for the plaintiffs.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:.
Harvey J. Wolkoff for State Senator Jarrett T. Barrios & others.
Mark R. Freitas for Massachusetts Alliance for Arts Education & others.
Richard W. Benka for Massachusetts Health Council, Inc., & others.
Joel Z. Eigerman for Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action & others.
Daniel J. Gleason for Jonathan Kozol.
Roger L. Rice & Jane E. Lopez for Centro Latino de Chelsea & others.
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M. Julie Patino, Nadine Cohen, & Laura Maslow-Armand for Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law of the Boston Bar Association & others.
Andrea C. Kramer, A. Lauren Carpenter, & Robert E. Sullivan for Massachusetts [***2]
2020 Foundation & others.
Ann Clarke, Stephen J. Finnegan, Jeffrey N. Jacobsen, & Michael J. Long for
Massachusetts Teachers Association/NEA & others.
Thomas J. Dougherty & Kurt Wm. Hemr for Massachusetts Urban School
Superintendents.
Henry C. Dinger & Benjamin M. Wattenmaker for Massachusetts Business Alliance for
Education & others.
M. Robert Dushman, Albert W. Wallis, & Samantha L. Gerlovin for MassPartners for
Public Schools & another.
Daniel J. Losen for The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University.
Michael D. Vhay for Federation for Children with Special Needs, Inc.
Neil V. McKittrick & Patrick M. Curran, Jr., for Strategies for Children, Inc., & another.
JUDGES: Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, Cordy, JJ.
MARSHALL, C.J. (concurring, with whom Spina and Cordy, JJ., join). GREANEY, J.
(dissenting, with whom Ireland, J., joins).
OPINION
[*430j [**1136] BY THE COURT. This matter is before the court on reservation and
report by a single justice. A full description of the procedural background of the matter is
set forth in [***3] the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice.
A majority of the Justices decline to adopt the conclusion of the specially assigned judge
of the Superior Court that [**1137] the Commonwealth presently is not meeting its
obligations under Part n, c. 5, § 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution, and reject her
recommendation for further judicial action at this time. The plaintiffs' motion for further
relief is therefore denied, and the
single justice's ongoing jurisdiction shall be terminated. By this action, the court disposes
of the case in its entirety.
So ordered.
CONCUR BY: MARSHALL; COWIN
CONCUR
MARSHALL, C.J. (concurring, with whom Spina and Cordy, JJ., join). For its effective
functioning, democracy requires an educated citizenry. In Massachusetts the democratic
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imperative to educate finds strong voice in the "education clause" of the Massachusetts
Constitution, Part II, c. 5, § 2 (education clause), 1 [*431] which "imposes an enforceable
duty on the magistrates and Legislatures of this Commonwealth to provide education in
the public schools for the children there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and
without regard to the fiscal capacity of the community or district in which such [***4]
children live." McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545,
621, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993) (McDuffy). This reflects the conviction of the people of
Massachusetts that, because education is "fundamentally related to the very existence of
government," id. at 565, the Commonwealth has a constitutional duty to prepare all of its
children "to participate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a
republican government, namely the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." Id. at 606. Today,
I reaffirm that constitutional imperative. The question is whether the Commonwealth
presently is meeting its duty to educate.
[***5] Twelve years ago, in McDuffy, this court declared that the Commonwealth failed
to fulfill that obligation, id. at 617, where the Commonwealth had delegated the
responsibility for public school education to local communities, and its system of funding
primary and secondary public education relied all but exclusively on local property taxes.
That system left property-poor communities with insufficient resources to provide
students with educational opportunities comparable to those available in property-rich
communities. It amounted to an abdication of the Commonwealth's duty to educate. See
id. at 614-617. This court left correction of the constitutional violation to the elected
branches of government and left to the discretion of a single justice whether to retain
jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 550-551, 621.
[*432] Three days after McDuffy issued, the omnibus Education Reform Act of 1993
(act), long under consideration in the Legislature, became law. See St. 1993, 71, enacted
by emergency preamble on [**1138] June 18, 1993. See generally G. L. c. 69-c. 71.
There, the Legislature declared its "paramount goal" to provide a public [***6] education
system that reflected "a consistent commitment of resources sufficient to provide a high
quality public education to every child," and that would extend to all children "the
opportunity to reach their full potential and to lead lives as participants in the political
and social life of the Commonwealth and as contributors to its economy." G. L. c. 69, § 1.
The act, as I shall describe below, radically restructured the funding of public education
across the Commonwealth based on uniform criteria of need, and dramatically increased
the Commonwealth's mandatory financial assistance to public schools. The act also
established, for the first time in Massachusetts, uniform, objective performance and
accountability measures for every public school student, teacher, administrator, school,
and district in Massachusetts.
The plaintiffs here, all students in Commonwealth public schools, claim that evidence
from the public school districts of Brockton, Lowell, Springfield, and Winchendon
(which the parties have termed the "focus districts") demonstrates that public education in
those districts has not improved significantly since 1993, and that the Commonwealth
[***7] is still in violation of its constitutional obligation to educate children in its poorer
communities, most notably children with special educational needs. A Superior Court
judge specifically assigned to hear evidence and report to the single justice agreed. She
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found that, while substantial improvements in public education had occurred since 1993,
significant failings persisted in the focus districts, and that the Department of Education
(department) lacked sufficient resources and capacity to address these failings. She
recommended that the department be ordered to determine the "actual cost" of funding a
"constitutionally adequate level of education" for all students in the focus districts, and
that the Commonwealth be ordered to implement the funding and administrative changes
necessary to achieve that result. The single justice reserved and reported the case to the
full court.
[*433] I accord great deference to the Superior Court judge's thoughtful and detailed
findings of fact. I accept those findings, and share the judge's concern that sharp
disparities in the educational opportunities, and the performance, of some Massachusetts
public school students persist. The public education [***8] system we review today,
however, is not the public education system reviewed in McDuffy. Its shortcomings,
while significant in the focus districts, do not constitute the egregious, Statewide
abandonment of the constitutional duty identified in that case. 2
In the twelve years since McDuffy was decided, the elected branches have acted to
transform a dismal and fractured public school system into a unified system that has
yielded, as the judge found, "impressive results [***9] in terms of improvement in
overall student performance." She found that, "spending gaps between districts based on
property wealth have been reduced or even reversed. The correlation between a district's
median family income [**1139] and spending has also been reduced." Public dollars for
public education are now being allocated to where they are the most effective: defining
core educational goals for all students, evaluating student performance toward those
goals, and holding schools and school districts accountable for achieving those goals. See
G. L. c. 69, §§ 1 and ID. A system mired in failure has given way to one that, although
far from perfect, shows a steady trajectory of progress.
No one, including the defendants, disputes that serious inadequacies in public education
remain. But the Commonwealth is moving systemically to address those deficiencies and
continues to make education reform a fiscal priority. It is significant, in my view, that the
Commonwealth has allocated billions of dollars for education reform since the act's
passage, and that this new and substantial financial commitment has continued even
amidst one of the worst [***10] budget crises in decades. By creating and implementing
standardized Statewide criteria of [*434] funding and oversight; by establishing objective
competency goals and the means to measure progress toward those goals 3; by
developing, and acting on, a plan to eliminate impediments to education based on
property valuation, disability, lack of English proficiency, and racial or ethnic status; and
by directing significant new resources to schools with the most dire needs, I cannot
conclude that the Commonwealth currently is not meeting its constitutional charge to
"cherish the interests o f . . . public schools." Part n, c. 5, § 2.
[***11] I inteiject some words of caution. I do not retreat from the court's holding in
McDuffy. 4 The education clause "imposes an enforceable duty on the magistrates and
Legislatures of this Commonwealth to provide education in the public schools for the
children there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and without regard to the fiscal
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capacity of the community or district in which such children live." Id. at 621. It [**1140]
remains "the responsibility of the Commonwealth to take such steps as may [*435] be
required in each instance effectively to devise a plan and sources of funds sufficient to
meet the constitutional mandate." Id. I do not suggest that the goals of education reform
adopted since McDuffy have been fully achieved. Clearly they have not. Nothing Isay
today would insulate the Commonwealth from a successful challenge under the education
clause in different circumstances. The framers recognized that "the content of the duty to
educate . . . will evolve together with our society," and that the education clause must be
interpreted "in accordance with the demands of modem society or it will be in constant
danger of becoming atrophied and, infact, may [***12] even lose its meaning." McDuffy,
supra at 620, quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn. 2d 476, 516, 585 P.2d 71
(1978).
[***13] Here, the legislative and executive branches have shown that they have
embarked on a long-term, measurable, orderly, and comprehensive process of reform "to
provide a high quality public education to every child." G. L. c. 69,§ 1. They are
proceeding purposefully to implement a plan to educate all public school children in the
Commonwealth, and the judge did not find otherwise. They have committed resources to
carry out their plan, have done so in fiscally troubled times, and show every indication
that they will continue to increase such resources as the Commonwealth's finances
improve. While the plaintiffs have amply shown that many children in the focus districts
are not being well served by their school districts, they have not shown that the
defendants are acting in an arbitrary, nonresponsive, or irrational way to meet the
constitutional mandate.
I
In summarizing the relevant background, I shall not repeat the facts recounted in
McDuffy, except as they are necessary to place the present controversy in its proper
context. I summarize the relevant facts subsequent to the McDuffy decision in greater
detail, drawing from the judge's findings [***14] and other undisputed material of record.
I begin with the situation confronting the Legislature and the court prior to the enactment
of the Education Reform Act. At that time, public education in Massachusetts was
governed by a [*436] loosely connected melange o f statutes, local regulations, and
informal policies. See McDuffy, supra at 556. Locally elected school boards in hundreds
of communities across the Commonwealth had broad, individual discretion to set
educational policy and practice. Id. At 607-608. As a direct result of the executive and
legislative branches' hands-off approach to public education, property-poor localities
were left perennially unable to educate their students. Id. at 614 Although
Commonwealth aid for local public school education was mandated, the statutory
guidelines went largely unheeded, leaving cities and towns at the mercy of unpredictable
annual appropriations from the Legislature. See McDuffy, supra at 613-614. Moreover,
communities were not required to differentiate Commonwealth aid for public schools
from other Commonwealth aid, or even to use school aid for the schools. Id. at 556.
[***15] The statutory authority of the department and a board of education (board) to
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establish and enforce uniform educational standards existed more on paper than in
practice. See id. at 614-615.
[**1141] Beginning in 1978, public school students in property-poor cities and towns in
Massachusetts filed suit in the county court against State education officials. A Superior
Court action sought a declaration that the Commonwealth's school-financing scheme
effectively denied them an opportunity to receive an adequate education in their
communities, in contravention of the Massachusetts Constitution. See generally
McDuffy, supra at 548-550 & n.4. 5 In 1992, thelawsuits, now consolidated, came to the
court on reservation and report of the single justice on facts stipulated by the parties. Id.
at 549
[***16] As various education proposals made their way through the Legislature in the
early 1990's, the Legislature was aware of the pending McDuffy case. The representative
who chaired a special legislative committee to reform education expressed his hope that
Massachusetts would become the first State to overhaul education financing before being
ordered to do so by a court. See Education, State House News Service, Jan. 4, 1993. The
Governor stated in early January, 1993, six months before the [*437] McDuffy decision
issued, that the court's decision in the case could make a new funding scheme mandatory.
Id. Legislative efforts culminated in the Education Reform Act. 6
[***17] The act entirely revamped the structure of funding public schools and
strengthened the board's authority to establish Statewide education policies and standards,
focusing on objective measures of student performance and on school and district
assessment, evaluation, and accountability. 7 See G. L. c. 69, § IB . I discuss briefly the
act's sweeping reach.
[***18] The act eliminated the central problem of public school funding that we
identified as unconstitutional in McDuffy. See Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 421 Mass.
117, 129, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (1995) ("The question before the court in McDuffy . . . was
whether the Massachusetts school-financing system was constitutional, and the court held
that it was not"). Specifically, the act eliminated the principal dependence on local tax
revenues that consigned students in property-poor districts to schools that were
chronically short of resources, and unable to rely on sufficient or predictable financial or
other assistance from the Commonwealth. The act established for the first time a
"foundation budget" for each and every Massachusetts school district, derived from a
complex formula designed to account for the number and needs of the children residing
in each [**1142] district. See G. L. c. 70, §§ 2 et seq. 8 The defendants have described
the foundation budget as the State's estimate of the [*438] "minimum amount needed in
each district to provide an adequate educational program" (emphasis added). 9
The act guarantees that each public school district receive its foundation budget through a
combination of Commonwealth and local funds. Where, before 1993, the Legislature
ceded to municipalities virtually unlimited control over school budgets, the act now
requires municipalities to provide a standardized contribution to education. A
municipality’s required contribution to its foundation budget depends in large part on its
equalized property valuation. G. L. c. 70, § 6. The Commonwealth provides the
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difference between [***20] municipalities' mandatory funding obligations and their
respective foundation budget amounts. G. L. c. 70, § 2. In practice, districts in wealthier
communities with high property valuations receive most o f their funding from local
property tax receipts, while districts serving communities with less valuable property
receive most of their funding from the Commonwealth. Localities have flexibility to
allocate their foundation budget amounts according to local priorities, but they may not,
as previously, use school funds to pay for other municipal services. They must spend
them on public education. G. L. c. 70, § 8.
The act also established a centralized system of objective, data-driven, performance
assessment and school and district accountability. As the court recently described at some
length, [*439] see Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ.,440 Mass. 752, 755-759, 802 N.E.2d
105 (2004), the act imposes various obligations on the Commissioner of Education
(commissioner) and the board to develop academic standards, and "curriculum
frameworks" for attaining those standards (or "competency determination") in certain
"core subjects": mathematics, [***21] science and technology, history and social science,
English language arts, foreign languages, and the arts. See G. L. c. 69, §§ IB, ID, IE, II.
10 The act specifically [**1143] requires, for the first time in the history of the
Commonwealth, that every senior graduating from a school that accepts funds from the
Commonwealth (including public, vocational, and charter schools) attain competency in
the core subjects of mathematics, science and technology, history and social science,
foreign languages, and English language arts, as measured by the student's score on the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System examination (MCAS examination).
See G. L. c. 69, § ID; 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.03 (2000); Student No. 9 v. Board of
Educ., supra at 758. 11 The requirement is not designed, however, to winnow
underperforming students from the graduation process. Prior to the act, failing high
school students would have been permitted either to graduate without basic skills or fade
away from the public education system altogether. [***22] They are now given extensive
remedial opportunities. See generally id. at 759-761. At present, theMCAS examination
is administered in English and mathematics to students in grades four, eight, and ten.
With some exceptions, students need a score in at least the "needs improvement"
category in both subjects on the grade ten MCAS examination [*440] to receive a high
school diploma. See generally id. At 758-760. The department's goal is that every public
school student achieve a level of "proficient" or "advanced" on the MCAS examination of
English and athematics by 2014. 12 CURRICULAR VALIDITY
The Commonwealth is now required to assist schools and districts that fail to improve
student performance. See G. L. c. 69, § 1J. Under the act, schools and districts [***24]
must demonstrate that they are making "adequate yearly progress" toward achieving, by
2014, student proficiency in English language arts and mathematics. Adequate yearly
progress is assessed not only in the aggregate but also with respect to targeted subgroups:
students receiving special education services; students with limited English proficiency;
and minority students, including African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians-Pacific
Islanders. The purpose of the school performance ratings, as the judge found, "is to
permit the department to assess undeiperformance and where there may be a need for
State intervention, and also to look for districts that have experienced distinct
improvements in student performance and that can help disseminate information about

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

659

successful strategies; the latter are [**1144] designated as 'compass schools."' Schools
with low performance ratings and schools that show either no progress toward
improvement or worsening conditions are referred for "school panel review." Those
schools are given the highest priority for district and Commonwealth support, which may
include targeted additional funding or training by department specialists in areas such as
curriculum development, [***25] instructional practices, and performance improvement
planning. If the school panel review determines that a school is "underperforming," the
department [*441] schedules a fact-finding mission. Fact finding involves extensive, on
site evaluations by a team of specialists who report on ways a school might improve its
performance. Underperforming schools must submit an improvement plan to the
department. See G. L. c. 69, § 1J ; 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.03 (6) (2000). If the school
does not improve sufficiently within twenty-four months, the department may deem it
"chronically underperforming" and target it for additional corrective action. See G. L. c.
69, § 1J.
A similar evaluation process occurs at the district level. School district review is
conducted by the office of educational quality and accountability, a separate agency
within the department that began to operate in 2001. See G. L. c. 15, § 55A, as appearing
in St. 2000, c. 384, § 4 (establishing office of educational quality and accountability).
Chronically underperforming districts may be targeted for receivership. The judge
[***26] stated that, "according to the department, the school and district accountability
system it has developed is one of the first in the United States." See generally Student
No. 9 v. Board of Educ., supra at 755-759.

The Legislature also made institutional changes to reform the process of training and
certification of public school teachers. The act abolished the long-standing practice of
teacher tenure. It imposes stringent initial and renewal certification requirements for
teachers that are "designed," in the words of the judge, "in part to link the educational
requirements that new teachers must meet with die contents of the Massachusetts
curriculum frameworks, and to enhance the quality and subject matter mastery of
teachers. The [teacher] examination and these regulations are among the most rigorous
teacher qualification programs in the United States." 13
[***27] In summary, the act revolutionized public education in [*442] Massachusetts.
Across the board, objective, data-driven assessments of student performance and specific
performance goals now inform a standardized education policy and direct the
Commonwealth's public education resources. The current, integrated public education
system contrasts markedly with the system discussed in McDuffy. I turn now to [**1145]
the events that precipitated the current litigation.
In December, 1999, the plaintiffs revived the McDuffy case by filing a motion for further
relief in the county court. 14 The plaintiffs alleged that the foundation budget in their
districts "is insufficient to provide [them] with a constitutionally sufficient education."
They further alleged that their school systems "continue to suffer with largely the same
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conditions" existing prior to June 1993, and that students were not receiving the public
education mandated by McDuffy. 15
[***28] On June 27,2002, the single justice directed a specially assigned Justice of the
Superior Court to "establish a tracking order, preside over discovery issues, hear the
parties and their witnesses, and thereafter make findings of fact and such
recommendations as the said pecially assigned justice considers material to the within
complaint." Following consultation with the parties, the judge proceeded to trial focusing
the factual evidence on a group of districts fewer than the total. The plaintiffs ultimately
selected four "focus" districts: Brockton, Lowell, Springfield, and Winchendon. 16 The
plaintiffs also offered limited evidence from three other districts —Brookline, ConcordCarlisle, and Wellesley (comparison districts) - each [*443] of which had been presented
as a comparison district in the McDuffy proceedings. 17
Trial began on June 12,2003, and concluded in January, 2004. The judge heard
testimony from 114 witnesses and received in evidence more than 1,000 exhibits. On
April 26,2004, the judge issued a 318-page report containing thoughtful and
comprehensive findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations.
I shall discuss the judge's findings in detail below. Here I note only the judge's conclusion
that, although the Commonwealth had accomplished substantial reforms in public
education since 1993, it had failed to meet its constitutional obligation to equip all
students in the focus districts, and especially those in the disadvantaged subgroups, with
an education consistent with our holding in McDuffy. She recommended that the court
provide [***30] remedial relief by directing the Commonwealth defendants (1) to
ascertain the actual cost of providing all public school pupils in the focus districts with
the educational opportunities described in McDuffy; (2) to determine the costs of
providing "meaningful" [**1146] educational improvement in the focus districts' capacity
"to carry out an effective implementation of the necessary educational program"; and (3)
to "implement whatever funding and administrative changes result from the
determinations made in (1) and (2)." 18 Further, [*444] the judge recommended
continued court oversight of the department's progress toward implementing the order. 19
[***31] On May 20, 2004, the single justice reserved decision and reported the case to
the full court, as noted above.
II
A
The question, as framed by the single justice, is "whether, within a reasonable time,
appropriate legislative action has been taken to provide public school students with the
education required under the Massachusetts Constitution." Put another way, the single
justice asked whether, notwithstanding the considerable changes in public education that
have occurred since 1993, the Commonwealth remains in violation of the education
clause. I apply to the adjudicative task well-settled principles of review. I would accept
the judge's findings of fact absent clear error, Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438
Mass. 635,642-643, 783 N.E.2d 399 (2003). Her conclusions of law I assess de novo.
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Wesson v. Leone Enters., Inc., 437 Mass. 708, 712-713, 774 N.E.2d 611 (2002). See
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542, 551,289 N.E.2d 571 (1972) (Hennessey, J.,
concurring). To effectuate the purpose of the education clause, I construe it as "a
statement of general principles and not a specification of details." McDuffy, supra at 559,
quoting [***32] Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 357 Mass. 564, 571, 259 N.E.2d 539 (1970). I
am mindful of the presumption of constitutional validity guiding our consideration, see
Fifty-One Hispanic Residents of Chelsea v. School Comm, of Chelsea, 421 Mass. 598,
606, 659 N.E.2d 277 (1996) ("Constitutional analysis begins with a presumption of
statutory validity"), and the substantial deference afforded to the department in carrying
out the act's provisions. See Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 762, 802
N.E.2d 105 (2004) (administrative agency "has considerable leeway in interpreting a
statute it is charged with enforcing"); School Comm, of Wellesley v. Labor Relations
Comm'n, 376 Mass. 112,116, 379 N.E.2d 1077 (1978). I emphasize that this is not a case
where the Legislature reasonably [*445] could be said to have neglected or avoided a
constitutional command. Cf., e.g., Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 740, 400
N.E.2d 1231 (1980) (judicial intervention appropriate where public officials "persist[] in
indifference to, or neglect or disobedience of court orders").
B
I turn once more to the judge's findings, which comprise more than 300 pages. The
judge's findings of fact [***33] are a model of precision, comprehensiveness and
meticulous [**1147] attention to detail. 20 Although I shall set out only a general
summary, I am confident that in their entirety the judge's findings will stand as a
compelling, instructive account of the current state o f public education in Massachusetts.
[***34] 1. Funding. In the judge's words, the act "changed dramatically the manner in
which public school elementary and secondary education is funded in Massachusetts."
That change is evident both in dollars spent on public education and on substantially
reduced disparities in education funding between rich and poor districts. In sheer dollars,
the total amount annually spent on kindergarten to grade twelve education rose from
approximately $ 3.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1993, prior to passage of the act, to $ 10.1
billion in FY 2002. Annual increases in school funding in that period averaged twelve per
cent. State aid, the great bulk of it from foundation budget funding, accounted for about
thirty-nine per cent of this annual spending. 21 [*446] In all, from 1993 to 2003, the
Commonwealth contributed about $ 31 billion to fund public education.
[***35] The focus districts in particular have seen striking increases in their school
spending in the years since the act became law. The judge found that, between 1993 and
2003, annual net school spending nearly doubled in Springfield (from $ 126.2 million to
$ 236.4 million), and more than doubled in Brockton (from nearly $ 56 million to $ 143.5
million), Lowell (from $ 61 million to $ 136 million), and Winchendon (from
approximately $ 5.78 million to almost $ 14 million).
The act also tackled the huge disparities in public school funding between rich and poor
districts that we faulted in McDuffy. The judge found that "spending gaps between
districts based on property wealth have been reduced or even reversed. The correlation
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between a district's median family income and spending has also been reduced." 22 In the
ten-year period following passage of the act, the gap in per pupil spending between highproperty-value districts and low-property-value districts was cut by one-half, from thirtyeight per cent in 1993 to approximately eighteen or nineteen per cent in 2003. And while
"the top quartile of districts defined by median income is spending more per pupil than
the lowest [***36] quartile, the difference between them has fallen from [twenty-seven
per [**1148] cent] to [seven per cent]" from 1993 to 2003.
The public education funding system, however, has not been immune from the effects of
recent years of sharply diminished Commonwealth revenues. The judge reported
decreases in Commonwealth aid to public schools since the "high water ark" of fiscal
year 2002. Fiscal years 2003 and 2004 saw cuts in G. L. c. 70 aid, see note 21, supra, and
"drastic" cuts in some public school grants programs. For example, "early literacy grants
for early reading programs were . . . [***37] cut by two-thirds," [*447] from $ 18.3
million in FY 2003 to $ 3.8 million FY 2004. 23 Overall, Commonwealth aid to public
education declined about 5.5 per cent in FY 2003 and FY 2004. As the Commonwealth's
fiscal situation improved in FY 2005, the Legislature acted to increase funding for public
education, see, e.g., Letter from Governor Mitt Romney to the Senate and House of
Representatives, June 25,2004 (noting approval of $ 80 million to increase funding for
special education), but prior decreases in funding forced the focus districts to lay off staff
and scale back or cut some programs. The judge found that the department faced
diminished resources just as its oversight responsibility was increasing significantly. In
2 0 0 1 , the judge found, the department identified between 1 0 0 and 20 0 schools as
candidates for "underperforming" status because of "critically low" or "very low" MCAS
examination scores. Due to a lack of resources within the department, however, only
about twenty-four of those problem schools were accorded frill school panel reviews. For
the remaining schools, the task of mapping out improvements fell to the school districts
themselves.
[***38] 2. Performance and accountability. The judge reported the quality of public
education in the four focus districts to be uneven at best. She also found substantial
improvements in student performance and some outstanding examples of successful
schools and programs in those same districts. We summarize her findings below.
The judge found that over-all academic performance of students in the focus districts,
particularly those with special educational needs, was poor. Her conclusion is amply
supported by evidence of MCAS examination scores in the focus districts. In 2003, for
example, the Statewide average pass rate on the MCAS mathematics examination for
grade ten was eighty-five per cent, but only seventy-three per cent in Brockton, sixtyseven per cent in Lowell, fifty-four per cent in Springfield, and seventy-seven per cent in
Winchendon. In all four focus districts, [*448] public school students who required
special education, and students who had limited English proficiency, came from lowincome families, or were members of racial or ethnic minority groups performed at
substantially lower levels on the MCAS examinations than did their peers in the focus
districts. The pass [***39] rates for these targeted populations on the 2003 grade ten
MCAS mathematics examination were twenty-three per cent in Brockton, twenty-five per
cent in Lowell, fifteen per cent in Springfield, and twelve per cent in Winchendon,
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compared with a Statewide average of fifty per cent. Even these statistics overstate the
academic achievements of students in the focus districts, because a disproportionately
large number of those students pass the MCAS examinations with "needs improvement"
scores. See note 11, supra. Pursuant to the provisions of the No Child Left Behind
[**1149] Act, by 2014 only students who attain the categories of "proficient" or
"advanced" will be deemed to have passed the MCAS examination. See note 12, supra.
The judge found that the focus districts lagged in other measures of student achievement
as well. Students in the focus districts, especially minorities, are less likely to take the
Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) for college entrance than their peers. And in each
focus district, the dropout rate significantly exceeds the Commonwealth norm. 24
[***40] The judge tied the focus districts' failings in student performance to a lack of
educational resources. She amply documented schools in the focus districts that struggle
with overcrowded classrooms, outmoded textbooks and libraries, inadequate technology,
unsatisfactory services and educational access for special needs students, and decrepit or
overcrowded school facilities. The judge found other problems as well, including
antiquated curricula, teachers lacking proper teaching certification, and poor leadership
and administration, a point we [*449] shall return to below. 25 Some of these same
conditions characterized the public schools attended by the McDuffy plaintiffs. See
McDuffy, supra at 553-554 (listing stipulated conditions of plaintiffs' schools). Not
surprisingly, the judge found that, in general, the current conditions in the focus districts
compared unfavorably to those of the comparison districts, and often to State wide
average.
[***41] The judge determined that funding for the department was inadequate to enable
it to carry out its statutory duties of evaluating and providing corrective measures to lowperforming schools and districts. She stated, among other things, that "in the three years
since the department developed the school accountability system, it has been able to
conduct school panel reviews in only twelve to fourteen schools each year, although the
annual pool of schools demonstrating 'low1or 'critically low' performance is in the
hundreds." The district review process was similarly underfunded. Although the
department's goal is to review every school district every six years, the judge was
skeptical about this possibility, given the department funding levels then in effect. She
concluded that "the department's own lack of capacity impedes its ability effectively to
help the local districts with theirs."
The public education system in place since the 1993 act mandates extensive
Commonwealth involvement to improve schools that are underperforming.
Notwithstanding that the department currently has difficulty meeting its statutory
obligations in this regard, the judge found encouraging signs [***42] o f progress as a
result of the Commonwealth's active stewardship of public education, even amidst the
depressing picture of limitations and low performance in the focus districts. She found
that MCAS examination scores have been rising in the focus districts since the first
[**1150] MCAS examinations were administered in 1998. In 1998, for example, fortyfour per cent of Brockton's grade ten public school students failed the MCAS [*450]
English language arts examination, a figure that was reduced by more than one-half
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(eighteen per cent) by 2003. MCAS grade ten English language arts examination scores
showed similar improvements in Lowell (thirty-six per cent in 1998 and twenty-one per
cent in 2003) and Springfield (sixty per cent in 1998 and thirty-four per cent in 2003),
although they remained virtually steady at approximately twenty-one per cent in
Winchendon. "Failing" scores on the MCAS grade ten mathematics examination from
1998 to 2003 dropped in Brockton, from seventy-six per cent to thirty-three per cent; in
Lowell, from sixty-four per cent to thirty-six per cent; in Springfield, from eighty-three
per cent to fifty-three per cent; and in Winchendon from fifty-six per cent to thirty-four
per [***43] cent. 26
In addition to a general improvement over time in MCAS examination scores in the focus
districts, the judge found other signs of progress precipitated by the Commonwealth's
actions. I highlight some findings from each focus district. The department has
designated four elementary schools in Springfield and Brockton [***4 4 ] as highachieving "compass schools." In 2002, Brockton High School was one o f six high
schools designated a Commonwealth compass school in recognition of its significant
gains in student achievement. "Overall, Brockton's sixth graders were one year and one
month ahead of the national average on the Iowa Basic Skills test in language, six months
ahead of the national average in math, and equal to the national average in reading."
Springfield has made considerable progress in developing programs for students
struggling in mathematics, implementing successful teacher development programs, and
running alternative school programs for students at risk of dropping out of school. Lowell
offers full-day kindergarten to all children, has [*451] an extended day school program
for middle-school children who need extra time to learn reading, writing, and
mathematics, and has school libraries that "are in better shape than in other focus districts
because Lowell has so many new and renovated schools." Even in Winchendon, one of
only two "underperforming" districts in the Commonwealth, see note 25, supra, the judge
found "a very good public school preschool program," which, however, lacked resources
[***45] to accommodate all of the children who need to attend.
3. Conclusion. The evidence leaves no doubt that the act profoundly altered the
Commonwealth's role in public education. The Commonwealth has devoted billions of
dollars to the task of systemically reforming public education, and has cut funds for
public education only when confronted by drastic revenue shortfalls. The evidence also
establishes, as the dissenting opinions correctly point out, see post at - (Greaney, J.,
dissenting), post at (Ireland, J., dissenting), that many schools in the focus districts are
[**1151] struggling to meet the goals of the act, but that the department is succeeding in
raising the levels of student performance in the focus districts and Statewide, although
much work remains. I now turn to the judge's conclusions.
C
The judge concluded that the Commonwealth and the department "have accomplished
much over the past ten years in terms of investing enormous amounts of new money in
local educational programs, ensuring a far greater degree of equitablespending between
rich and poor school districts, and redesigning in some fundamental ways the entire
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public school educational program. [***46] "Notwithstanding these gains, she stated,
"the factual record establishes that the schools attended by the plaintiff students are not
currently implementing the Massachusetts curriculum frameworks for all students, and
are not currently equipping all students with the McDuffy capabilities."
The judge reasoned that "a very important and independent cause" of poor student
performance in the focus districts was that the foundation budget formula, on which all
Massachusetts public schools depend, is structurally flawed because it fails to [*452]
account for the true costs of: special education, aligning school districts with the
curriculum frameworks, providing adequate teacher salaries (which comprise the "largest
category of expenditure" in a school district's budget), and educating students who are
bilingual or of limited English proficiency. Another cause of poor student performance,
in her view, was that the department "does not presently have enough staff and resources
to do the job it is expected and required to do." As a result, "the public school education
programs provided to all the children who are enrolled [in the focus districts] do not meet
the requirements of [the [***47] education clause]." I now examine the merits of the
judge's legal conclusions and recommendations.
m
In McDuffy, this court faced an overwhelming, stipulated body of evidence that the
structure of public education in Massachusetts was condemning generations of public
school students in our poorer communities to an inferior education. It was a record o f
abysmal failure. The public education system reviewed today has been radically
overhauled with one "paramount goal" in mind —to implement a plan to educate every
public school student in Massachusetts. See G. L. c. 69, §
The judge and the parties all agree that the current system o f public education has
achieved a great deal in the twelve years since its enactment. The curriculum frameworks
designed to educate students in core subjects "were uniformly described by witnesses for
all parties to be of excellent quality, focusing on knowledge and skills that students need
to acquire." They are "rigorous but reasonable," and "articulate a level of knowledge that
students need if they are to achieve the McDuffy capabilities." The English language arts
framework is of "exceptional quality, [***48] " and the mathematics curriculum
framework is "a world class document." The arts framework is "excellent," and the health
curriculum framework was described by the plaintiffs' expert "to be one of the best if not
the best in the nation." The teacher competency tests and the department's teacher
licensing regulations "are among the most rigorous [*453] teacher qualification programs
in die United States." While the dissenting Justices claim that the department's efforts to
improve educational standards have not reaped appreciable results, see post at [**1152]
(Greaney, J., dissenting); post at (Ireland, J., dissenting), the record proves otherwise.
New schools are being built. The department is evaluating and addressing problems in
underperforming schools and districts according to a plan o f "pragmatic gradualism" that
employs objective, measurable criteria to gauge progress. See Student No. 9 v. Board of
Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 763-764, 802 N.E.2d 105 (2004) (board may phase in competency
determinations required by act "in a reasonable manner and on a reasonable timetable").
In the focus districts, MCAS English language arts and math scores are improving. State
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spending on public education in [***49] the focus districts has more than doubled.
Compass schools exist in districts that previously had none. Facilities, equipment, and
supplies are being upgraded.
In assessing whether this record of considerable progress, marred by areas of real and in
some instances profound failure, offends the education clause, I must consider that clause
"in the light of the conditions under which it and its several parts were framed, the ends
which it was designed to accomplish, the benefits which it was expected to confer, and
the evils which it was hoped to remedy." McDuffy, supra at 559, quoting Cohen v.
Attorney Gen., 357 Mass. 564, 571,259 N.E.2d 539 (1970). I must give its words "a
construction adapted to carry into effect its purpose," McDuffy, supra, quoting Cohen,
supra, while recognizing that, "the content of the duty to educate which the Constitution
places on the Commonwealth necessarily will evolve together with our society."
McDuffy, at 620.
The constitutional imperative to "cherish the interests" of public school education
requires the elected branches of government to assume actual, not merely titular, control
over [***50] public education. It is a structural command, dictating a specific
organization of government. See McDuffy, supra at 565 (placement of education clause
in Massachusetts Constitution "indicates structurally . . . that education is a 'duty' of
government. . . . The framers' decision to place the provisions concerning education in
'The Frame of Government' - rather than in the 'Declaration of Rights' -- demonstrates
that the [*454] framers conceived of education as fundamentally related to the very
existence of government"). 27 The education clause mandates that the Governor and the
Legislature have a plan to educate all public school children and provide the resources to
establish and maintain that plan. See McDuffy, supra at 621. At the same time, the
education clause leaves the details of education policymaking to the Governor and the
Legislature. Id. at 610, 620. 28 Where the Governor and the Legislature establish,
exercise ultimate control over, and provide substantial and increasing (subject only to
dire fiscal circumstances) resources to support, public education in a way that minimizes
rather [**1153] than accentuates differences [***51] between communities based on
property valuations, constitutionally impermissible classifications, and other criteria
extrinsic to the educational mission, see id. at 621, we cannot conclude that they are
presently violating the education clause.
The plaintiffs read the education clause to mandate that all current public school students
[***52] demonstrate competency in a specific program of education: that is, the seven
"capabilities" that were identified in McDuffy. Those capabilities are:
"(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function
in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems to enable students to make informed
choices; (iii) sufficient understanding o f governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and
nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge o f his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training [*455]
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or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as
to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to
compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or
in the job market."
Id. at 618-619, quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989) [***53] (Rose). 29 In McDuffy, this court recognized that an "educated child"
possesses these "capabilities," McDufiy, supra at 618, but did not mandate any particular
program of public education. Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 754, 802
N.E.2d 105 (2004), does not hold otherwise. There, citing to the capabilities of Rose, this
court stated that McDuffy "held that the Massachusetts Constitution imposes an
enforceable duty on the Commonwealth to ensure that all children in its public schools
receive an education that is to include certain specific training." The seven "capabilities"
listed in Rose do not in themselves prescribe a specific curriculum. Thus, in Student No.
9 v. Board of Educ., supra, this court held, among other things, that, "nothing in the
McDuffy decision requires . . . a graduation requirement based on an assessment of
multiple subjects." Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., supra at 765. The dissenting Justices
cite Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998) (Abbott), and Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 801 N.E.2d 326, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2003)
[***54] (CFE), to support the position that this court should exercise its authority "to
identify the level of spending required" to meet a certain level of education. Post at n.5
(Greaney, J., dissenting). Those cases presented dramatically different circumstances than
those we face here. In Abbott and CFE, the respective courts stepped in, only reluctantly,
after many years of legislative failure or inability to enact education reforms and to
commit resources to implement those reforms, a circumstance not present here. See
Abbott, supra at 492 ("sixteen years after the start of the Abbott litigation, the court found
that the continuing constitutional deprivation [*456] [**1154] had persisted too long and
clearly necessitated a remedy"; CFE, supra at 925 ("We are, of course, m indful. . . of the
responsibility. . . to defer to the Legislature in matters of policymaking . . . . We have
neither the authority, nor the ability, nor the will, to micromanage education financing").
In sharp contrast, the Massachusetts Legislature and Governor responded to adjudication
concerning education with a comprehensive and systematic overhaul of State financial
aid to and oversight [***55] of public schools. The level of responsive, sustained, intense
legislative commitment to public education established on the record in this case is the
kind of government action the Abbott and CFE courts, in the respective underlying cases,
had hoped to see from their Legislatures, and reluctantly concluded would not be
forthcoming without a detailed court order. See Abbott, supra at 490 (noting "judicial
involvement in the long and tortuous history of the State's extraordinary effort to bring a
thorough and efficient education to the children of its poorest school districts"); CFE,
supra at 919-925 (documenting State's attempt to distance itself from responsibility for
dismal quality of education in New York City public schools). 30
[***56] The plaintiffs further argue that the Commonwealth is in [*457] violation of the
education clause because it has had more than sufficient time since McDuffy to bring all
students in the Commonwealth to full academic competency, and it has failed to do so.
As one of the dissenting opinions point out, the education clause does not "guarantee
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equal outcomes in all school districts" according to certain measurable criteria. Post at
(Greaney, J., dissenting). Yet the plaintiffs' frustration with the slow, sometimes painfully
slow, pace of educational reform in the focus districts is understandable. I am cognizant
that, for the student whose special needs go unaddressed, for the student who sits in an
overcrowded classroom or an ill-equipped school library, and for their parents or
guardians, the prospect of "better things to come" in public education comes too late. The
dissenting Justices point to United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution to suggest that in declining
to order relief now members of this court are "naysayers" who have abandoned [**1155]
the constitutional imperative of McDuffy. See post at, [***57] citing Brown v. Board of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 6 8 6 (1954) (Greaney, J.,
dissenting), post at, citing Brown v. Board o f Educ., supra, and DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,103 L. Ed. 2d 249,109 S. Ct. 998 (1989)
(Ireland J., dissenting). I emphatically reject any such conclusion. The court has not been
called on to interpret the eqaul protection and due process provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution, nor are we confronted with the wholesale abandonment of
children that the record in those cases evidenced. Here, the independent branches of
government have shown that they share the court's concern, and that they are embracing
and acting on their constitutional duty to educate all public school students. In contrast to
this court's holding in McDuffy, I cannot conclude on the record before this court that the
Commonwealth is presently neglecting or is likely to neglect its constitutional duties,
thus requiring judicial intervention. Cf., e.g., Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 390
Mass. 523,458 N.E.2d 702 (1983); Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 740,
400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980). 31 EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
[***58] The delay in full implementation of the provisions of the act [*458] does not
derive from legislative or departmental inaction. Cf. Bates v. Director of the Office of
Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 763 N.E.2d 6 (2002). Some delays have been
occasioned by continued public debate, opposition to, and protracted litigation over some
provisions of education reform. See, e.g., Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass.
752, 802 N.E.2d 105 (2004). Some parts of the act, such as foundation budget funding
and the implementation of the curriculum frameworks, have been deliberately phased in
to permit schools and departments time to adjust to new standards. Still other reforms, as
the judge acknowledged, have been slowed by severe revenue shortfalls, which have
forced reductions in spending for public education, as well as for other vital public
services. We note that, since approximately 2001, Massachusetts has wrestled with a
"profound economic downturn." Comprehensive Annual Financial Report at 31 (Dec. 31,
2003). Figures from the Department of Revenue indicate that total tax revenues declined
14.6 per cent in real dollars between FY 2001 and FY 2002, and have not fully recovered.
[***59] Reserve funds have had to be expended to fund essential services. 32 And the
crisis is not over. See Statutory Basis Financial Report at 1 (Oct. 24,2003) ("Our
financial picture will remain cautious for the near future"). Yet through this period the
Commonwealth continued to appropriate "substantial sums" toward education reform.
See, e.g., Student No. 9 v. [**1156] Board of Educ., supra at 766 (noting that, in FY 2003
and FY 2004, Legislature voted "substantial sums for intensive remediation programs for
those who need them in order to pass the MCAS exam"); Letter of Governor Romney to
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the Senate and House of Representatives (June 25,2004) (noting approval of $ 80 million
to increase funding for special education). Because [*459] decisions about where scarce
public money will do the most good are laden with value judgments, those decisions are
best left to our elected representatives.
[***60] Implementation of change, fundamental, sweeping change, such as that
mandated by the Education Reform Act, is seldom easy. When change is directed at a
system as complex and multi-dimensional as public education, where the theories and
methodologies of education reform are so varied, 33 and when reforms must apply to
hundreds of towns and municipalities spread across a Commonwealth —localities that
include small villages and large cities, communities of new immigrants (many of whom
speak no English), and long-established residents, wealthy neighborhoods and those in
which far toomany families struggle every day to feed and clothe their children - change
must be measured over years. The evidence here is that the Commonwealth's
comprehensive Statewide plan for education reform is beginning to work in significant
ways.
[***61] I turn last to the remedy of ordering a cost study, which the dissenting Justices
would impose. The Superior Court judge recommended that this court order the
department to undertake a wide-ranging study. 34 She further recommended that the
department be ordered to "implement whatever funding and administrative changes result
from" the adoption of certain educational policies. Contrary to the view of the dissenting
Justices, the study would be problematic on at least three counts: First, a cost study itself
is likely to retard rather than advance the progress of educational reform. It would divert
substantial [*460] time and resources from the task of education reform and would
needlessly duplicate in many respects the fine work done by the judge.
[***62] Second, the study the dissenting Justices would order is rife with policy choices
that are properly the Legislature's domain. The study would assume, for example, that in
order to fulfil its constitutional obligation under the education clause, the Commonwealth
"must" provide free preschool for all three and four year old children "at risk" in the
focus districts, and presumably throughout the Commonwealth thereafter. That is a policy
decision for the Legislature. In fact, as I noted previously, see note 23, supra, the
Legislature recently determined to place more emphasis on early childhood education.
[**1157] Other programs might be equally effective to address the needs of at risk
students, such as remedial programs (policy choices that in the judge's view should not be
a mandatory component of public education; see note35, infra), nutrition and drug
counselling programs or programs to involve parents more directly in school affairs. Each
choice embodies a value judgment; each carries a cost, in real, immediate tax dollars; and
each choice is fundamentally political. 35 Courts are not well positioned to make such
decisions. See post at (Greaney, J., dissenting) (acknowledging [***63] "the complexity
of education policy in general [,] and the disagreement between competent experts on
how best to remediate a nonperforming or poorly performing school district"). It is for
these reasons that "we leave it to the [Governor] and the Legislature[] to define the
precise nature of the task which they facein fulfilling their constitutional duty to educate
our children today, and in the future." McDuffy, supra at 620.
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Finally, and most significantly, the study would not be a final order, but a starting point
for what inevitably must mean judicial [***64] directives concerning appropriations. The
Superior Court judge recognized that the ultimate purpose o f a study would be to [*461]
channel more money to the focus districts. Her order would encompass not only a study,
but a directive to the department to "implement whatever funding and administrative
changes" the study concluded were necessary to meet its educational goals.
The dissenting Justices endorse only the judge's proposed study and reject her proposal
that the department be ordered to implement the necessary changes. They then state that
their remedy "has nothing to do with orders for the appropriation of money." Post at,
(Greaney, J., dissenting). What ails our failing schools cannot be cured by a study. And
one cannot gloss over the difficult issue of forcing the Legislature to appropriate more
money, see post at (Greaney, J., dissenting), with the assertion that, "if money is needed,
and it is not forthcoming, there will be ample time to discuss the matter of appropriations
later in a cooperative and non adversary way." Post at (Greaney, J., dissenting). No one
reading the judge's report can be left with any doubt that the question [***65] is not "if'
more money is needed, but how much. Endorsing one aspect of her recommendation (a
study) and rejecting the other (the directive to "implement" additional funding) will not
cure the constitutional violation the dissenting Justices perceive, and merely evades the
true complexities of the issue. Certainly, whether the legislative and executive branches
are meeting their constitutional duty is not a matter for "nonadversary" "discussion"
between judges and members of the General Court.
The Governor, the Legislature, and the department are well aware that the process of
education reform can and must be improved. The board, for example, recently enacted
rules to streamline and accelerate the process for intervening in schools identified to be
"chronically underperforming." See 603 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2:00 (Aug. 24,2004). The
amply supported findings of the judge reflect much that remains to be corrected before all
children in our Commonwealth are educated. The Legislature may well choose to
[**1158] rely on these findings as it continues to consider efforts to improve public
education. Her findings
are also a testament to the many educators, teachers, parents, business and community
[***6 6 ] leaders who insist that, until that goal is reached, they will continue to demand
improvement [*462] and will seek the help of our elected officials to ensure that
meaningful reform is ongoing.
"The presumption exists that the Commonwealth will honor its obligations." Bromfield v.
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 390 Mass. 665, 669,459 N.E.2d 445 (1983). I am confident
that the Commonwealth's commitment to educating its children remains strong, and that
the Governor and the Legislature will continue to work expeditiously "to provide a high
quality public education to every child." G. L. c. 69, § 1.1 reaffirm the court's holding in
McDuffy. The education clause, Part II, c. 5, § 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution
"imposes an enforceable duty on the magistrates and Legislatures of this Commonwealth
to provide education in the public schools for the children there enrolled, whether they be
rich or poor and without regard to the fiscal capacity of the community or district in
which such children live." Id. at 621. It remains "the responsibility of the Commonwealth
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to take such steps as may be required in each instance effectively to devise a plan and
sources [***67] of funds sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate." Id.
COWIN, J. (concurring, with whom Sosman, J., joins). I concur in the decision by the
court today because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Commonwealth has
violated Part n, c. 5, § 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution, the "education clause." I
write separately to articulate what I believe is the proper scope of the education clause
and the limited role this court should have in public policy debates of the type presented
here.
The scope of the education clause. The Constitution is a structural document that confers
on the various branches of government broad areas of authority, see generally Part n, c. 1
("The Legislative Power"); Part n, c. 2 ("Executive Power"); Part n, c. 3 ("Judiciary
Power"), and guarantees for the citizens that the government will not interfere with
certain basic rights. See generally Part the First ("A Declaration of the Rights of the
Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts"). In securing rights and dividing
powers, our Constitution protects citizens against government encroachment and provides
a broad organizational [*463] framework for our Commonwealth. See, [***6 8 ] e.g., art.
1, as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments of the Massachusetts Constitution
("Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged . . . "); art. 2 ("no subject shall be
hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD"); art.
14 ("Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches . .."); art. 16,
as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments of the Massachusetts Constitution ("The right
of free speech shall not be abridged"). See also Part n, c. 1, § 1, art. 4 ("full power and
authority are hereby given and granted to the said general court, from time to time, to
make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws,
statutes, and ordinances"). Even where our Constitution explicitly provides for a
legislative role in the enactment of laws or appropriation o f funds, it generally confers on
the General Court only the power or authority to enact or appropriate, but falls short of
requiring that any specific action be taken. See, e.g., art. 49, as amended by art. 97 of the
Amendments to the Constitution of Massachusetts ("The general court shall have the
power to enact legislation [**1159] necessary [***69] or expedient to protect [the
people's right to clean air and water] [emphasis added]); art. 41, as amended by art. 110
("Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the general court to prescribe
for wild or forest lands . . . such methods of taxation as will develop and conserve the
forest resources . . . " [emphasis added]). I can find no Constitutional provision explicitly
mandating the creation of specified public programs or services.
In the past, we have respected these intentional limitations in our Constitution. As we
stated in Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 357 Mass. 564, 570-571, 259 N.E.2d 539 (1970),
quoting Tax Comm'r v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 523-524, 116 N.E. 904 (1917), and
Attorney Gen. v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 573,129 N.E. 662 (1921):
'"The Constitution of Massachusetts is a frame of government for a sovereign
power. It was designed by its framers and accepted by the people as an enduring
instrument, so comprehensive and general in its terms that a free, intelligent and
moral body of citizens might govern themselves under its beneficent provisions
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through radical [*464] changes in social, economic and industrial conditions. It
declares [***70] only fundamental principles as to the form of government and
the mode in which it shall be exercised . . . . It is a statement of general principles
and not a specification of details.'. . . 'It ordinarily is not long, complicated nor
detailed and does not descend to the minute particulars appropriate to a statute. Its
phrases are chosen to express generic ideas, and not nice shades of distinction."'
See Brookline v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 406,419, 631 N.E.2d 968
(1994); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 559, 615
N.E.2d 516 (1993) (McDuffy).
It is inconsistent therefore with the general structure of our Constitution to interpret the
education clause as imposing an enforceable duty on the Commonwealth to create and
maintain the kind of highly complex and intricate public school establishment that the
Chief Justice's concurring opinion today would presume. Instead, the clause should be
construed as a broad directive, intended to establish the central importance of education
in the Commonwealth and clarify that the legislative and executive branches will be
responsible for the creation and maintenance of our public [***71] school system. See
Part n, c. 5, § 2 ("it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, 1 in all future
periods of the commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences . . .
[and] public schools and grammar schools in the towns .. ."). For the full text of the
clause, see ante at - n.l] (Marshall, C.J., concurring). While I do not debate that the
clause presumes the establishment of some public schools by the legislative and
executive branches, nowhere in its text does the clause mandate any particular action on
the part of the Commonwealth, or confer any role on the judiciary to enforce it. Public
education is a government service, the organization and finance of which is to be
determined by the executive and legislative branches.
Nonetheless, in [***72] McDuffy, supra at 610-611, 614, this court determined from the
broad language of the education clause [*465] that the Commonwealth was failing to
meet a judicially enforceable duty to educate. I believe the McDuffy opinion read too
much into the [**1160] education clause, and that the Chief Justice's concurring opinion
erroneously endorses that aspect of the decision. See ante at, (Marshall, C.J. concurring).
Even assuming that the education clause imposes some continuing duty on the
Commonwealth to support a public education system, it clearly does not guarantee any
particular level of educational success or mandate specific programmatic choices. In a
display of stunning judicial imagination, the McDuffy court used its already bold reading
of the education clause to include specific programmatic "guidelines" for the
Commonwealth to follow (the seven McDuffy "capabilities") in an attempt to guarantee
future levels of scholastic achievement in specific curriculum areas. McDuffy, supra at
618-619. The McDuffy court fashioned these guidelines from a constitutional directive
that only speaks of "cherishing" education, under the guise [***73] of constitutional
"interpretation." Id. at 558-559. To read specific mandates, or even guidance, into the
education clause is unsupportable. The clause no more guarantees certain educational
results for the children of the Commonwealth than it guarantees any measure of success
in any other category that the same section instructs the Legislature to promote —
"humanity," "general benevolence," "industry," "charity," "frugality," "honesty,"
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"punctuality," "sincerity," "good humor," "social affections," and "generous sentiments
among the people." See Part n, c. 5, § 2. See Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 421 Mass.
117,129, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (1995) (Constitution does not "guarantee[] each individual
student the fundamental right to an education"). The Massachusetts General Laws, not
the Declaration of Rights, structure our government programs, provide for their content,
and establish minimum levels of attainment —this holds true for government services
ranging from our educational system to our public ways.
Therefore, I believe that if McDuffy is to stand at all, its overreaching "guidelines"
should be rejected and the opinion should be limited [***74] to its most generalized
holdings: that the education clause creates "a duty to provide an education for all [the
Commonwealth's] children, rich and poor, in every city and town," [*466] McDuffy,
supra at 606, and that the Commonwealth (not this court) must "devise a plan and sources
of funds sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate." Id. at 621. Unfortunately, we have
missed an opportunity to limit McDuffy to its proper sphere. Under a more limited
reading of McDuffy, assuming there is some enforceable duty imposed by the education
clause, the Commonwealth has more than fulfilled its obligations. In the twelve years
since McDuffy, the Legislature passed the Education Reform Act, see generally G. L. cc.
69-71, and spent billions of dollars toward realizing its goals. That is certainly enough
under our broad constitutional directive to satisfy the mandate that the Commonwealth
"cherish" our public schools.
The courts' role in educational policymaking. Even if the education clause is to be
interpreted as imposing some duty upon the Commonwealth to maintain a public school
establishment, a conclusion which is by no means apparent, [***75] our Constitution
requires that the duty be fulfilled by the legislative and executive branches, without
oversight or intrusion by the judiciary. The education clause itself explicitly leaves to the
legislative and executive branches responsibility for determining the form and scope of
its obligations. See Part II, c. 5, § 2. Where the drafters explicitly conferred authority on
only two [**1161] of the branches of government, we cannot ordain the third branch
"overseer."
In addition to the clause's explicit language conspicuously omitting any reference to the
judicial branch, the overarching doctrine of the separation of powers prohibits judicial
intervention in otherwise discretionary functions of the executive and legislative
branches. See art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them"). See, e.g., Bates v.
Director of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 183, 763 N.E.2d 6
(2002) (Appendix) (Cowin, J., dissenting to order entered Jan. 25, 2002), quoting
Commonwealth v. Leno, 415 Mass. 835, 841, 616 N.E.2d 453 (1993) ("Article 30's
principle of separation of power prevents [***76] the 'judiciary [from] substituting its
notions of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legislature'"); Matter of
McKnight, 406 Mass. 787, 792, 550 N.E.2d 856 (1990) ("A court.. . [*467] may not
properly exercise the functions of the executive branch of State government"). This case
presents none of the extraordinary circumstances that might warrant an exception to this
general rule. Contrast, e.g., Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the
Dep't of Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430,446-447,465, 677 N.E.2d 127 (1997);
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Matter of McKnight, supra at 801-802; Attorney Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County , 394
Mass. 624,630, 631,477 N.E.2d 361 (1985); O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of
Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 509-510, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972). Indeed, the constitutional
requirement that the judiciary stay out of the business of educational policy is echoed in
our well-established rule that "allocation of taxpayer dollars, especially in times of
limited fiscal resources, is the quintessential responsibility o f the popularly-elected
Legislature, not the courts." County of Barnstable v. Commonwealth, 410 Mass. 326,
329, 572 N.E.2d 548 (1991). [***77] See Bromfield v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 390
Mass. 665, 670 n.9,459 N.E.2d 445 (1983), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass.
605, 612,19 N.E.2d 807 (1939). "Any attempt by this court to compel the Legislature to
make a particular appropriation .. . would violate art. 30." Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,
432 Mass. 613, 619, 739 N.E.2d 1100 (2000). Where, as here, the remedy for an alleged
deprivation would require a court to order the Commonwealth to spend money that the
Legislature has not appropriated, judicial intervention is not permitted. We must be
mindful that "not every violation of a legal right gives rise to a judicial remedy." Bates v.
Director of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., supra at 168-169. These separation
of powers principles are applicable even where parties assert constitutional violations.
See LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 414 Mass. 31, 35, 604 N.E.2d 1307 (1992) ("a
judicial remedy is not available whenever a joint session fails to perform a duty that the
Constitution assigns to it"). There we declined to intrude in the political debate over term
limits:
"The courts should be most hesitant in instructing the [***78] General Court
when and how to perform its constitutional duties. Mandamus is not available
against the Legislature . . . . The principles [of separation of powers] call for the
judiciary to refrain from intruding into the power and function of another branch
of government. . . . Restraint [*468] is particularly appropriate here where [the
Constitution]. . . gives to the courts no enforcement role."
Id.
The McDuffy court cast aside this separation of powers doctrine and improperly inserted
a final layer of judicial review on [**1162] top of the public policy debate over
education. While the Chief Justice's concurring opinion suggests a discomfort with the
breadth of ur reading of the education clause in McDuffy, see ante at - (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring), and an awareness of separation of powers principles, see ante at, „ (Marshall, C.J., concurring), it would suppress these concerns and embrace McDuffy's
judicially constructed authority. Her concurring opinion today engages in a lengthy and
inappropriate review of the Superior Court judge's findings for "clear error." Ante at (Marshall, C.J., concurring). The very fact of this review is symptomatic [***7 9 ] of a
misunderstanding of this court's role in what is a legislative and executive matter. 2 The
Chief Justice's articulation of this court's task in reviewing the record underscores a deep
misapprehension concerning the court's proper function. In its own words, the Chief
Justice's concurring opinion undertakes to "assess [] whether this record of considerable
progress, marred by areas of real and in some instances profound failure, offends the
education clause." Ante at (Marshall, C.J., concurring). Through an artful review of the
Superior Court judge's findings for "clear error" followed by an effective rejection of her
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conclusions, the Chief Justice's concurring opinion avoids the need to deal with
McDuffy's intrusive and flawed analysis. If the Chief Justice and those Justices who
joined with her are concerned about a self-imposed position at the helm of this debate,
they should reject much or all of McDuffy. If, on the [*469] other hand, they are
comfortable with the prospect of determining whether the Commonwealth's educational
reforms and expenditures have produced satisfactory results, they should accord the trial
judge's findings and conclusions their due deference. [***80]
Instead, the Chief Justice's concurring opinion would fashion a new constitutional
standard virtually ensuring that the courts will be tangled at the epicenter of our
educational policy debate for the foreseeable future. Her concurring opinion proclaims:
"Where the Governor and the Legislature establish, [***81] exercise ultimate control
over, and provide substantial and increasing (subject only to dire fiscal circumstances)
resources to support, public education in a way that minimizes rather than accentuates
differences between communities based on property valuations, constitutionally
impermissible classifications, and other criteria extrinsic to the educational mission . . .
we [the Chief Justice, joined by Justices Spina and Cordy] cannot conclude that they are
presently violating the education clause." Ante at (Marshall, C.J., concurring). This
standard inappropriately and inexplicably injects an eqaul protection analysis where the
parties do not claim any violation of eqaul protection guarantees and there is no evidence
of discrimination in the record. I do not dispute that, had there been evidence of an
[**1163] eqaul protection violation in the provision of public education, this court would
have the authority under our eqaul protection doctrine to order an appropriate remedy.
However, where the plaintiffs only claim widespread deficiencies in the public school
system under the education clause, remedies must come from the legislative and
executive branches.
Further cementing our [***82] continued encroachment in this debate, the Chief Justice
suggests that nothing said today "will insulate the Commonwealth from a successful
challenge under the education clause in different circumstances." Ante at (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring). Given this invitation, we may very well be asked some day to determine
whether myriad future changes to educational programs, or to the level of support or
nature of resources provided by the Governor and Legislature, "minimize[] rather than
accentuate^" differences. Ante at (Marshall, C.J., concurring). And how will courts
answer these questions? As the Superior Court judge's hard work foreshadows, [*470]
courts will examine voluminous records filled with data on educational outcomes. This
cannot be the role that the Constitution envisioned for the judiciary. This court is not a
"super Legislature" empowered to review the work of the duly elected members of the
General Court. And the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the Commonwealth's
actions are not to be found at the endof a road paved with endless inquiries and thousands
of judicial findings.
Justice Greaney, in his dissent, argues that our doctrine of stare decisis [***83] requires
that we suppress these concerns and reaffirm McDuffy in its totality. See post at (Greaney, J., dissenting). While he acknowledges that "stare decisis is not a rigid
requirement," post at (Greaney, J., dissenting), he would nonetheless have us adhere
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uncompromisingly to a decision which, from its genesis, overstepped the limits imposed
on this court by our Constitution. 3 This approach misconstrues our rule of stare decisis.
Certainly this court must not indulge trivial shifts in our constitutional interpretation. See
post at - (Greaney, J., dissenting). However, when we are called on to revisit a decision,
no matter how recently decided or thoughtfully drafted, that is plainly wrong in an area of
such constitutional significance as our separation of powers doctrine, we must not let our
desire for consistency overpower our commitment to the intellectual honesty of our
jurisprudence. Stare decisis, while an unquestionably important pillar of our judicial
system, does not require slavish adherence to unconstitutional precedent. See Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827,115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), quoting Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665, 88 L. Ed. 987, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944) [***84] (" [**1164]
when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly [*471] reasoned, 'this Court has
never felt constrained to follow precedent"'); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266, 88
L. Ed. 2d 598, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) (recognizing exception to stare decisis for
precedents that have proved "unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious
reconsideration"). "Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.'. . . This is
particularly true in constitutional cases . .. ." Payne v. Tennessee, supra at 828, quoting
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 84 L. Ed. 604,60 S. Ct. 444,1940-1 C.B. 223
(1940). Were stare decisis an absolute rule, we would not have the benefit today of many
landmark Supreme Court decisions that vindicated cherished rights after centuries of
neglect and corrected misguided judicial decisions to conform to the dictates of the
Constitution. Perhaps the most well-known example was the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 6 8 6 (1954),
squarely overruling the "separate but equal" doctrine of [***85] Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 41 L. Ed. 256,16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896). Also of note is Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963), which overruled Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942), and established that the constitutional
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 86 Ohio
Law Abs. 513 (1961), the Court determined that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional
search was inadmissible in State prosecutions, rejecting its earlier opinion in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359 (1949). And there are other
examples. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 609,61 S. Ct. 451
(1941) (holding that Congress has power to exclude products made in violation of wage
and hour limits from interstate commerce and overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 [1918], among other cases); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 81 L. Ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937) (overruling [***8 6 ] Adkins v.
Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785,43 S. Ct. 394 [1923], and finding
minimum wage laws are not an unconstitutional burden on the right to contract). My
belief that the McDuffy opinion should be limited in no way disparages the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, supra. To the contrary, I would
honor the Brown Court's [*472] understanding that, where the Constitution commands it,
stare decisis must yield.
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[***87] Education is an emotional issue for many. Equally, it is a topic characterized by
numerous and legitimate differences of opinion concerning the course of action most
likely to improve our schools and prepare our children for bright futures. Often, these
disagreements about education concern how much money to spend and how best to spend
it. The issue of public education is thus no different from our political controversies
concerning whether we should invest more money in our public transportation system or
our roads, how much money we ought to allocate for environmental preservation, and the
amount we should provide in public assistance to low-income individuals and families. In
other words, the controversy before us today is largely a funding debate. Choices
regarding how much money to spend and how to spend it are in every instance political
decisions left to the Legislature, to be arrived at with input from the executive branch and
the citizenry; they should not be the result of judicial [**1165] directives. Our
Constitution, in separating judicial functions from legislative and vice versa, restricts
policymaking to its intended branch. See generally Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4.
Furthermore, [***8 8 ] there are practical reasons why the courts should refrain from
interfering with this design in the hopes of improving our schools. The courts, insulated
from the political fray as we are for good reason, are ill suited to craft solutions to
complex social and political problems. Unlike State legislators and their staffs, judges
have no special training in educational policy or budgets, no funds with which to hire
experts in the field of education, no resources with which to conduct inquiries or
experiments, no regular exposure to our school system, no contact with the rank and file
who have the task of implementing our lofty pronouncements, and no direct
accountability to the communities that house our schools. Had this lawsuit been
successful and this court were once again to fashion a judicial remedy, the elected
officials who, pursuant to our Constitution, ought to bear the ultimate burden of resolving
our current educational debate would have been insulated from public accountability. The
more this court interferes in policymaking [*473] and political funding debates, the more
we allow the Legislature to avoid difficult questions, and the more our citizens get
accustomed to turning to [***89] the courts for solutions rather than to their elected
officials. As I said in Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436
Mass. 144,185, 763 N.E.2d 6 (2002) (Appendix) (Cowin, J., dissenting to order entered
Jan. 25, 2002), "the plaintiffs' remedy, as it always is with political questions, is at the
ballot box."
DISSENT BY: GREANEY; IRELAND
DISSENT
GREANEY, J. (dissenting, with whom Ireland, J., joins). As the only remaining member
of the court who participated in McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ.,
415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993) (McDuffy), and as the single justice who has
supervised these proceedings over several years, I write separately for the following
reasons: to emphasize the nature and rule of the McDuffy case; to point out again the
crisis that exists in the four focus districts before us; to explain how the court can and
should remain involved in the proceedings without impermissibly intruding on legislative
or executive prerogatives; and to express regret that the court has chosen to ignore the
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principles of stare decisis, thereby effectively abandoning one of its major constitutional
precedents.
(a) McDuffy [***90] was released with the court's knowledge that the Legislature was
poised to enact the Education Reform Act of 1993 (ERA). See St. 1993, c.71. The
McDuffy decision, the adoption of the ERA, and the Governor's signing of the ERA into
law were harmonious and contemporaneous events which, on the one hand, stated in
McDuffy (after comprehensive research of original and modem sources) the
constitutional obligation to provide a minimally adequate education for the
Commonwealth's children and, on the other hand, put into place measures to satisfy that
obligation. Thus, the three events comprised in fact and law a joint enterprise on the part
of the three branches o f government to seek and compel change and improvement. Over
the past decade, McDuffy has never been understood to constitute anything less. And, as
emphasized by Justice Ireland, post at (Ireland, J., dissenting), and acknowledged by the
Chief Justice, ante at - [*474] (Marshall, C.J., concurring), the obligation stated in
McDuffy is mandatory and not one which can later be recast as more or less aspirational.
[**1166] (b) By any standard, the extensive findings made by the Superior Court judge
conclusively establish that the constitutional [***91] imperative of McDuffy is not being
satisfied in the four focus districts, when they are examined objectively against the three
comparison districts. The factual record establishes that the schools attended by the
plaintiff children in the focus districts are not currently implementing the Massachusetts
curriculum frameworks in any meaningful way, nor are they otherwise equipping their
students with the capabilities delineated in McDuffy as the minimum standard by which
to measure an educated child. See McDuffy, supra at 618-619, 621. The judge's decision,
reached after a lengthy adversarial trial, documents in comprehensive detail a disturbing
state of affairs in the schools of the four focus districts. The following is but a partial
recitation of the judge's findings.
Acute inadequacies exist in the educational programs of the four focus districts in the
core subjects of English language arts, mathematics, science and technology, and history.
In Lowell, a large percentage of elementary school students are reading below grade
level. One middle school has insufficient textbooks and supplementary reading materials
to accommodate all of its students and [***92] no specialized reading teachers at all to
assist those students who are reading below grade level. Lowell High School has many
students who read below grade level, and thirty to forty per cent of its students lack
fluency in English. The school, however, has no funds to create a formal reading
program. In Springfield, thirty-six per cent of fourth graders at one elementary school
failed the English Language Arts (ELA) Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System (MCAS) test in 2002. A significant number of its fifth grade students enter
middle school reading two and one-half (or more) years below grade level. There is,
nevertheless, only one reading resource teacher to serve all six of Springfield's middle
schools. An astounding seventy per cent of Springfield's seventh graders scored below
the proficient level on the ELA MCAS test in 2003, and the same dismal percentage of
tenth graders failed to achieve proficiency on the ELA MCAS test.
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All four of the focus districts have difficulty attracting and [*475] retaining certified
mathematics teachers. As a result, only fifty per cent of Brockton's middle school
mathematics teachers were appropriately certified in 2 0 0 2 and only thirty-five per cent in
2003. At the high school, twenty-seven [***93] per cent of Brockton's mathematics
teachers were not certified to teach high school mathematics in 2003. In Winchendon,
none of the seventh and eighth grade mathematics teachers is appropriately certified.
Only one of three middle school science teachers is certified, but there is no professional
development in Winchendon devoted to science instruction. Winchendon cannot provide
the range of science courses necessary to meet the needs of students interested in
applying to a four-year college. Ninety-five per cent of Winchendon students scored at
the warning-failing or needs improvement level on the eighth grade history MCAS test.
Winchendon's reading, math, science, and social studies programs are not aligned with
the State curriculums framework. Although the State science framework contemplates
instruction in a laboratory setting, four of the six middle schools in Springfield lack
science laboratories altogether, and those that do exist do not all have running water or
electrical outlets. Only one-half of Springfield's elementary schools have a science
teacher. The science curriculum framework was adopted in [**1167] 2001, but many of
Springfield's high school science textbooks are ten years [***94] old. The science supply
budget for the district as a whole has been $ 2 per student for the last fifteen years, an
amount that is utterly insufficient to implement the framework.
Even larger weaknesses are apparent in the areas of health, the arts, and foreign
languages. In 2003, the elementary and middle schools in Lowell had a per pupil arts
expenditure budget of $ 1.63. Twenty-seven art teachers, thirty-one music teachers, and
four theater teachers in Springfield serve a student population of 26,000, and it was
estimated that fully one-half of the students in Springfield's graduating class of 2003 went
through twelve years of public school without any arts instruction at all. Although Lowell
and Springfield have student populations with numerous and serious health issues,
including alcohol and marijuana abuse, poor nutrition, high obesity rates, high teenage
pregnancy rates, HIV, and domestic violence, neither district has the resources or staff to
provide its students with the level of [*476] instruction contemplated by the State health
curriculum framework. In Brockton, forty-two per cent of its foreign language teachers in
the middle school, and twenty-five per cent of its foreign [***95] language teachers in
the high school, are not certified in the languages they teach.
Libraries in all four of the focus districts lack sufficient staff, an adequate number of
current titles and periodicals, and computer resources necessary to equip students with
research skills contemplated by the curriculum frameworks. All four focus districts have
been designated by the Department of Education (department) as "high needs" school
districts with respect to technology, and one has met benchmarks set by the department
pertaining to the availability of modem, fully functioning computer equipments or the
staff to service them.
All four focus districts have difficulty servicing children referred for special education,
due primarily to a lack of psychologists able to perform the necessary evaluations. All
lack sufficient space to provide special education services in appropriate settings and fail
to provide students with disabilities with meaningful access to the regular education
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curriculum in regular education classrooms. Children with disabilities in the focus
districts suffer from the absence of meaningful professional development both for regular
education teachers on teaching special needs students [***96] and for special education
teachers on subject matter content areas that children with disabilities need to learn. All
of the focus districts lack sufficient personnel to support and assist children with
disabilities in regular education classrooms. In 2003, the percentage of special education
students who passed the tenth grade math MCAS test in die focus districts ranged from
twelve to twenty-five per cent. The percentage of special education students in the focus
districts who passed the tenth grade ELA MCAS test was twenty-four to fifty. 1 In all four
focus districts the scores of students at risk, including students with [**1168] disabilities,
racial and ethnic minority [*477] students, limited English proficient students, and lowincome students, were shockingly low and substantially lower than the scores of regular
education students.
[***97] Each of the four focus districts runs a public school preschool program of high
quality, but their programs serve only a fraction of all of the three and four year olds who
would attend if there were sufficient resources and adequate space. Brockton serves only
ten per cent of its three and four year olds; Lowell serves about thirteen per cent;
Springfield serves less than thirty per cent; and Winchendon serves about one-third.
Twenty-five per cent of kindergarten students in Brockton and Lowell, and close to forty
per cent of kindergarten students in Springfield, tested more than one standard deviation
below the norm in terms of receptive vocabulary acquisition, "a sign of children who are
at considerable risk of school failure because they are already so far behind the starting
gate." Because of budget reductions in recent years, however, each of the focus districts
has had to cut back on its programs directed toward early childhood education.
In summary (and without attempting to include many other negative findings that add to
what is stated above), the judge's report paints a "bleak portrait of the plaintiffs' schools"
that is remarkably similar to what the McDuffy [***98] court found eleven years ago. Id.
at 617. The judge examined a number of objective criteria used by the department as
indicators of education program quality: MCAS scores, dropout rates, retention rates, ontime graduation rates, SAT scores and SAT participation rates, and the postgraduation
plans of high school seniors. She concluded that, on almost every objective indicator, the
four focus districts have, with few exceptions, not improved at all since 1993, and "if one
concentrates particularly on the last five years, when one would expect at least to begin
seeing the impact of ERA investments, there are almost no exceptions." She concluded
that public school students in the plaintiffs' districts are offered significantly fewer
educational opportunities, and a [*478] lower quality of educational opportunities, than
are students in the schools of the comparison districts and, on average, than are students
in the Commonwealth in the whole. Despite the many positive changes effected by the
ERA, the conclusion is inevitable that the four focus districts are failing to equip their
students with the capabilities described in McDuffy as necessary to become free and
productive [***9 9 ] citizens of the Commonwealth. Moreover, even within the four focus
districts, those children demonstrating the greatest needs typically receive less than other
students of average needs. We have then between the focus districts and the comparison
districts a tale of two worlds: the focus districts beset with problems, and lacking
anything that can reasonably be called an adequate education for many of their children,
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the comparison districts maintaining proper and adequate educational standards and
moving their students toward graduation and employment with learned skills necessary to
achieve in postgraduate education and function in the modern workplace.
(c) The plaintiffs' situation requires relief by this court. Creating academic standards that
are national models cannot be deemed constitutionally appropriate if those standards
cannot be implemented in the focus districts where funding is inadequate. Further,
creating a rigorous student assessment system cannot be deemed constitutionally
appropriate when a majority of students in the focus districts are scoring at the failingwarning, or needs improvement level, under that system. [**1169] Similarly, raising
certification standards [***1 00 ] for teachers cannot be deemed satisfactory when schools
cannot attract, pay, or retain certified teachers. Changes effected by the Legislature and
the department since 1993 have been laudable. These changes, however, ultimately must
be judged on results and not on effort (no matter how praiseworthy), and, as pointed out
by Justice Ireland, the Commonwealth's insistence to the contrary seeks, in effect, to
overrule McDuffy. Post at (Ireland, J., dissenting).
I do not suggest that the Commonwealth must guarantee equal outcomes in all school
districts with regard to such measures as MCAS scores, graduation rates, and college
admissions (although these certainly would be inspirational goals). The Commonwealth's
constitutional duty to educate its children [*479] will not be fulfilled, however, until all
of its students have a reasonable opportunity to acquire an adequate education, within the
meaning of McDuffy, in the public schools o f their communities. This, as the judge's
report meticulously documents, the Commonwealth has failed to do in the four focus
districts. 2 Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever to justify the Chief Justice's
optimism that considerable progress [***101] in the focus districts is being made. 3 Ante
at (Marshall, C.J., concurring). To the contrary, the judge's report, read as a whole,
documents a startling and dismal performance gap between the Commonwealth's
privileged and underprivileged children (the hardest and costliest to educate) that
continues to hold its course.
[***102] I would adopt the judge's recommendation that we order the department
promptly to conduct a study to assess the actual costs of effective implementation of the
educational programs intended to provide an adequate education in the four focus
districts. No persuasive consensus exists regarding how much spending is necessary to
provide an "adequate" education. Actual spending levels strongly suggest, however, that
the formula now relied on by the department to reflect the minimum amount each district
needs to provide an adequate education to its students does not reflect the true cost of
successful education in the Commonwealth, at least in the focus districts. Between fiscal
years 2001 and 2003, each focus district's actual net school spending was at or only
slightly above its foundation budget. In contrast, the seventy-five school districts that
perform the highest on the MCAS tests spend, on average, 130 per cent of the foundation
budget. The comparison districts spent between 151 to 171 per cent of the foundation
budget, while the State average was between 115 to 117 per cent of the foundation
budget. These figures alone suggest that there are structural [*480] deficiencies in the
formula [***103] for the foundation budget that must be addressed. I am cognizant that
money alone will not solve all of the issues that are confronted daily by educators in our
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poorer urban districts, as are three of the four focus districts. On the other hand, a realistic
assessment of the costs of effectively implementing an educational [**1170] plan in such
districts reasonably could, and should, contemplate other factors that affect student
performance such as poverty, teenage pregnancy, nutrition, family issues, drugs,
violence, language deficiencies and the need for remedial teaching and tutoring. It also
should include a cost assessment of measures necessary to improve the administrative
ability of the districts successfully to implement the educational plan.
Once this study is accomplished, we (meant collectively to include all three branches of
government) shall be in a position to understand where assistance, administrative,
financial and otherwise, can be targeted in the focus districts (and, eventually in other
districts similarly situated) to bring them into reasonable balance with the rest of the
State. Additionally, consideration must be given to increasing the personnel and
resources of [***104] the department, which (as the judge found and Justice Ireland
reiterates, post at & n .6 [Ireland, J., dissenting]) are obviously inadequate to apply
practical measures to resolve the needs of the focus districts. I would remand this case to
the county court so that the single justice can monitor the remedial process and continue
to use the judge (who has acquired special expertise on the state of education [or lack of
it] in the four focus districts) to provide direction.
In this way, the court will play a vital role in ensuring that the Commonwealth's public
schools are adequately financed that would not intrude on the other two branches. The
problem is of such magnitude that the collective involvement of all three branches of
government is needed. I advocate no role on the part of the court in the department's
decisions as how best to bolster achievement of our public school students or how to
allocate its resources between districts. In view of the enormity of the task, to remove the
court from the process entirely is a great misfortune and mistake.
(d) The McDuffy court held unequivocally that the Commonwealth [*481] has an
obligation, enforceable by the court, to [***105] provide a public education of quality
sufficient to provide its students to take their place as knowledgeable and productive
citizens. McDuffy, supra at 564, 619-620. McDuffy made clear that the constitutional
duty to "cherish" public schools must be understood as a "duty to ensure that the public
schools achieve their object and educate the people." Id. at 564. The McDuffy court
emphasized what the framers themselves well understood -- that a free public education
is a foundation of democracy. We stated:
"The framers' decision to dedicate an entire chapter —one of six —to the topic of
education signals that it was to them a central concern. Their decision to treat
education differently from other objects of government by devoting a separate
chapter to education rather than listing it as a matter within the powers of the
legislative or executive branches indicates structurally what is said explicitly by
words: that education is a 'duty' of government, and not merely an object within
the power of government. Lastly, the framers' decision to place the provisions
concerning education in 'The Frame of Government' —rather than [***106] in
the 'Declaration of Rights' —demonstrates that the framers conceived of education
as fundamentally related to the very existence of government."
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Id. at 565.
The Chief Justice endorses in eloquent language the "constitutional imperative"
announced in McDuffy and accepts the judge's factual findings as a "compelling,
[**11711 instructive account of the current state of public education." Ante at, (Marshall,
C. J., concurring). She believes, nonetheless, that the Commonwealth currently is meeting
its duty to educate the plaintiff students in the focus istricts, because the fulfillment o f its
duty to educate depends on effort and not on results. This proposition is way off the
mark. The Chief Justice, in effect, would overrule McDuffy. The plurality result reached
today both undermines protections guaranteed to the students in the focus districts (and in
other districts where the obligations of the education clause are not being fulfilled) and
ignores principles of stare decisis.
[*482] The McDuffy court unanimously held that children in the Commonwealth are
constitutionally entitled to an education that is reasonably calculated to provide them with
[***107] the seven capabilities set forth in the Supreme Court of Kentucky's guidelines
in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,212 (Ky. 1989). 4 That
pronouncement was reached after intensive and scholarly examination of the meaning
and provenance of the education clause and consideration o f the principles involved. All
of the arguments now advanced by the parties were contemplated, and decided, in
McDuffy, and there was then no misconception of the points involved. That court was
acutely aware (as am I) of the lack of consensus among experts as to what constitutes an
adequate education and what the costs of such an education might be. The McDuffy
court, nevertheless, allowed the single justice to retain jurisdiction to ensure that the
Commonwealth devised a plan and sources of funds sufficient "to provide education in
the public schools for the children there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and
without regard to the fiscal capacity of the community or district in which such children
live." Stare decisis is not a rigid requirement, but abandonment of precedent (especially
when constitutional doctrine is involved) demands special justification. [***108] See
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984). As
recently articulated by a Justice of this court, "in order to overrule a prior case, it is not
enough that some or all of the Justices of this court have some intellectual or academic
disagreement with the earlier analysis of the issue. There must be something more, above
and beyond such a disagreement, that would justify some exception to the doctrine of
stare decisis." Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441
Mass. 549,588, 808 N.E.2d 205 (2004) (Sosman, J., concurring). No exception to the
doctrine is present in this case.
Justice Cowin, writing separately, [***109] boldly proclaims that McDuffy was"a
display of stunning judicial imagination" that now should be overruled. Ante at (Cowin,
J., concurring). This is a surprising position [*483] and one not advanced by the
defendants. I strongly take issue with Justice Cowin's assertion that twelve years of
retained jurisdiction, several months of trial, and over 300 pages of meticulously prepared
findings should now be "for naught," because, in her words, the court has no role to play
(and never had a role) in ensuring the Commonwealth's compliance with the mandate
embodied in the education clause. Ante at n.2 (Cowin, J., concurring).Interpretation of
our Constitution is this court's most solemn function. [**1172] It would be intolerable

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

684

indeed if our decisions construing constitutional provisions, such as McDuffy and others,
were no more constant than the changing membership of our court. See Mabardy v.
McHugh, 202 Mass. 148,152, 88 N.E. 894 (1909) ("it is . . . vital that there be stability in
the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties
should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate
on a fluctuation of the [***110] law with every change in the expounders of it").
Justice Cowin asserts that "where the Constitution commands it, stare decisis must yield."
Ante at (Cowin, J., concurring). In support of this pronouncement, she cites "many
landmark [United States] Supreme Court decisions that vindicated cherished rights after
centuries of neglect and corrected misguided judicial decisions to conform to the dictates
of the Constitution." Ante at (Cowin, J., concurring). The decisions she cites, however,
represent reevaluations of constitutional provisions in light of changing social
circumstances and current perspectives on the nature of individual rights —that were
endorsed unanimously or by the majority of an entire court —and not the separately
expressed opinion of one lone Justice (joined by another) that a unanimous decision of
the court, released only twelve years before, was "overreaching," "unsupportable," or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. They, thus, are irrelevant.
There are other reasons for not abandoning the plaintiffs and the full force of the
McDuffy doctrine. A brief in support o f the plaintiff has been filed by many State
legislators, arguing (what [***111] we all know to be true) that the Commonwealth is not
providing any sort of an adequate education to the majority of students [*484] who attend
public schools in low income districts and urging the court to adopt the judge's
recommendations in full. The Governor has, correctly, identified the education crisis
facing our schools as the civil rights issue of our generation. 5 Public support is already
behind this task.
[***112] Practically everyone involved in this case assumed that the court was going to
use this litigation to order the Legislature to appropriate money to remedy the severe
problems identified. This assumption is incorrect. I am well aware of the limitations that
apply to unelected members of a court ordering an elected Legislature and executive to
appropriate money and, frankly, the difficulties that might be encountered if it became
necessary to enforce any orders against recalcitrant elected officials. The problem, of
course, is magnified considerably when dealing with expenditures needed to fund public
education; the need to allocate resources equitably between [**1173] various school
districts achieving at different levels; the complexity of education policy in general; and
the disagreement between competent experts on how best to remediate a nonperforming
or poorly performing school district. But the remedy I propose has thing to do with orders
for the appropriation of money. The remedy takes full advantage of the exhaustive and
excellent work of the Superior Court judge and brings to bear on the problem the voice
and aid of the court as an integral part of the joint enterprise I have [***113] described. If
money is needed, and is not forthcoming, there will be ample time to discuss the matter
of appropriations later in a cooperative and nonadversarial way.
[*485] Surely, our education clause means what McDuffy says it means. Were it
otherwise, the clause becomes an empty promise. If the same kind of thinking that
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naysayers now espouse occurred in Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
98 L. Ed. 873,74 S. Ct. 6 8 6 (1954) (Brown I), and in Brown v. Board of Educ. of
Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, 75 S. Ct. 753, 71 Ohio Law Abs. 584 (1955)
(Brown IT), then those decisions would have gone the other way, with the United States
Supreme Court refraining from becoming involved in serious matters of educational
policy in the States, notwithstanding the compelling nature of the facts and the existence
of unambiguous constitutional language (as is the situation here).
Rather than doing that, however, the United States Supreme Court took profound and
decisive action and affirmed the status of educational opportunity in words that articulate
the dictates of McDuffy:
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory [***114] school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him [or her] for later professional
training, and in helping him [or her] to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he [or she] is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."
Brown I, supra at 493.
Because our highly respected court has chosen to turn back from McDuffy, at a time
when the focus districts most need our help, I respectfully dissent.
IRELAND, J. (dissenting, with whom Greaney, J., joins). Education is one key to success
in life. "It is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied [*486] the [***115] opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,493,98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). Today, a plurality o f the
court has left the children of the Commonwealth, who have been waiting now for over
twelve years for the promises of a constitutionally required education this court declared
in McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545,621, 615
N.E.2d 516 (1993) (McDuffy), without recourse.
In my view, McDuffy contains clear, unequivocal language concerning the
Commonwealth's duty to educate its children. The McDuffy court held that "the
Massachusetts Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on the magistrates and
Legislatures [**1174] of this Commonwealth to provide education in the public schools
for the children . . . whether they be rich or poor and without regard to the fiscal capacity
of the community or district in which such children live" (emphasis added). Id. at 621.
The court extensively analyzed whether the duty to provide education was aspirational,
and concluded it was not. Id. at 606. The citizens "of the Commonwealth have a
correlative right to be educated." Id. At 566 n.23. [***116] 1 The McDuffy court also
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concluded that "an educated child must possess 'at least.. . seven . . . capabilities'"
(emphasis added). 2 Id. at 618, quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
[***117] The McDuffy court also held that the duty was not being met and that simply
offering to aid education was insufficient. McDuffy, supra at 606, 611, 614, 621. The
Legislature also is not permitted to shift its duty to local governments. Id. at 606.
Moreover, particularly as none of its conclusions is equivocal, I conclude that McDuffy
did not envision that this constitutional [*487] duty would be subject to the vagaries of
budget issues. 3 See also id. at 570-577 (discussing historic statutes calling for fines
where communities failed to provide for education).
[***118] I write separately because I disagree with both concurring opinions. Because I
agree completely with the reasons stated by Justice Greaney in his dissent, it is not
necessary for me to address Justice Cowin's concurrence. Therefore, this dissent
addresses the concurrence of the Chief Justice. I disagree with the Chief Justice's
assessment that the enactment of the Education Reform Act and the existence of what she
calls "painfully slow" progress fulfils the Commonwealth's enforceable constitutional
duty to provide education to public school students. 4 Ante at (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring). Although admittedly an imperfect analogy, the Chief Justice's endorsement
of "painfully slow progress" reminds me of the "with all deliberate speed" standard the
United States Supreme Court endorsed concerning school desegregation. Brown v. Board
of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301, 99 L. Ed. 1083,75 S. Ct. 753, 71 Ohio Law Abs.
584 (1955). That Court expressed its frustration with the pace of desegregation eight
[**1175] years later. See, e.g., Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 531,10 L. Ed. 2d 529,
83 S. Ct. 1314 (1963). I believe that the Chief Justice's assessment that this painfully
slow progress does not [***119] violate the education clause implicitly overrules the
holding of McDuffy. 5 I see no reason to do so. Rather, I agree with the analysis and
conclusions of this court in McDuffy and of the Superior Court judge who was specially
assigned to hear this case and report to the single justice, in particular her conclusion that
the children of the Commonwealth are not receiving their constitutionally required
education. Indeed, the Chief Justice herself states that the "goals of education reform
adopted since McDuffy [clearly have not] been fully achieved." Ante at (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring).
[*488] Although the judge found that the Education Reform Act "changed dramatically
the manner in which public school. . . education is funded . .. and changed, almost as
dramatically [***120] the role that the Commonwealth plays in pubic school education,"
the judge also concluded that McDuffy compels the court to analyze whether, through
this legislation, the Commonwealth is providing students with the capabilities it outlined.
As the Chief Justice states, the judge's findings are a "model of precision,
comprehensiveness, and meticulous attention to detail." Ante at (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring). She evaluated the four districts using two indicators. The first was the
curriculum frameworks the defendants have developed to fulfil the seven capabilities
identified in McDuffy. The judge found that these frameworks, on paper are "of excellent
quality, focusing on knowledge and skills that students need to acquire." Although she
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highlighted some positives in the four districts, when she evaluated each district's
capacity to implement the frameworks, as detailed by Justice Greaney, ante at - (Greaney,
J., dissenting), the judge concluded that the four districts did not meet the constitutionally
required minimum level of education.
The judge also compared the four districts to "comparison" districts of Brookline,
Concord-Carlisle, and Wellesley (the [***121] districts that were comparison district in
McDuffy). As criteria for the comparison the judge used objective criteria that the
Department of Education and the office of educational quality and accountability use as a
way to evaluate the school districts, including MCAS scores, retention rates, on-time
graduation rates, SAT scores, and post graduation plans of high school seniors. She made
extensive findings, detailed by Justice Greaney's dissent, and concluded:
"While it is certainly true that MCAS scores in the [four] focus districts have
improved, [their] scores are still much lower than the State average, not to speak
of the comparison districts. As for the other criteria .. . dropout data, retention
rates, graduation rates, SAT scores, post-secondary school plans —with few
exceptions, the four focus districts [*489] have not improved at all, and if one
concentrates particularly on the last five years, when one would expect at least to
begin seeing the impact of [Education Reform Act] investments, there are almost
no exceptions" (emphasis added).
After concluding that the students of the Commonwealth were not receiving their
constitutionally mandated [***122 ] education, the judge identified areas of critical
concern in the four districts: funding, special education, [**1176] attracting qualified
teachers, and facilities. The judge's findings concerning these areas are detailed by Justice
Greaney, therefore I emphasize only some of the judge's findings concerning funding.
The judge considered evidence concerning the foundation budget formula and found that
even the defendants' own witnesses were not able to say that the foundation budget is
adequate to provide the education called for by McDuffy, in terms of the curriculum
frameworks. 6 For example, in 2001, a review commission created by the Legislature in
the Education Reform Act reviewed the formula and concluded that it was inadequate in
certain respects including special education, class-size assumption for elementary grades,
low-income factors, and full-day kindergarten. In addition, the commission called for a
technology factor to be added to the budget. 7 The judge also noted that State funding has
been [*490] cut since fiscal year 2002. These cuts include a reduction of between .1 and
8.8 per cent in G. L. c. 70 aid and cuts in grants for class size reduction, MCAS
remediation, preschool [***123] and early childhood education, and early reading
programs.
In addition to this bleak picture of the four focus districts, I note that nearly one-third of
eighth graders across the State failed to pass the MCAS science examination, tentatively
scheduled to become a graduation requirement with the class of 2009. Although this
alone is cause for concern, Springfield, Brockton, and Lowell had even higher student
failure rates of seventy per cent, fifty-six per cent, and fifty-three per cent, respectively.
Amid Science Push, Many Students Lag, Boston Globe, Jan. 20,2005, at A1 and B5.
Moreover, in the Commonwealth's report to the Federal government pursuant to the No
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Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq. (2002), it was reported that
forty-nine per cent of the Commonwealth's schools have not improved test scores of
black students and forty-six per cent of schools did not make gains in the scores [***125]
of their low-income students. Schools Hit on Minority Progress, Boston Globe, Oct. 15,
2004, at B1 and B 8 . Given this information, coupled with the judge's findings and
conclusions, I could not disagree more with the Chief Justice's assessment that the
Commonwealth is meeting its constitutional duty.
[**1177] Concerning the remedies ordered by the judge, the defendants rely on a
separation of powers argument to state that the court cannot order remedies. However,
their argument is undermined by the judge's conclusion:
"The difficulty with the defendants' solution is that the system they depend on to
improve the capacities of schools and districts is not currently adequate to do the
job. Since approximately 1980, the department's staff has been reduced by more
than half —from over 1,000 employees to a number less than 400. At the same
time, under the [Education Reform Act], the department's responsibilities have
multiplied and intensified in critical ways. In terms of reviewing school district
performance, in the three years since the department developed the school
accountability system, it has been able to conduct school panel reviews in only
twelve to fourteen schools [*491] each [***126] year, although the annual pool of
schools demonstrating 'low* or 'critically low 1performance is in the hundreds."
I would impose only the remedies ordered by the judge that require the defendants,
within six months, to determine the actual costs associated with ( 1) implementing all
seven of the curriculum frameworks that the Commonwealth chose as a way to
implement the McDuffy capabilities, and (2) measures that would provide assistance to
districts effectively to implement the Commonwealth's educational program. I have faith
that the Legislature and the executive, having had pointed out to them the deficiencies of
their good faith attempt to provide the children of the Commonwealth with their
constitutionally required education, will act to remedy the situation. McDuffy, supra at
619 n.92 ("We shall presume at this time that the Commonwealth will fulfil its
responsibility with respect to defining the specifics and the appropriate means to provide
the constitutionally-required education"). My faith is based on events that have occurred
since the judge heard evidence in this case, indicating that the Legislature is very
concerned with the state of education [***127] in the Commonwealth. For example, in
July, 2004, the Legislature established a Department of Early Education and Care. St.
2004, c. 205. In December, 2004, more than one hundred legislators signed on to a bill
that calls for the creation of a commission to examine education financing. See What
Cost Education? Area Lawmakers Want to Create a Commission to Answer the Question,
MetroWest Daily News, Dec. 15,2004. 8 Moreover, in this case, the court received an
amicus brief from forty-seven legislators urging us to endorse the judge's findings and
conclusions.
In Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 768, 802 N.E.2d 105 (2004) 9 [*492]
(Ireland, J., concurring), quoting Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 709, 704 N.E.2d
1147 (1999) (Ireland, J., concurring), [***128] I repeated:
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"The education of our children is no less a compelling issue than their physical
safety. 'Local schools lie at the heart of our communities. Each morning, parents
across the Commonwealth send their children off to school. They entrust
[**1178] the schools with nothing less than the safety and well-being o f those
most dear to them —their own children. No arm of government touches more
closely the core of our families and our children than our schools."' 10
I expressed my concern that in the years that passed since McDuffy was decided
"progress toward providing education in all core subjects to all the Commonwealth's
students educated with public funds, disabled and nondisabled, rich and poor, and of
every race and ethnicity, has not advanced more." Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., supra
at 771 (Ireland, J., concurring). I feel the same today. As I have stated supra, that
education is the key to success in life has been long recognized by courts. Brown v.
Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 6 8 6 (1954) (public
education "is a principal instrument in . .. preparing [a child] for later professional
[***129] training").
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't o f Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 103 L. Ed. 2d
249,109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), the State of Wisconsin, although documenting [***130] the
abuse Joshua DeShaney received at the hands of his father, which abuse left him mentally
impaired, did not act to protect him. Joshua sued the Department of Social Services
claiming the department's failure to act deprived him of his liberty under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 191. The
Court expressed its "natural sympathy" for Joshua, but declined to hold that the due
process clause offered him any relief. Id. at 202. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun
lamented "Poor Joshua!," [*493] and stated that given a choice, he would adopt a
"'sympathetic' reading [of the due process clause], one which comports with dictates of
fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province
of judging." Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Today the Chief Justice states that she
has sympathy for the "sharp disparities in the educational opportunities, and the
performance, of some" children of the Commonwealth and states that, for many students,
it is too late. Ante at, (Marshall, C.J., concurring). See generally [***131] ante at (Cowin, J., concurring). I am disappointed and saddened that, instead of acting to assist
our children, five Justices leave them without recourse like "Poor Joshua." 11 Our
children deserve better.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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For Jack O'Connell, in his official capacity as State Superintendent of Public Instruction,
California Department of Education, Respondents: Amy Bisson Holloway, LEAD
ATTORNEY, California Department of Education, Legal Division, Sacramento, CA;
Eileen Gray, California Department of Education, Sacramento, CA Sacra.
JUDGES: WILLIAM ALSUP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: WILLIAM ALSUP
OPINION
ORDER
(1) REMANDING CASE; (2) FINDING M OTION TO INTERVENE M OOT; AND
(3) VACATING HEARING
INTRODUCTION
In this education-rights action brought under California state law, plaintiffs move to
remand this case to the Superior Court of San Francisco due to lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Because the complaint does not raise a substantial issue of federal law, there
was no basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). Accordingly, this order GRANTS
plaintiffs' motion to remand the action.
STATEMENT
Plaintiffs are various public [*4] school districts, non-profit organizations, students and
parents challenging California's failure to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act
("NCLBA")(20 U.S.C. 6301 etseq.) with respect to students who are not yet proficient in
English. Defendants are collectively responsible for implementing education policies in
compliance with the NCLBA for California public schools. The NCLBA is a
comprehensive educational-reform statute enacted "to ensure that all children have a fair,
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a
minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards and state
academic assessments." 20 U.S.C. 6301.
In furtherance of this goal, each state is required to implement "a set of high-quality,
yearly student academic assessments that include, at a minimum, academic assessments
in mathematics, reading or language arts, and science that will be used as the primary
means of determining the yearly performance" of schools within the state. 20 U.S.C
6311(b)(3)(A).
For students learning English as a second language, annual assessments of English [*5]
proficiency is also required. 20 U.S.C. 6311(b)(7). The NCLBA specifically provides that
"limited English proficient students.. .shall be assessed in a valid and reliable manner and
provided reasonable accommodations on assessments...including, to the extent
practicable, assessments in the language and form most likely to yield accurate data on
what such students know and can do in academic content areas, until such students have
achieved English language proficiency." 20 U.S.C. 631 l(b)(3)(C)(ix)(III). Academic
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assessments in another language (other than English) are expressly permitted, although it
is presumed that students will develop English competency within three to five years. 20
U.S.C. 631 l(b)(3)(C)(x). Plaintiffs challenge defendants' alleged refusal to provide
reasonable accommodations on assessments of students with limited English proficiency.
In particular, plaintiffs argue that California, unlike fourteen other states, refuses to
utilize a Spanish-language test or a modified-English test which reduces unnecessary
linguistic complexity (Br. 2). The complaint, filed on June 1, 2005, (1) seeks a [*6] writ
of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 to compel defendants to
implement "valid and reliable" testing of students with limited English proficiency; (2)
alleges illegal expenditures of taxpayers' funds in violation o f California Code of Civil
Procedure § 526(a); (3) alleges a violation o f plaintiffs' right to education under the
California Constitution; and (4) seeks declaratory relief. This action was removed by
defendants on June 29,2005. Plaintiffs now move for remand.
ANALYSIS
1. LEGAL STANDARD.
Removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) is permitted for actions involving a federal question
over which the district court would have had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1331. The removing party always bears the burden of establishing removal is proper.
Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1990).
The "well-pleaded complaint rule" provides that federal jurisdiction only exists when a
federal question is presented on the face of plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint,
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal. Gully v. First Nat'I Bank in
Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 113, 57 S. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936) [*7] (further noting that
the federal issue must not be "merely a possible or conjectural one"). A federal defense,
even if anticipated, is not part of a plaintiffs cause o f action. Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522
U.S. 470,475,118 S. Ct. 921, 139 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1998). This rule thus enables the
plaintiff, as "master of the complaint," to have his action heard in state court "by
eschewing claims based on federal law." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399,
107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). Subject-matter jurisdiction clearly exists where
federal law creates the cause of action. Where the plaintiff only asserts causes of action
under state law, the case may nonetheless be deemed to "arise under" federal law "where
the vindication of a right under state law necessarily tum[s] on some construction of
federal law." MerrellDow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S. Ct.
3229, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1986). The mere presence o f a federal issue in a state cause of
action, however, does not automatically raise a federal question. Id. at 813. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has explicitly found that "a complaint alleging a violation of a federal
statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has [*8] determined that
there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim
'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'" Id. at 817. In other
words, "if a federal law does not provide a private right of action, then a state law action
based on its violation perforce does not raise a 'substantial' federal question." Utley v.
Varian Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1987).
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2. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT RAISES NO FEDERAL QUESTION.
There is no dispute that the complaint only alleges causes of action under California law.
The issue, then, is whether this action nonetheless "arises under" federal law. In essence,
defendants argue that "one of the substantial federal questions posed by this case" is
whether the NCLBA creates a private cause o f action, although defendants insist there is
none
(Opp. 11). The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. At least two other district
courts, however, have held that it does not. Ass'rt o f Community Orgs. fo r Reform Now v.
New York City Dep't o f Educ., 269 F. Supp.2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Fresh Start
Academy v. Toledo Bd. o f Educ., 363 F. Supp.2d 910 (N.D. Ohio 2005). [*9] This Court
agrees. Indeed, at the case management conference, plaintiffs were willing to stipulate
that they did not have a private cause of action under the NCLBA. We thus have the
curious situation in which everyone in this action agrees that there is no private right of
action under this statute. It would seem that defendants have manufactured an issue out of
thin air in a vain effort to bootstrap their own issues into federal court. Plaintiffs'
allegations that defendants have failed to comply with the NCLBA do not raise a
substantial federal question. Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283.
Nor do plaintiffs appear to be challenging the validity or construction of the NCLBA
itself. Defendants argue that the Court should construe 20 U.S.C. 631 l(b)(3)(C)(ix)(III)
because it "will be totally outcome determinative" (Opp. 7). Because subject-matter
jurisdiction is lacking, however, the undersigned declines to engage in any substantive
interpretation of the NCLBA. This case must be remanded. In any event, it may very well
be, as defendants argue, that California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 cannot create a
right (but can only be used to enforce one), [*10] such that if plaintiffs have no private
right of action under the NCLBA, their first cause of action necessarily fails (Opp. 10).
But this is for the state court to decide.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to remand is GRANTED. This action is
immediately REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County of San
Francisco. In light of this ruling, the pending motion to intervene is RENDERED
MOOT. The hearing on these two motions, currently scheduled for AUGUST 18,2005
AT 8:00 A.M., is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 5,2005
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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IRIAM FLORES, individually and as parent of Miriam
Flores, a minor child, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. STATE OF
ARIZONA, et al., Defendants.
No. CV. 92-596-TUC-RCC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
405 F. Supp. 2d 1112; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35313
December 15,2005, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Vacated by, Remanded by Flores v. Rzeslawski, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21921 (9th Cir. Ariz., Aug. 23, 2006)
PRIOR HISTORY: Flores v. Arizona, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23177 (D. Ariz., June 11,
2002)
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs, a parent and her minor child, sued defendants,
the State of Arizona and state entities, alleging the English Language Learners (ELL)
program was inadequately funded. Plaintiffs sought sanctions, including injunctive relief,
for the State's failure to comply with a court order that the ELL program had to be funded
in non-arbitrary and capricious manner. Defendants sought an advisory opinion as to the
status of federal funds.
OVERVIEW: Nearly six years earlier, a trial judge had held that the ELL programs
were inadequately funded in an arbitrary and capricious manner, in violation o f the Equal
Education Opportunity Act, and ordered the legislature to enact legislation to address this
problem. It did so, but the governor vetoed it. Defendants alleged they acted in good
faith, but disputes between the legislative and executive branches impeded the legislation.
The court, noting that there was no good faith exception to the requirement of obeying
court orders, held defendants in contempt. Evidence that over 80 percent of ELL high
school students failed Arizona's Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) test was
adequate for injunctive relief in light of the egregious delay in complying with the orders.
It therefore enjoined defendants from requiring ELL Students to pass the AIMS test as a
requirement for graduating from high school. It declined defendants' request to issue an
advisory opinion as to the availability of federal funds. It denied plaintiffs' request to
enjoin the receipt of federal highway funds as a sanction, as there was no connection
between the funds and ELL students.
OUTCOME: Until defendants complied with the order, they were enjoined from
requiring ELL Students to pass the AIMS test before graduating, and would be fined $
500,000 per day for 30 days, starting 15 days after the next legislative session began, $ 1
million per day for the next 30 days, $1.5 million per day until the end of the session,
and $ 2 million per day thereafter. They were to pay the attorney's fees plaintiffs incurred
after the last order.
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CORE TERMS: graduation, funding, funded, high school, academic standards, good
faith, enjoin, school system, diploma, unfair, federal funds, attorney's fees, complied,
equitable powers, black students, civil contempt, injunction, disparate, graduate,
enjoined, contempt, legislative session, highway funds, fine, failure rate, equal protection,
graduating, pertains, testing, scores
COUNSEL: [**1] For Superintendent Thomas C Home, Defendant: Eric J Bistrow,
Burch & Cracchiolo PA, Phoenix, AZ.
For American Council of Engineering Companies of Arizona, Intervenor: James J
Sienicki, Ronald W Messerly, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, AZ.
For Associated General Contractors of America, Arizona Chapter, Intervenor: Keith F
Overholt, Michael J Farrell, Jennings Strouss & Salmon PLC, Collier Ctr, Phoenix, AZ.
For C Diane Bishop, Superintendent of Public instruction, Eugene Hughes, member of
the state board of education, David Silva, member of the state board of education,
Claudine Bates Arthur, member of the state board of education, John Hosner, member of
the state board of education, Ken Bennett, member of the state board of education, Ray
Kellis, member of the state board of education, Defendants: Lynne Christensen Adams,
Lewis & Roca LLP, Phoenix, AZ.
For Jim Allman, member of the state board of education, Defendant: Lynne Christensen
Adams, Lewis & Roca LLP, Phoenix, AZ; Susan P Segal, Office of the Attorney
General, Education & Health Section, Phoenix, AZ.
For Arizona, State of, Defendant: Jose A Cardenas, Lynne Christensen Adams, David D
Gamer, Lewis & Roca [**2] LLP, Phoenix, AZ.
For Miriam Flores, individually and as a parent of Miriam Flores, minor child, Rosa
Rzeslawski, individually and as a parent of Mario Rzeslawski, minor child, Plaintiffs:
Timothy Michael Hogan, Arizona Ctr for Law in the Public Interest, Phoenix, AZ.
JUDGES: Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge.
OPINION BY: Raner C. Collins
OPINION
[*1113] ORDER "W O "
On October 31,2005, the Court took under advisement a request made by Plaintiffs for
sanctions due to the State of Arizona's failure to take action to comply with the Court
Order (Docket No. 296), that found that English Language Learners ("ELL") programs
must be funded in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious. Also, the Court took
under advisement the following motions: Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions
and Request for Accelerated Determination Re: Consideration of Federal Funds (Docket
No. 303), and the Opposition of ACEC and AGC to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions
(Docket No. 300).
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The Court was also asked to preclude the State from requiring ELL students to pass the
Arizona's Instrument to Measure Standards ("AIMS") test as a necessary criteria to
receive a diploma and graduate from high school [**3] until the State has properly
funded ELL programs for a sufficient period of time to provide ELL students with a
meaningful opportunity to achieve the State's academic standards that are measured by
the AIMS test.
Defendants have asked the Court for an advisory opinion to decide the status of federal
funds in relation to the determination regarding the adequacy of ELL funding. Plaintiffs
have asked the Court for attorney's fees for their continued efforts in trying to get the
State to comply with its legal obligations to fund ELL programs properly.
The Court has reviewed this case from its inception which was 1992. Thousands of
children who have now been impacted by the State's continued inadequate funding of
ELL programs had yet to begin school when Plaintiffs filed this case. After extensive
lawyering on both sides, the case finally resulted in Judge Marquez deciding in February
2000, that the method used by the State for funding ELL programs bore no rational
relationship to the actual cost of providing such programs and was inadequately funded in
an arbitrary and capricious manner that was violative of the Equal Education Opportunity
Act ("EEOA") of 1974. EQUAL PROTECITON
The legislature in the [**4] first instance decided after some prodding by both the
Plaintiff and the Court, that they would do a cost study for determining the amounts
necessary to achieve this purpose. In December of 2001, the legislature passed [*1114J
House Bill ("HB") 2010. This bill was to be an interim measure that would allow for the
study to be completed and for the legislature to have time to pass the necessary
legislation to comply with the Court's order. Ultimately, with the Court's consent, the
legislature gave itself nearly three years to accomplish this process. In January 2005,
Plaintiffs approached the Court to complain that the study had yet to be completed and
that they believed more than enough time had passed for the legislature to complete its
obligation.
On January 28, 2005, the Court gave the State until the close of the 2005 legislative
session to comply with the Court's Order and essentially to fulfill its promise to set the
appropriate funding for ELL programs. When the Court issued that Order, it had already
been asked by the Plaintiffs to apply sanctions for the State's failure to live up to its
obligation. It was with that backdrop that the Court gave the legislature and the State one
last [**51 chance to comply with Judge Marquez' Order of February 2000.
Defendants allege that they take their obligation to establish adequate funding for ELL
programs very seriously. Defendants assert that due to good faith differences between the
States' executive and legislative branches as it pertains to the needs of the ELL students,
they were unable to enact the legislation contemplated by the January 28,2005, Court
order. Defendants argues that their non-compliance does not equate to "indifference" as
asserted by the Plaintiffs' Motion for sanctions.
The legislature passed HB 2718 at the end of the 2005 session, and the Governor vetoed
it because she believed it was inadequate to comply with the Court's Order. Not much
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activity has transpired since. The legislature believes that it has complied with the Court's
Order. The Governor disagrees. Whether or not the legislative or executive branch is
right or wrong and whether or not either has acted in good faith is of no moment because
nearly six years have passed since the Court issued the original Order requiring the State
to establish adequate funding for ELL programs.EQUAL PROTECTION
The Court can only imagine how many students have started school [**6] since Judge
Marquez entered the Order in February 2000, declaring these programs were
inadequately funded in an arbitrary and capricious manner that violates ELL students'
rights under the EEOA. How many students may have stopped school, by dropping out or
failing because of foot-dragging by the State and its failure to comply with the original
Order and compliance directives such as the Order issued on January 28, 2005? Plaintiffs
are no longer inclined to depend on the good faith of the Defendants or to have faith that
without some extraordinary pressure, the State will ever comply with the mandates o f the
respective Orders issued by this Court.
Plaintiffs contend that after nearly six years, it is clear that using Court Ordered deadlines
is not an effective means for enforcing the State's compliance with the EEOA of 1974
and this Court's declaratory judgement. Plaintiffs assert that the establishment of yet
another deadline by this Court will not guarantee relief. As such, Plaintiffs argue, that this
Court must consider more meaningful sanctions as a coercive measure to ensure the
State's full and swift compliance and provide ELL students with the rights to which they
are entitled [**7] under the law.
I. Motion for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs assert that in 1991, the State Board of Education adopted academic standards
that prescribed the content knowledge in subjects including reading, writing and
mathematics that students [*1115] should master at every grade level. Plaintiffs also
assert that after the adoption of the academic standards, legislation was enacted that
required the State Board of Education to adopt a competency test as a prerequisite to
graduation from high school. A.R.S. § 15-701.01(A)(3). The AIMS test is designed to
measure student achievement of the State Board adopted academic standards in reading,
writing and mathematics. A.R.S. § 15-741.NEXUS TO STATE GOALS
Plaintiffs contend, regardless of their performance, requiring ELL students to pass the
AIMS test to graduate while being denied the equal participation guaranteed to them
under federal law, is patently unfair. Plaintiffs assert that this case was filed to protect the
rights of ELL students under the EEOA to equal participation in instructional programs.
20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). As such, Plaintiffs argue that the relief this Motion [**8] seeks is
necessary to ensure that ELL students are not harmed any further by the State's
intransigence as it pertains to the Court's order and the law.
Plaintiffs assert that regardless of AIMS test scores, ELL students have been attending
schools with ELL programs that this Court declared are illegally underfunded.
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue, it is unfair to those students that they be required to pass a
graduation test that is premised on a system in which all students have the same
opportunity to achieve the State's academic standards. Plaintiffs further argue that the
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relief requested in this motion would be necessary even if ELL students as a group, were
performing as well as, or better than, their peers on the AIMS test.
Plaintiffs state that the ELL failure rate is more than three times the failure rate of English
proficient students. Plaintiffs contend that 82% of ELL students continue to fail the
AIMS test in reading and 81% ELL students continue to fail in writing. As such,
Plaintiffs argue without adequately funded programs, ELL students cannot be expected to
succeed to the same extent as their peers until die language barriers that impede their
equal participation [**9] are removed as required by the EEOA.
Plaintiffs argue that this Court should exercise its broad equitable powers to protect ELL
students from permanent and irreparable harm due to the State's continuing failure to
comply with the Court's judgement and the EEOA. Plaintiffs argue that if past
discrimination is sufficient for the exercise of the Court's equitable powers, then the
current discrimination that is visited on ELL students by the State should be more than
sufficient to invoke the Court's equitable powers to protect ELL students. See Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265,276, 110 S. Ct. 625, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1990).EQUAL
PROTECTIONN
Here, Plaintiffs argue that courts have enjoined the administration of high stakes
graduation tests when their application would be unfair or perpetuate past discrimination.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). In, Debra P., the Court enjoined
the administration of the graduation test on both due process and eqaul protection
grounds. 1 Plaintiffs argue that the application of Debra P., in this case is clear. Plaintiffs
contend that just as it was unfair to punish black students for deficiencies created by the
dual school system in [**10] Debra P., it would be equally unfair to punish ELL students
for the deficiencies caused by Arizona's continuing failure to adequately fund ELL
programs. As such, Plaintiffs request that [*1116] the Court enjoin the State from
requiring ELL students to pass the AIMS test in order to graduate from high school.
Additionally, Plaintiffs request that the AIMS test not be used to preclude ELL students
from graduating until ELL programs have been adequately funded for a sufficient period
of time so that ELL students will have a meaningful opportunity to achieve the academic
standards that are assessed by the AIMS test.
1 In Debra P., the Court determined that, in part, the failures of black students
taking the test could be attributed to the unequal education they received during the
period when Florida maintained a dual school system based on race. EQUAL
PROTECTION
Defendants assert that the AIMS issue raised by the Plaintiffs was rejected by the Court
in 1999. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs did not appeal that decision and [**11]
cannot now circumvent that ruling by claiming they are entitled to the same result as a
way of enforcing compliance with the Court's EEOA ruling. Defendants also contend that
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof as it pertains to the AIMS test.
Defendants contend that the Court prefaced its January 2000 Order by noting that the
August 1999 trial "addressed only two specific issues . . . 1) whether or not Defendants'
[sic] adequately fund and oversee the LAU program in NUSD, and 2) whether or not the
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AIMS test disparately impacts minority students at NUSD." Flores v. Arizona, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 1225, 1226 (D. Ariz. 1999). Finally, Defendants argue that although Arizona
is approaching the first year in which passing the AIMS test will be a requirement for
graduation from high school for all students, this is a fact that Plaintiffs knew six years
ago.3
2 The Court then stated, "Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint did not include
the AIMS Challenge; nevertheless, the Court heard the parties' arguments and finds
that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence at trial to make a prima facie case of
disparate impact." See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S. Ct. 786, 39 L. Ed.
2d 1 (1974).
[** 12 ]

3 "The State Board has also determined that in order to receive high school
diplomas, all students in the Arizona public school system, except those with
certain disabilities, must earn satisfactory AAS/Essential Skills scores on the AIMS
tests, effective in 2000-2001." Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp 2d 937, 956 (D. Ariz.
1999).
Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are reduced to arguing that they are entitled to
relief because ELL students attend schools that this Court declared are illegally
underfunded. Defendants argue that this logic is incorrect for two reasons. First, it would
effectively allow Plaintiffs to use their victory on their EEOA claim as a basis for getting
relief on die AIMS clam that they lost. Second, passing the AIMS test is not the only
graduation requirement for Arizona students including ELL students, eqaul protection
There are a number of graduation requirements, for example, a minimum number of
credits that students must successfully complete. Defendants contend that under
Plaintiffs' arguments, if the AIMS testing requirement is not imposed on ELL students
this [**13] year, it should not have been imposed at any time over the past 5 years. SOLE
CRITERION
Defendants argue that granting relief requested by Plaintiffs might actually create rather
than eliminate impermissible disparate treatment and thus possibly raise eqaul protection
issues. Defendants contend the non-application of the AIMS test would raise significant
eqaul protection issues because ELL students would be exempt from passing the AIMS
test, however, the AIMS test graduation requirement would stand for all non-ELL
students. EQUAL PROTECTION
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs not only failed to present a prima facie claim, but they
failed to even explain how requiring ELL students to pass the AIMS test to graduate
violates due process and eqaul protection rights. Defendants argue that in Debra P., the
Court initially concluded that due process concerns were implicated [*1117] because the
testing requirement was imposed at "the eleventh hour." 4 Unlike Debra P., Defendants
argue, Arizona students have had nearly ten years notice that passing the AIMS test
would become a graduation requirement. Defendants further state that the underlying
district court decision in Debra P. found four to six years sufficient. [**14]5 Defendants
contend that Debra P. did find an eqaul protection violation that was based on the trial
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court's finding that black students' poor performance on the exit exams was related to
Florida's relatively recent operation of a school system segregated on the basis of race.
However, Defendants argue, no such claim has been made here, due process
ADEQUATE NOTICE
4 Debra P., 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981).
5 Debra P., 730 F.2d at 1407 (citing Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. at 244,
267) (M.D. Fla. 1979); c f Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 251,
253-54 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (upholding exit exam requirement and distinguishing
Turlington because "In this case, students in Texas have known for seven years
that they must pass a comprehensive examination before receiving their
diplomas.").
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to mention that, upon remand, the district court
lifted its injunction against the use of high stakes testing. Debra P. v. Turlington, 564 F.
Supp. 177, 189 (M.D. Fla. 1983), [**15] a ffd !3 0 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984).
Defendants state the court did so because of its decision that the Florida test was
"constitutionally impermissible only if the disproportionate failure rate among black
students is due to the learning deficits created by the past segregation of the Florida
public schools or its effects." Id. at 188.
Defendants argue students have known for years that passage of the AIMS test would
eventually be required for graduation; students have five separate opportunities to pass
the test; and the State has made available tutoring funds for remedial efforts designed to
help students, including ELL students, who may need additional assistance. MULTIPLE
OPPORTUNITIES AND REMEDIATION. Additionally, Defendants argue, under
recently enacted legislation, students graduating in 2006 or 2007 will be able to apply
grades received in some high school classes to augment their AIMS test scores. A.R.S. §
15-701.01.SOLE CRITERION
Defendants state that the Tenth Amendment requires that the Court should give due
deference to the State's decision to require students to pass the AIMS test. Defendants
argue that in the absence of proof of discrimination, courts are [**16] rightly reluctant to
interfere with the great latitude given the States in the area of education JUDICIAL
RELUCTANCE. Defendants state that even the cases Plaintiffs cite acknowledge this
principle. Also, Defendants argue that the Williams court acknowledged this principle in
its analysis. 6 Defendants submit that Plaintiffs have failed to prove the extraordinary
circumstances that would warrant the extraordinary interference they seek. As such,
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion seeks a remedy for a claim that they not only
have not proved, but that has been rejected. Defendants' request that Plaintiffs' motion be
denied.
6 "The level of education and academic achievement necessary to obtain a diploma
. . . is appropriately a judgement call for the person elected for that state
responsibility and those experienced persons responsible for educating and
preparing students to achieve the established level of competence. Any interference
in this process is simply destructive to the attempts by the state to salvage its
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educational system, and this includes interference by the federal judiciary." 796 F.
Supp. at 256. NEXUS TO STATE GOALS
[**17] As an alternative, Plaintiffs assert, Defendant's lack of concern for Arizona's ELL
students and lack of respect for this Court's orders, the Court should enjoin the receipt of
federal highway funds. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to delay the proposed sanctions for at
least 30 days from the [*1118] issuance of the Court's order so that the Defendants have
an opportunity to enact the remedial legislation that is required.
The Court views their request for injunctive relief as different and distinct from
determining that the AIMS test is biased or has a disparate effect. This is about requiring
something of ELL students for which the State has failed to provide the proper
foundation and for which the State still wishes to require ELL students to nevertheless
hold up the walls.
Plaintiffs submission that more than 80% of ELL students in high school have failed the
AIMS graduation test is adequate for injunctive relief in light of the egregious delay in
complying with the Court's Orders. Until Defendants make the appropriations required
for properly funding ELL programs, the State is requiring something of ELL students for
which the State has failed to provide the proper foundation. The Court's [**18] finding
that the AIMS test be enjoined for ELL students is based soley on the facts of this case,
and the February 2000 Order, and is not to be construed as any broad characterization of
whether or not the AIM S test has a disparate effect on limited English speaking students.
EQUAL PROTECTION
II. Defendant's Request for Court to Make a Ruling
Defendants allege that monies made available through No Child Left Behind ("NCLB")
and other funds are now a significant part of the ELL landscape. Defendants argue that
the Court should decide whether and to what extent those federal funds can be used in
determining the adequacy of ELL funding in Arizona. Defendants assert that in their
response to Plaintiffs' motion for injunction on January 9, 2002, they stated that the
NCLB "will significantly affect public education in general and the provision of language
acquisition programs." Defendants contend that the issue of whether HB 2010 should be
evaluated by considering all available funding for ELL programs, including that provided
by federal funds was not addressed by the Court. Defendants further argue that in the
Court's January 28, 2005, Order, it did not say whether Federal funds may be considered
[**19] in deciding whether the State has "appropriately and constitutionally" funded its
ELL programs.
Plaintiffs contend that federal funding was addressed at the trial in this case and discussed
in the Court's judgement.7 Plaintiffs state that Defendants request for the Court to
consider federal funding is an attempt to relitigate issues that the Court has already
decided. Plaintiffs argue that statutorily, federal funds must supplement and not supplant
the State's obligation.8 Moreover, Plaintiffs argue if the Court were to take time to issue
an advisory opinion in this matter, its only outcome would be more delay and would not
resolve anything at all.
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7 Flores, 172 F. Supp.2d at 1236-7(D. Ariz. 2000).
8 No Child Left Behind Act, P.L. 107-110, Secs. 1114(a)(2)(B), 3115(g).
The Court agrees. The Court sees this issue as a request to issue an advisory opinion and
declines to do the same.
Plaintiffs state that the Court should award their attorney's fees due to Defendant's noncompliance [**20] with the Court's judgement on January 28, 2000. Plaintiffs allege that
for nearly six years the State has done nothing to comply with the Court's judgement.
Plaintiffs argue that after the Court ordered the State to perform a cost study in October
of 2000, the State took no action even though the cost study was performed. Also,
Plaintiffs contend that they returned to the Court to [*1119] establish a deadline for
compliance in August of 2004 however, the cost study was not submitted. As a result,
Plaintiffs state they returned again to the Court in an effort to ensure compliance. Finally,
Plaintiffs argue that the State has failed to comply and request the Court to award
attorney's fees and costs for the work related to enforcement of the Court's orders that
they have performed on this case since judgement was issued on January 24, 2000.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court has jurisdiction over the present action against Defendants by its order dated
January 28,2005, and under the Declaratory Judgement Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-1831 et seq.,
A.R.S. § 12-864, and Rule 65 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"Courts have inherent [**21] power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders
through civil contempt." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S. Ct. 1531, 16
L. Ed. 2d 622 (1966). This power has been relied on to hold city and state legislatures in
contempt. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276, 110 S. Ct. 625, 107 L. Ed. 2d
644 (1990). "When a district court's order is necessary to remedy past discrimination, the
court has an additional basis for the exercise of broad equitable powers." Id. However,
these powers are not unlimited, and the Court is obliged to use the "least possible power
adequate to the end proposed." Id. quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231, 5 L. Ed.
242 (1821). In devising a remedy, the Court must take into account the interests of State
and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. Id.
A district court has the power to adjudge in civil contempt any person who willfully
disobeys a specific and definite order of the court. Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263, 265
(9th Cir. 1984). However, the contempt does not need to be willful and there is no good
faith exception to the requirement of obedience to a court order. In re Dual-Deck Video
Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litigation, 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993). [**22] [HN3] A
court has wide latitude in determining whether there has been contemptuous defiance o f
its order. Gifford, 741 F.2d at 266. A party should not be held in contempt if the "action
appears to be based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the [court's order]."
quoting VertexDistrib., Inc. v. Falcon Foam Plastics, Inc., 689 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1982). "Substantial compliance" with the court order is a defense to civil contempt. Id.
[HN4] The party alleging civil contempt must demonstrate the alleged contempt or
violation of the court's order by clear and convincing evidence, not a preponderance of
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the evidence. Id. While the set of rules the court should use is easy to articulate, they may
be difficult to apply. Id. The court should determine (1) that the party violated the court
order, (2) beyond substantial compliance, (3) not based on a good faith and reasonable
interpretation of the order, (4) by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The record in this
case supports that the Plaintiffs have passed this test.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
It is therefore the judgement of the court that the State has failed to comply with [**23]
this Court's Order, and the Court will apply appropriate sanctions. The Plaintiffs have
asked the Court to enjoin the State from receipt of federal highway funds as a sanction.
The Court does not think this is an appropriate remedy.
The American Council of Engineering Companies of Arizona and Associated General
Contractors of America, Arizona Chapter ("Intervenors") argue that Plaintiffs' [*1120]
motion for sanctions are not related to Arizona's highway funding. Also, Intervenors
assert that the Plaintiffs' request for sanctions is made without consideration or respect of
the limitations on the authority of the Court both as a matter of applicable law, inherent
powers of equity, and the Constitution of the United States. Intervenors further argue that
if the relief sought by Plaintiffs is granted, it would have a direct, immediate, and
significant impact on Intervenors' member firms.
The Court must use the least possible power to the end proposed. The remedy the
Plaintiffs request, enjoining federal highway funds, has no relationship to ELL students.
If the Court were to enjoin federal educational fimds, it would not only harm ELL
students, it would hurt all students in the Arizona school [**24] system. Therefore, the
Court will DENY Plaintiffs' request to enjoin the receipt of federal highway funds as a
sanction.
During the October 2005 hearing, mention was made whether someone should go to jail.
Under the circumstances, this is not an appropriate remedy at this time.
The Court has been asked by the Plaintiffs to enjoin the state from requiring that ELL
students be subject to passing the AIMS test as a graduation requirement until such time
as ELL student's education have been funded at an appropriate level and have had
appropriate time to benefit from such funding.
The state of Arizona has spent a great deal of time dealing with the AIMS situation and
revised the test several ways to increase the passage rates of those students who are
required to take it. However, the State has failed to comply with the Court's judgement
for almost six years by under-funding ELL programs, which would provide ELL students
with the necessary tools to pass the AIMS test. The State's offering tutoring outside the
classroom and other things to all students for the purpose o f passing the AIMS
REMEDIATION test does not remedy the fact that the under-funded ELL programs
deprive ELL students of an [**25] equal opportunity to pass the AIMS test in the first
instance EQUAL PROTECTION
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The Court therefore GRANTS the injunction for relief requested by the Plaintiff and
orders that ELL students not be required to pass the AIMS test to secure their diploma
until the State has properly funded ELL programs and there has been sufficient time to
allow ELL students to compete equally on the test, eqaul protection STUDENT
PREVAILED
SANCTIONS
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that until Defendants fully comply with the mandates of the February
2000 Order, the State is enjoined from requiring ELL Students to pass the AIMS test as a
requirement for graduating from high school.
FURTHER, it is ordered that upon full compliance, the State may file a motion to lift the
injunction and present evidence as to the reasonable time ELL students should remain
exempt from the AIMS test as a requirement for high school graduation.
FURTHER, it is ordered that the legislature has 15 calendar days after the beginning of
the 2006 legislative session to comply with the January 28, 2005 Court order. Everyday
thereafter and for the ensuing 30 days that the State fails to comply with this Order, a $
500,000 per day fine for the [**26] next 30 days will be imposed until the State is in
compliance.
FURTHER, if after that, the State has still not complied, the Court will impose a $ 1
million dollar per day fine for the following 30 days until the State is in compliance.
FURTHER, if after that, the State has still not complied, the Court will impose a [*1121]
$ 1.5 million dollar per day fine until the end of the 2006 legislative session.
FURTHER, if after that, the State has not complied by the end of the 2006 legislative
session, a $ 2 million dollar per day fine will be imposed until the State has complied
with the January 28, 2005 Court order.
FURTHER, it is therefore ordered that Defendants' are to pay Plaintiffs' reasonable
attorney's fees for the time period beginning after the January 28,2005, Court order.
Plaintiffs counsel is to submit calculations for said attorney's fees and a proposed order
for the Court to approve.
DATED this 15th day of December, 2005.
Raner C. Collins
United States District Judge
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JACK O'CONNELL, as Superintendent of Public Instruction, etc., et al.,
Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent;
LILIANA VALENZUELA et al., Real Parties in Interest.
A l 13933
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT,
DIVISION FOUR
141 Cal. App. 4th 1452; 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147; 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 1236; 2006 Cal.
Daily Op. Service 7460; 2006 Daily Journal DAR 10684
August 11, 2006, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Superior Court o f Alameda County, No. JCCP 4468, Robert
B. Freedman, Judge. O'Connell v. S.C. (Valenzuela), 2006 Cal. LEXIS 6400 (Cal., May
24, 2006)
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Superior Court of Alameda County, California,
issued a preliminary injunction restraining defendants, the California Board of Education
and associated officials, from denying diplomas to members of the 2006 graduating class
at California public high schools who were otherwise eligible to graduate, but who had
not passed both portions of the California high school exit exam (CAHSEE). Defendants
sought a writ of mandate to vacate
that order.
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff students claimed it was a violation of the state constitution's
eqaul protection clause to apply the CAHSEE diploma requirement, Ed. Code, § 60851,
subd. (a), to students who allegedly had passed all the course requirements for
graduation, but who had not been provided with the educational resources necessary to
enable them to pass the CAHSEE. The court held that the trial court erred in granting a
statewide preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants from enforcing the statute mandating the CAHSEE diploma requirement,
because in so doing, the trial court gave undue weight to the students' claim o f irreparable
injury and insufficient weight to defendants' countervailing concerns, and because the
relief was legally impermissible, misdirected in character, and overbroad in scope. The
trial court did not give due consideration to the obligation to preserve the status quo or
take into account the public interest
in enforcing the CAHSEE diploma requirement as an integral part of the statutory
scheme adopted by the legislature in an effort to raise academic standards in California
public schools. The relief granted was not tailored to the fundamental right allegedly
infringed.
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OUTCOME: The court issued a peremptory writ o f mandate compelling the trial court
to vacate its order, insofar as that order granted a preliminary injunction.
CORE TERMS: diploma, high school, injunction, preliminary injunction, school
districts, educational, eqaul protection claim, exit, exam, supplemental, funding, pupil,
fundamental right, graduation, graduate, skills, interim, injunctive relief, status quo,
disadvantaged, proficiency, eligible, economically, issuance, class members", statewide,
remedial, high school, relief granted, grade
SUMMARY:
CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY The trial court issued a
preliminary injunction that restrained the State Board of Education and its officials from
denying diplomas to members of the 2006 graduating class at California public high
schools who were otherwise eligible to graduate, but who had not passed both portions of
the California
high school exit exam (CAHSEE). The students' suit claimed that it was a violation of the
eqaul protection clause of the California Constitution to apply the CAHSEE diploma
requirement (Ed. Code, § 60851, subd. (a)) to students who, they alleged, had passed all
of the course requirements for graduation, but who had not been provided with the
educational resources necessary to enable them to pass the CAHSEE. The injunction was
later stayed by the California Supreme Court. (Superior Court of Alameda County, No.
JCCP4468, Robert B. Freedman, Judge.)
The trial court issued a preliminary injunction that restrained the State Board of
Education and its officials from denying diplomas to members of the 2006 graduating
class at California public high schools who were otherwise eligible to graduate, but who
had not passed both portions of the California high school exit exam (CAHSEE). The
students' suit claimed that it was a violation of the eqaul protection clause of the
California Constitution to apply the CAHSEE diploma requirement (Ed. Code, § 60851,
subd. (a)) to students who, they alleged, had passed all of the course requirements for
graduation, but who had not been provided with the educational resources necessary to
enable them to pass the CAHSEE. The injunction was later stayed by the California
Supreme Court. (Superior Court of Alameda County, No. JCCP4468, Robert B.
Freedman, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the trial court to
vacate its order, insofar as that order granted a preliminary injunction. The court held
that, in granting a statewide preliminary injunction, the trial court gave undue weight to
the students' claim of irreparable injury and insufficient weight to the board's
countervailing concerns. Further, the relief was legally impermissible, misdirected in
character, and overbroad in scope. The injunction exceeded the limits of judicial power
because, rather than requiring defendants to develop a plan to remedy an infringement of
educational equality, the trial court imposed its own remedy by enjoining the
enforcement of the statute imposing the CAHSEE diploma requirement. The trial court
failed to give due consideration to the obligation to preserve the status quo and also failed
to take into account the public interest in enforcing the CAHSEE diploma requirement as
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an integral part of the statutory scheme adopted by the Legislature in an effort to raise
academic standards in California public schools. The relief granted by the injunction,
requiring that diplomas not be withheld, was not tailored to the fundamental right
allegedly infringed. (Opinion by Ruvolo, P. J., with Reardon and Sepulveda, JJ.,
concurring.) [*1453]
COUNSEL: Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor
General, James M. Humes, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Thomas R. Yanger,
Assistant Attorney General, Douglas M. Press, Kara Read-Spangler, Hadara R. Stanton
and Karin S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioners.
Allan Zaremberg for California Chamber of Commerce, California Business Roundtable
and California Business for Education Excellence as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioners.
Raneene Rae Belisle for Las Familias del Pueblo as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Morrison & Foerster and Arturo J. Gonzalez, Shane Brun, Vanina Sucharitkul, Chris J.
Young and Johanna Hartwig for Real Parties in Interest.
Public Advocates, John Affeldt, Jenny Pearlman and Tara Kini for Campaign for Quality
Education, Asian/Pacific Islander Youth Promoting Advocacy and Leadership, California
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Californians [***2] for
Justice, California Tomorrow, Coalition for Educational Justice, Community Asset
Development Redefining Education, Justice Matters, Parents for Unity, United Teachers
Los Angeles, Youth in Focus and Youth Together as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real
Parties in Interest.
Melissa W. Kasnitz for Disability Rights Advocates as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real
Parties in Interest.
JUDGES: Ruvolo, P. J., with Reardon and Sepulveda, JJ., concurring.
OPINION BY: Ruvolo [*1457]
OPINION
[**150] RUVOLO, P. J.~
I.
INTRODUCTION
By order of the California Supreme Court, we are charged with reviewing defendants' 1
petition for writ of certiorari, mandate, and other appropriate relief, challenging a
preliminary injunction issued by the Alameda County Superior Court, but later stayed by
the California Supreme Court. That injunction restrained defendants from denying
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diplomas to members of the 2006 graduating class at California public high schools who
were otherwise eligible to graduate, but who had not passed both portions of the
California high school exit exam, otherwise known as the CAHSEE.
1 For simplicity and clarity, we will refer to the petitioners in this writ proceeding, who
were the defendants and respondents in the trial court, as defendants, and to the real
parties in interest, who were the plaintiffs and petitioners in the trial court, as plaintiffs.
[***3] We conclude, inter alia, that: (1) the trial court's determination that plaintiffs were
likely to prevail on their primary eqaul protection claim was supported by substantial
evidence and legally proper, although the court's determination as to their secondary
claim was not; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it balanced
the factors it was legally required to consider in deciding a motion for preliminary
injunction, and in concluding that the injunction was necessary in order to maintain the
status quo while the underlying litigation
proceeded; and (3) the remedy exceeded what the court had the legal authority to impose,
and was otherwise overbroad in its scope. Accordingly, we grant defendants' writ
petition, and vacate the preliminary injunction.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The historical background facts relevant to this litigation are largely a matter of public
record, and are not in dispute. In [**151] March 1999, the California Legislature found
that "[l]ocal proficiency standards" set by individual school districts were "generally set
below a high school level and [were] not consistent with state adopted academic content
[***4] standards." (Stats. 1999, 1st Ex. Sess. 1999-2000, ch. 1, § 1(a).) The Legislature
concluded that "[i]n [*1458] order to significantly improve pupil achievement in high
school and to ensure that pupils who graduate from high school can demonstrate grade
level competency in reading, writing, and mathematics, the state must set higher
standards for high school graduation." (Stats. 1999, 1st Ex. Sess. 1999-2000, ch. 1, §
1(b).)
(1) In order to further this goal, the Legislature directed that defendant "Superintendent of
Public Instruction, with the approval of [defendant] State Board of Education, shall
develop a high school exit examination in English language arts and mathematics in
accordance with ... statewide academically rigorous content standards adopted by
[defendant] State Board of Education ...." (Ed. Code, § 60850, subd. (a).)2 The
examination developed under that mandate has come to be known as the CAHSEE. The
CAHSEE is administered to all public high school students starting in grade 10, and each
student is permitted to continue to take the CAHSEE at each subsequent administration,
several times a year, until he or she has passed both sections. [***5] (§ 60851, subd. (b).)
School districts are required to offer "supplemental instructional programs for pupils ...
who do not demonstrate sufficient progress toward passing the [CAHSEE]." (§ 37252,
subd. (a); see also § 60851, subd. (f).)
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2 All further references to statutes are to the Education Code unless otherwise noted.
The legislation creating the CAHSEE provided that passage of the examination would be
required as a condition of astudent's receipt of a high school diploma (the CAHSEE
diploma requirement). (§ 60851, subd. (a).) Originally, the Legislature directed that the
CAHSEE diploma requirement take effect commencing with the 2003-2004 school year.
{Ibid.) In 2001, however, the Legislature gave defendant State Board of Education the
authority, at any time prior to August 1, 2003, to delay implementation of the CAHSEE
diploma requirement if it determined, based on an independent study mandated by the
legislation, that "the test development process or the implementation of standards-based
[***6] instruction [did] not meet the required standards for a test of this nature." (§
60859, subd. (a); see Stats. 2001, ch. 716, § 3.) As permitted by this legislation,
defendant State Board of Education determined in July 2003 not to impose the CAHSEE
diploma requirement on students graduating prior to the spring of 2006. A motion to
defer the requirement for one additional year, until 2007, failed by one vote.
Since the start of the 2000-2001 school year, school districts have been required to notify
their students' parents or guardians annually about the CAHSEE diploma requirement. (§
48980, subds. (a), (e); see Stats. 1999,1st Ex. Sess. 1999-2000, ch. 1, § 3 [amending §
48980, subd. (e), to require notification regarding CAHSEE diploma requirement].)
Accordingly, at least since July 2003, it has been a matter of public record that students
scheduled [*1459] to graduate from high school in the spring o f 2006 (the class of 2006)
would be required to pass the CAHSEE in order to receive their diplomas. DUE
PROCESS
In May 2000—shortly after the legislation creating the CAHSEE went into effect-the
same law firm that represents plaintiffs in this action filed a class action on behalf of
public school [***7] students against [**152] the State of California (the Williams
litigation), charging the state with "failing to meet its constitutional obligation to provide
students with fundamentally equal educational opportunity, focusing on dramatic
inequalities in access to instructional materials, adequate learning facilities, and qualified
teachers." In August 2004, the state agreed to settle the Williams litigation, and as part of
that agreement, passed several pieces of legislation providing for improvements in the
provision of teaching materials, clean and safe facilities, and qualified teachers to all
California students. It was not until March 2005, however, that the superior court judge
who presided over the Williams settlement entered a final order approving its terms, and
it is undisputed that the improvements in educational equality required under the
Williams settlement had not yet been fully implemented by the time the CAHSEE
diploma requirement became effective.
The skills tested on the CAHSEE are neither esoteric nor highly advanced. To pass, a
student need only be able to achieve a 60 percent score on a test of up to 10th grade
English language skills, and a 55 percent [***8] score on a test of math skills at up to a
7th grade level, plus algebra. Nonetheless, only 69 percent of the students in the class of
2006 were able to pass both sections of the CAHSEE when they first took it in February
2004, while they were in the 10th grade. By January 2006, the aggregate pass rate for the
class of 2006 had improved to 89 percent. 3 Significant differences remained, however,
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between the overall pass rate and the pass rates for Hispanics (82 percent), AfricanAmericans (80 percent), economically disadvantaged students (82 percent), and English
learners (69 percent).
3 Plaintiffs contend that this figure, and other pass rates reported by defendants, is
inflated, because they are computed against a denominator that excludes students who
dropped out of high school. Nonetheless, it does not appear to be disputed that the
CAHSEE pass rate for the class o f 2006 rose significantly over time.
In the fall of 2005, with the implementation of the CAHSEE diploma requirement
scheduled to occur at the [***9] end of the current school year, the Legislature
appropriated $ 20 million in supplemental funding (the supplemental funding) for school
districts with the highest percentage of students in the class of 2006 who had not yet
passed the CAHSEE. The statute appropriating the money specified that it was to be
distributed by ranking schools on the basis of the percent
of their students in the class of 2006 who had not yet passed the CAHSEE, and then
distributing $ 600 per pupil to the [*1460] school districts in which those schools were
located, in the order determined by defendant Superintendent of Public Instruction, until
the funds were exhausted. (Former § 37254.) The result of this legislative directive was
that all of the supplemental funding went to school districts containing schools in which
28 percent or more of the class of 2006 had not yet passed the CAHSEE. School districts
in which none of the schools had a CAHSEE failure rate of at least 28 percent did not
receive any of the supplemental funding, no matter how many students in those districts
had not passed.
The legislation creating the CAHSEE required defendant State Board of Education, in
consultation with defendant Superintendent of [***10] Public Instruction, to "study the
appropriateness of other criteria by which high school pupils who are regarded as highly
proficient but unable to pass the [CAHSEE] may demonstrate their competency and
receive a high school diploma." (§ 60856.) The parties disagree as to whether a study
complying with this mandate was performed, but it is not disputed [**153] that no "other
criteria" for receiving a diploma were adopted before the class of 2006 was to graduate.
By the time the results of the February 2006 4 administration of the CAHSEE were
released, the percentage of the class of 2006 that had passed both sections had increased
slightly, to 89.3 percent. Nonetheless, at that point there remained almost 47,000
members of the class of 2006—about 10 percent—who had yet to pass at least one section
of the CAHSEE, and who therefore were at risk of not receiving their diplomas at the
expected time, if they did not succeed in passing it at the March or May administration. 5
4 All further references to dates are to the year 2006 unless otherwise noted.
5 At defendants' request, we have taken judicial notice of the results of the March and
May CAHSEE administrations, which were released after the trial court issued the
injunction under review. By the March administration, 90 percent of all students in the
class of 2006 had passed. Nearly 42,000 students, however, remained at risk of failing to
graduate because of the CAHSEE diploma requirement. On July 21 defendants
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announced that an additional 1,759 members of the class of 2006 had passed the
CAHSEE in May, and defendants' counsel indicated at oral argument that students in this
group who have met all the other requirements for graduation will receive their diplomas
in due course. Nonetheless, as of July 21, over 40,000 members of the class of 2006—a
little more than 9 percent—still had not passed the CAHSEE. Moreover, the pass rates for
certain categories of students remained considerably lower than the overall rate: about 85
percent for Hispanics, 83 percent for African-Americans, 86 percent for economically
disadvantaged students, and 77 percent for English learners.
[***11] On February 8, plaintiffs initiated this litigation by filing, in the San Francisco
Superior Court, a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief. The complaint was framed as a class action on behalf of "those high
school students in California public schools who are scheduled to graduate with the
[c]lass of 2006 and who have satisfied all of their requirements for graduation except for
passing the [*1461] [CAHSEE]." 6 The complaint alleged that defendants had (1)
deprived plaintiffs of their fundamental right to a public education by denying plaintiffs
their high school diplomas; (2) violated the eqaul protection clause [**154] of the
California Constitution by failing to provide plaintiffs with an equal opportunity to pass
the CAHSEE, unfairly allocating the supplemental funding, and disadvantaging English
learners; (3) violated their statutory duty to conduct a good faith study of alternatives to
the CAHSEE; and (4) deprived plaintiffs of their property interest in obtaining their high
school diplomas without due process. The complaint also included a prayer for
declaratory relief, framed as a separate cause of action.
6 No plaintiff class has yet been certified. Nonetheless, purely for convenience, we will
use the term "plaintiff class members" to refer to students in the class of 2006 who
completed all the requirements to graduate from high school on schedule, except for
passing either or both sections of the CAHSEE.
In plaintiffs' complaint, the proposed class was defined to exclude students who were
members of the plaintiff class in a separate, pending action on behalf of students with
disabilities, Kidd v. California Department o f Education (Super. Ct. Alameda County,
No. 2002049636) (the Kidd action). By the time plaintiffs filed the instant litigation,
urgency legislation had been passed deferring application of the CAHSEE diploma
requirement to students with disabilities for one year, and permitting such students in the
class of 2006 to graduate and receive a diploma even if they did not pass the CAHSEE or
obtain a waiver. (§ 60852.3, eff. Jan. 30,2006, repealed eff. Dec. 31, 2006; see Stats.
2006, ch. 3, § 2.) The Kidd action remains pending in the Alameda County Superior
Court, and is one of the actions with which this litigation has been coordinated.
Even though the definition of the proposed plaintiff class in the present action excluded
members of the plaintiff class in the Kidd action, the trial court's injunction in the present
case did not contain any exception for those students. In light of the Supreme Court's stay
of the injunction, any issue arising from that omission may be moot, and in any event, in
light of our disposition of the merits, we need not address the issue. Moreover, it goes
without saying that nothing in this opinion is intended to affect either the cited
legislation, or any relief granted or other order entered in the Kidd action.
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[***12] On March 17, defendants demurred to the complaint. On March 23, plaintiffs
filed a motion for preliminary injunction, supported by voluminous declarations and
exhibits. The motion sought an injunction "preventing [defendants from requiring
students in California's [c]lass of 2006 to pass the [CAHSEE] as a condition of
graduation."
On March 30, while the demurrer and the motion for preliminary injunction were still
pending, Judge Ronald Sabraw of the Alameda County Superior Court entered an order
coordinating this case with the Kidd action, and recommending Alameda County as the
venue for the coordinated case. This case was then transferred to the Alameda County
Superior Court, and assigned to Judge Robert Freedman as coordination trial judge.
[*1462]
On April 19, the trial court overruled defendants' demurrer in all respects except as to the
State of California's demurrer to the cause of action for mandamus relief. Defendants
filed their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction on April 27, and their
answer to the complaint on May 1.
On May 9, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion for preliminary injunction.
After receiving supplemental briefs from both [***13] parties, on May 12, the court filed
an order granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (the May 12 order). 7
7 The May 12 order also included a case management order setting a case management
conference and requiring counsel to take specified steps to prepare for that conference.
That portion of the order is not before us, and nothing in this opinion should be construed
to affect it in any way.
The May 12 order provided that defendants were "enjoined and restrained... from
denying any high school senior who is a member of a 2006 graduating class and who is
otherwise eligible to graduate and receive a diploma from participating in graduation
exercises and receipt of such diploma solely on the ground that such student has not
passed all parts of the CAHSEE." The court noted that its order did not prevent anyone
from annotating a diploma to indicate that the recipient had passed the CAHSEE, or from
reporting a student's status as having passed or not passed the CAHSEE to the extent that
information [***14] was subject to disclosure under existing law. The court also
emphasized that its order was directed only at the class o f 2006, and it did not stay
continued administration of the CAHSEE or continued efforts to assist students to
prepare for it. Later in the day on May 12, the court denied defendants' motion for a
temporary stay of the May 12 order pending their anticipated appeal.
On May 19, defendants filed with the California Supreme Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari, mandate, or other appropriate relief, together with a request for an immediate
stay of the preliminary injunction granted by the trial court's May 12 order. On May 22,
plaintiffs filed an opposition to the request for immediate stay. Defendants filed a reply
later the same day.
[**155] On May 24, the Supreme Court issued an order providing that "Respondent and
real parties in interest are ordered to show cause before the Court of Appeal, First
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Appellate District, why the relief sought in the petition for writ of mandate should not
issue. Because at this juncture this court is not persuaded that the relief granted by the
trial court's preliminary injunction—which would require school districts to grant high
school [***15] diplomas to students despite
the students' failure to pass the [CAHSEE]—would be an appropriate remedy even if
plaintiffs were to prevail in their underlying claims, the injunction issued by the trial
court in its order of May 12, 2006, is [*1463] stayed pending the Court of Appeal's
determination of this writ proceeding. This stay does not preclude the trial court from
conducting further proceedings in the underlying matter during the pendency of the writ
proceeding in the Court of Appeal, [f]
Upon receipt of this writ proceeding, the Court of Appeal is directed to establish a
schedule for expedited briefing and argument."
In compliance with the Supreme Court's order, we set an expedited schedule for the
parties and amici curiae to file briefs and responses thereto. Briefing was complete on
July 5, and we heard oral argument on July 25.
III.
Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
(2) "In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two
'interrelated' factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on
the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of
the injunction. [Citation.] [***16] Appellate review is limited to whether the trial court's
decision was an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] [f] The trial court's determination must be
guided by a 'mix' of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the
plaintiffs showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.
[Citation.] Of course, '[t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by
the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.' [Citation.] A trial court
may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless
there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the
claim. [Citation.] Unless potential merit is conceded, an appellate court must therefore
address that issue when reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction." {Butt v.
State o f California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678 [15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 842 P.2d 1240]
{Butt).) To the extent that the trial court's assessment of likelihood of success on the
merits depends on legal rather than factual questions, our review is de novo. {Citizens fo r
Better Streets v. Board o f Supervisors (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1,6 [11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 349]
[***17] [construction of statute]; San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. U.S. Citizens Patrol
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 964, 969 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364] [constitutional issue].)
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[*1464] (3) In reviewing the injunction issued in this case, we must also bear in mind the
extent to which separation of powers principles may affect the propriety of injunctive
relief against state officials. In that context, our Supreme Court has emphasized that
"principles of comity and separation of powers place significant restraints on courts'
authority to order or ratify acts normally committed to the discretion of other branches or
officials. [Citations.] In particular, the separation o f powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. HI,
§ 3) obligates the judiciary to respect the separate constitutional [**156] roles of the
Executive and the Legislature." {Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 695.) In the same context, the
Supreme Court has stressed that "a judicial remedy must be tailored to the harm at issue
[citations]," and that "[a] court should always strive for the least disruptive remedy
adequate to its legitimate task." {Id. at pp. 695-696.)
B.
Probability of Success on the Merits
When [***18] the trial court assessed plaintiffs' likelihood o f success on the merits in its
May 12 order, it gave little or no weight to plaintiffs' statutory and due process
arguments, but found their eqaul protection argument "far more compelling." The court
concluded that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success both as to their general claim
of deprivation of equal access to education (equal protection claim), and as to their
specific claim that the "arbitrary" allocation of the supplemental funding violated equal
protection. Because the trial court based its decision to issue the challenged injunction on
a finding of likely success on the merits only as to those two claims, we will focus our
review on those issues.
1. Equal Protection
The gravamen of plaintiffs' primary eqaul protection claim is narrow, and quite specific.
The focus of their claim is that it is a violation of the eqaul protection clause of the
California Constitution to apply the CAHSEE diploma requirement to students who, they
allege, have passed all of the course requirements for graduation, but who have not been
provided with the educational resources necessary to enable them to pass the CAHSEE. It
[***19] is important to note that plaintiffs have not made a facial challenge either to the
CAHSEE itself or to the
CAHSEE diploma requirement. As the trial court explained, "[pjlaintiffs are not
challenging the CAHSEE itself, and are not seeking to enjoin the continued
administration of the tests, or efforts to prepare students state wide [s/'c] to be able to pass
it. They seek only to delay the implementation of the diploma condition, and only as it
affects this year's graduating class."
[*1465] In other words, plaintiffs do not dispute that the state has the authority to
determine, or to authorize local agencies to determine, what the requirements for high
school graduation shall be, and whether a given student has satisfied them. In California,
the Legislature has determined that, effective with the class o f 2006, those requirements
shall include passage of the CAHSEE, in addition to satisfaction of all locally imposed
criteria for high school graduation. Plaintiffs do not question the Legislature's
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constitutional prerogative to impose that requirement. Nor have plaintiffs argued that the
CAHSEE imposes unfair or academically invalid standards for high school graduation.
(Cf. GIForum Image de Tejas v. Texas Educ. Agency (W.D.Tex. 2000) 87 F. Supp. 2d
667,682-683 [***20] [Texas high school exit exam that conformed to accepted academic
norms did not violate students' substantive due process rights].) Finally, plaintiffs do not
contend that the CAHSEE, as designed, is an invalid test of the skills it was designed to
measure.
(4) As the trial court correctly noted in its May 12 order, established California case law
holds that there is a fundamental right of equal access to public education, warranting
strict scrutiny of legislative and executive action that is alleged to infringe on that right.
{Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686, 692; [**157] Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d
728, 768 [135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929] {Serrano II).) The trial court also concluded,
at least implicitly, that the right of equal access to education includes the right to receive
equal and adequate instruction regarding all specific high school graduation requirements
imposed by the state, including passing both portions of the CAHSEE. For purposes of
this opinion, we assume this conclusion was correct. (Cf. Debra P. v. Turlington (5th Cir.
1981) 644 F.2d 397,406,408 [state violated eqaul protection by withholding diplomas
from high [***21] school seniors based on failure to pass test that included material not
actually taught in classrooms].)
Turning to the facts of the present case, the trial court credited plaintiffs' evidence
regarding the "disparate effect of ...scarcity of resources on schools serving economically
challenged neighborhoods and communities," and found that "students in economically
challenged communities have not had an equal opportunity to learn the materials tested"
on the CAHSEE. The court also found that some schools had not yet fully aligned their
curriculum to the test, and that lack of adequate preparation and resources had a
disproportionate effect on English learners.
Defendants have disputed these findings on appeal, but our review of the record indicates
that they are supported by substantial, albeit not uncontroverted, evidence. Given the
standard of review and our normal deference to trial court findings of fact, we accept the
trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits as
to the denial of their fundamental right to equal educational opportunity.
[*1466] 2. Allocation o f Supplemental Funding
The trial court's May 12 order also [***22] found that plaintiffs proved a likelihood that
they would succeed on the merits on their second claim, namely, that the manner in
which supplemental funding for remedial instruction for the class of 2006 had been
distributed also violated equal protection.
The legislative formula for the distribution o f the supplemental funding, as set forth in
former section 37254, was designed to give priority to the school districts with the
highest percentage of students who had not yet passed the CAHSEE. The statute defined
"eligible pupils" as those who have failed one or both parts o f the CAHSEE (former §
37254, subd. (a)), and directed as follows: "(b) The Superintendent [of Public Instruction]
shall rank schools on the basis of the percentage of eligible pupils. The Superintendent
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may give priority to schools with the highest percentage of eligible pupils who have
failed both parts of the examination, flj] (c) From the funds appropriated for purposes of
this section, the Superintendent shall apportion six hundred dollars ($ 600) per eligible
pupil to school districts on behalf of schools identified pursuant to subdivision (b) in the
order determined by the Superintendent until the fimds are exhausted. [***23] ..."
(Former § 37254, subds. (b), (c).)
It is undisputed that in distributing the supplemental funding for the 2005-2006 school
year, defendants adopted an allocation formula that complied with the statutory
requirements. Unfortunately, the $ 20 million appropriated for that purpose was not
nearly enough to provide $ 600 for each eligible pupil. As a result, under the allocation
formula, school districts with CAHSEE failure rates of less than 28 percent received no
supplemental funding.
Accepting plaintiffs' characterization of defendants' allocation of the supplemental
funding as "arbitrary," the court concluded that plaintiffs could support their eqaul
protection claim on that basis as well. We [**158] disagree with the trial court's analysis
of this issue. We see nothing "arbitrary" in this formula. It did not violate eqaul
protection principles for the Legislature and the executive branch to decide to allocate a
limited sum of money in such a way as to benefit those school districts that evidently had
the greatest need for additional assistance in order to raise the CAHSEE pass rates of
their students.
(5) " 'The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge
[***24] to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well
established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public
welfare in one way and not another are "not confided to the courts. The discretion
belongs to [the legislative branch], [*1467] unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display
of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment." ... In enacting legislation of this kind a government does not deny eqaul
protection "merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality.' " [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Cleland v. National College o f
Business (1978) 435 U.S. 213, 221 [55 L. Ed. 2d 225, 98 S. Ct. 1024] [upholding
restrictions on federal educational assistance for veterans, and rejecting eqaul protection
claim based on lack of similar restrictions in other federal educational assistance
programs].)
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, if there was any constitutional infirmity with the
supplemental funding, it was not [***25] that the amount appropriated was improperly
distributed, but that it was apparently inadequate to provide all of the plaintiff class
members with sufficient remedial instruction to prepare them to pass the CAHSEE prior
to their scheduled graduation dates. Indeed, far from being "arbitrary," the pedagogical
triage performed by defendants, so as to ensure that the available funds were allocated to
those districts most in need, was to be commended.
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As to the funding shortfall, we note further only that plaintiffs did not ask the trial court
to order defendants to provide additional funds to pay for the necessary instruction. Thus,
the question whether such relief would have been constitutionally appropriate, legally
justified, or practically feasible is not before us. (See generally Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
pp. 695-703; Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 539-540 [174 Cal. Rptr. 841, 629
P.2d 935].) 8
8 Defendants' request for judicial notice, filed on June 23 and granted on June 28,
included a copy of then-pending legislation (Assem. Bill No. 1801 (2005-2006 Reg.
Sess.)) appropriating additional funds for supplemental education needed by students at
risk of failing the CAHSEE during the 2006-2007 fiscal year. On our own motion, we
take judicial notice that this legislation was subsequently passed, and was signed by the
Governor on June 30. As enacted, the legislation appropriates over $ 100 million "for
allocation by the Superintendent of Public Instruction ... to school districts to increase the
number of pupils that pass the [CAHSEE]." (Budget Act o f 2006, Stats. 2006, ch. 47 [at
line item 6110-204-0001].) EQUAL PROTECTION
[***26] C.
Relative Interim Harm
As we have already noted, in determining whether to issue an injunction, a court must
weigh and balance both the likelihood the moving party will succeed in the litigation on
the merits of its claim, and also the relative interim harm to the parties if the injunction is
granted, or not granted. (Butt, [*1468] supra, 4 Cal.4th at [**159] pp. 677-678.) " 'The
ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should
issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]'
[Citation.]" (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554 [133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 68 P.3d
74], italics omitted.)
In their motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs argued strenuously that denying
diplomas to members of the class o f 2006 who had not passed the CAHSEE prior to their
scheduled graduation dates would cause them severe and irreparable injury. In support of
this contention, they introduced considerable evidence regarding the impact of failure to
receive a high school diploma on a student's prospects for success in later life.
In the May 12 order, the trial court found that the threatened harm to plaintiff [***27]
class members included the "practical realities attendant to life without a high school
diploma"; and the "emotional toll attendant to the resulting disadvantages and stigma."
Accordingly, the court concluded that "[i]n toto,... the evidence of potential harm
weigh[ed] heavily in favor of plaintiffs."
While we accept the trial court's findings relating to the threatened harm to plaintiffs, we
disagree with the court's conclusion from those findings for several reasons. First, die
trial court gave virtually no weight to defendants' proof that at least in some cases,
plaintiffs' failure to pass the CAHSEE would only result in a delay in their receipt o f their
high school diplomas, rather than a permanent denial of them. 9 The record makes clear
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that members of the plaintiff class have nine options available to them by which they can
continue their educations and obtain either a high school diploma or a similar certificate:
9 For example, as already noted, defendants represented to the court at oral argument that
the 1,759 students who learned in July that they had passed the CAHSEE at the May
administration will receive their diplomas, albeit belatedly, if they are otherwise eligible
to graduate.
[***28] 1. Receive, or continue receiving, supplemental remedial instruction for at least
an additional year following completion of the 12th grade (see § 37252, subds. (c), (h));
2. Enroll for an additional year in a public high school or alternative education program
in the school district;
3. Enroll in a public school independent study program until they succeed in passing the
CAHSEE;
4. Enroll in a public charter school;
[*1469] 5. Attend adult school secondary education classes offered by a local school
district;
6. Obtain a diploma through an adult education program at a community college—an
option that may not require passing the CAHSEE;
7. Obtain a diploma through a county office of education program for dependent or
delinquent youth, if permitted by court order;
8. Pass the California High School Proficiency Exam and obtain a Certificate of
Proficiency (§ 48412); or
9. Pass the national General Education Development (GED) test and obtain a California
High School Equivalency Certificate.
Plaintiffs point out, perhaps correctly, that as a practical matter, not all of these
alternatives are available to every student, and that the last two do not culminate in the
award of a high [***29] school diploma, but rather in certificates that plaintiffs contend
[**160] have less value. Plaintiffs also complain that even if practical alternatives are
available, delaying the pursuit of other educational or employment opportunities while
the plaintiff class members pursue these remedial avenues will cause appreciable harm in
itself, particularly for students from low-income households. 10
10 Plaintiffs also premised their claim of irreparable injury on the harm to members of
the plaintiff class caused by not being able to participate in graduation ceremonies along
with their classmates. We do not view the trial court as having given much weight to this
harm, nor do we. It appears from the record that students in many school districts were
permitted to "walk" with their classmates despite failing to pass the CAHSEE. In any
event, the emotional harm caused by exclusion from one's high school graduation
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ceremony, while undoubtedly distressing, is not of sufficient weight to support the relief
granted by the trial court.
[***30J These contentions are not supported by any specific factual findings of the trial
court, however. Rather, the trial court gave only a partial, and fleeting, response to these
alternatives, opining that "[r]emaining for a fifth or subsequent year in an already stressed
district or attending community college when the student might otherwise be accepted to
a four year [s/c] institution 11 all demonstrate significant risk of harm." This finding is
plainly [*1470] an inadequate response to defendants' assertion that plaintiffs had
considerably overstated the irreparability and seriousness of the harm with which they
were threatened.
11 Apparently, one of the named plaintiffs had been accepted to a campus of the
California State University despite his failure to pass the CAHSEE. This circumstance is
manifestly inadequate to justify the issuance of a statewide injunction applicable to all
members of the plaintiff class, or to conclude that plaintiffs as a group have been harmed
irreparably. Moreover, since the lawsuit was filed, three of the original named plaintiffs
have passed the CAHSEE. One of these passed even before the May 12 order was issued,
and the other two passed while this appeal was pending. A fourth came within two points
o f passing the March administration.
[***31] Based on its preliminary findings, the trial court then concluded that there was
"no persuasive credible evidence of harm flowing to any one [sic] from granting the
requested relief." But, in reaching this conclusion, the court failed to consider important
record evidence establishing that granting the relief plaintiffs sought would cause
substantial harm to others and—more significantly—to the public interest, and failed to
balance that harm against that which plaintiffs would suffer without the relief. It was also
based on the false premise that the harm to plaintiffs is not the loss of educational
opportunity, but the denial of a diploma. 12
12 See Discussion, part HID.2, post.
(6) It is undisputed that the CAHSEE requirement was legislatively enacted to
accomplish two goals. The first was to ensure that students graduating from California
high schools actually possessed the minimum proficiency in core academic skills needed
to thrive in an economically competitive society. (Stats. 1999,1st [***32] Ex. Sess.
1999-2000, ch. 1, § 1(b) [legislative finding in support of adoption of CAHSEE that "to
ensure that pupils who graduate from high
school can demonstrate grade level competency in reading, writing, and mathematics, the
state must set higher standards for high school graduation"].) Thus, the CAHSEE
provided a way to demonstrate to those outside the academic world that California
graduates could compete equally with students from other states whose schools enjoyed
higher ranking and esteem than California's. (See Stats. 2002, ch. 1028, § 1(f) [legislative
finding in support of High School Pupil Success Act that "the implementation of the
[**161] [CAHSEE] ha[s] raised expectations of pupil performance"].)
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Within the borders of California, until our schools can achieve the academic parity
envisioned by the Williams litigation and settlement, the CAHSEE also provides students
who attend economically disadvantaged schools, but who pass the exit exam, with the
ability to proclaim empirically that they possess the same academic proficiency as
students from higher performing, and economically more advantaged, schools. Granting
diplomas to students who have not proven [***33] this proficiency debases the value of
the diplomas earned by the overwhelming majority of disadvantaged students who have
passed the exit exam. [*1471]
Plaintiffs' answer to this point is to argue that students can simply refer prospective
employers to the fact that their diplomas contain an annotation attesting to their passage
of the CAHSEE, as a way to dissipate any inference that they might have been granted
their diplomas without passing the exit exam. This response underscores one of the
pernicious effects of the trial court's injunction, by emphasizing that students who obtain
their diplomas by court order, without passing the CAHSEE, will remain in a distinct
disadvantaged group, stigmatized forever by their own unannotated diplomas.
As important as the CAHSEE may be to socially disadvantaged students who pass the
exit exam, it is of equal importance to plaintiffs who have not passed. The second goal of
the CAHSEE is to identify those students who lack the education needed to achieve even
the minimal level of proficiency demanded by the exit exam, and to target them for
remedial instruction. (See Stats. 1999, 1st Ex. Sess. 1999-2000, ch. 1, § 2 [amending §
37252, subd. (a), in [***34] conjunction with adoption of CAHSEE, to provide that
summer school instructional programs are to be offered to pupils "who do not
demonstrate sufficient progress toward passing the [CAHSEE]...."].) Only in this way
can they be assured of gaining the equal educational opportunity for which the instant
lawsuit was brought. Therefore, the trial court's injunction mandating that these students
receive diplomas, rather than additional remediation, works a cruel irony by depriving
plaintiffs of the very education to which they have a fundamental constitutional right.
In addition, in determining that no harm would result from granting plaintiffs the
requested relief, the trial court failed to consider countervailing public policy interests. "It
is well established that when injunctive relief is sought, consideration of public policy is
not only permissible but mandatory. [Citation.]" {Teamsters Agricultural Workers Union
v. International Brotherhood o f Teamsters (1983) 140 Cal. App. 3d 547, 555 [189 Cal.
Rptr. 627], citing Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d
582, 588 [39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548] [affirming denial of injunction [***35]
against flight operations at public airport].) "Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin
public officers and agencies in the performance of their duties[,] the public interest must
be considered. [Citation.]" {Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472-1473 [28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734], italics added
[affirming denial of preliminary injunction against collection of pollution mitigation
fee].) In the present case, therefore, the trial court also erred in failing to take into account
the public interest in enforcing the CAHSEE diploma requirement as an integral part of
the statutory scheme adopted by the Legislature in an effort to raise academic standards
in California public schools. [*1472] [**162]
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Finally, the ostensibly interim relief of forcing the "social promotion" 13 of plaintiffs, by
ordering that they be given diplomas, in fact does not maintain the status quo of the
litigation, but ends it. Surely the trial court did not expect that if defendants ultimately
prevailed in the litigation, plaintiffs would give back the diplomas they had received
under the mandate of the court's preliminary injunction. (Cf. White v. Davis, supra, 30
Cal.3d at pp. 554, 561 [***36] [because ultimate goal in deciding whether to issue
preliminary injunction is to minimize harm that may be caused by erroneous interim
decision, court considering issuance of preliminary injunction cannot ignore possibility
that its initial assessment of merits may turn out to be in error].) Indeed, plaintiffs'
counsel conceded at oral argument before us that this eventuality was highly unlikely. In
failing to consider the effect of its interim relief on the status quo of the litigation, the
trial court ignored the foundational legal principle that the general purpose of a
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final adjudication of the
claims on the merits. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528 [67 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889]; see also King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217,1227 [240 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889].)
13 See Debra P. v. Turlington (5th Cir. 1981) 654 F.2d 1079, per curiam opinion on
denial of rehearing ("To suggest that the panel opinion has somehow found a
constitutional right to a diploma in the absence of an education is to play word games
which we feel are both inappropriate and unfounded. Apparently our dissenting brothers
would approve of 'social promotions' coupled with a denial o f a diploma ascomplying
with the legal requirements of equal educational opportunities within a unitary school
system."). (Italics omitted.)
[***37] Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that the May 12 order did preserve the status quo,
premised on their definition of the status quo as the historical practice of granting
students diplomas based on their completion of local school district requirements, without
requiring them to pass any statewide test. This argument fails to acknowledge that long
before this litigation was filed, this historical practice had ceased to be the current status
quo. Once it was determined, in 2003, that the CAHSEE diploma requirement would be
implemented starting with the class of 2006, it was no longer reasonable for students to
expect that any such "historical practice" would continue. Moreover, the status quo at the
time this lawsuit was filed was, by definition, that none of the plaintiff class members
would receive a high school diploma. Thus, far from preserving the status quo, the trial
court's injunction disrupted it to a point where, had the Supreme Court not issued a stay,
it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to return to the status quo if
defendants ultimately prevail in the litigation.
The failure to consider and balance the harm from granting the injunction, and the
[***38] failure to give due consideration to the obligation to preserve the [*1473] status
quo, are sufficient error to require us to vacate the trial court's May 12 order.
D.
Appropriate Nature and Scope of Relief
1. The Trial Court's Injunction Exceeds the Limits o f Judicial Power
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The trial court's preliminary injunction was statewide, and barred the denial of diplomas
to any members of the class of 2006 on the basis of the CAHSEE [**163] diploma
requirement. 14 In deciding to issue the preliminary injunction that plaintiffs requested,
the trial court relied on the Supreme Court's affirmance of orders granting injunctive
relief in two cases involving the fundamental right of access to education: Butt, supra, 4
Cal.4th 668, and Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728. (See also Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5
Cal.3d 584, 608-610 [96 Cal. Rptr. 601,487 P.2d 1241] {Serrano I) [establishing
education as fundamental right for eqaul protection purposes].) The relief issued in those
cases was, however, fundamentally different from the relief granted by the trial court
here, and an analysis of those differences will serve to highlight one of [***39] the
reasons for our conclusion that the issuance of the injunction in the present case was an
abuse of the trial court's discretion.
14 Because of our disposition of this proceeding, we need not reach the issue whether it
was proper to grant an injunction requiring the issuance of diplomas without joining as
defendants the local school districts that issue those diplomas. We note, however, that
under Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th 668, school districts act as agents of the state, and that in
another context, our Supreme Court has held that an injunction requiring the provision of
benefits to individuals, due to the invalidation of a state regulation under which those
benefits were improperly withheld, binds local officials who act as agents of the state in
administering those benefits, even if the local officials were not parties to the underlying
action. (Boss v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 905-909 [141 Cal. Rptr. 133, 569
P.2d 727].)
In Serrano II, the [***40] trial court found that despite legislative changes in California's
public school financing that had been enacted in response to Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d
584, "substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil resulting from differences in local
taxable wealth ... continue[d] to exist," and that those "[substantial disparities ...[would]
cause and perpetuate substantial disparities in the quality and extent of availability of
educational opportunities." (Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 746-747.) Accordingly,
the trial court concluded that "the system before it was violative of our state
constitutional standard" of equal protection, ordered that this violation be remedied, and
"set a period of six years from the date of entry of [*1474] judgment as a reasonable time
for bringing the system into constitutional compliance." (Id. at p. 749, fh. omitted.) The
trial court in Serrano II specifically noted that its judgment "was not to be construed to
require the adoption of any particular system of school finance, but only to require that
the plan adopted comport with the requirements of state eqaul protection provisions."
[***41] (Id. at p. 750.) To ensure that its order was carried out, the court retained
jurisdiction to issue further relief in the event of "a failure by the legislative and executive
branches of the state government to take the necessary steps ... within a reasonable time"
to design and implement a public school financing system that would comply with state
eqaul protection requirements.
(Ibid.)
(7) In upholding the trial court's order, the majority of the California Supreme Court
pronounced itself in agreement with the dissenting justices th a t" 'the ultimate solutions
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[to the problem of educational inequality] must come from the lawmakers and from the
democratic pressures of those who elect them.' " {Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 775, fti.
54.) Thus, in upholding the trial court's injunction, the majority explicitly declined--as
had the trial [**164] court—"to address ourselves to the constitutional merits of the
various financing alternatives ... developed in the scholarly literature ...." {Ibid.) Instead,
the court restricted itself to expressing "confiden[ce] that the Legislature, aided by what
we have said today ..., will be able to [***42] devise a public school financing system
which achieves constitutional conformity from the standpoint of educational opportunity
...." {Ibid.)
In Butt, the trial court was confronted with the prospect that a particular school district
would close its schools six weeks before the end of the scheduled school term because it
had run out of funds. It issued an order directing the state and the relevant executive
branch officials, including the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI), "to ensure b y
whatever means they deem appropriate' th a t... students [in the affected district] would
receive their educational rights," but "made clear that '[h]ow these defendants accomplish
this is up to the discretion of defendants. ...' " {Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 694.) The SPI
and the State Controller (Controller) then proposed a loan arrangement to keep the
schools open for the remainder of the school year, conditioned on the court's willingness
to order that the SPI could temporarily assume control of the school district and appoint a
trustee. The trial court issued the requested order, and also authorized the Controller to
obtain the funds needed [***43] for the loan from funds that the Legislature had
previously appropriated for other specific purposes, but which remained unspent. {Id. at
pp. 694, 697.) [*1475]
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that "the State has a constitutional
duty ... to prevent the budgetary problems of a particular school district from depriving its
students of basic' educational equality," and that preliminary injunctive relief was
warranted. {Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 674, 693-694.) It also held that, "in light of the
'unique emergency financial conditions' presented by the case," the court did not err in
approving the loan conditions proposed by the SPI, including the SPrs temporary
takeover of the school district. {Id. at pp. 695-697.) The one aspect of the injunction
granted by the trial court in Butt of which the Supreme Court disapproved was its
provision authorizing the Controller to fund the loan by diverting unspent funds from
money that the Legislature had previously appropriated for specific purposes. The
Supreme Court overturned this part o f the injunction on separation of powers grounds,
holding that "[b]y diverting [***44] the funds from their earmarked destinations and
purposes, the court invaded the Legislature's constitutional authority." {Id. at p. 698.) The
court reaffirmed that the courts have the power to order the executive branch to pay
specified obligations out of general operating budgets, but held that this power does not
extend to the diversion of funds that the Legislature has allocated for specific purposes.
{Id. at pp. 697-703.)
Similarly, in Crawford v. Board o f Education (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280 [130 Cal. Rptr. 724,
551 P.2d 28], the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's injunction requiring a school
district's board to "prepare and implement a reasonably feasible desegregation plan" {id.
at p. 285; see also id. at pp. 307-308), but cautioned that once a plan promising
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meaningful progress had been implemented, "the court should defer to the school board's
program and should decline to intervene in the school desegregation process [**165] so
long as such meaningful progress does in fact follow." (Id. At p. 286; see also id. at pp.
305-306.)
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, in both [***45] Serrano II and Butt, as well as
in Crawford, the injunctive relief issued by the trial courts, and upheld by the Supreme
Court, was limited to directing the legislative and executive branches to find a way to
redress the particular constitutional violation identified by the judicial branch, by
providing the affected students with the funding needed to ensure their equal access to
educational opportunity. Indeed, the oneaspect of the trial court's order that the Supreme
Court reversed in Butt was the one respect in which the order went beyond that limitation,
and would have directly countermanded a specific legislative directive.
The injunction issued by the trial court in the present case stands in sharp contrast to the
relief granted and upheld in Serrano II and Butt. Rather than requiring the defendants to
develop a plan to remedy an infringement of [*1476] educational equality, as the trial
courts did in Serrano II and Butt, the trial court here imposed its own remedy by
enjoining the enforcement of the statute imposing the CAHSEE diploma requirement.
This approach hardly comports with our Supreme Court's directive in Butt that equitable
relief against [***46] other branches of government must be restrained by "principles of
comity and separation of powers," and that "[a] court should always strive for the least
disruptive remedy adequate to its legitimate task." (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 695, 696;
see also Wolfe v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 554, 568
[53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878] [where Legislature has enacted statutes expressly intended to
address issues of public policy raised in litigation, judicial restraint is called for, and
courts should "decline the invitation to undo what the Legislature has done" by issuing
injunctive relief].)
In seeking judicial intervention, plaintiffs rely in part on the fact that the statutory scheme
creating the CAHSEE requires that the school curriculum be aligned to the test, and that
remediation be provided to students who have difficulty passing it. (§§ 60850, subd.
(f)(3), (4), 60851, subd. (f), 60853.) Plaintiffs may be correct that the state's failure to
provide a properly aligned curriculum and adequate remediation amounts to a violation of
plaintiffs' statutory rights, and perhaps of their constitutional rights as well. The
appropriate [***47] judicial remedy for any such violations, however, would be to order
the state to provide the mandated curriculum alignment and remediation. 15 It is not to
mandate that all students meeting district requirements be given high school diplomas,
regardless of the reason for their failure to pass the CAHSEE. (Cf. Brookhart v. Illinois
State Bd. ofEduc. (7th Cir. 1983) 697 F.2d 179,188 [appropriate remedy for due process
violation arising from lack of adequate notice of exit exam requirement would be to
require school district to provide free remedial education affording students reasonable
opportunity to learn tested material; where passage of time had rendered that relief
unrealistic, however, court ordered issuance of diplomas to 11 individual plaintiffs, all
suffering from disabilities].)
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15 Plaintiffs concede that "[i]f the CAHSEE program actually made equal educational
opportunities and adequate remediation available toall students who need it, there might
be no violation." We agree, though we would say "would" rather than "might."
[**166]
[***48] Similarly, plaintiffs argue, and the trial court found, that the changes mandated
by the Williams settlement did not occur soon enough to allow the class of 2006 a fair
chance to pass the CAHSEE. This may well be true, and it may be that those changes will
not be sufficient to provide that opportunity for some years to come. Even accepting the
trial court's finding, however, at [*1477] most it justified ordering defendants to provide
additional assistance to give students—including those in the class of 2006—a full and fair
opportunity to leam the skills needed to pass the CAHSEE.
16 It did not justify the issuance of an injunction requiring defendants to grant diplomas
to all otherwise eligible students, despite their failure to pass the CAHSEE. 16 In that
connection, we note that while plaintiffs contend that the options put forward by
defendants for plaintiffs to continue studying for the CAHSEE after their fourth year of
high school are not realistic as a practical matter, plaintiffs did not seek an injunction
requiring defendants to provide options that were practical and realistic. Such options are
not impossible to imagine. For example, undisputed evidence in the record discloses that
the Los Angeles Unified School District planned to offer a "Leam and Earn" program in
the summer of 2006 that would enable a limited number of high school juniors and
seniors who had not yet passed the CAHSEE, but were on track to graduate, to receive
intensive CAHSEE instruction during part of the day, and work at part-time jobs during
the remainder.
[***49] Plaintiffs deny that the trial court's injunction infringed on the separation of
powers, pointing to cases in which preliminary injunctions enjoining enforcement o f a
statute were deemed appropriate. However, as plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, these
cases all stand for the relatively unremarkable legal proposition that the enforcement of a
law found to be unconstitutional can be enjoined.
For example, in Conover v. Hall (1974) 11 Cal.3d 842 [114 Cal. Rptr. 642,523 P.2d
682], the principal case on which plaintiffs rely, the Supreme Court upheld the issuance
of a preliminary injunction preventing state officials from enforcing a state law setting a
maximum welfare work-expense allowance that was incompatible with a governing
federal statute. (Id. at pp. 845-846.) The court noted that "[a] host of cases interpreting
these sections [Civil Code provisions limiting the court's jurisdiction] ... do not apply to
an unconstitutional or invalid statute or ordinance and that courts have full authority to
enjoin the execution of such enactments. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 850; see also Kash
Enterprises, Inc. v. City o f Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 299 [138 Cal. Rptr. 53, 562
P.2d 1302] [***50] [trial court erred in refusing to grant preliminary injunction as to
portion of ordinance that was unconstitutional on its face].)
As already noted ante, however, while plaintiffs raise eqaul protection and due process
claims relating to the denial of their fundamental right to a public education, they do not
allege that the statute imposing the CAHSEE diploma requirement (§ 60851) is itself
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unconstitutional. Plaintiffs only sought to enjoin the enforcement of that statute as
applied to them, because they were unconstitutionally denied the ability to leam the skills
needed to pass the CAHSEE. Therefore, cases upholding preliminary injunctions
restraining enforcement of facially unconstitutional laws are inapplicable here, and do not
undercut the limitations discussed in Butt and Serrano II on the use of [*1478] judicial
power to control the acts of the executive or legislative branches of state government in
the area of public education.
[**167] 2. The Relief Granted by the Injunction, Requiring That Diplomas Not Be
Withheld, Was Not Tailored to the Fundamental Right Allegedly Infringed
In directing defendants not to withhold diplomas from all students who failed to [***51]
pass the CAHSEE, the trial court relied in part on the assumption that for the purpose of
plaintiffs' eqaul protection claim, access to education includes access to a diploma, which
the trial court characterized as the "final fruits" of that education. On this point—a legal
rather than a factual one—we again part company with the trial court. We believe the trial
court's May 12 order erred by focusing its remedy on equal access to diplomas rather than
on equal access to education (and the funding necessary to provide it). In so doing, the
trial court failed to heed Butt's caution that "a judicial remedy must be tailored to the
harm at issue. [Citations.]" (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 695.)
The purpose of education is not to endow students with diplomas, but to equip them with
the substantive knowledge and skills they need to succeed in life. A high school diploma
is not an education, any more than a birth certificate is a baby. Its purpose is to symbolize
the holder's acquisition of a certain level of knowledge and skills. Students who
successfully completed their high school educations, but who did not receive diplomas
for some reason (for example, [***52] because their school records were destroyed in a
natural disaster), would still in fact possess the same level of education as persons with
high school diplomas. As we have observed earlier, on the other hand, students who did
not successfully complete high school, but who were awarded their diplomas anyway,
would not, in fact, have acquired a high school education.
In short, we see a distinction, where the trial court did not, between an eqaul protection
claim based on the well-established fundamental right to an education, and an eqaul
protection claim based on the asserted fundamental right to a high school diploma. In our
view, the cases holding that education is a fundamental right for eqaul protection
purposes under California law do not necessarily support the entirely different
proposition that there is a fundamental right to be awarded a high school diploma-a
proposition for which plaintiffs have not cited any persuasive authority. 17
17 Plaintiffs and amici curiae have cited some cases holding that for due process
puiposes, there is a property interest in the right to receive a high school diploma upon
completing all stated requirements. (E.g., GI Forum Image de Tejas v. Texas Educ.
Agency, supra, 87 F.Supp.2d 667; Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. o f Educ., supra, 697
F.2d 179; Debra P. v. Turlington, supra, 644 F.2d 397; Board o f Educ. v. Ambach
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1981) 107 Misc. 2d 830 [436 N.Y.S.2d 564], revd. in part and mod. sub
nom. MTR Board o f Educ. v. Amback (N. Y. App.Div.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH STAKES TESTING

728

1982) 90 A.D.2d 227 [458 N.Y.S.2d 680]; cf. Anderson v. Banks (S.D.Ga. 1981) 520
F.Supp. 472, 505.) As we have noted, the trial court here rejected plaintiffs' claim that
their due process rights had been violated in connection with the adoption of the
CAHSEE diploma requirement, and we concur.
Some amici curiae have also cited Anderson v. Banks, supra, 520 F.Supp. 472, in support
of plaintiffs' eqaul protection claims. That case, however, involved a school system that
had long been racially segregated by law, and an exit exam requirement that was imposed
on shortnotice, along with a discriminatory tracking system, shortly after the schools
were forced to integrate. Thus, the relief granted in that case, to the extent it rested on an
eqaul protection theory, was based not on the alleged denial of a fundamental right, but
on racial discrimination.
(Id. at pp. 498-503, 512.) Plaintiffs do not contend that the present case involves any
history, much less recent history, of de jure segregation. Therefore, Anderson, like the
due process cases cited, is clearly inapposite.
[***53] [*1479]
For the foregoing reason, we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that directing
[**168] defendants to give plaintiffs diplomas was an appropriate remedy to further the
equality in education that plaintiffs seek by their lawsuit. Instead, as we have already
observed, doing so would have ensured that the state would never live up to its
pedagogical responsibility to these students, and would inadvertently have perpetuated a
bitter hoax: that the diplomas plaintiffs would have obtained under the court's May 12
order somehow would have equipped them to compete successfully in life, even though
they had not actually acquired the basic academic skills measured by the CAHSEE.
EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
3. The Scope o f the Trial Court's Injunction Is Overbroad
Even were we to assume the trial court had both the authority and the justification to
grant the requested relief, the scope of the injunction was still impermissibly overbroad.
Indeed, the trial court acknowledged as much in the May 12 order when it noted that
plaintiffs' showing did not allow the court to identify which plaintiff class members could
trace their failure to pass the CAHSEE either to inadequate school resources or to lack of
access [***54] to the supplemental
funding, and commented that "no suggestion has been made of a workable mechanism
for doing so." Thus, the court conceded that issuing the injunctive relief plaintiffs were
requesting might result in a windfall for students whose failure to pass the CAHSEE did
not result from any of the adverse conditions that constituted the factual basis for
plaintiffs' claims. The court deemed this result preferable, however, to denying diplomas
to students who had suffered from disparities in their opportunities to leam.
In light of the strictures on judicial power emphasized in Butt, we believe the trial court
erred in this regard. As we have pointed out earlier, the Supreme Court in Butt has
cautioned courts that in fashioning injunctive relief to remedy unequal educational
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opportunities on an interim basis, "[a] [*1480] court should always strive for the least
disruptive remedy adequate to its legitimate task." (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 696.) This
the trial court plainly did not do. The scope of the relief granted affected every high
school in the state regardless of circumstances, and would have required the granting of
diplomas to 47,000 [***55] high school students regardless of how many of that number
were actually educationally disadvantaged.
Plaintiffs seek to defend the trial court's statewide injunction by arguing that when a test
is found to be discriminatory, a court may prohibit reliance on it even as to persons not
affected by the underlying discrimination. The federal cases on which plaintiffs rely,
however, are all distinguishable.
In Gaston County v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 285 [23 L. Ed. 2d 309, 89 S. Ct.
1720], the United States Supreme Court upheld a decision under the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (42 U.S.C. § 1973b) precluding the reinstatement of a literacy test as a condition of
the right to register to vote in a jurisdiction where segregated schools had resulted in a
low literacy rate among black voters. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U.S. 424
[28 L. Ed. 2d 158, 91 S. Ct. 849], the Supreme Court held that under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, an employer could not base hiring and promotion decisions on a high
school completion requirement and an intelligence test that had a disparate impact on
black job applicants and workers, and that had not been shown [***56] to be job [**169]
related. 18 In Castaneda v.Pickard (5th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 989,1013-1015, the Fifth
Circuit held that if the plaintiffs could prove that a Texas school district's ability grouping
(tracking) scheme was a vestige of past unlawful discrimination against MexicanAmerican students, it would be improper for the school district to use tests administered
in English to determine Spanish-speaking students' placement into ability groups in
subjects other than English.
18 Plaintiffs' reliance on Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is somewhat ironic, given that
opinion's emphasis on the importance of focusing on workers' actual skills rather than on
whether they have a high school diploma. As the Griggs court put it, "Diplomas ... are
useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense proposition that they are
not to become masters of reality." (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at p. 433.)
In all of these cases, precluding use of the challenged test afforded relief to the members
of the affected [***57] class in a very direct way, by giving them access to the specific
right they alleged they had been denied: voter registration, a job or promotion, or an
appropriate educational placement. Thus, enjoining use of the test was an appropriate
remedy for the cause of action alleged. In the present case, by contrast, the right that
plaintiffs allege they have been denied is 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 1236, ***53; 2006 Cal.
Daily Op. Service 7460 the right to equal and adequate educational resources. Enjoining
the CAHSEE diploma requirement does nothing to enhance plaintiffs' access to that right.
If anything, it undercuts it by eliminating the need for defendants to support plaintiffs in
learning the skills tested on the CAHSEE. [*1481]
Plaintiffs virtually concede the overbreadth of the trial court's injunction in their
argument that some students in their putative plaintiff class "actually know the material,
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but do not pass the exit exam due to test anxiety." But plaintiffs have not argued, much
less established, that there is any constitutional violation involved in depriving a student
of a diploma when he or she has in fact received the educational resources required to
pass the CAHSEE, but has not been able to do so because of "test anxiety."
Plaintiffs alternatively [***58] complain that defendants have not suggested any other
remedy. Unlike the trial court in Butt, however, the trial court here did not frame its May
12 order in a way that permitted defendants to do so. In any event, the burden was on
plaintiffs, as the parties seeking injunctive relief, to show all elements necessary to
support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) 9:632.1, p. 9(II)-30 (rev. # 1, 2005); cf.
Anderson v. Souza (1952) 38 Cal.2d 825, 840-845 [243 P.2d 497] [where plaintiffs
sought injunction entirely prohibiting use of private airfield for aviation, burden was on
plaintiffs to prove that airfield could not be operated at all without constituting a
nuisance].) As plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged at oral argument, it was plaintiffs'
burden, not defendants', to formulate the nature of the remedy they were seeking. Having
failed to offer the trial court any alternative to a statewide, across-the-board ban on
enforcement of the CAHSEE diploma requirement, plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain
on appeal that defendants somehow had the legal obligation to suggest a different form
[***59] of injunction.
Moreover, the urgency with which the trial court was forced to decide plaintiffs' motion
may have been, to some extent,of plaintiffs' own making--a fact that the trial court, as a
court of equity, should have taken into account in determining what weight to give
plaintiffs' claim of imminent irreparable injury. {Lusk v. Krejci (1960) [**170] 187 Cal.
App. 2d 553, 556 [9 Cal. Rptr. 703] ["Long delays in assertion of rights can be the basis
of denial of mandatory injunctive relief."]; Fay Securities Co. v. Mortgage G. Co. (1940)
37 Cal. App. 2d 637, 642 [100 P.2d 344] [same]; Dolske v.Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d
513, 520-521 [25 Cal. Rptr. 270, 375 P.2d 174] [delay in seeking injunction against
encroachments is factor to be considered in determining whether relief is warranted]; but
cf. Youngblood v. Wilcox (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1368, 1376 [255 Cal. Rptr. 527] [trial
court did not abuse discretion in finding preliminary injunction not barred by laches,
where plaintiff delayed bringing suit for eight months after expulsion from country club
in hope of resolving dispute informally].) Plaintiffs, and their counsel, were well aware
by the [***60] beginning of the 2005-2006 school year that thousands of [*1482]
members of the class of 2006 were at risk of being denied their diplomas because of the
low pass rate on the CAHSEE experienced by various disadvantaged groups. 19 Had this
litigation been initiated at that time, rather than in February 2006-only three or four
months before the end of the school year—there would have been more time to try to
devise a way to provide meaningful remediation to the plaintiff class members before
their scheduled graduation dates.
19 On October 11, 2005, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to the Governor, the president of
defendant State Board of Education, and defendant Superintendent of Public Instruction,
averring that "nearly 100,000 seniors have not passed one or both" portions o f the
CAHSEE, and that "the exam is having a disproportionate impact on Latinos, African
Americans, and limited English proficient students." The letter was referenced in
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plaintiffs' complaint in this action, and a copy was attached as an exhibit. The purpose of
the letter was to urge defendants to adopt alternatives to the CAHSEE, as permitted by
section 60856. At oral argument in this court, plaintiffs' counsel explained the timing of
the lawsuit by noting that it was not until early 2006 that defendants finally decided that
no alternatives to the CAHSEE would be offered. Plaintiffs' counsel's efforts to resolve
the issue through administrative action before filing suit are commendable, but the fact
remains that the timing of the lawsuit made the trial court's task much more difficult.
[***61] IV.
CONCLUSION
There is no controversy about the fundamental issues of public policy implicated in the
case now before us. The parties and amici curiae unanimously agree—as do we—that all
California children should have equal access to a public education system that will teach
them the skills they need to succeed as productive members o f modem society. Nor is
there any genuine disagreement that California's public education system has fallen short
of achieving that goal in recent decades, as the Legislature 20 and the Governor 21 have
both recognized.
20 In a 2003 report entitled "The California Master Plan for Education," a joint
legislative committee acknowledged that "The sobering reality of California's education
system is that too few schools can now provide the conditions in which the State can
fairly ask students to leam to the highest standards, let alone prepare themselves to meet
their future learning needs."
21 During a press conference regarding the Williams settlement, Governor
Schwarzenegger stated that it had been " 'a huge mistake' " a n d " 'outrageous'" for the
state to contest the lawsuit, and that in his opinion, it was preferable for the state to "
'come clean' " and admit that " 'we have not provided equal education for many children.'
[***62] In 1999, the Legislature decided that one way to address the inadequacy of
California's education system was to create the CAHSEE, and to require students to pass
it in order to receive their high school diplomas, while providing remedial education
[**171] for those students not yet having the skills to pass. The Legislature also
conferred discretion on the executive branch to [*1483] determine that the CAHSEE
diploma requirement would apply to the high school class of 2006, and that no
alternatives would be adopted. Those actions are entitled to substantial deference by the
judicial branch, which is constitutionally obligated to refrain from usurping the role o f the
other two branches in formulating and implementing public policy. (See Butt, supra, 4
Cal.4th at pp. 694-703.)
(8) We have concluded that the trial court erred in granting a statewide preliminary
injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing the statute mandating the CAHSEE
diploma requirement, because in so doing, the trial court gave undue weight to plaintiffs'
claim of irreparable injury and insufficient weight to defendants' countervailing concerns,
and because the relief was legally impermissible, misdirected [***63] in character, and
overbroad in scope. 22 While we reverse the trial court's order, our action should not be
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viewed as reflecting indifference to the plight of those students in the class of 2006
whose diplomas were withheld solely because they had not passed the CAHSEE. We
have been pleased to note that several of the original named plaintiffs have succeeded in
passing the CAHSEE during the pendency of this litigation, and we encourage the
remaining plaintiff class members to endeavor to do the same.
22 In light of this disposition, we deem it unnecessary to address defendants' other
grounds for challenging the propriety of the May 12 order, including their assertion that
the named plaintiffs are not proper class representatives for the putative plaintiff class.
We are also aware that the record in this case raises considerable doubt as to whether the
improvements in California schools required by the Williams settlement will be
sufficient, at least in the immediate future, to give all students currently [***64] enrolled
in high school an adequate opportunity to prepare properly for the CAHSEE. If not, a
practical solution should be found, and quickly, in order to avoid a repeat of this litigation
next year and thereafter, with the attendant confusion and hardship involved for all
concerned. With this in mind, we urge the parties, with the active assistance of the trial
court, to step outside their "fog of war" and cooperatively find the pathways necessary to
provide equal and adequate access to meaningful remedial assistance to students in the
class of 2007 and beyond who enter their senior year of high school with the CAHSEE
hurdle still before them. In order for that process to result in any practical benefit to the
remaining plaintiff class members, who had hoped to graduate in 2006, it obviously must
begin immediately.
[*1484] V.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue compelling respondent Alameda County Superior
Court to vacate its May 12 order, insofar as that order granted a preliminary injunction. In
the interests of justice, this decision shall be final immediately as to this court. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 24(b)(3).)
Reardon, [***65] J., and Sepulveda, J., concurred.
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OPINION
I. Introduction
Appellant Californians for Justice Education Fund (CJEF) 1 appeals from the denial of its
petition for writ of mandate and motion for a peremptory writ. CJEF contends that
respondents were required by state law to complete their study of alternatives to the
California high school exit exam (CAHSEE), pursuant to Education Code section 60856,
2 in sufficient time to enable the Legislature to consider that study prior to the initial
enforcement of the statute ALTERNATE ASSESSMENT precluding the issuance o f high
school diplomas to students failing either portion of the CAHSEE. ( § 60851.) We
disagree, and affirm the trial court judgment.
II. Facts and Procedural Background
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In 1999, the California Legislature adopted legislation requiring that all public high
school students in California pass an exit examination (the CAHSEE) in order to receive
a high school diploma (the CAHSEE diploma requirement). (Ed. Code, § 60851; see
Stats. 1999-2000,1st Ex. Sess., ch. 1, § 5.) The CAHSEE diploma requirement was to be
implemented starting with the graduating class of 2004. Later, as authorized by statute,
respondent State Board of Education (the Board) decided that the CAHSEE diploma
requirement would be applied for the first time to the graduating class of 2006. ( §
60859.)
When the CAHSEE statutory scheme was adopted, the Legislature also enacted section
60856, which reads as follows: "After adoption and the initial administrations of the high
school exit examination^] the [Board], in consultation with the Superintendent of Public
Instruction [SPI], shall study the appropriateness of other criteria by which high school
[*3] pupils who are regarded as highly proficient but unable to pass the high school exit
examination may demonstrate their competency and receive a high school diploma.
SOLE CRITERION This [sic] criteria shall include, but is [sic] not limited to, an
exemplary academic record as evidenced by transcripts and alternative tests of equal rigor
in the academic areas covered by the high school exit examination. If the [Board]
determines that other criteria are appropriate and do not undermine the intent of this
chapter that all high school graduates demonstrate satisfactory academic proficiency, the
board shall forward its recommendations to the Legislature for enactment." We will refer
to the study required by this statute as a section 60856 study, or study of alternatives.
The CAHSEE was administered for the first time in the spring o f2001, at which
members of the graduating class of 2004, who were then in the ninth grade, were given
two opportunities to take it, but were not required to do so. It was administered two more
times in the spring of 2002, and then six more times during the 2002-2003 school year.
MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES REMEDIATION
In May 2003, the Board's CAHSEE consultant (the Human Resources Research
Organization, [*4] or HumRRO) released a report setting forth the results ofits
legislatively mandated 3 study of the validity and appropriateness of the CAHSEE. The
HumRRO report concluded that the CAHSEE satisfied all professional standards for
implementation as a high school graduation requirement, but also expressed some
concerns about the fairness of imposing the CAHSEE diploma requirement on students
who could legitimately claim that the public school system had not adequately prepared
them to pass the exam. Based on these concerns, HumRRO identified a number of
concerns for the Board to consider in deciding whether or not to defer implementation of
the CAHSEE diploma requirement. The HumRRO report also briefly discussed several
other measures that the Board could adopt, including: lowering the passing standards;
reducing the scope of the subject matter covered by the test; allowing high scores on one
section to compensate for non-passing scores on another section; permitting waivers
based on high grades in relevant courses; or allowing students to present portfolios of
their work.
[*5] At its meetings in May and July 2003, the Board considered and discussed the
recommendations and suggestions discussed in the HumRRO report. Ultimately, at its
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July 2003 meeting, the Board decided to exercise the discretion conferred on it by the
Legislature ( § 60859) to defer implementation of the CAHSEE diploma requirement
until the scheduled graduation of die class of 2006. The Board also modified the
"blueprint" for the CAHSEE in a number of ways, which included reducing its scope by
eliminating one of the essay questions from the English language skills portion. The
Board did not, however, adopt any of the other measures, such as a compensatory scoring
system, that were described in the HumRRO report.
In October 2003, the Legislature directed the SPI and the Board to commission a study
regarding alternatives to the CAHSEE specifically for "pupils with disabilities."( §
60852.5, added by Stats. 2003, ch. 803, § 1.) In compliance with this mandate,
respondents retained an independent consultant, WestEd, which released its report (the
WestEd report) on April 28,2005. During the interval between July 2003 and April 2005,
respondents did not conduct or commission any further [*6] study of alternatives to the
CAHSEE other than that conducted by WestEd.
The WestEd report noted on its face that its assignment precluded it from "making
recommendations for assessment policies directly pertaining to .. .populations" other
than pupils with disabilities. Nonetheless, WestEd's nationwide review of exit exam
alternatives analyzed and discussed performance assessment formats that had been
applied in other states to pupils without disabilities, and the WestEd report noted that
"[m]any of our recommendations are, in fact, applicable to other student populations"
other than students with disabilities.
The Board considered and discussed the WestEd report at its May 2005 meeting, but took
no action on it. At the same meeting, the Board also took note that legislation (AB 1531)
had been introduced that would have authorized local school district superintendents to
approve alternative performance assessments which students in their districts could
substitute for one or both parts of the CAHSEE. The California Department of Education
(CDE) recommended to the Board that it take an official position opposing AB 1531, and
the Board agreed to do so. AB 1531 passed in both houses [*7] of the Legislature, but
was vetoed by the Governor on October 7,2005.
In August 2005, several CDE staff members met to consider various alternative
assessment methods discussed in the WestEd report and in other sources, as those
alternatives might apply to non-disabled as well as disabled students. These discussions
did not, however, result in any recommendation to the SPI and the Board, and thus did
not prompt any consideration of CAHSEE alternatives by respondents themselves, as
opposed to their staff.
In September 2005, HumRRO issued another in an ongoing series of reports regarding its
study of the CAHSEE's validity and impact. This report mentioned the possibility of
alternatives to the CAHSEE, such as senior-year portfolios, but ultimately recommended
that the CAHSEE diploma requirement be implemented as scheduled, starting with the
class of 2006.
In October and November 2005, the law firm that represents CJEF in this litigation, as
well as other attorneys representing the plaintiff class in litigation seeking to improve the
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quality of California public schools (the Williams litigation), each wrote separately to
respondents, asserting that they had violated section 60856 [*8] by failing to conduct a
study of alternatives, and urging them to do so. On November 30, 2005, the SPI issued a
"Letter to All Interested Persons" which invited the public to participate in an open
meeting on alternatives to the CAHSEE, to be held on December 15, 2005.
Written comments submitted by two education scholars in connection with the meeting
on December 15,2005, urged the SPI to consider adopting alternative assessment
measures, particularly but not exclusively for English learners and pupils with
disabilities, including alternative tests, coursework that reflected state learning standards,
and local or statewide performance assessments. The comments noted, however, that it
would be difficult to implement any of those alternatives in time to benefit students
scheduled to graduate from high school
in 2006. Some of the speakers at the meeting supported the CAHSEE and opposed the
adoption of alternatives.
On March 2, 2006, a deputy superintendent in the Department of Education sent a memo
to the members of respondent Board in anticipation of their meeting to be held on March
8, 2006. The memo summarized the proceedings at the December 15, 2005 meeting, and
noted that many [*9] of the members of the public who had appeared at the meeting
advocating the adoption of alternatives "did not provide sufficient evidence that their
proposed options . . . were of equivalent rigor to the CAHSEE." The report indicated that
"[a]fter reviewing all the options available," respondent SPI had "concluded that there is
no practical alternative available which would ensure a student awarded a high school
diploma has met the minimal requirements contained in the CAHSEE."
The March 2,2006 memo attached a letter from respondent SPI, dated January 6,2006,
setting forth the basis for his conclusion in more detail, and specifying reasons why he
had rejected each suggested alternative. With respect to the possibility of a statedeveloped alternative test, the SPI commented that, although this alternative would
address his concerns regarding statewide consistency, "it would be very costly to
develop," would still involve difficulties in guaranteeing equivalence "given the need for
local scoring," and in any event "could not be implemented for the class of 2006 as any
reasonable implementation would be two to three years out." The SPI emphasized that
the absence of alternatives [*10] to the CAHSEE "does not mean, as some have said,
those students who have been unable to pass the exam will be denied a diploma
indefinitely. It simply means that their basic education is not complete and they must
continue on through our [public school] system, adult education, or community colleges
to obtain the necessary skills to warrant receipt of a diploma."
At its meeting on March 8, 2006, respondent Board considered an agenda item entitled
"California High School Exit Examination: Examination of Alternatives Under California
Education Code Section 60856." (Italics omitted.) The Board voted unanimously, with
one abstention, in support of a resolution finding that "at this tim e,. . . there are no other
criteria [i.e., alternatives to the CAHSEE] that are appropriate and that do not undermine
the Legislature's intent that all high school graduates demonstrate satisfactory academic
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proficiency, as set forth in [section] 60856," and that the Board therefore would not
recommend that the Legislature enact any alternatives to the CAHSEE.
On April 17, 2006, CJEF filed a verified petition for writ of mandate in the Alameda
County Superior Court, together [*11] with a motion for issuance of a peremptory writ.
The resulting proceeding was coordinated into Judicial Council Coordinated Proceeding
No. 4468, along with two other pending actions involving the CAHSEE, Valenzuela v.
O'Connell (Super. Ct. Alameda County, No. CPF06506050) (the Valenzuela litigation 4
and Kidd v. California Department of Education (Super. Ct. Alameda County, No.
2002049636), and the coordinated proceeding was assigned to Judge Robert Freedman.
[*12] On May 16,2006, following briefing and oral argument on CJEF's motion for a
peremptory writ, Judge Freedman issued an order denying the motion and dismissing the
writ petition. In his order, Judge Freedman rejected respondents' contention that their
consideration of the WestEd report amounted to a section 60856 study, and agreed with
CJEF that "the evidentiary record shows that [respondents did not engage in a 'study1of
alternatives until very late in the process." Thus, Judge Freedman understood "the pivotal
issue" in the case to be "whether a showing of 'late' compliance with the statutory
requirement is enough to warrant the relief requested," including a temporary delay o f the
CAHSEE diploma requirement.
Judge Freedman went on to note that section 60856 does not include any language
expressly requiring the study of alternatives to be completed within a specified .
Rejecting CJEF's "creative attempt to characterize the statute as inclusive of a mandatory
timing provision," he concluded that "without [that]key element[,] [CJEF's] argument
fails." Accordingly, Judge Freedman held that CJEF had not established that respondents
had failed to discharge a mandatory duty [*13] to complete a section 60856 study within
any specific time limit, and therefore denied their petition. This timely appeal followed. 5
HI. Discussion
As the trial court noted, and as CJEF's counsel acknowledged at oral argument in this
court, CJEF "does not argue that [Respondents did not conduct a [section 60856] study at
all, but rather that [they] did not do so in a timely manner." Thus, the issues in this case
are whether section 60856 mandated that respondents complete the required study within
[*14] any specific time period, and if so, what remedy would be appropriate for their
failure to comply with that requirement. As the trial court succinctly summarized it,
CJEF's "position is that the delay in conducting the [section 60856] study constitutes a
violation of [Respondents' ministerial duty, and that the only way to cure the continuing
effect of this violation is to delay the 'diploma denial' [i.e., the CAHSEE diploma
requirement] until the Legislature has had the opportunity toconsider, enact, and
implement any alternatives raised in a study by [Respondents."
A. Mootness
As a threshold issue, respondents argue that this case is moot, because the section 60856
study has now occurred, and respondents are therefore no longer under a duty to perform
it. 6 This case certainly is not moot in any traditional sense. Many of the students in the
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class of 2006 who were denied their diplomas because they did not pass the CAHSEE
still do not have those diplomas. 7 Thus, if we were to find for CJEF on the merits o f its
substantive claim, and if we determined that granting diplomas to those students would
be an appropriate remedy, we could hardly affirm the trial court's order [*15] denying
relief on the ground of mootness. [*16] In short, respondents' mootness argument cannot
be separated from their contention that the remedy sought by CJEF - delay of the
CAHSEE diploma requirement - is inappropriate. In our view, therefore, this issue is
better addressed as part of our review of the merits, rather than as a threshold issue of
mootness.
B. Standard of Review
CJEF's sole basis for seeking relief in this proceeding is a petition for writ of mandate
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. "A traditional writ of mandate brought
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 lies 'to compel the performance o f an act
which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.'
Under this section, mandate will lie to compel performance of a clear, present, and
usually ministerial duty in cases where a petitioner has a clear, present and beneficial
right to performance of that duty. [Citations.] Mandamus has long been recognized as the
appropriate means by which to challenge a government official's refusal to implement a
duly enacted legislative measure. [Citation.]" (Morris v. Harper (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th
52,58.) [*17]
However, "mandamus will not lie to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., tocompel an
official to exercise discretion in a particular manner. [Citation.] Generally, mandamus
may only be employed to compel the performance of a duty that is purely ministerial in
character. [Citation.] [P] A ministerial act has been described as 'an act that a public
officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority and without regard to his [or her] own judgment or opinion concerning such
act's propriety or impropriety, when a given set of facts exists.' [Citation.] On the other
hand, discretion is the power conferred on public functionaries to act officially according
to the dictates of their own judgment. [Citations.] [P] However,. . . [a] refusal to exercise
discretion is itself an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, although mandamus is not
available to compel the exercise of the discretion in a particular manner or to reach a
particular result, it does lie to command the exercise of discretion - to compel some
action upon the subject involved under a proper interpretation of the applicable law.
[Citations.] 'Where a statute [*18] requires an officer to do a prescribed act upon a
prescribed contingency, his functions are ministerial. Where a statute or ordinance clearly
defines the specific duties or course of conduct a governing body must take, that course
of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion. [Citation.]'
[Citation.]" (Morris v. Harper, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 62-63.) " ' "In reviewing the
trial court's ruling on a writ of mandate [under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085], the
appellate court is ordinarily confined to an inquiry as to whether the findings and
judgment of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] However,
the appellate court may make its own determination when the case involves resolution of
questions of law where the facts are undisputed. [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citations.]"
(Morris v. Harper, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58-59.)
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In the present case, the underlying historical facts are not in dispute. 8 Rather, the
principal issue is whether section 60856 imposed a duty on respondents to complete a
study of alternatives to the CAHSEE, [*19] and to make an appropriate recommendation
to the Legislature, in time for the Legislature to act on that recommendation prior to the
implementation of the CAHSEE diploma requirement. This is essentially a question of
statutory interpretation, and "[i]t is well settled that the interpretation and application o f a
statutory scheme presents a pure question o f law and is subject to independent review by
the courts of appeal. [Citation.] Under this standard, we undertake our own interpretation
of the determinative statute and assess any claims raised by the parties completely anew."
(Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.)
[*20] C. Statutory Interpretation of Section 60856
Section 60856 provides that respondents are to begin their study of alternatives after the
initial administrations of the CAHSEE, but does not include any language explicitly
setting a time limit within which respondents must complete that study. This undeniable
fact poses a formidable obstacle to CJEF's argument that the statute should be construed
to include an implied time limit within which the required study of alternatives was to be
completed. First, the primary rule o f statutory construction is that ”[i]f the words o f a
statute are reasonably free of ambiguity and uncertainty, we look no further than those
words to determine the meaning of that language. [Citation.]" (Lazar v. Hertz Corp.
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494,1503; see also Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238 [key to statutory construction is applying rules in
proper sequence, starting with examination of actual language of statute].) We do not
perceive any ambiguity in the language of section 60856. In our view the lack of an
explicit time limitation is not an ambiguity, but rather a perfectly [*21] clear indication
that respondents' duty to conduct a study of alternatives was (and remains) unconstrained
by alegislatively imposed deadline.
CJEF contends, however, that despite the absence of an explicit deadline in the statute
itself, examining the statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and the
circumstances that led to its enactment reveals a latent ambiguity which the courts must
address. (See generally Whaley v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 479,487 [language appearing unambiguous on its face may have latent
ambiguity as shown by extrinsic evidence of a necessity for interpretation or choice
between possible meanings].) In this regard, CJEF argues that in ordering respondents to
conduct the study ofaltematives "[a]fter adoption and the initial administrations of the
[CAHSEE]" ( § 60856, italics added), the Legislature intended that while respondents
should defer commencing the study until after the CAHSEE had been given once or
twice, once that milestone had been passed they were to begin the study at the earliest
possible time. In other words, CJEF argues that a latent ambiguity [*22] arises from the
statute's use of the word "after," because it could mean either "at any time after" or
"immediately after."
We are not convinced that this chimeric ambiguity actually exists, but even if we were,
we would still be required to examine CJEF's proposed reading of the in the light o f other
applicable principles of statutory construction. (Whaley v. Sony Computer Entertainment
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America, Inc., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 487.) In doing so, we are similarly convinced
that no deadline for the studyof alternatives was intended by the Legislature when it
enacted section 60856.
One of these additional statutory construction tenets is that " 'where a statute, with
reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission such provision from a
similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different
legislative intent existed with reference the different statutes.' [Citation.]" (In re Jennings
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 (Jennings).) As respondents point out, the statutory scheme
encompassing implementation of the CAHSEE includes four statutes requiring
respondents to undertake further [*23] study of issues pertaining to the proficiency
testing of California high school students. Each of the other three statutes requiring
respondents to perform studies in connection with the CAHSEE contains an explicit time
limit. ( §§ 60852.5 [final report on study of alternatives for disabled students to be
completed by May 1, 2005]; 60855, subd. (d) [initial report on multiyear independent
evaluation of CAHSEE to be submitted on July 1,2000, with reports to follow every two
years beginning February 1,2002]; 60857, subd. (a) [final report on study of CAHSEE
diploma requirement due by May 1, 2003].) Only the study o f alternatives statute, section
60856, does not include a deadline. Thus, to paraphrase the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Jennings, "[b]ecause the wording of [the other CAHSEE study] statutes shows the
Legislature, if it wishes, knows how to express its intent that [a study be completed by a
given deadline], the absence of such a requirement in section [60856] indicates it
intended no such requirement. [Citation.]" (Jennings, supra,34 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
Recognizing this impediment to its proposed construction o f section 60856, CJEF [*24]
attempts to distinguish the other CAHSEE study statutes by pointing out that they relate
to studies to be performed by independent consultants, whereas the study of alternatives
was to be undertaken by respondents themselves. We do not agree that this distinction
justifies that we read into section 60856 a time deadline that the Legislature apparently
deliberately omitted. Indeed, to do sowould require us to violate other well-recognized
tenets of statutoryconstruction.
Foremost among these is that, as the Supreme Court also noted in Jennings, when
construing a statute, courts "must be careful not to add requirements to those already
supplied by the Legislature. [Citation.]" (Jennings, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 265; see also
Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 ["In the construction of a statute . .., the office of the judge is
simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted...."].) Thus, " '[w]here the words of a statute are clear, we
may not add to oralter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of
the statute or from its legislative [*25] history.' [Citation.]" (Jennings, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 265.) In other words, " '[w]e may not, under the guise ofconstmction, rewrite the law
or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.'
[Citations.] More specifically, we may not 'insert qualifying provisions not included in
the statute.' [Citation.]" (Whaley v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc., supra,
121 Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) Our own division has put it thusly: "We may not speculate
that the Legislature meant something other than what it said, nor may we rewrite a statute
to make express an intention that did not find itself expressed in the language o f that
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provision. [Citation.]" (Lazar v. Hertz Corporation, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1503; see
also Comite de Padres de Familia v. Honig (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 528, 533, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 517 [rejecting contention that a statute requiring state agencies to "assist" local
school districts in developing programs for affirmative action in employment should be
construed to include a duty to "monitor" or "enforce" compliance with such programs].
[*26])
%In the present case, CJEF acknowledges that there is no legislative history supporting
the view that the Legislature intended to impose a time limitation on the study of
alternatives, but simply failed to express that intent in the statute's language. Instead,
CJEF argues that such an intent should be inferred because imposing a deadline is
consistent with the purpose of the statute, and is necessary to accomplish that purpose.
Our Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument in People v. Guzman (2005) 35
Cal.4th 577 (Guzman).
In Guzman, the defendant committed a nonviolent drug possession offense while on
probation following his conviction for violent offenses. The defendant argued that he was
entitled to probation under a statute mandating probation and diversion for nonviolent
drug crimes. He conceded that the statute's language did not extend its coverage to
persons on probation for violent offenses, but argued that the omission was the product of
a drafting error and that to construe the statute to exclude him would be inconsistent with
the statute's purpose and would lead to an absurd result. (Guzman, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
pp.
584-586.) [*27] The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that " 'inserting]'
additional language into a statute 'violate[s] the cardinal rule of statutory construction that
courts must not add provisions to statutes.[Citations.]. . . . ' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 587, first
three brackets in original.) In the absence of " 'firm evidence' " that the omission of
persons on probation for violent offenses was an oversight inconsistent with the drafters'
intent (id. at p. 588), the court declined to adopt a proposed revision of the statute that
was a major expansion of its scope rather than a " 'relatively minor rewriting o f the
[statute]. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 587.)
For the same reasons articulated in Guzman, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 587-588, we are not
persuaded that a time limitation on respondents' duty to study alternatives to the
CAHSEE must be inferred where that intention is neither evident on the face of section
60856 nor supported by firm evidence that its omission was a mere oversight on the part
of the Legislature.
Nor are we persuaded by CJEF's argument that declining to impose such a time limitation
[*28] would lead to an absurd result. It might have been preferable for respondents to
complete their study of alternatives in time for the Legislature to act on their
recommendations prior to the effective date of the CAHSEE diploma requirement, but
not necessarily so. Certainly, respondents' failure to do so did not deprive the Legislature
of the power to enact such alternatives if it chose to do so, 9 or to defer the effective date
of the CAHSEE diploma requirement until respondents had complied with their statutory
duty. Also, the efficacy of CAHSEE as the preeminent means to evaluate student
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proficiency in the tested materials is evolutional. The value o f that form of testing, and
the prospect that other equally reliable evaluative protocols can be developed, will no
doubt be better tested in the cmcible of actual experience with the CAHSEE over time.
Thus, evaluation methodologies rejected today may yet, in time, prove to be efficacious.
Thus, an argument can easily be made that imposing a deadline would have hampered the
educational community's ability eventually to develop viable alternative means to test
student proficiency. For this reason, contrary to CJEF's contention, imposition [*29] of a
time limit on respondents' duty to comply with section 60856 is not necessary "to avoid
an absurd result." (Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p.
1239.) 10
For all of the foregoing reasons, we concur with the trial court's conclusion that section
60856 cannot [*30] properly be interpreted as requiring respondents to complete a study
of alternatives within any particular time period after the initial administrations of the
CAHSEE. Thus, because the statute did not impose a ministerial duty on respondents to
complete the section60856 study within a particular time, mandamus relief is not
available based on their delay in fulfilling that requirement. 11
[*31] IV. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Ruvolo, P.J.
We concur:
Reardon, J.
Sepulveda, J.
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OPINION
ORDER
Plaintiffs are a group of thirteen young men and women who were once students at
defendant Abraham Lincoln High School ("Lincoln"). Lincoln, a public alternative high
school in Minneapolis, was established to serve foreign-born students with limited
English skills and little formal education. When plaintiffs attended Lincoln, it was run by
defendant Institute for New Americans ("the Institute") under an arrangement between
third-party defendant Metropolitan Federation of Alternative Schools ("MFAS") [*2] and
defendant/third-party plaintiff Special School District No. 1 ("District 1"), the entity that
runs the Minneapolis public schools.
Plaintiffs contend that they were badly educated and discriminated against at Lincoln in
violation of two federal laws and one state law: the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of
1974 ("EEOA"), which requires schools and school districts to make efforts to overcome
language barriers faced by students, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits recipients of federal funding from discriminating on the basis of,
among other things, national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and the Minnesota Human Rights
Act ("MHRA"), which likewise bars national-origin discrimination, Minn. Stat. §
363A.13.
The Institute and District 1 move for summary judgment, as does MFAS. For the reasons
that follow, the Court grants the Institute's and District l's motions. As a result o f this
ruling, District 1's third-party complaint against MFAS, in which District 1 seeks
recovery against MFAS if District 1 is held liable to plaintiffs, is now moot. The Court
therefore denies MFAS's motion for summary judgment without addressing its merits.
I. [*3] BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are set forth in the Court's March 13,2006 order on defendants'
motions to dismiss [Docket No. 36]. Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., Civ. No. 052176, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9967, 2006 WL 640510 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2006). 1 The
parties largely agree on the facts, but to the extent that the parties disagree, the Court
recounts the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.
Lincoln was established in the late 1990s by the Institute, a nonprofit corporation. Inst.
Mem. Supp. Mot. S.J. ("Inst. SJ Mem.") at 6 [Docket No. 136]; Inst. Ex. 46 at 2 Req. 3
[Docket No. 119]. Lincoln itself is not a legal entity; rather, it is essentially a trade name
of the Institute, which operates Lincoln. See Inst. SJ Mem. at 6; Giles Aff. P 6 [Docket
No. 129]. The Court will therefore sometimes refer to Lincoln and the Institute
collectively as "Lincoln."
The Institute is a member of another nonprofit entity, third-party defendant MFAS. Inst.
Ex. 46 at 2 Req. 3. MFAS is an umbrella organization whose members operate public
alternative [*4] schools. MFAS Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial S.J. ("MFAS SJ Mem.") at 3
[Docket No. 112]. From 1997 through 2003, District 1 contracted with the Institute
indirectly, through MFAS. During that period, District 1 had an arrangement with MFAS
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whereby MFAS's members (such as the Institute) would operate alternative schools (such
as Lincoln) on behalf of District 1. Inst. Exs. 24-25. Beginning in mid-2003, District 1
contracted directly with the Institute for the education of students at Lincoln. Inst. Exs.
26-28. 2 Since mid-2007, when Lincoln became a public charter school funded by the
State of Minnesota, District 1 has not had any authority, direct or indirect, over Lincoln.
Giles Aff. P 7.
Plaintiffs are thirteen students who attended Lincoln between 1999 and 2006. 3 Nine
plaintiffs were bom in Somalia, and four in Ethiopia. All thirteen plaintiffs fled their
native countries and lived for some [*5] time in Kenyan refugee camps before
immigrating to the United States. Most plaintiffs were in their mid- to late teens when
they immigrated, though one (Muna Mohamed) was as young as fourteen and another
(Maymuna Muktar Osman) was as old as twenty. At the time of their enrollment at
Lincoln, plaintiffs had varying, but generally low-to-nonexistent, levels of formal
schooling and familiarity with the English language.
In Minnesota, students cannot graduate from high school unless they accumulate enough
credits of course work and pass certain state-mandated tests. When plaintiffs attended
Lincoln, the required tests were the Basic Skills Tests ("BSTs") in reading, writing, and
mathematics. 4
Two plaintiffs passed the BSTs (Amal Mohamed and Yurub Siyad) after receiving
disability-related accommodations from the state; two other plaintiffs (Amina Harun and
Mohamud Mohamed) passed the BSTs without receiving any accommodations. All four
of these plaintiffs graduated from Lincoln. One more plaintiff (Maymuna Muktar Osman)
graduated from Lincoln; it is not clear from the parties' briefing whether she passed the
BSTs or (as sometimes happens) was exempted from doing so. The remaining eight
plaintiffs did not graduate from Lincoln; seven o f these eight failed all portions of the
BSTs, while one (Muna Mohamed) passed the mathematics portion of the tests but failed
the reading and writing portions. Several of the plaintiffs were allowed to remain enrolled
at Lincoln past their twenty-first birthdays, despite the fact that Lincoln received no
public funding for students after they turned twenty-one. Mpls. Pub. Sch. Mem. Supp.
Mot. SJ. ("Dist. 1 SJ Mem.") at 6,11-25 [Docket No. 128],
Plaintiffs criticize Lincoln [*7] for its poor curriculum, its underqualified teachers, its
failure to assess students' progress, its placement of students in a program (so-called
Level 9B) that provided little educational benefit and effectively guaranteed that the
students would not graduate, its failure to assess whether students needed specialeducation services, and its failure to provide such services when needed. PI. Mem. Opp.
Defs. Mots. S.J. ("PI. SJ Opp.)" at 5-18, 21 -31 [Docket No. 137]. According to plaintiffs,
Lincoln's shortcomings amounted to intentional discrimination against them on the basis
of their national origin. Id. at 1 ("The evidence of record in this case establishes that
defendants collectively were responsible for the establishment and operation of a
substandard high school that essentially warehoused immigrant students until they aged
out of the school system without even the mdiments of an adequate education, solely
because they were immigrants."). Plaintiffs also argue that because of the school's many
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flaws, Lincoln failed to provide them an education designed to overcome language
barriers as mandated by the EEOA. Id. EQUAL PROTECTION
With respect to the curriculum, plaintiffs deny that Lincoln had a [*8] coherent
curriculum of any kind. Id. at 6-7. They further argue that if such a curriculum existed, it
was unsound. Id. at 27-28. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Lincoln's instruction was a
form of "English immersion" and that immersion is not an effective approach for students
like plaintiffs. Id. For its part, Lincoln counters that it did have an appropriate curriculum,
which was based on a "sheltered English" model of instruction. Inst. Reply Mem. Supp.
Mot. S.J. ("Inst. Reply") at 2-5 [Docket No. 145]. But plaintiffs' educational expert,
Martha Bigelow, supports their contentions that Lincoln's curriculum was both
insufficiently developed and poorly suited to Lincoln's student population. Inst. Ex. 21.5
Plaintiffs also present evidence that teachers and the principal at Lincoln were
underqualified because they lacked necessary credentials. PI. SJ Opp. at 8-9; Inst. Ex. 21
at 16-18. The Institute counters by alleging that plaintiffs looked for licensing data in the
wrong place and therefore erroneously concluded that some state-licensed teachers were
unlicensed. Inst. Reply at 6-8. Thus there appears to be a dispute of fact over the
credentials of Lincoln's teachers and its principal. For summary-judgment purposes, the
Court assumes that at least some of the teachers at Lincoln lacked proper teaching
credentials.
Plaintiffs' criticisms about special-education testing and services are bome out, in part, by
a report issued in June 2005 by the Minnesota Department o f Education ("MDE") after
the department investigated a student's complaints [*10] about how Lincoln treated
students with disabilities. Shulman Aff. Ex. A [Docket No. 138], 6 The MDE found that
under one percent of Lincoln's student population in 2004-2005 was receiving specialeducation services. Id. at 4. The MDE further found that students at Lincoln were
required to wait at least one year after enrolling in Lincoln before Lincoln or District 1
would evaluate them for special-education services —and that, in general, students were
not evaluated until they had received at least three years of "English Language Learners"
(or "ELL") instruction (i.e., instruction in the English language for non-native speakers).
Id. at 8 Colo. 467, 9 P 15.
District 1 and Lincoln do not deny that it was their policy to defer assessing students at
Lincoln for special-education services until the students had received three years of ELL
instruction. The MDE report on which plaintiffs rely, however, says that this policy was
based on District 1's belief that special-education assessments would not be reliable if
they were done any earlier because some part of a student's assessment results might be
attributable to English-language [*11] deficiencies rather than genuine special-education
needs. Id. The MDE, however, found that District 1 and Lincoln's policy of delaying
assessment for three years was impermissible under state and federal regulations. Id. at
11. The MDE also found that Lincoln and District 1 violated state regulations by not
developing adequate remediation plans for students who failed the BSTs. Id.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
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Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A dispute over a fact is "material" only if its resolution might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute over a fact is "genuine" only if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 469 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2006). In considering a
motion for summary judgment, a court "must view the evidence and the inferences that
may be reasonably drawn [*12] from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non
moving party." Winthrop Res. Corp. v. Eaton Hydraulics, Inc., 361 F.3d 465, 468 (8th
Cir. 2004).
B. Title VI and MHRA Claims
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination by recipients of federal
funding. Specifically, § 2000d of Title 42 of the United States Code provides: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The
MHRA contains an even broader prohibition on discrimination by educational
institutions. 7 Minn. Stat. § 363A.13. Plaintiffs contend that Lincoln and District 1
violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and the MHRA by discriminating against them because they
were not bom in the United States.
District 1 and Lincoln concede that they are subject both to the MHRA and, because they
received federal funding, to § 2000d. But they argue that plaintiffs have no evidence that
either defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs. [*14] At most, say
defendants, plaintiffs have evidence that District 1's and Lincoln's actions had a disparate
impact on plaintiffs because of their national origin. Dist. 1 Reply Mem. Supp. S.J. Mot.
at 6 [Docket No. 150]; Inst. SJ Mem. at 45.
The Court agrees with District 1 and Lincoln. The facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, support, at most, a disparate-impact claim. It is settled law that
disparate-impact claims cannot be brought under Title VI; rather, Title VI prohibits only
intentional discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,280, 121 S. Ct. 1511,
149 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2001). Thus, to establish a Title VI violation, a plaintiff must prove
that a defendant's challenged actions were rooted in discriminatory animus —in a
subjective intent to discriminate.
In general, there are two different methods of proving intentional discrimination: the
direct method and the indirect method. See Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748,
753-54 (7th Cir. 2003); Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.
2003); Darke v. Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Co., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1032,1040-41 (D. Minn.
2008). Under the direct method, a plaintiff with strong evidence of a defendant's
discriminatory intent, [*15] such as discriminatory statements by key decision makers,
may rely on that strong evidence to directly establish intentional discrimination. See
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Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004); Darke, 550 F. Supp.
2d at 1041 ("[T]he direct method applies when the plaintiff. . . has strong evidence o f
discrimination."). The indirect method, available to plaintiffs with weaker evidence of
discriminatory intent, is based on the familiar three-step framework described in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d
668 (1973). Darke, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 ("[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence is weaker,
McDonnell Douglas gives the Court a framework for analyzing whether the evidence is
nevertheless sufficient to support a verdict of discrimination.").
To the extent that plaintiffs have any evidence of intentional discrimination by either
Lincoln or District 1, that evidence is quite weak. And, as explained below, that weak
evidence is insufficient for a jury to find that either defendant intentionally discriminated.
Although a reasonable jury could perhaps find that District l's and Lincoln's actions
produced a disparate impact on plaintiffs because plaintiffs received [*16] a substandard
education compared to United States-bom students, a reasonable jury could not find that
either District 1 or Lincoln intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs —that is,
provided a poor education to them because of their national origin.
The Court therefore grants summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' Title VI and
MHRA claims. Because the Court's analysis with respect to Lincoln differs slightly from
its analysis with respect to District 1, the Court discusses each defendant separately,
eqaul protection EDUCATIONAL AGENCY PREVAILED
1. Lincoln
Plaintiffs in this case do not have strong evidence of intentional discrimination by
Lincoln. Indeed, the record contains only a single statement by a single teacher at Lincoln
that could be interpreted as reflecting animus against plaintiffs based on their national
origin: After some students circulated a petition criticizing a teacher at Lincoln, another
teacher wrote, "I am certain that students would never dare try something like this in their
home country, and it shouldn't be allowed here." Shulman Aff. Ex. KK. This single
statement by a single teacher is not nearly enough for a jury to conclude that Lincoln, as
an institution, intentionally discriminated against [*17] plaintiffs.
Indeed, although plaintiffs contend that there is direct evidence of discrimination, their
argument is based almost entirely on evidence of the impact of Lincoln's educational
system on plaintiffs. PI. SJ Opp. at 63-67. Plaintiffs assert, correctly, that Lincoln was
"intentionally created . . . to accommodate students who were not native-born." Id. at 64.
Plaintiffs then appeal to the "axiomatic" proposition "that persons intend the
consequences of their actions." Id. at 63. With that proposition in mind, plaintiffs
contend:
Since [the Institute] established and operated [Lincoln] only for immigrant
students, but then failed to educate them, [Lincoln] by design knew and intended
that its unlawful conduct would affect only immigrant, foreign-born students, and
not American-born, non-immigrant students. It created and maintained a
substandard facility and program for immigrants, something [the Institute] knew
would never be permitted for mainstream, non-immigrant students. Because [the
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Institute] knew it was dealing with a non-English speaking immigrant population,
the record clearly supports an inference that [the Institute] believed it could get
away with doing less for this [*18] group of immigrants than for a non-immigrant
population. This is the essence of discrimination.
Id. at 64-65.
As this passage makes clear, plaintiffs contend that they were badly educated at Lincoln.
The Court assumes, for summary-judgment purposes, that this is true. But the
substandard education that plaintiffs received is an effect of the educational policies and
practices of Lincoln, and although that effect was felt only by foreign-born students, it
does not follow that Lincoln intentionally discriminated against such students. Put
simply, not every disparate impact reveals discriminatory intent; if it did, the distinction
between disparate-impact claims and intentional-discrimination claims would evaporate.
In this case, it is theoretically possible that Lincoln deliberately set out to provide a poor
education to foreign-bom students as a way of harming them. There is no evidence of
this, however, and it is at least equally possible that Lincoln educated its students badly
as a result of incompetence, not animus. Incompetence that happens to burden only
members of a protected class is not, by itself, evidence of discriminatory animus.
Suppose, for example, that a former professional [*19] baseball player volunteers to
coach a Little League team made up entirely o f African-American boys. And suppose
further that the former player —an African-American himself —turns out to be a terrible
coach. The impact of the terrible coaching would be felt only by African-Americans. But
that does not mean that the former player provided terrible coaching because of animus
toward African-Americans. He might have had positive feelings toward AfricanAmericans and sincerely wanted to help them —indeed, that may have been why he
volunteered to coach a team of African-American boys —but simply turned out to be an
incompetent coach. Likewise Lincoln may have had positive feelings toward foreignbom students and sincerely wanted to help them, but simply turned out to be a
substandard school.
Lacking strong evidence of discriminatory intent on Lincoln's part, plaintiffs could —if
this were an ordinary case —rely upon the three-part McDonnell Douglas framework to
attempt to establish that Lincoln intentionally discriminated against them. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046,
1055 (8th Cir. 2007); Fuller v. Rayburn, 161 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 1998) [*20]
(discussing applicability of McDonnell Douglas in Title VI cases). Under McDonnell
Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff does so, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for its challenged actions. The plaintiff must then put
forward sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory explanation is pretextual. See Elnashar, 484 F.3d at 1055; Darke, 550
F. Supp. 2d at 1042.
Plaintiffs cannot, however, establish a prima facie case against Lincoln because of the
unusual facts of this case, as the Court observed in its March 13,2006 order. Mumid,
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2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9967, 2006 WL 640510, at *4 ("In this case, it is not possible for
similarly situated people to be treated differently because Plaintiffs allege that all students
are members of the same protected class."). To establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he
suffered adverse action; and (3) a similarly situated person (or persons) outside of the
protected class - called a "comparator" - did not suffer the challenged adverse [*21]
action. In this case, with respect to Lincoln, there are no comparators: Lincoln served
only members of the protected class (foreign-born students); it did not serve any students
outside of the protected class.
Given the absence of comparators in this case, the McDonnell Douglas framework cannot
be applied. Indeed, plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge the inapplicability of the McDonnell
Douglas framework by choosing not to rely on it in their brief opposing defendants'
summary-judgment motion. Instead, they argue that a jury could infer discriminatory
intent from the fact that Lincoln provided a substandard education to foreign-born
students and no one else. PI. SJ Opp. At 63-67. For the reasons already explained, the
Court finds that no reasonable jury could find, based on the record, that discriminatory
animus motivated Lincoln's actions.
2. District 1
Plaintiffs argue, as they do with respect to Lincoln, that a jury could infer discriminatory
animus on District 1's part from the fact that Lincoln —under contract to District 1 —
provided a substandard education to a population made up entirely of foreign-born
students. PI. SJ Opp. at 67. This argument is no stronger with respect to [*22] District 1
than with respect to Lincoln. Thus, for the reasons given above, plaintiffs cannot establish
District 1's discriminatory intent by the direct method of proof.
District 1, however, differs from Lincoln in that District 1 serves both native-born and
foreign-born students. And plaintiffs have evidence that District l's policy with respect to
testing for special education differed for the two groups of students. Specifically, District
1 had a general policy of refusing to test foreign-born students for special-education
services until they had been enrolled in ELL classes for three years. Shulman Aff. Ex. A
at 9 P 15.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, this policy supports a prima facie case of
discrimination: Plaintiffs are members of a protected class (foreign-born students); that
class was subject to adverse action because its members were denied special-education
testing until they had taken three years of ELL classes; and non-class members (nativeborn students) did not suffer the adverse action but rather were offered special-education
testing as needed.
District 1 is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' discrimination claim
with respect to special-education [*23] testing for two reasons. First, eleven of thirteen
plaintiffs have no evidence that they personally suffered any injury from District 1's
testing policy. Second, plaintiffs' claim does not satisfy the McDonnell Douglas
framework because District 1 has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for
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its policy and plaintiffs have no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the
explanation is pretextual.
There is no dispute that District 1 had a general policy of refusing to test foreign-born
students for special-education services until the students had taken three years of ELL
classes. But the only students who were injured by policy were those who were in need of
testing for special education. Plaintiffs have offered two types of evidence to support
their contention that all thirteen of them needed special-education testing, but a
reasonable jury could conclude from that evidence that, at most, only two plaintiffs were
in need of such testing.
First, plaintiffs point out that one teacher at Lincoln said that four plaintiffs needed
special education. PI. SJ Opp. at 68; Shulman Aff. Ex. TT. But the teacher did not
identify the particular plaintiffs he had in mind, and in [*24] any event, there is no
evidence that the teacher knew what he was talking about —that is, there is no evidence
that he was qualified to assess special-education needs generally or that he had enough
information about the four (unnamed) plaintiffs to assess their particular needs. Second,
plaintiffs point out that two of them —Amal Mohamed and Yurub Siyad —were granted
accommodations under § 504 plans. PI. SJ Opp. at 69. Such plans are developed for
students with disabilities, and a reasonable jury could find, based on the existence of
those plans, that District 1 should have assessed the needs o f these two plaintiffs for
special-education services earlier than it did. But a reasonable jury could not find that any
of the other eleven plaintiffs was deprived of special-education testing that he or she
should have received.
As to the two plaintiffs who may have been harmed, however, there is no evidence that
District 1's explanation for its policy of delaying special-education testing is a pretext for
discrimination. Accordingly, Amal Mohamed and Yurub Siyad, like the other eleven
plaintiffs, cannot prevail on their Title VI claims against District 1.
The evidence shows that District [*25] 1 adopted its policy with respect to specialeducation testing because it did not believe that it could reliably assess whether a student
needed special-education services until the student had been in the country long enough
to learn English. Shulman Aff. Ex. A at 9 P 15. The wisdom of District l's policy was
doubtful, and the MDE required District 1 to abandon the policy because it violated state
and federal regulations. Id. At 11-13. But for McDonnell Douglas purposes, the reasons
for District 1's policy need not have been wise; they need only have been sincere (and
nondiscriminatory). District l's explanation is indeed nondiscriminatory, and plaintiffs
have offered no evidence that it is pretextual. Plaintiffs have thus failed to create a
question of fact as to District 1's discriminatory intent.
C. EEOA Claims
Section 1703 of Title 20 of the United States Code, a provision of the EEOA, forbids
states to "deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her . . .
national origin" by engaging in various practices. 20 U.S.C. § 1703. Subsection (a)
forbids "deliberate segregation" and subsection (c) forbids assigning students to schools
outside their neighborhoods [*26] if doing so would increase the degree of segregation in
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the school system. Id. §§ 1703(a), (c). Although Count 4 of plaintiffs' second amended
complaint raises segregation-and assignment-based claims under §§ 1703(a) and (c),
plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the evidence does not support either type of
claim. Rather, the evidence shows that each plaintiff chose to attend Lincoln; District 1
did not assign them there or otherwise segregate them. The Court therefore grants
summary judgment to defendant District 1 on Count 4. 8
Plaintiffs bring their remaining EEOA claim, in Count 1 of the second amended
complaint, under § 1703(f). Section 1703(f) identifies "the failure by an educational
agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal
participation by its students in its instructional programs" as a prohibited practice under
the EEOA. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). Put another way, § 1703(f) imposes an affirmative
obligation on state school systems to "take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers . . . . " Id.
Whether District 1 took "appropriate action to overcome language barriers" facing
students at Lincoln is, on the record before the Court, a disputed question of fact.
Plaintiffs offer expert testimony that Lincoln used an "English immersion" curriculum
that was pedagogically unsound in theory and badly implemented in practice. Inst. Ex.
21. District 1 responds by criticizing various aspects of plaintiffs' expert report. Dist. 1 SJ
Mem. at 36-42. The Court recognizes [*28] the force of some of District l's criticisms,
but the Court nonetheless finds that plaintiffs' evidence suffices to create a jury question
as to the appropriateness of District l's efforts to overcome plaintiffs' language barriers.
District 1 is, however, entitled to summary judgment for a different reason: Plaintiffs'
injuries, if any, are not redressable by this Court. Plaintiffs seek both injunctive and
monetary relief. But, as is explained below, monetary relief is not available for violations
of the EEOA, and the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs would do nothing to redress
their injuries. Redressability is an element of standing, which is a prerequisite to this
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61,
112 S. Ct. 2130,119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992); Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190,1195-96
(8th Cir. 1998). This Court therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
EEOA claims because plaintiffs lacks standing to bring them.
1. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs seek an injunction that would either (1) forbid Lincoln from engaging in any
practices found to be unlawful or (2) shut Lincoln down entirely. Second Am. Compl. at
19-20 PP D, F [Docket No. 70]. But [*29] no plaintiff will ever again be a student at
Lincoln. Five plaintiffs -- Maymuna Muktar Osman, Mohamed Amal, Yurub Siyad,
Amina Harun, and Mohamud Mohamed —have already graduated. The remaining eight
plaintiffs are now too old to attend Lincoln or any other public high school.
Because no plaintiff will ever again attend Lincoln, any injunctive relief requiring
Lincoln to change its practices or shut its doors will have no impact whatsoever on the
plaintiffs. By definition, then, the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs cannot redress
their injuries, and thus plaintiffs do not have standing to seek that injunction. See City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 n .7 ,103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983)
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(holding that plaintiff lacked standing to seek an injunction against the Los Angeles
police department's choke-hold policy because he could not "credibly allege that he faced
a realistic threat from the future application" of the policy); see also Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,184-85,120 S. Ct. 693,145 L.
Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (discussing Lyons). Plaintiffs therefore lack standing with respect to
their claims for injunctive relief (as they effectively conceded at the summary-judgment
hearing).
2. [*30] Money Damages
Section 1712 of Title 20 provides that "[i]n formulating a remedy for a denial of equal
educational opportunity or a denial of the eqaul protection of the laws, a court.. . shall
seek or impose only such remedies as are essential to correct particular denials of equal
educational opportunity or eqaul protection of the laws." 20 U.S.C. § 1712. The plain
language of this provision signals that Congress intended to limit the remedies that courts
could impose for violations of the EEOA: Again, courts can impose "only such remedies
as are essential to correct" a particular violation of the EEOA. Id. (emphasis added). But
§ 1712 provides no explicit guidance as to whether or when money damages can qualify
as an "essential" remedy.
Plaintiffs appeal to the general principle that when Congress creates a cause o f action (as
it has in the EEOA), courts should presume that all remedies are available, including
money damages. PI. SJ Opp. at 70-71 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 66, 112 S. Ct. 1028,117 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1992)). Because Congress did not
forbid the award of money damages under the EEOA, argue plaintiffs, damages must be
available in a case like this one, in which an injunction [*31] would not redress the
plaintiffs' grievances.
Plaintiffs have not, however, cited a single case in which a court awarded money
damages for an EEOA violation. It would be extraordinary if money damages were
available under the EEOA, but, in the thirty-four-year history of the statute, no plaintiff
had yet managed to be awarded such damages. Further, it would be extraordinary if
Congress had authorized money damages under the EEOA given the potential for such
awards to bankrupt school districts. In the absence of any authority for plaintiffs' position,
and in light of the overall statutory scheme of the EEOA, the Court declines to become
the first federal district court ever to allow a suit for money damages under the EEOA. 9
Awarding money damages under the EEOA would not only be unprecedented, but it
would also be inconsistent with the tenor of the statute's remedy-related provisions. First,
§ 1712 itself authorizes only remedies that "are essential to correct" a particular violation
of the EEOA. 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (emphasis added). Money damages can compensate a
person for harm that she has suffered, but compensating for a wrong is different from
"correcting" it. The word "correct" in § 1712 suggests that remedies under the EEOA are
equitable in nature and are designed to change specific practices that violate the statute
rather than to compensate victims. Indeed, commentators seem to assume that § 1712
authorizes only equitable remedies. See 6 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 11:407 (West 2008) ("The
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scope of a trial court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs in school-desegregation
cases is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.").
Further, the EEOA's remedy provisions are directed explicitly at equitable remedies such
as busing, not at money damages. Sections 1712 through 1718 of Title 20, enacted as §§
213 to 219 of the EEOA, make [*34] up the entire "Remedies" subsection of the EEOA.
See Equal Educational Opportunites Act of 1974, Subpart 4, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat.
484, 516-18. Sections 1713 through 1718 give no hint that money damages are available
under the EEOA; to the contrary, they focus on equitable remedies.
Section 1713, for example, entitled "Priority of remedies," requires courts to give
preference to certain types of equitable remedies (e.g., assigning students to nearby
schools, 20 U.S.C. § 1713(a)-(b)) over others (e.g., constructing magnet schools, 20
U.S.C. § 1713(f)). An award of money damages is not among the remedies listed in §
1713, which governs "formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity
or a denial of the eqaul protection of the laws, which may involve directly or indirectly
the transportation of students . . . . " 20 U.S.C. § 1713.
Unfortunately, the reach of § 1713 is not entirely clear, and it likely applies only to
certain remedies —those that "may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of
students . . . . " Id. The reach of § 1713 depends on whether the relative clause "which
may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of students" is a restrictive [*35] or
nonrestrictive modifier of the noun "remedy." 10 That is, does § 1713 govern only
remedies that "may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of students," but not
other kinds of remedies (i.e., is the phrase beginning "which may involve" restrictive)?
Or does § 1713 govern any remedy under the EEOA, some of which may happen to
involve the transportation of students (i.e., is the phrase beginning "which may nvolve"
nonrestrictive)? Section 1713 is punctuated as if the phrase "which may involve" is
nonrestrictive —the phrase is preceded by a comma, and this is the conventional way of
marking a "which" clause as nonrestrictive. 11 But the remedies listed in § 1713 all relate
to the geographic distribution of students and schools, and it therefore makes sense that
the listed remedies would relate only to remedies that (restrictive) may involve the
transportation of students. 12
Nonetheless, even if § 1713 applies only to remedies that may involve the transportation
of students and not to other remedies, the remaining remedy-related provisions of the
EEOA focus exclusively on equitable remedies, not money damages. Section 1714 is
entitled "Transportation of students" and governs just that. 20 U.S.C. § 1714. Section
1715, titled "District lines," specifies the circumstances under which the boundaries of
school districts can be disregarded in formulating remedies for EEOA violations. 20
U.S.C. § 1715. Section 1716 provides that school districts can adopt voluntary
desegregation plans. 20 U.S.C. § 1716. Section 1717 allows parents and school districts
to challenge busing orders and desegregation plans if "the time or distance of travel" for a
student is excessive. 20 U.S.C. § 1717. And § 1718 governs the termination of "[a]ny
court order requiring, directly or indirectly, the transportation of students for the purpose
of remedying a denial of the eqaul protection of the laws . . . . " 20 U.S.C. § 1718.
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As noted above, money damages [*39] would not "correct" (but would merely
compensate for) a violation of the EEOA, and therefore the plain text of § 1712 does not
seem to authorize a remedy of money damages. This conclusion is reinforced by §§ 1713
through 1718, which -- taken with § 1712 —indicate that Congress intended to authorize
only equitable remedies under the EEOA. Because plaintiffs are entitled to neither money
damages nor an injunction, the Court holds that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their
EEOA claims because their injuries, if any, are not redressable.
D. MFAS's Third-Party Complaint
In its third-party complaint, District 1 brings claims of contribution and indemnification
against MFAS, seeking recovery from MFAS for any damages District 1 may be ordered
to pay plaintiffs. MFAS moves for partial summary judgment based on contracts that
governed the relationship between MFAS and District 1. Because the Court grants
summary judgment to Lincoln and District 1 on all of plaintiffs' claims, MFAS's claims
are moot, and the Court therefore denies MFAS's summary-judgment motion.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The motion of defendants [*40] Abraham Lincoln High School and the
Institute for New Americans for summary judgment [Docket No. 115] is
GRANTED.
2. The motion of defendant/third-party plaintiff Special School District No. 1 for
summary judgment [Docket No. 126] is GRANTED.
3. The motion of third-party defendant Metropolitan Federation of Alternative
Schools for partial summary judgment [Docket No. 110] is DENIED AS MOOT.
4. Plaintiffs' second amended complaint [Docket No. 70] is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: July 16,2008
/s/ Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge
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CANDICE SOSSAMON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF
KATELYN KIRKLAND, KATELYN KIRKLAND, AND JEFFREY S. DAVIS,
Appellants v. CLEBURNE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF
TRUSTEES AND JAMES WARLICK, INTERIM SUPERINTENDENT, Appellees
No. 10-08-00355-CV
COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, TENTH DISTRICT, WACO
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 520
January 20, 2010, Opinion Delivered
January 20, 2010, Opinion Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
From the 413th District Court, Johnson County, Texas. Trial Court No.C200800320.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and rendered.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, a mother, her daughter, and their attorney,
sought review of an order from the 413th District Court, Johnson County (Texas),which
imposed sanctions under Tex. R. Civ. P. 13, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. CodeAnn. §
10.004(a) (2002), and Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.161 (2006) after determining that a suit
against appellees, a school district and its superintendent, was frivolous.
OVERVIEW: When the daughter was a high school senior, she transferred to an
accelerated learning program because she was failing a required English class.
After learning that the daughter would receive a diploma from the accelerated program
and could not participate in the high school's graduation ceremony, the mother and
daughter first pursued an administrative remedy and then sought injunctive relief,
contending that the district had failed to provide notice of unsatisfactory performance
under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 28.022(a), (b) (2006). The mother testified that she never
received a notice to sign and return to the school, and there was no evidence to the
contrary. The court held that the suit was not groundless because Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §
7.057 (2006) provided for an administrative remedy and the trial court could have granted
injunctive relief. Under federal constitutional law, a student had a protected interest in a
high school diploma. Moreover, the record contained no evidence o f a local graduation
policy with which the daughter had failed to comply, and neither Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §
28.025(c)(1) (Supp. 2009) nor 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 101.4001(a) (2009) required such
compliance.
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OUTCOME: The court reversed the trial court's sanctions order and rendered judgment
denying the motion for sanctions.
CORE TERMS: graduation, ceremony, graduate, high school diploma, diploma, abused,
notice, extracurricular activities, groundless, school district, bad faith, injunction,
imposing sanctions, protected interest, property interest, curriculum, notice required,
authority to grant, exam, semester, high school, exit-level, guardian's, grading, testing,
senior, existing law, board of trustees, filing suit, good faith
JUDGES: Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Reyna, and Justice Davis. (Chief Justice
Gray dissenting with note) *
* (Chief Justice Gray dissents. A separate opinion will not issue. He notes, however, that
both the parent and the adult student had signed a document that would allow the student
to graduate from high school on time but would effectively prevent her from graduating
from CHS because she was transferring to TEAM after the start of the final semester
before graduation. Unless she can travel backwards in time, this foreclosed her ability to
transfer to CHS for graduation in the same semester.)
OPINION BY: FELIPE REYNA
OPINION
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Candice Sossamon and her daughter Katelyn Kirkland filed suit against the Cleburne
Independent School District Board of Trustees and Interim Superintendent James Warlick
(collectively, "Cleburne ISD") after Sossamon was informed that Kirkland would not be
receiving a high school diploma from Cleburne High School ("CHS") and would not be
allowed to participate in the CHS graduation ceremony. The trial court denied
Sossamon's and Kirkland's request for a temporary injunction [*2] and later granted a
motion for sanctions filed by Cleburne ISD. The court ordered Sossamon and Kirkland to
pay $ 7,500 in costs and attorney's fees under section 11.161 of the Education Code and
ordered Sossamon, Kirkland and their attorney Jeffrey S. Davis to pay an additional $
3,500 as sanctions under Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and section 10.004 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.
Appellants contend in three issues respectively that the court abused its discretion by
imposing sanctions under Rule 13, section 10.004, and section 11.161. We will reverse
and render.
Background
During the 2007-2008 school year, Kirkland was a senior at CHS on track to graduate,
except that she was failing her English class. She hid several report cards from Sossamon
and finally revealed her predicament by leaving a letter on Sossamon's pillow. School
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officials advised Sossamon that the only way Kirkland would be able to graduate was to
transfer to the TEAM School, an accelerated learning program. Sossamon and Kirkland
completed the paperwork for the TEAM School. One document they signed concerned
high school graduation and reads:
We understand that all students from the Cleburne Independent School [*3]
District who complete their credits from the TEAM School will be provided a
graduation exercise and diploma from the TEAM School. We also understand that
should it be our desire to graduate from Cleburne High School, we may transfer
to that school at the beginning of the last semester of our senior year.
Kirkland finished her coursework promptly and sought to transfer back to CHS so she
could graduate with her class. Cleburne ISD officials advised that she would not be
permitted to do so and referred them to the document they had signed regarding the
TEAM School graduation. Sossamon and Kirkland sought administrative review and
ultimately filed a grievance which was to be heard by the school board. However,
because the grievance was not filed until May 7, they were advised that it would not be
included on the agenda for the board's May 12 meeting. During the public comment
section of the meeting, Sossamon presented her complaint to the school board, which
advised that they would confer with Superintendent Warlick on the matter.
By letter dated May 16, Warlick advised Sossamon that Kirkland would not be permitted
to graduate from CHS. Sossamon filed a second grievance which the school [*4] board
placed on its agenda for the June 9 meeting. However, graduation was scheduled for May
30.
Sossamon and Kirkland filed suit on the afternoon of May 29. They alleged that Cleburne
ISD failed to provide the notice required by section 28.022 of the Education Code to be
given to the parent or guardian of a student whose performance in a subject "is
consistently unsatisfactory." See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.022(a)(3) (Vernon
2006). They sought a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendants from preventing
Kirkland from participating in CHS graduation ceremonies the following day and an
order directing that she be given a CHS diploma. The court held an emergency hearing on
May 30 and, after hearing Sossamon's testimony, denied the requested injunction. DUE
PROCESS/ADEQUATE NOTICE
The court granted Sossamon's and Kirkland's motion for non-suit on July 3. Cleburne
ISD filed a motion for sanctions claiming that the "suit is groundless, brought in bad
faith, misrepresented facts, and lacks basis in law and fact" because:
Sossamon and Kirkland were aware before filing suit that Kirkland could not
satisfy the local requirements necessary to receive a diploma from CHS and thus
was not entitled to such a diplom a;. [*5] state and federal law is "very clear" that
students do not have a fundamental right to participate in high school graduation
ceremonies; and their claim that Kirkland should be awarded a diploma from CHS
and allowed to participate in the CHS graduation ceremonies because of the
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defendants' alleged violations of the Education Code "is without support in Texas
law." GRADUATION CEREMONY
At the sanctions hearing, the court heard argument of counsel and admitted in evidence a
transcription of the injunction hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took
the matter under advisement and asked each side to submit a proposed order. The court
signed its order granting sanctions about a month later.
The court mled that the suit was groundless because: (1) "there is no remedy for a
violation of Texas Education Code § 28.022"; and (2) the court was "without the
authority to grant Plaintiffs their requested remedy." The court mled that the suit was
brought in bad faith for the purpose of harassing Cleburne ISD because Sossamon and
Kirkman were aware before filing suit that: (1) Sossamon had received the notice
required by section 28.022; and (2) they "were informed throughout their attempt to
receive a [*6] diploma and graduate with [CHS] that Kirkland had not, could not, and did
not meet all necessary requirements to so receive a diploma from and participate in
graduation ceremonies with [CHS]."
Standard of Review
We review an order imposing sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Low v.
Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Loeffler v. Lytle Indep. Sch. Dist., 211 S.W.3d
331, 347 (Tex. App.~San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
An appellate court may reverse the trial court's ruling only if the trial court acted
without reference to any guiding mles and principles, such that its mling was
arbitrary or unreasonable. To determine if the sanctions were appropriate or just,
the appellate court must ensure there is a direct nexus between the improper
conduct and the sanction imposed. Generally, courts presume that pleadings and
other papers are filed in good faith. The party seeking sanctions bears the burden
of overcoming this presumption of good faith.
Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614 (citations omitted).
Rule 13 Sanctions
Appellants contend in their first issue that the court abused its discretion by imposing
sanctions against them under Rule 13.
"The imposition of Rule 13 sanctions involves the satisfaction [*7] of a two-part test.
First, the party moving for sanctions must demonstrate that the opposing party's filings
are groundless, and second, it must be shown that the pleadings were filed either in bad
faith or for the purposes of harassment. "R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d
694,707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Estate of Davis v. Cook, 9
S.W.3d 288,297 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)).
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"'Groundless' for purposes of this rule means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13. "The trial court uses an objective standard to determine if a pleading was
groundless: did the party and counsel make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual
basis of the claim?" R.M. Dudley Constr., 258 S.W.3d at 708. In doing so, "the trial court
must examine the facts available to the litigant and the circumstances existing when the
litigant filed the pleading." Id.
Here, the trial court ruled that the suit was groundless because: (1) "there is no remedy
for a violation of Texas Education Code § 28.022"; and (2) the court was "without the
authority to grant Plaintiffs [*8] their requested remedy."
Generally, a party whose claim concerns a violation of school laws must exhaust the
statutorily provided administrative remedies with the Commissioner of Education before
seeking judicial relief. Guerra v. Santa Rosa Indep. Sch. Dist., 241 S.W.3d 594, 599-600
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied); Dotson v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist.,
161 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 7.057 (Vernon 2006) (providing for administrative appeal). One exception to this rule
applies when the party will suffer irreparable harm and the Commissioner is unable to
provide relief. Houston Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730
S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1987); Dotson, 161 S.W.3d at 291; Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist.
v.Rodriguez, 121 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.); see Guerra, 241
S.W.3d at 600.
Therefore, the court's conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law. See R.M. Dudley
Constr., 258 S.W.3d at 708 (failure to analyze or apply law correctly is abuse of
discretion). Here, Sossamon and Kirkland had a statutory right to pursue administrative
relief for the alleged violation of section 28.022. [*9] See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
7.057. And because the Commissioner is not authorized to award injunctive relief and
Kirkland would not otherwise have been able to receive a CHS diploma and participate in
the CHS graduation ceremonies, it was within the trial court's authority to grant
injunctive relief if Sossamon and Kirkland otherwise established their entitlement to it.
See Houston Fed'n of Teachers, 730 S.W.2d at 646.
Accordingly, the court abused its discretion by finding and concluding that Sossamon's
and Kirkland's suit was groundless. See R.M. Dudley Constr., 258 S.W.3d at 708. We
sustain their first issue.
Section 10.004 Sanctions
Appellants contend in their second issue that the court abused its discretion by imposing
sanctions under section 10.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
According to section 10.004(a), "A court that determines that a person has signed a
pleading or motion in violation of Section 10.001 may impose a sanction on the person, a
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party represented by the person, or both." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
10.004(a) (Vernon 2002).
The court's determination that Sossamon's and Kirkland's claims were "groundless" was
based on its understanding that "there [*10] was no basis in law or fact, nor was there a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law" with
respect to their claims. This conclusion led to the imposition of sanctions for violation of
section 10.001(2). 1 See id. § 10.001(2) (Vernon 2002). But we have already determined
that the court abused its discretion by finding and concluding that the suit was
groundless. Thus, the court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions for violation of
section 10.
The court also determined that their claims were brought in bad faith for the purpose of
harassing Cleburne ISD because Sossamon and Kirkman were aware before filing suit
that: (1) Sossamon had [*11] received the notice required by section 28.022; and (2) they
"were informed throughout their attempt to receive a diploma and graduate with [CHS]
that Kirkland had not, could not, and did not meet all necessary requirements to so
receive a diploma from and participate in graduation ceremonies with [CHS]." This
conclusion led to the imposition of sanctions for violation o f section 10.001(1). 2 Id. §
10.001(1) (Vernon 2002). Section 28.022 Notice
The first component of the court's bad faith determination is grounded in its Finding of
Fact No. 5:
The sole basis of Plaintiffs' complaint against the District was that Plaintiffs were
not provided with Notice, pursuant to Texas Education Code § 28.022, ("Notice")
informing Sossamon that her daughter, Katelyn Kirkland ("Kirkland") was
failing English. Plaintiffs were aware, prior [*12] to filing their Petition, that
Sossamon received the Notice from the District made the sole basis of their
complaint.
Cleburne ISD contends that this finding is supported by the following statement made by
counsel for Sossamon and Kirkland during the sanctions hearing: "Yes, Katelyn was
provided with a note to take home to her mother, but it wasn't the kind the Texas
Education Code said."
Statements of counsel do not generally constitute evidence unless made under oath.
Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); Russ v. Titus Hosp.
Dist., 128 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied). The oath
requirement can be waived if the opposing party fails to object when he knows or should
know that an objection is necessary. Id.
In Banda, the attorney "was clearly attempting to prove the existence and terms of the
settlement agreement," stating, for example, "this agreement that I'm testifying to today
before the court as an officer of the court, if Mr. Latham felt so strongly about it, he is not
present." See Banda, 955 S.W.2d at 272. Here, however, counsel was not offering
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evidence. Rather, counsel was presenting argument in response to Cleburne ISD's counsel
[*13] with regard to the propriety of sanctions and, in particular, whether Cleburne ISD
had violated section 28.022.
At the sanctions hearing, Cleburne ISD offered in evidence a transcription of the
injunction hearing. 3 Aside from this transcription, the only other evidence arguably
offered and admitted at the hearing was counsel's testimony regarding the amount of
attorney's fees incurred. Sossamon and Kirkland claimed that Cleburne ISD failed to give
the notice required by section 28.022, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a policy that:
(1) provides for a conference between parents and teachers;
(2) requires the district, at least once every 12 weeks, to give written notice to a
parent of a student's performance in each class or subject; and
(3) requires the district, at least once every three weeks, or during the fourth week
of each nine-week grading period, to give written notice to a parent or legal
guardian of a student's performance in a subject included [*14] in the foundation
curriculum under Section 28.002(a)(1) if the student's performance in the subject
is consistently unsatisfactory, as determined by the district.
(b) The notice required under Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) must:
(1) provide for the signature of a student's parent; and
(2) be returned to the district.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.022(a), (b) (Vernon 2006).
Their claim focused on the notice required by subsection (a)(3). 4 According to the
statute, written notice must: (1) be given to the parent or legal guardian; (2) provide for
the parent's (or, presumably, the guardian's) signature; and (3) be returned to the district.
Id.
The only evidence offered regarding whether a proper notice was given is Sossamon's
testimony at the injunction hearing. She testified that Kirkland first received a failing
grade in English during the third six-weeks' grading period in the fall of 2007. Kirkland
had failing marks in the fourth and fifth grading periods as well but did not tell Sossamon
until sometime during the fifth grading period that she was failing English. Sossamon
testified that Kirkland received [*15] progress reports for each grading period but never
showed them to Sossamon, instead making excuses for being unable to do so. She
testified unequivocally that she "never received anything to sign and return back to the
school."
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There is no evidence in the record that the progress reports given to Kirkland either
provided for a parent's or guardian's signature or indicated that they must be returned to
CHS. Thus, the record contains no evidence that "Sossamon had received the notice
required by section 28.022." The trial court abused its discretion in ruling otherwise. See
Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 57, 60, 2009 Tex. LEXIS 823, at *12
(Tex. Oct. 23, 2009) (per curiam) (trial court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions
"when its decision is contrary to the only permissible view o f probative, properlyadmitted evidence").
Compliance with Graduation Requirements
The second component of the court's bad faith determination is grounded in its Findings
of Fact Nos. 6 through 9 in which the court found:
6. Kirkland did not meet the state and local requirements to graduate and receive a
diploma from Cleburne High School.
7. Plaintiffs were aware, prior to filing their [*16] Petition, that Kirkland did not
meet the state and local requirements in order to graduate and receive a diploma
from Cleburne High School.
8. Plaintiffs were aware, as early as April 16, 2008, that Kirkland would not be
awarded a diploma from nor be allowed to participate in graduation ceremonies at
Cleburne High School.
9. By exhausting all administrative remedies before filing the Petition, Plaintiffs
had numerous conversations with District personnel and were aware that they
could not receive the remedy they requested.
From these findings, the court reached the conclusion that Sossamon and Kirkland "were
informed throughout their attempt to receive a diploma and graduate with [CHS] that
Kirkland had not, could not, and did not meet all necessary requirements to so receive a
diploma from and participate in graduation ceremonies with [CHS]."
Cleburne ISD argued and the court ruled that a student must satisfy both state and local
requirements to graduate from CHS. Cleburne ISD cited section 28.025 of the Education
Code, section 101.4001(a) of title 19 of the Texas Administrative Code, and Cleburne
ISD Board Policy EIF(LEGAL) to support this assertion. However, these provisions say
nothing [*17] about compliance with "local requirements" as a prerequisite for
graduation.
Section 28.025 provides in pertinent part that "a student may graduate and receive a
diploma only if the student successfully completes the curriculum requirements identified
by the State Board of Education under Subsection (a) and complies with Section 39.025."
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.025(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009). 5 Subsection (a) of this
statute refers to the statewide curriculum requirements specified in section 28.002. See id.
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§§ 28.002,28.025(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Section 39.025 requires a satisfactory score in
end-of-course assessments for "each subject in the foundation curriculum." 6 Id. § 39.025
(Vernon Supp. 2009).
Section 101.4001 of title 19 provides in pertinent part, "All students must pass exit-level
[*18] assessments in English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies to
qualify for a high school diploma from a Texas public school." 19 TEX. ADMIN. Code §
101.4001(a) (2009) (Tex. Educ. Agency, Testing Requirements for Graduation); see also
id. § 101.7(a) (2009) (Tex. Educ. Agency, Testing Requirements for Graduation) ("To be
eligible to receive a high school diploma, a student must demonstrate satisfactory
performance as determined by the State Board of Education (SBOE) on the assessments
required for graduation as specified in the Texas Education Code (TEC), Chapter 39,
Subchapter B."). 7
Cleburne ISD Board Policy 8 EEF(LEGAL) provides:
A student may [*19] graduate and receive a diploma only if the student successfully
completes:
1. The curriculum requirements identified by the State Board of Education [see
STATE GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, below] and has performed
satisfactorily on the exit-level assessments [see EKB]; or
2. An individualized education program (IEP) developed under Education Code
29.005.
This local policy appears to be nothing more than a local version of section 28.025(c) of
the Education Code. Cf. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.025(c). And like section 28.025
and the cited provisions of the Texas Administrative Code, this local policy makes no
reference to local graduation requirements. 9
The court found that Kirkland did not satisfy all state and local [*20] requirements to
graduate and receive a diploma from CHS, that Sossamon and Kirkland were aware of
this before they filed suit, and that they were aware as early as April 16, 2008 that
Kirkland would not be permitted to graduate or receive a diploma from CHS. However,
Cleburne ISD has not identified a single requirement which Kirkland did not satisfy.
Cleburne ISD focuses on the fact that Kirkland earned her final English credit at the
TEAM school rather than at CHS. The TEAM School Graduation document states that a
TEAM student who wishes to graduate from CHS "may transfer to that school at the
beginning of the last semester o f our senior year." It does not provide for or prohibit
transfers during the last semester of the senior year.
At the injunction hearing, Sossamon and Kirkland offered in evidence a May 16,2008
letter from Superintendent Warlick denying their request for Kirkland to graduate with
CHS. Warlick cited two reasons for his decision: (1) the above quoted TEAM School
Graduation document "clearly states that Katelyn and you understood that Katelyn must
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graduate from TEAM school and could not graduate from [CHS]"; and (2) page 3 o f the
TEAM School Handbook provides that [*21] a student in Kirkland's position must
graduate from the TEAM School and cannot "go back to [CHS] for graduation."
However, the quoted document does not "clearly state" this information and the TEAM
School Handbook is not in the record.
During cross-examination of Sossamon at the injunction hearing, Cleburne ISD's counsel
asked whether it was a district policy "that if a student goes in to TEAM School the last
semester of their senior year, they must graduate from TEAM School." Sossamon replied
that she did not know. Cleburne ISD did not introduce evidence of this alleged policy at
the injunction hearing and none appears in the record.
Improper Motive
10

In Finding of Fact No. 9, the court found that Sossamon and Kirkland were aware before
filing suit that they could not obtain the remedy sought. According to Cleburne ISD, it
may be inferred that they harbored an "improper motive" in filing this suit because "[t]he
relevant law available to Appellants before they filed the Petition was that: [*22] (i) in
order to graduate from CHS, Kirkland must meet all state and local graduation
requirements; and, (ii) a Texas court is without authority to grant Appellant's requested
relief."
We have already discussed how the record contains no evidence of a local graduation
policy with which Kirkland failed to comply. We now turn our attention to Cleburne
ISD's contention that a Texas court is without authority to grant the relief sought, namely,
to compel Cleburne ISD to permit Kirkland to participate in the CHS graduation
ceremony and give her a CHS diploma. However, the law in this area is not as settled as
Cleburne ISD contends, particularly with regard to the nature of a student’s interest in
receiving a high school diploma or participating in a graduation ceremony. The Fifth
Circuit has concluded that a high school student has a constitutionally protected property
interest in receiving a high school diploma.
It is clear that in establishing a system of free public education and in making
school attendance mandatory, the state has created an expectation in the students.
From the students' point of view, the expectation is that if a student attends school
during those required years, and [*23] indeed more, and if he takes and passes the
required courses, he will receive a diploma. This is a property interest as that term
is used constitutionally.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397,403-04 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981); see GI Forum
v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 682 (W.D. Tex. 2000) ("The Court has
previously found, and reiterates here, that the State of Texas has created a protected
interest in the receipt of a high school diploma.").
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The late federal Judge William Wayne Justice applied Debra P. in the case of three
students who failed the TAAS exam and were told they could not participate in their high
school's graduation ceremony.
It hardly needs emphasizing that high school graduation ceremonies are an
occasion to celebrate profound personal achievement and hope for the future. A
student's high school graduation is the source of fond memories and treasured
mementos and photographs that cannot be replaced. Unquestionably, plaintiffs
will suffer irreparable harm if they are denied the opportunity to participate in
their graduation ceremony.
Crump v. Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Tex. 1992). Judge
Justice granted two of the students 11 injunctive [*24] relief, ordering the school district
to permit them "to participate fully" in the graduation exercises. Id. at 557. Thus, Judge
Justice at least implicitly concluded that the right to participate in a particular graduation
ceremony is a constitutionally protected interest on the same level as the right to receive a
diploma. 12
Eleven days after the Crump decision, Judge Sam Sparks of the Western District of Texas
came to a different conclusion in a case involving another student who failed the TAAS
exam.
While the Court recognizes that high school graduation [*25] is an important and
memorable occasion in a young person's life, "walking across the stage" certainly does
not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest any more than
attending one's high school prom, which most young people also expect to do after
completing twelve years of public school. It is the actual high school diploma which is
the property interest described in Debra P. v.Turlington. There is no accompanying
constitutional right to receive that diploma at a specific graduation ceremony.
Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 251,255 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (citation
omitted). Judge Sparks denied Williams's request for injunctive relief. Id. at 256. In the
concluding paragraph of his opinion, he took the opportunity to express his difference of
opinion with Judge Justice regarding the interests at issue.
While the contentions and supporting evidence of these cases are obviously
dissimilar, this Court is also in basic disagreement with Judge Justice. The right of
a free public education in Texas is a Texas constitutional right, and the level of
education and academic achievement necessary to obtain a diploma from a Texas
high school is appropriately [*26] a judgment call for the persons elected for that
state responsibility and those experienced persons responsible for educating and
preparing students to achieve the established level of competence. Any
interference in this process is simply destructive to the attempts by the state to
salvage its educational system, and this includes interference by the federal
judiciary.
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Id.
Judge David Hittner of the Southern District has reached the same conclusion as Judge
Sparks. See Khan v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 561 F. Supp. 2d 760, 767 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (Khan "has no legally protected property interest in attending or speaking at his
high school graduation ceremony"). He held that "due process guarantees do not protect a
student's interest in participating in extra-curricular activities, such as a graduation
ceremony." Id. at 764.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals has taken the same position. [T]he law does
not preclude each school district's elected trustees and administrators from
permitting their high school students to participate in graduation ceremonies
despite the fact that they have failed to pass the TAAS test. The province and
wisdom of such a decision rests squarely on the elected [*27] board o f trustees
and not on the courts of this state.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Paiz, 856 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993,
no writ); see also Castro v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 04-04-00836-CV, 2005 Tex.
App. LEXIS 9286, at *13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 9, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.)
("While high school graduation may be an important occasion in a student's academic
career, participation in such a school function does not rise to a protected constitutional
property interest.").
Both Judge Hittner and the San Antonio Court have equated graduation ceremonies with
extracurricular activities in concluding that no constitutionally protected interest is at
stake. Cleburne ISD takes this view as well. The Supreme Court of Texas has
unequivocally held that a student has no constitutionally protected interest to participate
in extracurricular activities. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556,
561 (Tex. 1985) ("the federal constitution's due process guarantees do not protect a
student's interest in participating in extracurricular activities"). That Court has not,
however, held that a graduation ceremony constitutes an "extracurricular activity."
The [*28] Commissioner of Education has defined "extracurricular activities" in the
Texas Administrative Code.
(a) An extracurricular activity is an activity sponsored by the University Interscholastic
League (UIL), the school district board of trustees, or an organization sanctioned by
resolution of the board of trustees. The activity is not necessarily directly related to
instruction of the essential knowledge and skills but may have an indirect relation to
some areas of the curriculum. Extracurricular activities include, but are not limited to,
public performances, contests, demonstrations, displays, and club activities, with the
exception of public performances specified in paragraph (2) o f this subsection.
(1) In addition, an activity shall be subject to the provisions for an extracurricular
activity if any one of the following criteria apply:
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(A) the activity is competitive;
(B) the activity is held in conjunction with another activity that is
considered to be extracurricular;
(C) the activity is held off campus, except in a case in which adequate
facilities do not exist on campus;
(D) the general public is invited; or
(E) an admission is charged.
19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 76.1001(a) (2009) (Tex. [*29] Educ. Agency, Extracurricular
Activities).
A graduation ceremony might arguably fit within this definition, yet graduation
ceremonies have been differentiated from extracurricular activities in some cases and in
the Education Code. For example, in Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402
(5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit distinguished "extracurricular" basketball from a
graduation ceremony, which the court characterized as "a significant, once-in-a-lifetime
event." Id. at 406-07. And in Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735
(S.D. Tex. 2001), a federal magistrate judge addressed separately the due process
guarantees which attach to participation in extracurricular activities or in graduation. Id.
At 739.
The Education Code arguably equates the receipt o f a diploma, which Cleburne ISD
agrees to be a constitutionally protected interest, with graduation. See TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 28.025(c) ("a student may graduate and receive a diploma"). In addition,
Chapter 28 of the Education Code, which addresses "Courses of Study; Advancement"
(i.e., "academics"), even addresses the development of a "personal graduation plan" for
struggling students. Id. § 28.0212 (Vernon [*30] Supp. 2009).
Federal district Judge Royal Furgeson summarized the state of the law best when he
opined that "whether a student has a property interest in graduation ceremonies despite
having failed to complete all academic requirements such as the [TAAS exam] is by no
means settled." Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 654-55 (W.D.
Tex. 2000).
Contrary to the trial court's unequivocal finding that "a Texas court is without authority
to grant Appellant's requested relief," we agree with Judge Furgeson that the issue "is by
no means settled." In other words, Sossamon's and Kirkland's claim that Cleburne ISD
wrongfully denied Kirkland permission to participate in the CHS graduation ceremony is
a claim with arguable merit because the law is unsettled regarding whether a student has
a constitutionally protected interest in graduating from a particular high school during a
particular ceremony (i.e., with her fellow 12th grade classmates).
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Conversely, the law appears settled (and Cleburne ISD appears to agree) that a student
has a constitutionally protected interest in a high school diploma. See Debra P., 644 F.2d
at 403-04; GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 682; Crump, 797 F. Supp. at 554; [*31] Williams,
796 F. Supp. at 255. Part of the relief Sossamon and Kirkland sought was an order
directing that Kirkland be given a CHS diploma. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Debra P.,
"From the students' point of view, the expectation is that if a student attends school
during those required years, and indeed more, and if he takes and passes the required
courses, he will receive a diploma." 644 F.2d at 404. In Kirkland's case, it seems clear
that, after attending the requisite years in Cleburne ISD schools, her expectation was to
receive a CHS diploma rather than a TEAM School diploma.
In summary, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that
Sossamon and Kirkland brought their suit in bad faith for the purpose of harassing
Cleburne ISD. See R.M. Dudley Constr., 258 S.W.3d at 708 (failure to analyze or apply
law correctly is abuse of discretion). Thus, the court erred by imposing sanctions under
section 10.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We sustain their second issue.
Section 11.161 Sanctions
Appellants contend in their third issue that the court abused its discretion by imposing
sanctions under section 11.161 of the Education Code.
Section 11.161 [*32] provides:
In a civil suit brought under state law, against an independent school district or an officer
of an independent school district acting under color of office, the court may award costs
and reasonable attorney's fees if:
(1) the court finds that the suit is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation; and
(2) the suit is dismissed or judgment is for the defendant.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.161 (Vernon 2006).
We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that
Appellants' suit was groundless and brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment. For
the same reasons, we hold that the court abused its discretion to the extent it concluded
that the suit was "frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation" under section 11.161.
See Cavazos v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 948,966 (W.D. Tex. 2005),
affd, 210 F. App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2006).
We sustain Appellants' third issue.
Conclusion
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We reverse the trial court's sanctions order and render judgment denying the motion for
sanctions filed by Cleburne ISD and Superintendent Warlick.
FELIPE REYNA
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Reyna, and
Justice Davis
Chief Justice Gray dissenting with note) [*33] *
Reversed and rendered
Opinion delivered and filed January 20, 2010
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
LILIANA VALENZUELA, and her parents, et al
individually and on behalf of plaintiffs and all others similarly situated
Case No. RG06288707
CLASS ACTION
Petitioners/Plaintiffs
v
JACK O'CONNELL
in his official capacity as Superintendent of Public Instruction in California, et. al
Respondents/Defendants
TO: (1) ALL PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS AND THEIR PARENTS OR LEGAL
GUARDIANS; AND (2) ALL FORMER STUDENTS FROM THE CLASSES OF 2006
AND 2007 WHO HAVE NOT GRADUATED AND RECEIVED A DIPLOMA
BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT PASSED THE CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL EXIT
EXAMINATION (CAHSEE)
PLEASE READ TIDS NOTICE CAREFULLY. IT MAY AFFECT YOUR LEGAL
RIGHTS. Specifically, it may affect your ability to bring a lawsuit in the future regarding
the adequacy of your public school education and the adequacy of options available to
students who have not passed the California High School Exit Examination (CAHSEE).
IF YOU WISH TO COMMENT IN FAVOR OF THE SETTLEMENT, OBJECT TO
THE SETTLEMENT, OR APPEAR AT THE AUGUST 13,2007 COURT HEARING
REGARDING FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT, YOU MUST FOLLOW
THE DIRECTIONS IN TEDS NOTICE
Purpose of Notice
This notice sets forth the basic terms of the proposed settlement reached in Valenzuela v.
0 'Connell and advises class members of their procedural rights relating to the settlement.
The class in this lawsuit has been defined as follows
All past, present, and future public high school students in the State of California who
were, are, or will be unable to graduate, and/or who were, are, or will be denied diplomas,
as a result of failing to pass one or both sections of the CAHSEE. However, the class
shall exclude all past, present, and future members of the class certified
in Kidd v. California Department o f Education
Case No. JCCP 4468, pending in Alameda Superior Court
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Description of the Case
This class action lawsuit was brought against Jack O'Connell, the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, the State of California, the California Department of Education, and
the California State Board of Education, in 2006. Petitioners/plaintiffs alleged that the
State has failed to provide some or all of the members of the class with an equal and
reasonable opportunity to pass the CAHSEE. Accordingly, petitioners/plaintiffs
contended that denying a diploma to students who had not passed one or both sections of
the CAHSEE would violate their constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection. Respondents/defendants deny all of the allegations made by
petitioners/plaintiffs. Detailed information regarding this case, including an court papers,
may be found on the court's website.www.alameda.courts.ca. gov/courts
Terms of Settlement Agreement
After more than a year of intense litigation, the parties in the case reached a Settlement
Agreement on July 18, 2007. On July 19,2007, Alameda Superior Court Judge Robert
Freedman granted preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement and approved this
Notice
The parties' Settlement Agreement provides for a package of legislative proposals to
ensure that all students who do not pass the CAHSEE as of their intended graduation date
will be able to continue to study the material tested on the CAHSEE for up to two more
years at no charge to them through their school district. This will be in addition to other
options that may be available to such students who wish to continue their studies and/or
obtain a high school diploma, which include enrolling in community colleges, or adult
schools; being redesignated as a senior for an additional year of high school; and passing
the GED in order to receive a diploma equivalent.
The proposed legislation, AB 347, is presently in bill form. Ifit is not enacted, then the
Settlement Agreement will be considered nun and void. The full text of the bill, and
legislative analysis regarding the bill, may be found at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov. If
enacted, the bill would require districts that receive specified state funding to prepare
students for the CAHSEE to do the following:
Provide each pupil with the opportunity to receive intensive instruction and services
regarding the CAHSEE, based on an appropriate diagnostic assessment and prior results
on the exam, for up to two consecutive academic years after completion of grade 12 or
until the pupil has passed both parts of the high school exit examination, whichever
comes first.
Provide English learners who have not passed the CAHSEE by the end of grade 12 with
the opportunity to receive intensive instruction and services to improve English
proficiency as needed to pass both parts of the CAHSEE, for up to two consecutive
academic years after completion of grade 12 or until the pupil has passed both parts o f the
high school exit examination, whichever comes first
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Notify pupils of the availability of intensive instruction and services after grade 12 and
their right to file a complaint if they are denied such services
Use the school district's uniform complaint process to help identify and resolve any
deficienciesrelated to intensive instruction and services provided to pupils who have not
passed one or both parts of the high school exit examination after the completion o f grade
12 .

Release
Districts participating in the Middle and High School Supplemental Counseling Program
shall be required to provide information to pupils in grade 12 about the availability of
intensive instruction and services for up to two consecutive academic years after
completion of grade 12 or until the exit examination is passed, whichever comes first.
If the legislation is encted, and the court finally approves this Settlement Agreement, then
the following claims will be deemed released on behalf of the class.
Any and all claims by any Class Member against any State Entity concerning the
adequacy of options available to students who have not passed the CAHSEE as o f their
intended graduation date to continue to study and/or attend classes in order to learn the
material tested by the CAHSEE.
Any and all claims by any Class Member, who is or formerly was a member of the Class
of 2006, against any State Entity that was or could have been raised in the lawsuit
including, but not limited to, that denial of a diploma and/or graduation as a result o f the
requirement that they pass the CAHSEE (currently codified in Education Code section
60851, subdivision (a)) violates the constitutional or statutory rights of students.
However, the Settlement Agreement does not limit the rights of any class member to
bring any action directly against any school district based on its alleged failure to follow
any applicable law.
Attorneys' Fees and Costs
The Settlement Agreement provides that there shall be no application for or actual award
of attorneys' fees to be paid by any party . Respondents/defendants agree to pay plaintiffs'
/petitioners' costs in an amount not to exceed $87,000, in accordance with standard State
approval processes.
Final Approval Hearing and Comment/Objection Procedure
The hearing for final approval of the settlement has been scheduled for August 13,2007,
at 1 :30 p.m. in front of Alameda Superior Court Judge Robert Freedman, Department 20,
1221 Oak Street, 4th floor, Oakland, California, 94612. It is not necessary for class
members to appear at the hearing. Only class members who file a Notice of Intent to
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Appear, as described below, will be allowed to appear and offer oral comments about the
settlement at this hearing, subject to the court's discretion. Class members may enter an
appearance through counsel. The hearing may be postponed without further notice to the
Class. DO NOT TELEPHONE THE COURT.
Class members who wish to comment or object to the parties' Settlement Agreement may
do so orily by (1) filing a written comment or objection, or (2) filing a Notice of Intent to
Appear at the final approval hearing, on or before August 9,2007. A parent or legal
guardian may file these documents on behalf of any class member who is under 18 years
of age. Comments, objections, and/or Notice(s) oflntent to Appear must clearly identify
the case and number (Valenzuela v. 0 'Connell, Case No. RG06288707), and must state
the class member's full name and address; where the class member attends (or attended)
public high school and the date(s) of the class member's attendance; whether the class
member has received a high school diploma; the relationship of the person filing the
objection, comment or Notice to Appear to the class member (e.g., parent, legal guardian,
or counsel); and each specific reason in support of the comment or objection and any
legal support for each comment or objection. Comments, objections and/or Notice(s)
oflntent to Appear must be submitted by mailing them to BOTH of the following
addresses
Clerk of the Court
Superior Court of California, County of Alameda Rene C. Davidson Alameda County
Courthouse 1225 Fallon Street
Oakland, CA 94612
Arturo J. Gonzalez
Valenzuela Class Action
Morrison & Foerster.
425 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94105-2482
To be considered and valid, the Court and Counsel must receive any comments or
objections, and Notices oflntent to Appear, no later than August 9,2007.
A class member who fails to file and serve an objection in the manner described above
and by the specific deadline will be deemed to have waived any objections and will be
foreclosed from making any objection (whether by appeal or otherwise) to the settlement.
A class member who fails to file a Notice oflntent to Appear in the manner described
above and by the specific deadline will be deemed to have waived any right to appear to
comment or object at the hearing Getting More Information.
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The above is a summary of the basic terms of the Settlement. For the precise terms and
conditions ofthe Settlement, you are referred to the detailed Settlement Agreement, which
will be on file with the Clerk of the Court. The pleadings and other records in this
litigation including the Settlement Agreement, may be examined (a) online on the
Alameda County Superior Court's website, www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/courts. or (b) in
person at Room 109 at the Rene C. Davidson Courthouse at 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland,
California 94612, between the hours of9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday,
excluding Court holidays, or (c) you may contact Class Counsel, Arturo J. Gonzalez,
Morrison & Foerster LLP, 415-268-7000, 425 Market Street, San Francisco, California
94105-2482.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY O F ALAMEDA
COURTNEY KIDD et. aL, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT O F EDUCATION et. al,
Defendants.
Case No. 2002049636
CLASS ACTION
NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, PRELIMINARY COURT APPROVAL
OF SETTLEMENT, AND HEARING DATE FO R FINAL COURT APPROVAL
TO: ALL PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS FROM THE CLASSES OF
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,2009,2010, AND 2011 W HO ARE
OR W ERE ELIGIBLE FO R AN INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM
(“IE P”) AND/OR SECTION 504 EDUCATION PLAN (“ 504 PLAN”) AND TH EIR
PARENTS OR LEGAL GUARDIANS.
PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. IT MAY AFFECT YOUR LEGAL
RIGHTS. Specifically, it may affect your ability to bring a lawsuit in the future
regarding the adequacy of your public school education and the adequacy of options
available to students who have not passed the California High School Exit Examination
(“CAHSEE”).
IF YOU W ISH TO COMMENT IN FAVOR OF THE SETTLEMENT, OBJECT
TO THE SETTLEMENT, OR APPEAR AT THE MAY 30, 2008 COURT
HEARING REGARDING FINAL APPROVAL O F THE SETTLEMENT, YOU
MUST FOLLOW THE DIRECTIONS IN THIS NOTICE.
Purpose of Notice
This notice sets for the basic terms of the proposed settlement reached in Kidd v.
California Department o f Education and advises class members of their procedural rights
relating to the settlement. The certified class in this lawsuit is defined as follows:
All students eligible for an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) or a Section 504 Education Plan
(“504 Plan”) pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 who have taken or will be
required to take the California High School Exit Exam.
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Description of the Case
This class action lawsuit was brought in 2002 against the California Department of
Education, the California State Board of Education, and Jack O’Connell, the
Superintendent of Public Instruction in California. Plaintiffs allege that, for several
reasons, the application of the CAHSEE graduation requirement to public high school
students with disabilities constitutes a violation of California statutory and constitutional
law. Defendants deny the allegations made by Plaintiffs. Detailed information regarding
this case, including all court papers, may be found on the Court's website (Outside
Source).
Terms of Settlement Agreement
After approximately seven years of litigation, the parties in the case reached a Settlement
Agreement in March of 2008. On May 2, 2008, Alameda Superior Court Judge Robert
Freedman granted preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement and approved this
Notice.
The parties’ Settlement Agreement provides for the following:
•

Defendants will commission an independent study on the CAHSEE, and will
request and affirmatively seek up to $500,000 to retain and compensate an
external consultant for that purpose.

•

The study will examine twelfth graders (and possibly others) who have taken the
CAHSEE with modifications and accommodations specified in their respective
IEP or 504 plans, but who have not passed the CAHSEE, and who have satisfied
or will satisfy all other requirements for graduation from high school. The study
will examine why such students have not passed the CAHSEE. Among other
things, the study shall determine whether some group of students have learned the
material being tested, but are unable to demonstrate their mastery of that
knowledge through the CAHSEE, despite the students’ use of permissible
modifications and/or accommodations.

•

Based on the results of the study, the consultant will issue a report, setting forth
the consultant’s determinations for addressing any issues identified in the study.

•

If the study determines that some students have learned the CAHSEE material but
are unable to demonstrate that knowledge through the CAHSEE despite the
students’ use of permissible accommodations and/or modifications, the report
shall set forth recommendations as to whether such students could demonstrate
their knowledge of the CAHSEE standards through alternative means. If the final
report makes such determinations, it shall also identify and set forth an analysis of
such possible alternative means.
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•

The report will be disseminated to: the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the
California Department of Education, the members of the California Board of
Education, the Clerk of the Assembly, the Secretary of the Senate, Chairs of the
Senate Education and Fiscal Committees, Chairs o f the Assembly Education and
Fiscal Committees, the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the California Department of
Finance, and Plaintiffs’ counsel in the case.

•

Within five months of the final report being delivered, Defendants will consider
the report and make recommendations, if any, to the Legislature regarding the
issues addressed in the report. Defendants may also independently implement
policies responsive to the report that do not require legislation.
Release

If the Settlement Agreement receives final approval from the Court and the Court enters
final judgment, then the claims raised by Plaintiffs in this case will be deemed released
by all members of the certified class in the Classes of 2001 through 2011 against any
state entity.
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
The Settlement Agreement provides that Plaintiffs and their attorneys may move the
Court for reasonable attorneys fees and costs within 60 to 120 days after the Court grants
final approval of the Settlement Agreement and enters final Judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs’ claims.
Final Approval Hearing and Comment/Objection Procedure
The hearing for final approval of the settlement has been scheduled for May 30, 2008, at
2:00 p.m., in front of Alameda Superior Court Judge Robert Freedman, Department 20,
1221 Oak Street, 4th Floor, Oakland, California, 94612. It is not necessary for class
members to appear at the hearing. Only class members who file a Notice of Intent to
Appear, as described below, will be allowed to appear and offer oral comments about the
settlement at this hearing, subject to the Court’s discretion. Class members may enter an
appearance through counsel. The hearing may be postponed without further notice to the
class DO NOT TELEPHONE THE COURT.
Class members who wish to comment or object to the parties’ Settlement Agreement may
do so only by (1) filing a written comment or objection on or before May 23,2008; or (2)
filing a Notice of Intent to Appear at the final approval hearing on or before May 23,
2008. A parent or legal guardian may file these documents on behalf of any class member
who is under 18 years of age. Comments, objections, and/or Notice(s) of Intent to Appear
must clearly identify the case name and case number {Kidd v. California Department o f
Education, Case No. 2002049636), and must state the class member’s full name and
address; where the class member attends (or attended) public high school and the date(s)
of the class member’s attendance; whether the class member has received a high school
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diploma; the relationship of the person filing the objection, comment or Notice of Intent
to Appear to the class member (e.g., parent, legal guardian, or counsel); and each specific
reason in support of the comment or objection and any legal support for each comment or
objection. Comments, objections, and/or Notice(s) of Intent to Appear must be submitted
by mailing them to BOTH of the following addresses:
Clerk of the Court
Superior Court of California, County of Alameda
Rene C. Davidson Alameda County Courthouse
1225 Fallon Street
Oakland, CA 94612
Julia Pinover
Disability Rights Advocates
2001 Center Street, 3rd Floor
Berkeley, CA 94704
To be considered and valid, the above recipients must receive any comments, objections,
and/or Notice(s) of Intent to Appear by no later than May 23, 2008.
A class member who fails to file and serve an objection in the maimer described above
and by the specific deadline will be deemed to have waived any objections and will be
foreclosed from making any objection (whether by appeal or otherwise) to the settlement.
A class member who fails to file a Notice of Intent to Appear in the manner described
above and by the specific deadline will be deemed to have waived any right to appear to
comment or object at the hearing.
Getting More Information
The above is a summary of the basic terms of the Settlement Agreement. For the precise
terms and conditions of the Settlement, you are referred to the detailed Settlement
Agreement, which will be on file with the Clerk of the Court. The pleadings and other
records in this litigation, including the Settlement Agreement, may be examined: (a)
online on theAlameda County Superior Court's website (Outside Source); (b) in person at
Room 109 at the Rene C. Davidson Courthouse, 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland, California,
94612, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding
Court holidays; or (c) you may contact Julia Pinover, Disability Rights Advocates, 2001
Center Street, Third Floor, Berkeley, California 94704.
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